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Abstract 
The pressure to feed such a large population and the responsibility to stabilise incomes of a plethora 
of small-scale farmers presents a serious challenge for the Chinese government. Natural disasters, 
particularly weather-related, have increased both in frequency and intensity, heightening the 
demand for risk management strategies to enable households to cope with crop production risks. 
Among risk management strategies, agricultural insurance has been mooted as a powerful poverty-
alleviation mechanism and important agricultural protection tool. For China, the development of 
agricultural insurance has gone through: a trial period (1950-1958); recovery period (1982-1992); 
recession period (1993-2003); and breakthrough period (2004 onwards). From 2004, China 
commenced a new round of pilot experiments, with “policy-oriented” agricultural insurance 
conducted throughout China from 2007, supported by either the central government or by provincial 
governments. The experiments and program rollout uncovered several problems that have 
significantly constrained farmers’ demand for agricultural insurance including difficulties in claims 
procedures and low indemnity. Weather index insurance has been proposed as one means of 
overcoming some of these difficulties.  
The objective of this study is to investigate the relative merits, perceptions, and feasibility of 
weather index crop insurance as a means of managing weather-related production risks for 
individual farmers in China. The investigation is conducted using the case of Huojia County in 
Henan Province where the main crop of interest is winter wheat. The analysis draws on historical 
village yield and county weather data from 1981-2010, as well as information collected from 
households, insurance agents, meteorological bureau and local officials and leaders. Key 
components of the analysis include: (a) identifying the technical relationships between weather and 
crop yields which form the basis for the weather index crop insurance contracts; (b) understanding 
central and local government objectives, support for and capacity to facilitate weather index crop 
insurance; (c) eliciting the attitudes, perceptions and demand by farm households for risk 
management strategies, in general, and agricultural and weather index crop insurance, in particular; 
and (d) understanding issues associated with the supply and implementation of weather index crop 
insurance from the perspective of insurance companies. The renewed emphasis on agricultural 
insurance since 2004 has been accompanied by a growing literature and this study adds to that 
literature by providing a holistic analysis of weather index insurance rather than a focus on just one 
aspect such as the underlying technical relationships or on the attitudes of farm households. 
Included among the key findings from the study are: (a) weather insurance is technically feasible; (b) 
the policy environment is conducive for introducing weather index crop insurance in terms of 
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providing information, promotion, organization and coordination between departments, although 
the funding support from local government was found to be limited; (c) the demand for a weather 
index crop insurance product to offset the risk of yield loss for farmers in rural China represents a 
substantial opportunity and displays a growing trend as households seek time-efficient risk 
management strategies; and (d) the supply of weather index crop insurance products by insurance 
companies in China needs further attention especially in terms of product design and development 
to address concerns about profit margins, farmers’ trust, and high initial investment. Overall, the 
integrated analysis in the study indicates that purely commercial weather index crop insurance in 
rural China without government support is extremely unlikely at present to be successful. However, 
given the generally favourable perceptions of weather index crop insurance by farmers, insurance 
companies and government, subsidised insurance products meeting the risk management needs and 
objectives of households and governments, and the commercial imperatives of insurance companies 
may be possible in the future. 
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1 Introduction 
As China seeks to modernise and improve its diverse and complex agricultural sector, new policy 
measures and support instruments are being explored. One of the pressing problems facing Chinese 
agriculture and Chinese farmers is dealing with a wide range of production, market, and other risks. 
Innovative risk management tools such as weather index insurance are part of a range of measures 
being considered to deal with these issues. Through a detailed analysis of the key actors and 
underlying technical relationships, this study explores the potential, as well as the challenges, in 
implementing weather index insurance in China. 
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID 2006) defines weather index 
insurance as a “special form of insurance that can be used to compensate for losses related to 
extremes in weather which often plague agricultural enterprises and increase the level of risk 
involved in agricultural endeavours”. It can be used where there is an objective measurable event 
that is strongly correlated to the variable of interest. This objective measurable event acts as a sound 
proxy for losses and the triggering mechanism for indemnity1 payments. The indemnity payments 
are paid as a consequence of a policy specified in the contract, regardless of whether actual losses 
are incurred.  
Weather index insurance originated from the international weather derivative market which 
corporations used to hedge weather risks. In 1997, the first weather derivative transaction related to 
temperature variation was conducted in the US (Matei and Voica 2011). By 1999, weather index 
insurance was being discussed in academic papers as an alternative solution for developing 
agricultural economies. In 2002, the World Bank embarked on a weather index insurance agenda, 
and disbursed substantial loans and a component of technical support for crop specific insurance in 
India (USAID 2007). The contracts involved an index based on one or more weather conditions 
(such as temperature, precipitation, wind speed, etc.) that are implicitly related to a level of crop 
damage or income loss. When the index reaches a certain level, the insured can obtain the 
corresponding compensation according to the set contract (Sadler and Mahul 2009). The interest in 
weather index insurance for crop production came from an observation that the old crop insurance 
products were not viable for many countries where small average farm sizes and lack of 
commercialization are major obstacles to the sustainable development of crop insurance products. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Indemnity refers to the amount of compensation paid by the insurer to the insured in various forms, such as money, 
repair, replacement, or recovery in an ensured event. In the light of the insured’s monetary loss, this amount is set at a 
level equal to or less than the real value of the insured subject matter just before the loss. It is also related to the 
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Bryla-Tressler, Syroka and Dana (2011) outline several practical experiences in applying weather 
index crop insurance.  
1.1 Crop insurance in China 
As a large country that accounts for one-fifth of the world’s population but only 10% of its arable 
land, China is aware that crop production plays an important role in the national economy and 
social stability. In each of the ten consecutive years from 2004, the No. 1 Document from the 
Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and the State Council gives priority to the “three 
rural” issues - namely agriculture, rural areas and farmers - as the main problems facing 
contemporary China. Some of the main objectives of the Party-state are to expand demand in rural 
areas in order to stimulate domestic demand and to develop modern agriculture to transform 
China’s economic growth pattern based on the ideas of “steady food supply and security, stress 
raising farmer’s incomes, enhance rural investment, deepen rural reform, and speed up adoption of 
agriculture-related science and technology”. The No. 1 document of 2013 specifically mentioned 
reform of the rural financial system stating the importance of accelerating innovation in the crop 
insurance system for distributing the agricultural risk farmers faced and stabilising the income level 
of farmers. 
China has a high incidence of natural disasters, including droughts, floods, snowstorms, as well as 
pest infestations and plant diseases. These disasters reduce both the quantity and quality of crop 
production, which is a complex business requiring many skills (such as biology, agronomy, 
mechanics, and marketing) and covers a variety of operations throughout the year. Weather 
variability, particularly volatility of temperature and precipitation and the occurrence of extreme 
weather events, have increased in the past decade and are likely to continue increasing due to global 
climate change. The British Meteorological Office and the Association of British Insurers in 2009 
examined the financial implications of climate change using climate models and insurance 
catastrophe risk models. One of their key findings was that the average annual insured losses from 
typhoons affecting China could increase by 32%; the 100-year loss could increase by 9%; and the 
200-year loss could increase by 17% to £1.1 billion (Dailey et al. 2009). 
In addition to China’s fragile innate natural conditions and geographical characteristics, crop 
production units in China are scattered and small-scale. Chinese farmers are a particularly 
vulnerable group as they have limited choices to disperse the risks related to natural conditions. In 
addition, they confront many other risks including market risks, social risks, technology risks, and 
financial risks exacerbated by a lack of market information and management knowledge. The main 
form of natural risk management has been disaster relief, reconstruction and assisting victims, 
3	  
	  
which is the responsibility of the Ministry of Civil Affairs at central and local levels and 
supplemented by relatively small amounts of donations from individuals and businesses. This 
system has different roles with crop insurance and belongs to the basic safety net for farmer’s living, 
but it is expensive for all levels of governments. Thus identification of means to enable interested 
households to cope with crop production risks and to develop a sustainable agricultural economy is 
crucial. As part of this concern, academics, bureaucrats and policy makers have turned their 
attention to the issue of crop insurance.  
The incentive for many countries to develop crop insurance occurred when the WTO categorised it 
as a “green box policy” for the purposes of agricultural multilateral trade negotiations (Zhong, Ning 
and Xing 2006). Global crop insurance occurs predominantly in developed countries, especially in 
North America (accounting for 58% of worldwide premiums) and Western Europe (accounting for 
28% of worldwide premiums) (Kasten and Hazell 2004). At present, there are more than 40 
countries around the world that have successfully implemented or trialled subsidised crop insurance 
policies (Jia 2010). 
In China, the development of crop insurance has gone through four tortuous periods over the past 
60 years or more: a trial period (1950-1958); recovery period (1982-1992); recession period (1993-
2003); and breakthrough period (2004 to the present time) (Zhang, Gu and Shi 2006). This 
historical experience suggests that crop insurance was difficult to develop smoothly and sustainably 
without government intervention. In line with the principle of “government guidance, policy 
support, market operation, and farmers’ voluntary action”, the central government launched a pilot 
project in 2007 to trial a “policy-oriented agricultural insurance system”2 in six provinces of Jilin, 
Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Jiangsu, Sichuan and Hunan, with the schemes since rolled out beyond 
the pilot stage (Wang, Zhang and Zheng 2009a). Most provinces have tried policy-oriented 
agricultural insurance either supported by central government or conducted through the auspices of 
their own provincial government. 
This increased attention by policy-makers and insurance companies has been accompanied by an 
increasing number of studies and projects on crop insurance in China. Despite the insights from 
these studies, many unanswered question remain about China’s crop insurance system and how it 
should develop in the future. Furthermore, while comparative analysis of different types of 
agricultural risk management strategies are not uncommon (see, for instance, the comparative study 
of risk management in agriculture under climate change in Antón et al. (2012)), the investigation of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Policy-oriented agricultural insurance relies on government policy support through premium subsidies for the cropping 
and livestock breeding industries affected by natural disasters and accidents causing economic losses, with a wide 
coverage of multiple risks (Tuo and Zhu 2004).	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weather index crop insurance in the context of other kinds of crop insurance is less common. 
Moreover, the development of policy-oriented agricultural insurance and the results of related 
strategies have failed to meet farmers’ expectations, while weather index crop insurance offers 
potential advantages of transparency, no on-farm loss adjustment, avoidance of adverse selection 
and moral hazard, low operational and transaction costs, and rapid payouts. Thus identification and 
evaluation of appropriate risk management and tolerance strategies for China’s crop producers is a 
worthwhile field of endeavour. 
 
1.2 Research problem and research questions 
With this background in mind, the overarching objective in the thesis is to: 
Examine the applicability of weather index crop insurance as a means of managing risks for 
individual farmers, local governments and insurance companies in rural areas of China 
Individual farmers represent the buyers and users of weather index crop insurance products while 
insurance companies are the providers and sellers of weather index crop insurance products. The 
government has various roles and responsibilities that can be considered as both user and provider, 
or more precisely, as a facilitator of a conducive environment for the insurance to operate. Within 
the broad scope of this research, the thesis has a number of more specific objectives, namely:  
• To identify and compare the relative importance of different risks confronting farm 
households and the risk management strategies available to them;  
• To analyse the extent to which local meteorological or weather data are related to crop 
yields;  
• To identify key parameters and considerations in the design of a weather index crop 
insurance scheme;  
• To examine the potential effects and attitudes towards a weather index crop insurance 
scheme 
In meeting these objectives the study intends to: survey households’ attitudes towards weather 
index insurance; assess the potential market prospects for weather index crop insurance; identify the 
challenges that exist in developing and marketing such products; provide information for insurance 
companies about contract design and business operation; and assist in the development and 
assessment of intervention strategies for local and central governments in the implementation of 
weather index crop insurance. Thus the research aims to investigate the interests of farmers, 
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insurance companies, and governments in developing an appropriate risk management system for 
crop production.  
Following on from these objectives, the five key research questions to be addressed in the study are:  
Research Question 1: What can be learned from problems and experiences related to the 
operation of current policy-oriented agricultural insurance? 
Research Question 2: What is the relationship between farm crop yields and local weather 
indicators?  
Research Question 3: What are key design elements of a weather index crop insurance contract? 
Research Question 4: What central and local government measures may be needed to facilitate 
weather index crop insurance? 
Research Question 5: What are householders’ attitudes and views on weather index crop 
insurance application? 
    5a) How significant are natural risks relative to other risks faced by agricultural households? 
    5b): What strategies and measures are available to farmers and local government to deal with 
farming risks?   
    5c): What factors influence the willingness of households to purchase weather index crop 
insurance? 
Research Question 6: What are the favourable conditions and potential challenges in the design 
and implementation of weather index crop insurance scheme from the insurance company 
perspective?   
 
1.3 Contribution and significance of this research 
The major contributions of this research are: 
• Further analysis of innovative risk management strategies and measures for farmers in China; 
• Detailed investigation of weather index insurance for wheat farmers in central China that 
has not been the subject of extensive investigation despite the significant weather-related 
risks confronted by farmers in this area; 
• Development of an integrated research framework to investigate the weather index crop 
insurance taking into account technical design, demand identification, supply provision, 
institutional design, and government facilitation. 
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The practical significance of this research is in providing specific information useful in the design 
and implementation of weather index crop insurance from the perspective of insurance companies, 
central government and local governments by: 
• Providing an assessment of the extent to which weather index insurance may be a basis for 
meeting the insurance and risk management needs of small-scale and low-income farmers; 
• Providing technical information for insurance companies that would be needed to underpin 
any viable weather index insurance scheme;  
• Providing information on the incentives that farmers and insurance companies may need to 
engage in weather index crop insurance and the potential role for government.  
 
1.4 Framework and overview of methods 
Case study and mixed methods of qualitative and quantitative research are used in this study to 
answer specific questions in relation to the proposed objectives. Table 1-1 highlights the 
methodological framework used in the study. The left column reveals a sequence of inter-related 
research questions. The data collection and analysis methods appear in the middle and right 
columns. The statistical data collected from the local government office was used for quantitative 
analysis of the weather and yield relationship. It was followed by a contract design process using of 
information from a household survey and the literature review to show what a preliminary weather 
index crop insurance instrument would look like. For research question 3, this study analysed the 
household survey, government officer and insurance staff interviews to summarize, describe, and 
explain the problems and experiences with the current policy-oriented agricultural insurance 
instrument. In identifying the attitudes of government and insurance companies on weather index 
crop insurance instruments, the research mainly relies on narrating and analysing the conversations 
with government officers and insurance staff. Descriptive statistics and regression analysis was 
applied for research question 4 to study the householders’ attitudes and views on weather index 
crop insurance with the information collected from the household survey and village leader’s 
interview. 
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Table 1-1 Research questions and corresponding methods 
Research Questions Data Resources Data Analysis 
RQ1: Experience and 
problems with current policy-
oriented agricultural 
insurance instrument 
Household survey, interviews 
with government officers and 
insurance company staff, and 
review of literature 
Qualitative analysis 
(summary, description 
and explanation) 
RQ2: The extent to which 
weather indicators are related 
to local farm crop yields 
Crop yield & weather data 
collected from statistics office 
and meteorology bureau 
Quantitative analysis 
(including descriptive 
statistics, de-trending, 
regression analysis) 
RQ3: Weather index crop 
insurance contract design  
Information from analysis of 
other research questions and 
review of contract design 
literature 
Contract design  
(Define structure, trigger-
point setting, determine 
premiums, etc.) 
RQ4: Policy environment for 
application of weather index 
crop insurance from 
government perspective 
Interviews with government 
officers 
Qualitative analysis 
(narrative semi-structured 
interviews) 
RQ5: Householders’ attitudes 
and views on weather index 
crop insurance  
Household survey & village 
leader interviews 
Descriptive analysis & 
regression analysis 
RQ6: Favourable conditions 
and potential challenges from 
insurance company 
perspective 
Insurance staff interviews 
 
Qualitative analysis 
(narrative semi-structured 
interviews) 
 
1.5 Synopsis 
Based on the study questions and methods outlined in the previous sections, the thesis is organised 
into four parts as shown in Figure 1-1. The introduction part contains three chapters: Chapter 1 
introduces the study background and defines the research problem and research questions; Chapter 
2 critiques the relevant literature on farming risk, farming risk management, crop insurance and 
weather index insurance. The case study method is used in the study and the mixed methods 
employed in the data collection and data analysis are outlined in Chapter 3. Part 2 focuses on the 
context for the study and analysis by outlining in Chapter 4 the policy environment for crop 
insurance in China, the problems with the current crop insurance system, and the role of 
government in weather index crop insurance. The third part presents findings of the surveys, 
interviews, and analysis. Chapter 5 assesses the technical feasibility that would underpin any 
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weather index crop insurance in terms of establishing the relationship between weather variables 
and crop yields. After discussing the factors  (such as soil quality, agricultural inputs, irrigation, and 
management capability) possibly influencing crop yield variation, and studying the local weather 
conditions, this chapter illustrates how the regression approach was used to express the influence of 
weather factors on wheat production. It also described the pricing methodology for the design of 
weather index crop insurance contracts. Chapter 6 examines the demand for weather index 
insurance by providing a conceptual overview of farmers’ demand for weather index crop insurance, 
reports the descriptive analysis of farm household surveys and a regression analysis of factors 
affecting farmers’ interests in this insurance, as well as integrating the analysis with findings from 
interviews with village leaders.  Chapter 7 reports on the supply of weather index insurance from 
the perspective of the insurance company as analysed by looking at the current status of the crop 
insurance market and commercial incentives for insurance companies, as well as the 
implementation capacity and operational challenges at a local level. A summary of perceptions 
regarding the pros and cons of weather index crop insurance and an integrative analysis on the 
findings and results from Parts 2 and 3 of the research (Chapter 4 to Chapter 7 of the thesis) is 
outlined in the Part 4 in Chapter 8 which also includes a discussion on the activities, roles and 
responsibilities of key stakeholders, as well as the operational matters for weather index crop 
insurance instrument. Chapter 9 concludes by reflecting on theory versus practice, methods and 
methodology, and scope and limitations of the analysis.  
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2 Literature review 
To address the research questions of this study, a review of the relevant literature in the fields of 
farming risks, farming risk management, crop insurance, and weather index crop insurance was first 
undertaken. Within these four sections of the chapter, the first three form the basis on which to 
discuss the final section on weather index crop insurance.   
2.1 Farming risks 
Crop production is a risky business where deviations often occur from expected outcomes (Goucher 
1996). This section identifies the main types and characteristics of risks that farmers face in crop 
production. Classifying farming risks, and the reasons for these risks, is crucial for farmers in 
developing risk management strategies, and will be discussed in section 2.2. 
Farmers face a diverse set of risks that can be classified in different ways depending on the purpose 
of the analysis. For instance, some studies categorize farming risks into the two main areas of yield 
risk and price risk. Gabriel and Baker (1980) categorise farming risks into business risk and 
financial risk, with business risk further divided into production risk and market risk. Sonka and 
Patrick (1984) described another three types being social, technological, and labour risk. The main 
types of farming risk widely accepted in the literature are related to natural events, market price, 
social and technological change, labour issues, and finance (Baquet, Hambleton and Jose 1997; 
Fleisher 1990; Hardaker et al. 2004; Moschini and Hennessy 2001). These risks are discussed in the 
following sections. 
Despite the various risks that confront farmers in rural China, they are often interrelated, and have 
the common effect of impacting on the incomes of rural households. However, some risks may be 
more important than others. Huirne (2000) and Meuwissen et al. (2001) found that Dutch farmers 
considered price and yield risk to be most important. A survey conducted in Kazakhstan 
(Heidelbach, Bokusheva and Kussaiynov 2004) stated that price risk plays a predominant role in 
farmers’ decision-making. Comparable studies from the United States (Harwood 1997; Patrick et al. 
1985) confirmed the importance of price risk, especially for wheat and cotton farmers. Lien (2003) 
conducted a survey to examine how farmers perceived risk and risk management in practice. One of 
their conclusions was that institutional risk dominated other sources in Norway. These studies 
indicate that risk perceptions vary from farmer to farmer and are influenced by their experience, risk 
attitudes, and farming systems.  
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2.1.1 Natural risk 
One risk confronting farmers that differs from many other industries is risk related to natural events. 
Crop production is a biological process dependent on nature. The main natural causes that affect 
crop production are floods, fire, wind, drought, hail, earthquake, plant diseases and the interactions 
between them.  Justus and Fletcher (2006) warned that significant global warming might occur as a 
result of intensification of the greenhouse effect that could exacerbate the effect of these natural 
risks on agriculture and farmers. This could cause the loss of crop production and hinder 
reproduction, and threaten the livelihoods of farmers. For example, as Table 2-1	  shows, more than 
one quarter of the crop area sown in China was adversely affected (production reduced by more 
than 10%) by natural conditions in each of the past 30 years, while the area damaged (more than a 
30% reduction in yields) was between 10% and 22% of the sown area. 
According to a report by the Ministry of Agriculture (Zhang, X 2010), the drought in the southwest 
of China (Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan, Guangxi, Chongqing) during the spring of 2010, affected 
78.6 million hectares of cultivated land, including 6 million hectares that experienced medium 
drought, 190 thousand hectares heavy drought, 101 thousand hectares where crops withered, and 
1.68 million hectares which were too dry to be planted. Yunnan province was most severely 
affected with losses in agriculture as high as 17.2 billion yuan. On average, economic losses caused 
by natural disasters in China amounted to 12.5 billion dollars, accounting for about one quarter of 
the world’s average annual loss (Qian 2005).  
Table 2-1 Affected and damaged crops in China  
Year 
A  
Total sown area 
(thousand 
hectares) 
B  
Affected area 
(thousand 
hectares) 
C (=B/A) 
Percentage 
Affected  
 
D 
Damaged area 
(thousand 
hectares) 
E (=D/A) 
Percentage 
damaged  
F (=D/B) 
Severity: 
Damaged 
to affected  
 
1978 150105 50790 34% 24457 16% 48% 
1979 148477 39370 27% 15120 10% 38% 
1980 145618 44526 31% 29777 20% 67% 
1981 145157 39786 27% 18743 13% 47% 
1982 144688 33133 23% 15985 11% 48% 
1983 143993 34713 24% 16209 11% 47% 
1984 144221 31887 22% 15607 11% 49% 
1985 143626 44365 31% 22705 16% 51% 
1986 144204 47135 33% 23656 16% 50% 
1987 144957 42086 29% 20393 14% 48% 
1988 144869 50874 35% 23945 17% 47% 
1989 146554 46991 32% 22449 15% 48% 
1900 148362 38474 26% 17819 12% 46% 
1991 149586 55472 37% 27814 19% 50% 
1992 149007 51333 34% 25859 17% 50% 
1993 147742 48829 33% 23133 16% 47% 
1994 148097 55043 37% 31383 21% 57% 
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1995 149879 45821 31% 22267 15% 49% 
1996 152445 46989 31% 21233 14% 45% 
1997 153970 53429 35% 30309 20% 57% 
1998 155706 50145 32% 25181 16% 50% 
1999 156373 49981 32% 26731 17% 53% 
2000 156424 54688 35% 34374 22% 63% 
2001 155708 52155 34% 31743 20% 61% 
2002 154636 46946 30% 27160 18% 58% 
2003 152415 54506 36% 32516 21% 60% 
2004 153553 37106 24% 16297 11% 44% 
2005 155488 38818 25% 19966 13% 51% 
2006 152149 41091 27% 24632 16% 60% 
2007 153464 48992 32% 25064 16% 51% 
2008 156266 39990 26% 22283 14% 56% 
2009 158641 47214 30% 21234 13% 45% 
2010 160675 37426 23% 18538 12% 50% 
2011 162283 32471 20% 12441 8% 38% 
Average 150863 45076 30% 23147.74 15% 51% 
Source: “China Statistical Yearbook” statistics derived from statistical data (NBSC 1979-2012). 
Note: The affected area is the area that was affected by more than 10% reduction in yield per 
hectare due to natural disasters; the damaged area is the area that was damaged by more than 30% 
yield reduction per hectare due to natural disasters (drought, floods, wind, hail, frost and so on) 
during the crop growth period. Bold numbers indicate the years when the affected areas are greater 
than 30% or the damaged areas less than 15%.  
Natural disasters can impact severely on farmers’ incomes and livelihoods. In the event of extreme 
weather, households without mechanisms to transfer risk are more likely to be pushed into a 
situation of permanent poverty, and many may have to draw on household assets—often 
accumulated over years of savings and investment and that are needed to generate future income. 
They often have long-term health and developmental consequences, pushing some community 
members into a cycle of poverty (Barrett and Swallow 2006; Carter and Barrett 2006; Carter et al. 
2007; Kirwan and Edward 2005). 
In Figure 2-1, reproduced from Carter et al. (2004), the economic situation for two hypothetical 
households A and B is shown. Initially, both households experience upward growth in their asset 
levels and income, although B is close to the poverty line. If a risk event takes place, both 
households might experience an immediate decline in their assets and income due to loss or damage 
to productive crops, or to the cost of recovery. Household A retains more productive crops and so is 
able to recover more quickly. For a poorer household, such as B, the depletion of assets might push 
the household below the poverty line. Once the asset position of a household falls below the poverty 
line, its recovery is slow or unable to generate sufficient new income to rise above the poverty level 
and regain its previous economic position. This situation is referred to as a poverty trap, because 
once households on the margin slip into poverty, they often lack the strength needed to improve 
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their economic situation. The main difference in objectives between crop insurance in the US and 
that in China is the extent of guarantee. The crop insurance in United States could target with 
farmers’ diverse demand with a relatively high safeguard level, including yield insurance and 
income insurance. While crop insurance in China that targets poor rural and farm households aims 
to help households avoid the poverty trap by compensating them for weather-induced losses, thus 
enabling the income from lost crops to be replaced and stimulating faster recovery. It is a low 
safeguard crop insurance product. 
 
Source: Carter et al. (2004) 
Figure 2-1 Economic impact of farming risks on households in different economic situations  
Despite advances in technology, typhoons, snow, floods and other extreme weather events can still 
not be forecast with precision, while the ability to prevent their impact on crop yields once these 
natural phenomena occur is also constrained. Risk from natural causes has been identified as a 
major constraint to crop production in China. 
2.1.2 Market risk 
Crop production is a long-term process, and choice of enterprise mix and input decisions have to be 
made often well in advance of when the crop is sold or consumed. Furthermore farmers have to 
make these decisions with imperfect market information. Thus volatility in prices, and changes in 
market conditions, exposes farmers to significant risks. The impacts of variations in supply on price 
volatility are exacerbated by the price-inelastic demand for many staple crops (Tangermann 2011).  
The prices of inputs and outputs depend on developments in supply and demand while government 
policies can also add to the uncertainty about product prices (Drollette 2009). The Chinese 
government (through intervention buying, stock holding etc.) has many measures that specifically 
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target stabilisation of agricultural product markets and reduction in the volatility of prices but there 
is also a lot of intervention in crop product markets that has led to more volatile prices (Wang, M 
2003). The small scale of Chinese farmers and the rudimentary state of many crop product markets 
means that farmers are often price takers exposing them even more to volatile market prices over 
which they have no control and limited information.  
2.1.3 Social risk 
Social risk is also referred to as behavioural risk and is caused by the behaviour of individuals or 
groups. It can be divided into two parts:  policy risk and institutional risk. Policy risk arises from 
the instability of agricultural and rural economic policies or changes made by policy makers. Such 
changes might include food safety laws, product support prices, regulation of imports and exports, 
tax policy, and enforcement of environmental regulations (for chemical use, as an example) 
(Musser 1998). Implementation of China’s grain distribution policy has meant that when there is a 
grain shortage, grain-producing areas will hoard until a satisfactory price is reached while, during 
bumper seasons, grain-consuming areas will not purchase all their requirements at one time and 
there can be significant delays until consumption. There is also the opposite case, such as when 
state agencies sell during periods of shortage and hoard during bumper crops. Policy risk can have 
adverse effects, especially when policy changes and farmers often bear the brunt of these 
consequences. Institutional risk arises primarily from the administrative and financial systems. 
Leadership, and the standard of performance evaluation and performance appraisal, do affect 
decision-making behaviour (Antón 2008). The financial independence and fiscal systems whereby 
local authorities take full responsibility for their financial transactions can impact on the market 
economy as local authorities form regional blocs to protect their financial interests (Li et al. 2004).  
2.1.4 Technology risk 
Modern science and technology has greatly improved farm productivity, but also introduced new 
risks. The production and management methods of many low-income Chinese farmers often rely on 
traditional experiences (Sun and Zhang 2001a). In undeveloped areas of China, large numbers of 
farmers are still dependent on physical strength in traditional crop production.  They do not have 
relevant cropping technologies, and also have no opportunity to access formal training (Luo 2005). 
Furthermore the educational level of these farmers is relatively low. The average education level of 
farmers is 7.8 years and this may restrict the uptake of more complex technologies or precision 
forms of farming. According to the special survey of the Ministry of Agriculture in China, 39% of 
farmers could not read or could not correctly understand the instructions on pesticide labels. Instead, 
40% of them estimated the concentration to use, 33% of them selected pesticide varieties based on 
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elders’ experience, and only 8.3% of farmers considered the toxicity impact of pesticides on crop 
quality and quantity (Wang, J 2003).  
Although new advanced technology can promote the efficiency of crop production, uptake is based 
on the prerequisite of additional financial, material, and labour inputs, with the additional costs 
potentially compensated by higher returns under normal circumstances. However, farmers adopting 
these more lucrative new technologies can be exposed to higher losses if there is crop failure, so 
some technologies can make farming more vulnerable. Fischhoff et al. (1978) highlighted how 
technological advances such as effective insecticides, might lead to adverse side effects.  Pesticides 
that have obvious benefits for crop production can decrease the general biodiversity in the soil. 
Brenan and Murray (1998) noted that many of the chemicals used in insecticides are persistent soil 
contaminants, whose impact may endure for decades and adversely affect soil condition.  
Furthermore, the technology risks faced by crop producers can come from other parts of the 
economy and not just the agricultural sector. For instance, untreated water, gas, slag and other 
hazardous wastes are discharged in industrial production, which can seriously damage the 
ecological balance and natural resources, and cause great harm in agricultural production. Zhang 
(1998) conducted a survey of 168 industrial enterprises, which showed that 90% of the wastewater 
went into the Yangtze and Yellow River, which supply irrigation water to many cropping areas.  
2.1.5 Labour risk 
Several risks are also associated with farm labour including vulnerability of farmers to various 
health issues, farmers’ management strategies and reliability of farm labourers (Anderson 1994). 
Events such as death, divorce, injury and disease affect labour inputs and hence agricultural outputs 
(Hardaker et al. 2004). If the main source of labour in the family is affected by disease or injury, the 
reduced time spent on production can impact yields or lead to increased costs if outside labour has 
to be brought in. In the European Union, basic coverage for personal risk is normally provided by 
sector specific or general social security systems (Bieza et al. 2007). In China, there is a form of 
social security net called “dibao” which is the payments made to very low income households in 
some areas. Moreover, the transfer of labour from rural areas to the city is another source of risk. If 
the development goals of households change from professional farming to a sideline operation, the 
long-term investment in production capacity will be affected. Labour migration affects the 
promotion of new agricultural technologies and impacts on local consumption and demand. It can 
also result in skilled labour shortages for rural businesses.  
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2.1.6 Financial risk 
Financial risk is defined here as the added variability of net cash flows of farm owners, relative to 
their fixed financial liabilities, debt financing, and cash borrowings (Barges 1963). It depends on 
the raising and allocation of agricultural funds and the cost of capital, interest rates, and exchange 
rate fluctuations. Insufficient liquidity and loss of equity can be serious problems for farmers.   
Musser (1998) highlighted that financial risk involves three key elements of liquidity, solvency, and 
interest rate. The risks associated with low liquidity and insolvency are flow from the success or 
otherwise of the farm management strategy. Variations in interest rates derive from capital markets 
and macroeconomic policies. In China, farmers’ funds generated from crop production might be 
insufficient to expand production and they may need loans from financial institutions or private 
sources. The loan period and repayment deadlines are not always consistent with the crop 
production cycle, and so natural disasters, decreases in product prices, or poor management might 
reduce the value of crop production, and impact on the farmers’ capacity to repay the loans. 
2.1.7 Characteristics and causes of farming risks in China 
Sun and Zhang (2001b), Li et al. (2005), Feng (2007), and Cheng (2008) suggested that farming 
risks have the following characteristics: 
• Objectivity. Farming risk arises from the interaction between nature and society. The 
occurrence of farming risk is objective, especially for natural risks, which cannot be affected 
by human’s subjective wishes.   
• Uncertainty. Some farming risks may have associated probabilities of occurrence but some 
will be uncertain (when, where, and how, the scope and extent). As knowledge and 
technology advances, the occurrence of some farming risks may become more apparent. 
• Duality.  Farming risk has two sides. It may cause losses, but can also bring benefits. For 
example, natural disasters reduce farming output but there may be an offsetting rise in prices; 
typhoons may damage crops at the centre of the typhoon but the rain brought by the typhoon 
may benefit nearby crops. 
• Specificity. Farming risks faced by producers are closely related to their decision-making 
behaviour. Producers facing the same risk events may make different decisions with 
different consequent outcomes. 
• Regional. Farming risks are highly impacted by natural and geographical conditions. Risks 
vary in different regions of China:  risk of drought in northern China, flood risk in southern 
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China, typhoon risk along the east coast, market and technological risk in information-poor 
western regions. 
Wang (2002) identified four main reasons for the formation of farming risks in China: 
• The uncertainty of agricultural products market, including social and political uncertainty 
(policy uncertainty, macro-economic uncertainty, and uncertainty driven by the natural 
environment). 
• The complexity of economic operations. Economic integration links all aspects of 
production, distribution, and consumption closely, while its regulation should focus on 
efficiency of the whole system rather than a single aspect. Thus the cumulative effect of 
market risk can be significant. 
• The limitations imposed on the groups involved, which can be expressed in two ways: the 
limitations of individual consciousness, and the limits on the ability to control risk. 
Another scholar, Wang (2007), summed up the reasons for the existence of risks in three aspects: 
• Frequent natural disasters affect crop yield and quality. Since 2000, more than 50 million 
hectares of farmland were damaged by natural disasters each year, accounting for 30%-40% 
of arable farmland. These natural disasters reduced crop production in China by about 23 
million tonnes every year. 
• The market distribution system is not perfect and can cause dislocations in the timing of 
supply and demand in agricultural production creating sharp fluctuations in agricultural 
product prices in the absence of long-term price stabilising mechanisms. 
• The development of crop production has been plagued by the lack of finance. The main 
source of farming capital is surplus funds that farmers have accumulated by themselves with 
limited credit support from financial institutions. 
2.2 Farming risk management 
As 2.1 highlighted, farmers face a variety of risks. In the future, climate change, greater market 
orientation of the global economy, production specialization, agricultural trade liberalization, and 
restrictions on crop protection products may increase the risks faced by farmers. Therefore, risk 
management strategies are likely to become even more important. Farmers individually could adopt 
some management strategies, while the government could provide some policies and programmes 
that would help reduce risks directly or indirectly.  
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Farming risk management involves a series of economic and management activities to recognize, 
measure, analyse and then optimize multiple management techniques, with the aim of identifying a 
balance point between cost minimization and production security. Specifically, it has three 
dimensions or objectives (Wang, T 2009). The first is security, which means maintaining the 
stability of crop production and farmers’ incomes as well as meeting the needs of the whole nation 
in food production. The second objective is economic, or identifying the trade-offs between costs 
and benefits. The third target is ecological which involves paying attention to ecological and 
environmental protection. 
Risk management in farming and its feasibility in China have been studied from different 
perspectives. Based on the idea of industry chains, Cheng and Wu (2007) divided agriculture into 
three stages: pre-production, production,  and post-production. The first stage involves preparation 
and supply of inputs, including production materials such as seeds and fertilizers, householders’ 
expectations, decision-making in regard to planting structure and methods. The main risks 
considered in this stage are market risk and asset risk, and so the management methods could 
include subsidisation of the means of production and the building of supply chain systems and 
information services. The second stage involves the production process, including the natural 
environment, field management and technical inputs such as the application of pest-control 
technologies. The main risks that apply in this stage are natural risks and technology risk as well as 
asset risk. Thus agricultural insurance, technology promotion and risk funds are most relevant in 
this stage.  The last stage refers to products sales, distribution and processing and the main risks are 
market risk and institutional risk. Thus futures markets, special funds, production-on-order, contract 
farming, and other arrangements between companies and households, as well as price-support are 
likely to be the focus of attention in this stage.  
2.2.1 Risk management strategies for individuals/ households  
Households have various ways to manage risk including diversification, contracted production, 
futures and options, crop insurance, and off-farm employment. These strategies are summarised 
here and formed the basis for the questionnaire design (see Appendix 1 and 2). 
2.2.1.1 On-farm strategies 
On-farm risk management aims to avoid or limit the impact of production risk and price risk. Two 
methods commonly used by individuals include diversification and contracts.  
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• Diversification 
Diversification, in agricultural production, can be regarded as the re-allocation of a farm’s 
productive resources (including land, capital, farm equipment and paid labour) into new crops, to 
increase the total crop production in terms of quality, quantity, and monetary value under specific 
agro-climatic situations. Factors leading to decisions to diversify are many, but include avoiding 
risk, responding to changing consumer demands, government policy, climate change, and so on. 
There are two approaches to crop diversification in agriculture. First is horizontal diversification, 
which is the primary approach to crop diversification in production agriculture. Diversification 
often takes place through crop intensification by adding new high-value crops to existing cropping 
systems as a way to improve overall productivity of a farm or region's farming economy. Because 
prices or yields of different crops are not perfectly correlated, diversification of production can 
reduce income volatility. However, diversification involves additional costs as special machinery 
and equipment may be required for each individual activity and so farmers need to weigh up this 
cost against any reduction in risks (Musser, Patrick and Eckman 1996). 
The second option is the vertical diversification approach, in which farmers add value to products 
through processing, packaging, merchandising, or other efforts to enhance the product, or spread 
their sources of income to non-farm business. Another option is investment in projects outside the 
farm, and engagement in off-farm employment (e.g. as construction workers, or repairmen). 
Diversifying household income is a good way to strengthen the farm’s position against unknown 
events. Ellis (1998) stated that diversification is a desirable policy objective because it gives 
individuals and households more capacity to improve livelihood security and to raise living 
standards. The importance of diversification is greater for small farmers, because the diverse 
income may be higher than single agricultural income and less risky on average (MAFF 2001). 
Although diversification was found to be a less popular strategy in the household survey analysis 
reported in Chapter 6, farmers do not necessarily use diversification alone but combine it with other 
risk management methods.  
• Contract production  
Contracted production refers to agricultural production carried out on the basis of an agreement 
between the buyer (usually a company) and farmers. The agreement specifies the quantity and 
quality of the nominated crop, and the farmers’ remuneration, while the farmer agrees to deliver the 
product at a future date. More importantly, the contract outlines conditions for the production of 
crops and for their delivery to the buyer’s premises. In the transaction, farmers undertake to supply 
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agreed quantities of a product, based on the quality standards and delivery requirements of the 
purchaser. In return, the buyer will purchase the crop product, at the price that was established in 
the contract. Sometimes the company also agrees to support the farmer through providing inputs, 
assisting with land preparation, providing planting techniques and transport, and so on. 
Contract production has been used in agriculture for decades because it is attractive to many 
farmers, and also of interest to processors. For farmers, contract production offers an assured 
market, access to production support, and potential profits. Based on a survey of small scale farmers 
in Zimbabwe, four factors were identified by Masakure and Henson (2005) as motivating contract 
farming, namely, market uncertainty, indirect benefits (planting knowledge), income benefits, and 
intangible benefits. For processors, the guaranteed supply enables them to maximise utilization of 
their processing capacity (Eaton and Shepherd 2001).  Besides, as Collier and Dercon (2013) argue, 
contract production brings potential benefits for national economies as it is conducive to scale 
economies, and it may also create positive multiplier effects for employment, infrastructure, and 
market development in the local economy (Warning and Key 2002).  
However, there has been much debate regarding the negative impacts of contract production on 
cash income, rates of poverty, and potentially wider effects (Masakure and Henson 2005). This 
illustrates that the performance of contracts in regard to small-scale producers has been highly 
variable, making it difficult to draw broad policy conclusions. For instance, contract crop 
production may reduce the autonomy of farmers offsetting the possible benefits due to the specified 
fixed product price. A lack of transparency and the issue of information asymmetry may restrict this 
production mode. In addition, a number of problems have been exposed in the development of 
contract production, such as breach of contract, excessive government intervention, and contractual 
disputes. These problems can seriously hinder the development of contract farming, while many 
agricultural enterprises became the victims of “Chinese-style contracted production”. For instance, 
Tianyi Science and Technology Company Limited is the largest company involved in rapeseed 
crushing in China.  It is one of the oldest listed agricultural companies in China whose income 
comes mainly from rapeseed processing, and—was the first company offering contract production 
in the form of “enterprise + farmers”, providing canola seed, fertilizer, and technical guidance. 
When rapeseed prices tumbled in 2000-2001, farmers with contracts sold all of their output 
according to the original price in the contract, with the company having to bear all the losses. When 
the price rose sharply in 2002, the vast majority of farmers who had contracts with Tianyi 
terminated them, and so the company had to assume the losses on pre-sale rapeseed oil. 
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2.2.1.2 Off-farm strategies 
• Futures and options 
Futures and options markets provide the opportunity for farmers to hedge their price risk. 
Developed countries have established well developed agricultural futures market which are used by 
farmers directly or indirectly (through the sales options with agribusiness companies) to reduce 
their price risks. Nie (2007) pointed out that the function of futures and options markets is to 
discover prices, hedge price risk, and improve market efficiency. They provide a means of reducing 
risks without recourse to government funds. However, they also require educated farmers and a 
developed market.  
Research by Patrick et al. (1998) suggests limited use of futures and options, by surveying a large 
group of well-educated and progressive Indiana farmers over a 3-year period on their use of forward 
contracts and futures markets. Similar results have been reported by Morales et al. (2008), who 
conducted a survey of 1047 representative farmers in five EU Member States (Hungary, Spain, the 
Netherlands, Germany and Poland) to explore farmers’ risk perceptions, and demand for risk 
management instruments. The findings showed that only 2.33% of farmers used futures and options 
contracts, in spite of the documented advantages. Gardner (2000) argued that the problem why 
farmers rarely used options and futures contracts to hedge market risk was because most households 
are more likely to rely on non-agricultural business, and agriculture is only a small part of their total 
income.  
The application of futures and options in China is not as extensive as in Europe or the United States. 
Farmers are unable to use futures markets for hedging directly because of the complexity of 
contracts, limits on transaction size, and the relatively high fee for the small volume traded.  In 
China, there are four futures markets, which are the Shanghai Futures Exchange 3 , Dalian 
Commodity Exchange 4 , Zhengzhou Commodity Exchange 5 , and China Financial Futures 
Exchange6.  Only Zhengzhou and Dalian commodity exchanges deal in agricultural products, while 
the trading value and number of contracts has continued to increase gradually. During the past 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  At present, futures contracts underlying commodities, i.e., gold, copper, aluminium, steel rebar, steel wire rod, natural 
rubber, fuel oil and zinc, are listed for trading. 
4 Founded on February 28th, 1993, DCE offers a wide range of futures products including corn, No. 1 soybeans (non-
gmo), No. 2 soybeans (gmo), soybean meal, soybean oil, RBD palm olein, linear low-density polyethylene (LLDPE), 
polyvinyl chloride (PVC) and coke. 
5 ZCE is the first experimental futures market approved by the State Council. The listed products on ZCE include wheat 
(involving strong gluten wheat and hard white winter wheat), cotton, white sugar, pure terephthalic acid, rapeseed oil 
and early long-grain non-glutinous rice. 
6 Among the CFFEX’s main functions approved by the CSRC are organizing and arranging the listing, trading, clearing 
and settlement of financial derivatives including financial futures formulating business management rules, carrying out 
self-management, releasing market trading information, and providing technology, venues and facility services. 
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twenty-five years, these exchanges have gone through three stages of development: blind 
development stage (1990-1994), rectification stage (1994-2000), and normalized development stage 
(2001- present time). In the first stage, the blind development of China’s futures market (there were 
more than 50 Exchanges in the country) resulted in many problems such as large clients 
manipulating the market through orchestrated deals. Their behaviour was highly speculative, so that 
the majority of investors suffered huge losses that seriously distorted the futures market price and 
increased the difficulty of their use in risk management. The government revamped the futures 
market from 1994 to 2000, but the markets remained undeveloped. For instance, few products were 
traded, and some major agricultural futures (e.g. rice) were not available. Large state-owned 
agricultural enterprises could only hedge and not trade speculatively in the futures market, limited 
by the restrictions of national policies and social philosophy, and in consideration of the security of 
state-owned assets. In one case in 2004, the Agricultural Development Bank of China issued an 
emergency notice that said “cotton enterprises which had loans from the Agricultural Development 
Bank of China cannot be approved to enter the futures market. If anyone has opened an account, the 
futures market must take effective measures immediately to help these enterprises quit as soon as 
possible, to ensure the safety of credit funds”. Thus, the underdevelopment or lack of access to a 
futures market places more importance on the need to develop other options accessible and relevant 
to farm households. 
• Crop insurance 
Crop insurance is another off-farm risk management that can be an effective means to disperse 
farming risks and economic losses, and it has become an important tool of non-price protection 
policy. It will be elaborated upon in section 2.3. 
2.2.2 Risk management strategies for government 
Apart from strategies that households employ, government also plays a role in helping farmers cope 
with farming risks. The risk management strategies of the government are both to improve 
agricultural production conditions, and to close the income gap between the agricultural and non-
agricultural population. The implementation of such strategies uses the majority to protect the 
minority, and is part of the national income redistribution between producers and consumers. 
2.2.2.1 Disaster relief 
Disaster relief is a social assistance system for securing and aiding the victims that suffer from a 
variety of disasters. Its purpose is to rescue, to help victims survive the crisis, while allowing farm 
production and life in the affected areas to return to normal as soon as possible. As the main 
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provider of disaster relief, the government has an annual budget for disaster relief, but disaster relief 
cannot be planned in advance or carried out in accordance with an established program, because 
disasters cannot be determined in advance. It is difficult to coordinate disaster relief with other 
farming risk management strategies, especially with crop insurance. When farmers can voluntarily 
choose to buy insurance, the availability of disaster relief often affects their enthusiasm to purchase 
insurance. However, the risks to crop production can be high while freely provided disaster relief 
can become a severe challenge to national finances. When serious disaster occurs, government 
relief is limited. For instance He and Turvey (2009) reported an area of crop of up to 41091 hectares 
damaged in 2006 at an economic loss of about 252.8 billion yuan, but the accumulated relief funds 
of various types from the central government invested after the disaster were only about 11.2 billion 
yuan, the community contributed 3.6 billion yuan, and the indemnity from crop insurance was less 
than 0.6 billion yuan. This shows that most of the losses were met by the farmers themselves.  
2.2.2.2 Agricultural support 
The Chinese government uses various support measures to maintain price stability, increase farmers’ 
incomes, and improve labour productivity. The measures include: 
1) Price protection 
The key idea of price protection is that the government sets suitable prices for some products, which 
it uses to modulate abnormal movements in market prices to maintain the stability of farmers’ 
incomes. Implementation of agricultural protection policy must have two necessary conditions: a) 
the kind of products protected this way must have sufficient reserve stocks; and b) government must 
provide funding support for this policy.  
• Price support policy on agricultural products 
In order to prevent price fluctuations and adjust agricultural structure, the Chinese government has 
intervened in setting the prices of agricultural products. Generally, they predetermine a guaranteed 
price, including a target price and an intervention price. The target price is defined before the season 
and is normally set higher than the market price (the upper limit of price changes for agricultural 
products). The intervention price is referred to as the purchasing price, and is lower than the target 
price (lower limit of price changes in the market). If prices in the market fall below the intervention 
price, crops will be bought at the intervention price with the difference subsidised by national 
finance. Once the market price surpasses the target price, the state will stabilize the price by putting 
previously stored crops onto the market.  Luo (2005) argues that the price support policy stimulated 
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the enthusiasm of farmers for production, but the high subsidies also can exact a heavy economic 
burden on government (taxpayers) and distorted production, consumption and market prices. 
• Price support policy on means of agricultural production 
In order to encourage national agricultural production, input prices subsidies have been adopted in 
many countries. The main types of subsidised inputs include electricity, fuel, agricultural machinery, 
fertilizer, pesticides, seeds, and forage. For example, the government provides fertiliser subsidises 
of up to 40%-50% of the cost. In India, the government provides the fertilizers, pesticide, irrigation 
water and agricultural electricity to farmers at much lower prices with subsidies on fertilizer alone 
amounting to more than 10 billion rupees (1 US dollar=59 rupees) (Niu 2000). Moreover, most 
countries supply good crop varieties at a low price in order to encourage the uptake and expended 
production of advanced grain varieties. In 2008, 13 Chinese provinces including Shaanxi and Henan, 
different varieties of rice and wheat were subsidized by 10-15 yuan per mu7, while the central 
government allocated 4 billion yuan to subsidise the cost of rice transplanters and rice planters by 
50%. The funds to subsidize the purchase of agricultural machinery were reported to increase to 10 
billion yuan in 2009 (Feng 2008). The objective of the subsidies for means of agricultural 
production are to ease the difficulties of farmers wanting to expand production, maintain the 
development of agricultural production, and enhance their capability to resist farming risks. 
• Export subsidies and import restrictions 
In order to protect the interests of their farmers, the governments of many developed countries 
formulate a series of preferential policies to encourage exports and restrict imports. With export 
subsidies, the export volumes may increase, diverting supply from the domestic market helping to 
raise prices. This policy may result in prices rising but following accession to the WTO, China 
undertook to abolish agricultural export subsidies before the end of 2013. 
The government may also employ other border measures such as restricting the import of certain 
foreign agricultural products to protect the domestic agricultural market. For example, China 
implements tariff rate quotas for a range of agricultural products, which means that agricultural 
imports within the quota volume face in-quota (generally low) tariff rates, while beyond the quota 
volume, much higher out-of-quota tariff rates apply. Usually, there is a large difference between the 
in-quota and out-of-quota tariff rates. For instance importing durum wheat from a most-favoured 
nation under WTO regulations attracts an in-quota tariff of 1% and an out-of-quota tariff of 65%. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 1 mu = 1/15 hectare 
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This applies because China’s agricultural industries use low technology, and its development 
requires a supported environment.  
2) Tax reduction and exemption policy 
According to Chinese Taxation laws published by Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(2013), enterprises engaged in agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, and fisheries may be exempt 
from or incur reduced corporate income tax.  Business tax exemptions apply for mechanized 
farming, irrigation, plant protection, agricultural and animal husbandry insurance and their related 
technical training services, as well as poultry, livestock, and aquatic animal breeding and disease 
control, while the production bases for agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fisheries have 
exemption from urban land tax. 
• Agricultural tax exemption 
Chinese farmers have paid various forms of  ‘agricultural tax’ for over 2600 years (Wang, X 2011). 
Until recently, China operated parallel tax systems for urban and rural taxpayers. However the 
agricultural tax was deemed as unfair for two reasons: the tax was measured by a proxy for grain 
production (the average crop yield of the previous five years), forcing farmers to bear the same tax 
burden in both prosperous and lean years; secondly, the tax consumed a large proportion of farmers’ 
incomes. However the agricultural tax was repealed tax in 2006 with the goal of unifying and 
simplifying tax rules. 
• Low-interest loan policy on agriculture 
The government provides loans at preferential interest rates for the production and sale of 
agricultural products. Its lending targets include state-owned agricultural enterprises, agricultural 
production organisations, rural credit cooperatives, and farmers. Previously access to credit was 
difficult for many small farming operations.  Now microfinance loans based on the credibility of the 
farmers, within an approved amount and period, and without pledge or guarantee are available. The 
specific amount lent is identified by rural credit cooperatives according to the actual situation of the 
local rural economy, the income of farmers and the financial status of the rural credit cooperatives. 
Since the introduction of this policy, small farmers can obtain small loans for production. 
The research of Lin (2005) showed that credit support contributes a lot to China’s economic growth. 
Under the WTO framework, credit support polices have developed in the following areas: 1) by 
creating a formal financial system in rural areas, especially in underdeveloped areas; 2) limiting the 
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scope of these financial institutions’ main business to agriculture; and 3) providing loans for 
farmers, rural enterprises, and rural development projects at a lower interest rate.  
2.2.2.3 Agricultural information and infrastructure services 
In addition to disaster relief and protection policies, agricultural information services and 
construction of agricultural infrastructure are also important risk management tools provided by 
government. Along with the development of internet services, rapid development of agricultural 
information networks in China has had a big influence on Chinese agriculture, changing traditional 
ideas and production patterns as well as promoting the distribution of agricultural by products to 
increase the farmers’ incomes (Zhang, Xu and Dai 2004). The Chinese government has invested 
substantially investment in improving rural infrastructure, including irrigation and water 
conservancy, roads, agricultural service agencies, agricultural sales outlets, agricultural education, 
research, technology and meteorology facilities.  
Thus government support involvement in risk management has taken on different forms at different 
times.  In the traditional, planned economic system, the government mainly relied on disaster relief 
and household self-help. Under the market system, the risk management strategy has changed to 
focus to price protection and crop insurance. However, farming risks have become more complex 
with the development of the economy and hence the need for more sophisticated means of 
managing the risks. 
2.2.3 Comparisons of the effectiveness of risk management strategies 
Although various risk management measures are available, different strategies are appropriate to 
meet different objectives. The risk management approach adopted by farmers also depends on the 
cost, their risk perceptions, the value at risk, channels available to obtain compensation, and farmers’ 
income and wealth status (Miller and Tolley 1989). When facing specific risks, farmers select the 
most suitable strategy based on their consideration of these factors. In addition, risk management 
strategies might be closely related to communications with hired labour, use of consultants, use of 
management information systems, and forward contracting (Wilson, Luginsland and Armstrong 
1988). With market liberalisation and agricultural industrialisation, many risk management 
strategies that farmers see as important and useful, are emerging. The effectiveness of any risk 
management strategy is related to the resources owned by the farmers, although this may not make 
sense from a social or macro point of view (Ellis 1998). For example, households are more likely to 
choose low-profit, low-risk business activities to avoid risk that could lead to inadequate supply of 
risky agricultural products. When constrained by limited resources and household activities, the risk 
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management strategies adopted by farmers have inherent defects, and any one strategy may not be 
applicable at all times.  What has proved effective in the past, does not necessarily work in the 
future so farmers need to act according to their circumstances (Patrick et al. 1985). 
In addition, the importance assigned to various strategies differs considerably among farmers. The 
results from Meuwissen and Huirne (2001) indicate that farmers’ perceptions of risk and risk 
management are very personal with the management strategies adopted reflecting their personal 
perceptions of risk. The same point was emphasised by Beal (1996). Furthermore, Patrick et al. 
(2000) hold the view that farmers’ perceptions vary with geographic areas and farm type, as well as 
being affected by institutional structures and other factors affecting the production environment. 
Therefore policy makers, advisers, and researchers should take these differences into account (Lien 
2003). Ahearn, Perry and EI-Osta (1993) found that agricultural policies did not affect small 
farmers, because many policy instruments such as price support are closely linked to production and 
small farmers produce very little output. They also suggested that it might be beneficial to enhance 
farmers’ competitiveness in the off-farm labour market by offering education or training 
opportunities. Ahsan, Ali and Kurian (1982) support the observation that crop insurance has 
obvious advantages over alternative institutional arrangements. 
International literature on the effectiveness of farming risk management can be summarized as 
follows: 
1) Research has focused on contract crop production issues and national protection policies for 
agricultural producers. Contract production promotes crop production linked closely to the 
market, which addresses several concerns about farming while safeguarding the raw materials 
for the agricultural processing sector. However, contract production is bound to lead to 
specialization. As a result, the uniform structure created by specialization inevitably increases 
the risks in crop production. This requires appropriate protection (by state or private institutions) 
but is dependent on the strength of the economy, and specific measures adopted vary from 
country to country. 
2) Farming risk management is developing beyond theory and a conceptual base to a practical 
application stage. Most of the recent literature in this area is concerned with the specific 
problems of crop production, for instance, the identification (and quantification) of risks and 
control of production processes. 
3) The main methods employed in recent studies are quantitative. Almost all of the risk 
management research involves mathematical models. Since markets are more developed and the 
degree of commercialisation of agricultural products is relatively high in developed countries, 
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these markets are more amenable to analysis by applied mathematical modelling and specific 
issues can be analysed in a relatively accurate and reliable manner. 
4) The research covers a wide range of situations including a variety of agricultural products, 
agricultural futures, agricultural production and processing methods, agricultural markets, 
agricultural policy, food safety, and other risks. 
Chinese literature on the effectiveness of farming risk management studies can be summarized as 
follows: 
1) Due to the long-term planned economy in China, losses among farmers were normally 
compensated by national disaster relief. Since the economic reforms and opening up of markets 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s8, extensive research has been carried out on farming risk 
management and in particular how to establish a risk management system under the 
circumstances of a market economy (Dong 1999; Xiong 1997). In practice, farmers often 
changed their decisions about production and employment to diversify their incomes and reduce 
the risks. Wang (2002) shows that farmers’ means of risk management largely focus on 
“savings” and “credit”; in essence, in the absence of sufficient external resources, they use the 
family’s economic resources. The same result can be found in Chen and Ding (2005).  
2) In recent years, scholars proposed setting up a system with Chinese characteristics that is 
dominated by crop insurance but supplemented by disaster relief (Xiong 1997; Zhang, Gu and 
Shi 2005). Although inefficiencies associated with the current crop insurance system have been 
demonstrated many times (Diao 2011; Feng 2009; Yu 2010; Zhang, and Shi 2007), ways of 
effectively overcoming these inefficiencies are lacking. While government-subsidised crop 
insurance is seen as an important means of risk management, and has become a topic of 
academic study, little effective research into practical applications of this type of insurance are 
evident. This is discussed in detail in section 2.3. 
2.3 Crop insurance 
The need for effective and efficient mechanisms for transferring or distributing the risks farmers 
face is paramount given the negative impact these risks can have on livelihoods and small unit 
farming households in China. In the past, there is no crop insurance in China that has a high 
participation rate throughout the whole country, as crop insurance is still mostly in the development 
stages for much of China. As China became wealthier, especially in city areas, the government was 
able to eventually provide crop insurance subsidies that would assist farmers in rural areas (Boyd et 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The program of economic reforms called "Socialism with Chinese characteristics" in the People's Republic of China 
(PRC) were started in December 1978 by reformists within the Communist Party of China (CPC) led by Deng Xiaoping. 
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al. 2011). The research about crop insurance products attracted the attention of policy makers and a 
large number of stakeholders around the world (Kasten and Hazell 2004). China is now by far the 
fastest growing crop insurance market in the world and has became the world’s second largest 
agricultural insurance market after the United States (Xinhuanet News, 2014). China's crop 
insurance covered 1.1billion mu (73 million hectares) of crops in 2013, accounting for 45% of the 
total planting acreage (Xinhuanet News, 2014).  
2.3.1 Evolution of crop insurance in China 
The evolution of crop insurance in China can be divided into four intermittent stages. The first stage 
was the initial trial period (1950-1958). From 1934 to 1949, there were mutual rural insurance 
companies and an insurance scheme in which the National Government and commercial insurance 
companies participated. Both of them ended in losses. In 1950, soon after the formation of the 
People’s Republic, China reintroduced agricultural insurance. After a process of stopping and 
starting, agricultural insurance stopped in 1958 for political reasons (Zhang, Gu and Shi 2006). 
Table 2-2 Milestones of crop insurance from 1949-1958 in China 
1949 The People's Insurance Company of China (PICC) established by Chinese government 
1951 Cotton insurance available in suburbs of Beijing, Nantong of Jiangsu, Xianyang of Shaanxi 
1953 Discontinued insurance because of organization streamlining  
1954 In order to meet agriculture cooperation requirements, PICC decided to re-open their crop 
insurance operations 
1956 Fifth meeting on national insurance was held; crop insurance experienced a rapid but short-
term revival 
1958 With the emergence of People’s communes, the need for crop insurance disappeared, to be 
replaced by national disaster relief and so operations closed again 
Source: China agricultural insurance mode analysis  
The second stage is the recovery period (1982-1992). After the 3rd session of the 11th CPC 
(Communist Party of China) meeting, the “household contract responsibility system” of the Reform 
and Opening-up Policy began in many rural areas. Free from the shackles of the “planned 
economy”, farmers’ enthusiasm for production increased markedly. At the same time, they had to 
face all the risks independently. In 1982, the agricultural insurance business was restored by the 
PICC with the policy encouraged and financially supported by the central government. It was 
undertaken in most provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions in China, covering more 
than 40 kinds of products from agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, and fisheries (Huang 2011).  
The rate of agricultural development and improvement in farmers’ incomes promoted progress in 
agricultural insurance, while crop insurance provided protection against crop losses during this 
period. The PICC operated agricultural insurance on behalf of the state government and ignored the 
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balance between profit and loss in the company. In the absence of government subsidies, the PICC 
would have incurred huge losses.  
In the third period, labelled recession (1993-2003), paid-out claims continued to escalate while 
premiums increased modestly. As Table 2-3 shows, the claims to premium rates were more than 80% 
from 1990 to 1994, with the biggest payout of 117.4% of premiums in 1991. Even with the high 
claims ratio, the government hoped to commercialise the PICC, and imposed a new accounting 
system with the main objective of charging high taxes on them after 1994. From Table 2-3, it can be 
seen that the claims rate declined below 80% from 1995 (except in 2001) when PICC transformed 
to a commercial company and adjusted their business practices, and even suspended agricultural 
insurance in some provinces.  
Table 2-3 Agricultural premiums and payout claims in China, 1990-2003  
Year 
Agricultural 
GDP  
(Billion yuan) 
Value (to be 
compensated) 
(Billion yuan) 
Premiums 
(Billion yuan) 
Claims 
(Billion yuan) 
Payout 
Rate 
1990 5017 367 1.9 1.7 87% 
1991 5289 594 4.6 5.4 117% 
1992 5800 592 8.6 8.1 94% 
1993 6882 638 5.6 6.5 115% 
1994 9457 1209   5.0 5.4 107% 
1995 11993 1127 5.0 3.6 72% 
1996 13844 1204 5.7 3.9 68% 
1997 14211 1702 5.8 4.2 72% 
1998 14552 1511 7.1 5.6 79% 
1999 14472 1541 6.3 4.8 76% 
2000 14628 1933 5.3 3.0 57% 
2001 15412 1942 3.0 3.0 100% 
2002 16117 1717 4.8 4.0 80% 
2003 17092 1884 4.6 3.0 60% 
Sources: China Insurance Yearbook (1990-2003) 
The fourth stage was the breakthrough period (2004 to the present day).  The “Chinese three-
dimensional rural issues policy concerning agriculture, countryside, and farmers” has paid more 
attention to these issues after China formally entered the WTO. Farmers have been given a high 
priority on the government agenda since 2004, when the government re-emphasized the importance 
of agriculture in the No.1 Central Document. A new Chinese agricultural subsidy system was 
established to subsidize farmers directly in order to protect their interests. The sheltering effect of 
agricultural insurance became prominent, and attention and priority to agricultural insurance 
emerged again (Wang, Zhang and Zheng 2009a).  In 2004, Groupama (Anmeng insurance company) 
was approved to set up branches in Chengdu, Sichuan, and became the first foreign company 
entering China’s market for agricultural insurance. It has launched property insurance, health 
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insurance, public liability insurance and other services and also co-founded the first agricultural and 
rural insurance research centre in China with the Southwest University of Finance.  In March 2004, 
Shanghai Anxin agricultural insurance company was set up. It is the first domestic agricultural 
insurance company in China and differed from the previous companies that operated as a 
commercial entity but were underwritten by government subsidies. The Jilin Anhua agricultural 
insurance company and Yangguang mutual agricultural insurance company in Heilongjiang 
followed shortly after. By 2012, the number of insurance companies involved in agricultural 
insurance in China increased to 22, which was seven times higher than the number of companies in 
2004.  
During the ten consecutive years from 2004 to 2013, the central government issued a range of 
policies to accelerate agricultural development in the form of the State document NO.1. The key 
idea is to promote policy-oriented agricultural insurance in many provinces, and the eligible 
provinces that were chosen for pilot projects supply a certain proportion of the premium for the 
farmers who buy crop insurance. The local government is responsible for implementing these 
policies. In 2007, the State Council approved a 1 billion RMB fund for agriculture insurance 
subsidies in six provinces—Jilin, Sichuan, Hunan, Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Jiangsu. Central 
and provincial governments paid around 50% of the premium, while city and county governments 
paid between 10%-30%, depending on their economic capacity, with farmers paying the remainder. 
The premium rate varies from 3%-10% according to regions, crops, and perils. Several natural 
disasters were covered: rainstorms, flood, windstorms, hail, and drought, and several diseases in 
crops and livestock. During this stage, the total premiums collected from agricultural insurance 
(crop and livestock insurance) increased from 466.95 million yuan in 2004 to 30.66 billion yuan in 
2013. Therefore agricultural insurance entered a period of rapid development. At the same time, the 
exploration of insurance products, rate setting, risk diversification, and applications of technology 
are all problems that need to be resolved.  
2.3.2 Nature of crop insurance, subsidisation and crop insurance versus disaster relief 
Wei (1994) argued that the establishment of China’s agricultural insurance mechanism was a new 
way to redistribute the national income in rural areas by compensating farmers for losses caused by 
agricultural disasters. It is also seen as an economic lever for achieving common prosperity. When 
talking about insurance in the United States, Skees (1999) found that government support for 
agricultural insurance is more about maintaining the rural economy and income enhancement than 
about risk management. Li (1996) argued that crop insurance should be classified as a quasi-public 
good. The characteristic of high social-benefit, but low private benefit, ensures that it creates 
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significant public interest. Yet it also has elements of exclusivity. Thus crop insurance does not 
belong entirely in one category or another. Liu (2000) considered that crop insurance products 
couldn’t be exchanged in accordance with their actual value because of the poor ability of farmers 
to pay. Thus crop insurance product could not be defined as a pure private commodity. Tuo et al. 
(2002) held similar views that the nature of crop insurance lies between private and public goods, 
though it tended more to the public end of the spectrum. Feng and Lin (2003) agreed with this idea, 
that crop insurance was a kind of quasi-public good with a positive externality that is reflected in 
the demand of farmers and the supply by insurance companies. Pi and Li (2003) argued that 
agricultural insurance provides various social benefits including risk diversification, resource 
allocation, and improvements in yield and quality. Thus the academic consensus is that crop 
insurance is semi-public and semi-private, and that this nature is important in the design and 
analysis of weather index crop insurance later in the thesis. 
The issue of whether to subsidise crop insurance is another topical matter. In general, there are two 
perspectives on how to stabilise returns from crop production in an uncertain production 
environment, namely by government intervention through disaster relief or through the market-
oriented insurance system. Ahsan, Ali and Kurian (1982) provide a simple, yet general, theoretical 
framework for crop insurance that may be used to explore its possibilities as a market enterprise or 
as a state-run program. Since then, various people have studied the issue although no consensus has 
emerged. Through cost-benefit analysis, and using the concepts of consumer and producer surplus, 
Siamwalla and Valdes (1986) argued that social welfare is likely to decrease and that crop insurance 
should be traded as a normal good and that the government should not provide subsidies because 
crop insurance is not a public good. However, these ideas were questioned by Ibarra and Hewitt 
(1999). They proposed that all attempts at crop insurance operated on commercial principles have 
failed without exception, and claimed that most insurance companies were managed directly or 
indirectly by governments. However, there are huge differences in production scale, structure, and 
wealth between farmers in the United States and in China, and so their findings may not necessarily 
be applicable to China. 
Whether crop insurance could substitute for government disaster relief was addressed by Li et al. 
(2002), who argued that crop insurance is fairer than disaster relief, while it could raise funds to 
improve the effectiveness of disaster relief. Sun (2003) emphasized that many countries promote 
crop insurance, not because the program could improve the welfare of farmers or other people, but 
because they wanted to demonstrate that disaster relief should be replaced by a more efficient way 
of dealing with the issue. The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) has advocated a 
greatly increased usage of crop insurance to replace the government’s disaster relief program. Sun 
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and Zhu (2004) proposed that the Chinese government should increase efforts to support crop 
insurance, and that central and local governments’ financial subsidies for crop insurance be 
included in the annual budget, with the business entities that provide agricultural insurance 
becoming the main agents to deal with farmers seeking assistance after any disaster. In another 
more specific study, Shi (2008) stated that the establishment and improvement of an agricultural 
disaster compensation system needs two changes to be implemented:  the focus of the disaster relief 
system should be gradually changed from the victims to their production; and the development of 
crop insurance should be seen as the main way to compensate for agricultural disasters. 
Overall, there is no consensus on whether disaster relief is worse or better than crop insurance. 
Through analysis of U.S. government subsidies for agricultural insurance, Skees (1999) argued that 
although the government has increased support for agricultural insurance, the agricultural insurance 
industry has not developed any faster or better. Skees noted that there are four problems when 
operating a crop insurance scheme supported with government subsidies: 1) it increases the 
financial burden on the government because of the high claims ratio and management cost; 2) it 
distorts the compensation function of agricultural insurance to be a kind of income transfer 
instrument, which is also confirmed by Goodwin (2001); 3) it creates a negative impact on private 
insurance supply. Some analysts hold the opinion that subsidised insurance is a forlorn attempt by 
government to offset market failures. Recently, more debate and discussion has focused on the issue 
of whether market failure has led to government intervention or has government intervention 
crowded-out the development of private insurance; and 4) it reduces the efficiency of social capital 
and inhibits product innovation. The main opposition to disaster relief may be its ex-post nature that 
raises a potential moral hazard problem. 
In comparison, Glauber, Collins and Barry (2002) argued that crop insurance was seen as preferable 
to disaster assistance because it was less costly and hence could be provided to more producers, was 
less likely to encourage moral hazard, and unlikely to encourage producers to plant crops on 
marginal lands. Despite substantial growth in insurance programs, it has failed to replace other 
disaster relief as the sole form of assistance. Glauber (2004) proposed that weather-index contracts 
could provide a low cost alternative to insuring individual risks. By minimizing adverse selection 
and moral hazard problems, the cost of delivering indexed contracts are low, which suggests an 
alternative role for government as regulator and reinsurer of catastrophic risks rather than as a 
provider of individual risk protection through the sale of retail risk products.  
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2.3.3 Should crop insurance be voluntary or mandatory?  
Academics have different views on whether crop insurance should be voluntary or mandatory. Liu 
(2000) opposed compulsory insurance because one of the important aspects of Chinese insurance 
law is the voluntary principle, while he also highlighted problems associated with imperfect 
supervision. However Tuo (2002) insisted that compulsory insurance is the appropriate path for 
China on the basis that: 1) only enforcement can ensure farmers’ participation; 2) current insurance 
law lacks restrictions on policy-oriented agricultural insurance; and 3) compulsion helps to avoid 
adverse selection and prevents moral hazard. After considering the two views expressed above, 
Feng (2004a) argued that China should try induced-compulsory insurance which means it would be 
semi-mandatory.  The indirect coercion occurred by linking crop insurance with the existing 
preferential agricultural policies, such as direct subsidies, agricultural loans, and technical services.  
Feng’s study raises strong arguments, which means that neither purely voluntary nor totally 
mandatory schemes are suitable to China’s situation. Farmers are not enthusiastic about taking crop 
insurance as a completely voluntary option (Chambers 2007). The problems of moral hazard and 
adverse selection are likely to occur, because only high-risk farms will insure, shrinking the crop 
insurance market and increasing premiums. While it may not be able to be made mandatory, strong 
indirect incentives may be needed to push participation rates as high as possible, otherwise the 
program is likely to be unviable and ineffective.  
2.3.4 Demand for crop insurance 
In a survey of farmers in Fujian, Tuo (2001) found that there are traditional ways to spread risks for 
farmers such as decentralization of land parcels and diversity of plantings. These internal risk-
sharing mechanisms reduce the demand for crop insurance. Zhang et al. (2005), in a case study in 
Henan, argued that the weak demand for crop insurance in China was due to natural disaster risk not 
being a significant factor in farmers’ livelihood, at least in the areas they were investigating. 
Because agricultural income accounts for a declining proportion of total household income, and the 
changes that are occurring in rural population structure, crop insurance is not as prominent for 
farmers to improve their welfare. However, Zhong and Ning (2005) investigated farmers in the 
valley along the Manas River in Xinjiang and found that farmers demand for crop insurance was 
affected by many factors, such as the fluctuations in production, crop specialization, the total 
cultivated area, and the length of farming experience.  
Xu and Wang (2005) argued that the rural insurance market is an income-based market, and that the 
total participation will increase with income. As long as farmers’ disposable income increases, their 
35	  
	  
demand for insurance products will increase, because they cannot afford it when they have low 
incomes. However, crop insurance is primarily related to farming income. Farmers will be less 
interested in crop insurance if farming income occupies a low proportion of their total incomes. 
Other researchers also studied the relationship between income level and insurance demand. 
Although different scholars have used different indicators, their conclusions are similar; that a 
significant positive correlation exists between income level and insurance demand (Campbell 1980; 
Kim 1993).  Anderson (2010) used a simple dynamic model to examine the interaction between 
credit, insurance, and liquidity constraints for a risk-averse farmer who used crop insurance to 
manage risk and also borrowed and lent subject to a credit constraint. Both theoretical and 
numerical results are provided to support the hypothesis that liquidity constraints can have a large 
impact on optimal insurance decisions. 
China established crop insurance to provide farmers with another risk management tool and to 
promote other goals, such as improving farmers' access to credit, promoting production of high-
value crops that might also have higher yield risk, and providing more stability to agriculture and 
related industries. Given this background, it is worthwhile investigating what factors might 
influence farmers’ demand for weather index crop insurance and how the findings differ from those 
of previous studies.  
2.3.5 Insurance pricing  
Generally speaking, insurers take into consideration their own risk preferences, business benefits, 
and operational costs when setting a price for a risk management instrument. While there are lots of 
ways to go about pricing, the cost of each contract must cover some part of the expected loss, as 
well as some loading or risk margin that corresponds to a capital reserve charge required to bear the 
risk at a certain level for the business, plus administrative costs. In general the premium charged for 
a contract can be broken down, as highlighted by Ozaki (2009), as follows:  
Premium = Expected Loss + Risk Margin + Administrative Costs 
The expected loss is the average payout on the contract in any given season. The risk margin is 
charged by insurers because, in some years, when the insured events happen, compensation in 
excess of this average will be necessary and the insurers must be paid for this eventuality. This can 
be viewed as the premium for the insurance companies taking on the risk. The values for the 
expected loss and the risk margin need be established according to historical payment data (Martin, 
Coble and Barnett 2001). These values involve a provision to pay for uncertainties in the data such 
as trends or missing variables.  The methods for identifying the value of the expected loss are 
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different from insurer to insurer, and sometimes a combination method may be needed to determine 
the risk margin. Administrative costs are essentially the costs for the insurer to operate the business 
including charges for data, office work, salary and HR administration, taxes, and reinsurance and 
brokerage charges if necessary (Ozaki 2009). 
USAID (2006) has outlined a pricing method for insurance where the price is equal to the cost of 
the pure risk plus the cost of information to control adverse selection, the cost of monitoring to 
control moral hazard, the cost of loss adjustment, the cost of delivery, the cost to cover ambiguity of 
the risk, and the cost of ready access to capital to pay for all losses. Dealing with small farmers 
compounds all of these costs. Thus for small farmers, these costs are quite large relative to the 
amount insured. Due to the structure of agriculture in lower-income areas, commercial insurers feel 
that the investment to develop and administer an insurance product might be higher than the 
potential revenue from a relatively small market. The costs associated with administering the 
product are relatively high. 
The literature also proposes several methods for designing the contracts. Mahul and Wright (2003) 
proposed a definition of optimal insurance contracts. Many examples related to crop yield insurance 
in the United States of America and in the European Union highlight that the insurance scheme 
could not exist without government reinsurance and/or subsidies. Phelippe-Guinvarc’h and Cordier 
(2006) presented three ideas to overcome the difficulties of managing insurance contracts that 
include systematic risk: multi-year management to get the balance of the loss ratio over several 
years; private reinsurance; and the transfer of the systemic component to financial markets. These 
approaches were applied to a crop yield insurance contract but can be extended to other insurance 
contracts such as weather index insurance. The recommended strategies pool risk as is common 
with all insurance contracts. Additionally, the strategy transfers the pooled risk to financial markets 
in order to manage the systemic risks component.  
2.3.6 Distributions of crop yield  
A critical parameter in any crop insurance scheme is the likely distribution of crop yields. There are 
two main methods to study crop yield distributions; parametric and nonparametric. The parametric 
method assumes the yields obey a distribution function, and the observed sample of values can be 
used to estimate the parameter values. This method requires an a priori distribution function and a 
relatively large number of sample observations. Early research focused on the parametric method, 
and the initial idea was that yields are normally distributed (Botts 1958). As crop yields are not 
always normally distributed because of planting techniques and natural conditions (Ramirez, Misra 
and Field 2003), a variety of parametric distributions appeared in following years. Norwood et al. 
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(2004) reviewed six yield distributions popular in the literature during that period, namely the beta 
distribution (Preckel 1989), gamma distribution (Gallagher 1987), Weibull distribution (Sherrick et 
al. 2004), Burr distribution (Chen and Miranda 2004), lognormal distribution (Goodwin, Roberts 
and Coble 2000), and inverse hyperbolic sine transformation distribution (Ramírez 1997). By using 
different model specifications, estimation methods, and testing procedures, Ramirez (2003) 
examined the distribution of crop yield and concluded at both aggregate and farm-level, that yield 
distributions depend on the local circumstances. 
More scholars now use non-parametric estimation when fitting crop yield distributions because of 
advantages in not being constrained by broad assumptions or hypotheses and being less affected by 
observation error and accuracy. For example, Goodwin and Ker (1998) used non-parametric density 
estimation procedures to evaluate county-level crop yield distributions. The results were then used 
to measure yield and calculate the insurance premium rates for barley and wheat. In 2000, Goodwin 
and Ker went on to measure the distributional implications of alternative methods for estimating 
price risk and deriving insurance premium rates. Progress in providing flexible parametric 
specifications capable of recognizing the skewness and kurtosis present in commodity price 
distributions has been helpful.  
Turvey and Zhao (1999) applied 609 crop yield histories of Ontario farmers to check which one 
between Normal, Gamma, and Beta distributions best represented crop yield distributions. They 
also compared the efficiency in premium estimation with non-parametric kernel estimation for the 
same data. Their results showed that Beta and the kernel distributions were positively skewed. That 
is, a high premium rate is likely to inhibit the risk-adverse person to purchase insurance. Conversely, 
the normal and gamma distributions were negatively skewed, which meant that a low premium rate 
might encourage risk-preferers to purchase insurance. Specification of the distribution, which is 
often not examined, may lead to significant errors in crop insurance policy rating and expected 
payouts from polices (Sherrick et al. 2004). Lawas (2005) found that the Johnson family of 
distributions, including the lognormal distribution, SU distribution and SB distribution, were the 
best parameterised distribution models to fit crop yields. Compared with the Beta distribution 
(generally considered to be the most widely used model for fitting crop yield distributions), the 
study by Lawas showed that the four different distributions differ from each other when 
determining the insurance premium. Normally, the non-parametric approach is preferred for its 
flexibility when enough data can be obtained while the parametric approach is useful where few 
data are available (Goodwin and Mahul 2004).  
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2.3.7 Types of crop insurance 
In recent research, insurance has been seen as a form of risk management used to hedge against a 
contingent loss. The traditional definition is the equitable transfer of the risk of loss from one entity 
to another in exchange for a premium to prevent a large and possibly devastating loss. There are 
several features of this type of insurance that ensure it is treated as a special line of business. 
Difficulties in achieving adequate diversification because of the nature of the risk, asymmetries of 
information, the geographical dispersion of agricultural production, and the complexity of the 
biological processes of production, are all features which require skilled and expert underwriting of 
agricultural insurance, and justify it being considered a special business line. This section explores 
the different kinds of crop insurance that have been used or are being using now. A simple 
comparison helps us to identify the main characteristics and their applicability and these are 
explained.  It also serves as a definition of key terms used frequently in the study. 
Multi-Peril Crop Insurance (MPCI) is the oldest and most common form of crop insurance. It 
protects against crop yield losses by allowing participating producers to insure a certain percentage 
of their historical crop production. A single policy protects crops against all natural perils including 
adverse weather, fire, insects, disease, wildlife, earthquake, volcanic eruption and failure of 
irrigation water due to unavoidable causes. The advantages of this product are that it applies to the 
interaction of multiple risks and can be used for the insured crop with complex regional 
characteristics. The People’s Insurance Company of China, China United Insurance Company, and 
Xinjiang Production and Construction Corp all offer this kind of product.  
Policy-oriented agricultural insurance (including crop and livestock insurance) relies on government 
policy support through premium subsidies to the planting and breeding industries, to protect the 
economic losses caused by natural disasters and accidents. It is conducive to improving the 
effective use of finance, decentralizing agricultural risks and promoting sustainable growth in 
farmers’ incomes. This type of insurance is also allowed under WTO rules to support agricultural 
development as a green box policy (Wang, D 2009). Policy-oriented agricultural insurance is a 
special kind of multi-peril crop insurance supported by government subsidies. By definition, its 
implementation is to achieve the objectives of the government’s agricultural and rural economic 
development policy. There are several major features of this system. First, it provides a service that 
the commercial insurance companies find is difficult if not impossible to provide; second, the 
government is involved in macroeconomic policy-making and more generally in micro-
management activities; third, the government provides subsidies 
39	  
	  
administrative help to ensure the sustainability of such a system; and fourth, it is a non-profit 
scheme (Tuo and Zhu 2004). 
Yield insurance normally includes a yield guarantee, based on a regional average yield or on an 
individual’s historic yields, where the main risks affecting yield are all covered (Barnett et al. 2005). 
In area-yield insurance, indemnities and premiums are not based on a producer’s own yields but 
rather on the average yield for a surrounding geographical area (Miranda 1991). Miranda maintains 
that area-yield crop insurance offers numerous advantages over insurance based on individual yields. 
Because information about the distribution of an area’s yield is generally available, and more 
reliable than information regarding the distribution of an individual farm’s yields, insurers can 
assess the actuarial fairness of premiums more accurately under an area-yield policy, thereby 
significantly reducing the adverse selection problem. Moreover, because the indemnities are based 
on the area yield rather than the producer’s yield, a producer cannot increase his indemnity 
significantly by unilaterally altering his production practices. Thus under an area-yield program, 
moral hazard could essentially be eliminated. Administrative costs would also be substantially 
reduced under an area-yield program because claims would not have to be adjusted individually and 
verification of individual production histories would no longer be required. Mahul (1999) focused 
on the design of a crop insurance contract when the indemnity was based on the aggregate yield of a 
surrounding geographical area.  
Revenue insurance guarantees a certain level of revenue rather than just covering production risk. It 
combines the coverage of yield and price risks in a single product. The guarantee is based on market 
prices and the actual yield from an individual’s farm (Hofstrand and Edwards 2003). With area-
revenue insurance, indemnities are computed from the reduction in the product of average yields 
and prices in an area (Lin, Mullen and Wetzstein 2010). 
Income insurance covers income and so is dependent on both yield and price risks, but the costs of 
production are also considered. Usually this type of insurance is not product-specific, but related to 
whole-farm income. Whole-farm insurance provides coverage for the whole farm’s net revenue or 
total gross margin, which are good proxies for farmers’ profitability. This type of insurance consists 
of a combination of guarantees for the different agricultural products from a farm. Depending on the 
type of guarantee, it can be whole-farm yield insurance, whole-farm revenue insurance, or whole 
farm income insurance (Díaz-Caneja and Garrido 2009).  
Single crop insurance operates on the basis that when a pre-specified disaster occurs, the insured 
will receive payments according to the amount of crop yield lost. The payment is equal to the 
difference between the protection yield and remaining post-disaster yield multiplied by indemnity 
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amount and the area. This product is suitable for hail, frost, or any other extreme weather event. 
Hail insurance in many countries of Europe and North America is usually offered by the private 
sector since the loss by hail damage is relatively simple to assess and calculate. Single crop 
insurance is not applicable for drought or other disasters that might cause large losses but which are 
hard to assess independently.  
Weather index insurance can deal with weather conditions that directly affect crop production, with 
each value of the index having a corresponding crop yield. When this index reaches a certain 
threshold, the insured can receive the appropriate payout as compensation. In other words, weather 
index insurance insures against weather events that are highly correlated with production loss used 
as a proxy for the individual’s loss (Barnett and Mahul 2007; Collier, Skees and Barnett 2009). In 
comparison, weather index insurance would be one potential and promising means, by which the 
moral hazard issues can be avoided and which is especially applicable for crops and areas with 
limited revenue records. 
In summary, several alternative designs of crop yield and revenue insurance have been tried over 
the past few decades in an attempt to increase participation rates and to lower the loss ratios. Some 
programs aimed at reducing the moral hazard and adverse selection issues inherent in insurance 
contracts and some have tried to make contracts more efficient (cover larger portions of the risks 
faced by the producer) by utilizing new methodologies and data. Varieties of crop insurance 
products provided farmers a complex portfolio of risk management tools and choices. Lubben et al. 
(2013) used a four-stage simulation model to analyse the complementary or substitutability of 
different type of crop insurance choices, which not only identified the complementarity, but also 
found potential overlap between these products. This assessment provided insight for more effective 
and attractive policy design.  
2.4 Weather index insurance 
Crop production relies heavily on natural conditions and humans lack the ability to either control or 
effectively mitigate them. The nature of farming systems in developing countries means that 
farmers are particularly vulnerable to negative weather conditions (Dercon 2004). Using a ten-year 
series of panel data from three Indian villages, Dercon found that 78% of households had been 
seriously affected by weather events, such as drought, flooding, or frost that had a direct effect on 
harvest failure. Similar reports about how extreme weather led to yield decline can also be found in 
Kinsey, Burger and Gunning (1998), and Morduch (1995). Cole et al. (2009) identified drought as 
the major source of low-income shocks by almost 88% of Indian rural household in the states of 
Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat. Those weather shocks constrain farmers’ willingness to invest in 
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inputs that might increase their productivity and improve their economic situation, and limit the 
effectiveness of village risk-sharing networks because they influence the majority of households in 
the vicinity (Gine´, Townsend and Vickery 2008). Thus, weather shocks are particularly detrimental 
to rural residents.  
The advantages of index-based insurance over traditional insurance seem to have reached a 
consensus in theoretical discussions, and the debate about the promise and potential uses of index 
based crop insurance has continued since the late 1990s. Some consensus has emerged over the 
benefits of weather index insurance relative to traditional insurance with a growing number of 
researchers such as Alderman and Haque (2007), Murphy et al. (2008), and Skees (2008) 
advocating and supporting weather insurance projects in developing countries. Pilot weather 
insurance projects have been conducted by the Commodity Risk Management Group (CRMG) of 
World Bank in Mongolia, Ethiopia, Malawi, India, Peru, Mexico, Kenya, Nicaragua, and Ukraine 
while it is still in a pilot or exploration stage in Madagascar, Tanzania, and China. 
2.4.1 International research on weather index crop insurance  
The discussion of international research on weather index crop insurance has focused on four main 
areas. 
2.4.1.1 Weather index insurance versus traditional agricultural insurance 
There is an academic consensus on the advantages and disadvantages of weather index crop 
insurance compared with traditional insurance. The consensus is based on the following aspects: 
Many studies have identified moral hazard and adverse selection problems in farm-level insurance 
products which are usually suggested as causes for poor actuarial performance of crop insurance 
programs (Goodwin and Mahul 2004; Miranda 1991; Quiggin, Karagiannis and Stanton 1993). 
Quiggin et al. (1993) summarised that “both moral hazard and adverse selection are implications of 
two assumptions which are central to modern economic theory—that individuals make rational 
choices in the light of the constraints facing them, and that information is costly”.  
Moral hazard refers to the tendency of insurance protection to alter an individual’s motive to 
prevent loss which incurs an expense for the insurer and therefore, in turn, affects the cost of 
coverage for insured individuals (Shavell 1979). Vincent and Barry (1996) found that moral hazard 
effects, which encourage producers to act to increase the probability and size of losses, are assumed 
to provide incentives for less intensive cultivation practices as insured farmers reduce input use and 
average yields. Economists have suggested two partial solutions to reduce the possibility of moral 
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hazard. They emphasize a focus on incomplete (partial) coverage against loss and “observation” by 
the insurer of the care taken by the insured to prevent loss (Islam 1997). For example, the 
Agricultural Risk Protection Act instructed the Risk Management Agency of United States to 
increase surveillance of insured producers through the Farm Service Agency and use data mining 
techniques to identify potential sources of fraud and abuse (Rejesus et al. 2006).  
Adverse selection applies when the farmers with high risk can buy the insurance at the same price 
as the low risk farmers so that if only high-risk farmers buy insurance, insurance companies 
generate insufficient revenue to cover the payouts (Skees and Reed 1986). This situation occurs 
because of geographical differences and the different risks facing individual households. Individual 
farmers have knowledge about their own risk situation but insurance companies, without such 
information, cannot distinguish among their customers by their risk situation.  
As mentioned previously, the advantages of index insurance products are that no historic farm-level 
yield data are required and that it avoids costly claims adjustments, which are simply not practical 
for small parcels of land. However, Barnett (2004) points out that index insurance may also have its 
own limitations by exposing the policyholder to basis risk. They may not always be offered 
indemnity when experiencing losses while occasionally they may not get indemnities when having 
actually experienced losses. Barnett also said that weather index insurance might hold promise for 
specialty crops that are highly susceptible to freezing temperatures or commodities, such as pasture, 
where it is difficult to measure yield. 
Thus the biggest advantage of index insurance products is that they are not susceptible to the 
common problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. The payment is not implemented 
according to output of the individual producer but the weather situation provided by an objective 
and independent third party (weather station)(Collier, Skees and Barnett 2009; Vedenov and Barnett 
2004a). Neither the insured farmer nor the insurer can control nature, but depending on the weather 
report and signed contract, the information is generally symmetric. Two key benefits are perceived 
as:  
• Reduced costs where costs relate to two areas: a) administrative cost (operating and 
management cost); and b) the cost for assessing losses plot-to-plot. One challenge with 
traditional crop insurance products is the high cost of on-farm loss adjustment. Weather index 
crop insurance need not assess individual losses, which facilitate speedier claims, and reduces 
costs to the insurer significantly (USAID 2006). 
• Ease of reinsurance; when the total exposure of a risk or group of risks presents the potential for 
losses beyond the limit which is prudent for an insurance company to carry, the insurance 
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company may purchase reinsurance i.e. insurance of the insurance. Reinsurance (Belete and 
Mahul 2007) has many advantages including: (a) levelling the results of the insurance company 
over a period of time; (b) limiting the exposure of individual risks and restricting losses paid out 
by the insurance company; (c) increase in insurance company’s solvency margin (percent of 
capital and reserves to net premium income) maintaining the company’s financial strength; and 
(d) the reinsurer can share in the profits of the insurance company, but also contribute to the 
losses, the net result being a more stable loss ratio over the period of insurance. 
The contract for weather index crop insurance is straightforward, standard and transparent, so it is 
easily traded in the secondary market9, although it is sometimes bundled with other financial 
services. Farmers can sell contracts, while individuals or groups affected by weather risk 
(government, suppliers, and processors) can use weather index insurance to transfer farming risk to 
the financial and reinsurance market. In this way, weather index crop insurance has more ability 
than traditional agricultural insurance to spread risk because the risk associated with each contract 
can be shifted, because of market liquidity to the place where it is overvalued. 
Although weather index insurance overcomes some of the drawbacks of traditional agricultural 
insurance, and could promote the expansion of agricultural insurance, previous studies have also 
highlighted the following significant challenges: 
• Basis risk is the most challenging issue with weather index insurance. It is the risk associated 
with the imperfect match between compensation and actual losses. Once the correlation between 
index and loss is strong, basis risk will be less important, and vice versa. Because no 
individualised loss adjustment occurs with weather index insurance, the policyholder always 
carries the basis risk. It can be reduced by precise actuarial models, but cannot be eliminated 
(World Bank 2006). 
• Weather index insurance can protect some of the risk faced by farmers but cannot protect price 
changes and other risks such as pest damage (Syroka 2007). 
• The weather index insurance market is still in early stages of development and the start-up cost 
is high (NRAC 2012). Technical and financial obstacles constrain the development of weather 
index insurance (David Hofman 2006). 
• The weather cycle, microclimate, and accuracy of weather reports can all impact on the 
effectiveness and operation of weather index insurance (Bagazonzya and Kloeppinger-Todd 
2007). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  The secondary market, also called aftermarket, is the financial market where previously issued securities and financial 
instruments such as stock, bonds, options, and futures are bought and sold.	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• Reliable and accessible data can also be a problem. For index insurance to be viable, the 
underlying index must be objectively and accurately measured. If data used for the index cannot 
be trusted, or are not accurate, the system will fail. Making the data publicly available to both 
insurers and policyholders can help build confidence in the accuracy of the numbers. Whether 
provided by government or other third-party sources, index measurements must be widely 
disseminated and secure from tampering. 
2.4.1.2 Development process of weather index crop insurance 
Bagazonzya and Kloeppinger-Todd (2007) divided the development period for weather index 
insurance into two phases:  
• First stage 1997-2001 
• First weather derivative insurance transaction in U.S. in 1997 
• Incorporated into research agenda of the World Bank in 1999 
• Academic focus on designing generic applications for the rural sectors of developing 
countries 
• Second stage, 2002 onwards 
• First involvement by diverse donors in financing project development costs 
• Focus on design and implementation of pilot-scale weather-index insurance projects  
• Activities being prepared in Central America, Vietnam, Kenya, and Tanzania 
Conversely, Syroka (2007) argued that weather index insurance has experienced three stages. The 
first stage from 1997 to 2001 was mainly concerned with feasibility studies from a theoretical angle. 
Most academics focussed on the design of generic applications for the rural sectors of developing 
countries. The second stage lasted from 2002-2005 and involved diverse donors financing project 
developments, and some pilot-scale testing. The research moved to project design and 
implementation, collecting interesting experiences at national and farmer level, from Mexico (2001), 
India (2003), Ukraine (2005), Malawi (2005), and Ethiopia (2006). From 2006, there has been a 
dramatic increase in investments related to index based insurance programs from the international 
community, World Bank, IFC, European Investment Bank, Asian Development Bank, Caribbean 
Development Bank, and World Food Program (Barnett and Mahul 2007). The investment is also 
more diversified, focusing on new risks and more countries, innovative distribution channels, new 
risk assessment technologies, capacity building, design of new applications, systematic project 
evaluation, and developmental impact. The research extended to the deployment of a sustainable, 
scalable, standardised project. 
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2.4.1.3 Factors influencing adoption of weather index crop insurance 
There is a growing literature on factors that influence the suitability of insurance for developing 
countries, and how such products work in practice and contribute to development (Churchill and 
Rückversicherungs-Gesellschaft 2006). Most of these studies are in the area of health insurance in 
developing countries, and very few examine issues associated with crop insurance in particular 
(Kirchberger, Gunning and Platteau 2008).  
A lot of economic models suggest that the decision to purchase insurance depends on the perceived 
probability distribution of outcomes farmers face with or without insurance, and the farmer’s level 
of risk aversion with respect to potential crop losses. Nadolnyak (2010) presented a number of 
concepts particularly relevant for insurance, such as bounded rationality, and models of trust. 
Moreover, the experience from field studies helped understand the factors that could make index 
insurance more or less attractive to farmers. Making insurance economically attractive is the most 
important followed building trust. Serra (2003) undertook an empirical study of the demand for 
agricultural insurance and found that farmers’ motivation to buy agricultural insurance falls with the 
increase in their wealth. This conclusion is consistent with Friedman’s comments on absolute risk 
aversion. That is, beyond a certain level of wealth, the extent of risk aversion gradually reduces for 
the insured person, because they tend to protect themselves more extensively. 
Furthermore, abundant evidence from the field suggests that farmers in developing countries have 
difficulties understanding index insurance, at least when they first encounter it (Kirchberger, 
Gunning and Platteau 2008). Anecdotal evidence includes stories of farmers upset if they do not 
receive their premiums back at the end of the year, or if they receive no payments for a failed crop 
when the rainfall index was still exceeded (Suarez, Linnerooth-Bayer and Mechler 2007). Helping 
farmers understand index insurance will avoid situations like these — which can destroy confidence 
in the product—and will improve the chances that farmers will purchase index insurance that makes 
sense to them, and not purchase insurance that fails to meet their needs. Designing an insurance 
contract that meets farmers’ needs, and is attractive to them, is challenging. From an economic 
perspective, farmers purchase insurance if it increases their expected utility or welfare, which 
depends on its net average cost to them, the likelihood and extent to which it shields them from 
losses, and their personal level of risk aversion (Churchill and Rückversicherungs-Gesellschaft 
2006). From a social perspective, they will purchase insurance based on whether they trust the 
people who are selling it and whether they observe other members in their community doing the 
same (Suarez, Linnerooth-Bayer and Mechler 2007).  
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2.4.1.4 Application of weather index crop insurance 
• World Bank promotion 
As early as 1999, weather index-based insurance was being discussed in academic papers as an 
alternative solution for developing agricultural economies. In 2002, donors began to finance pilot 
testing of these ideas. In particular, the World Bank’s Commodity Risk Management Group 
(CRMG) was allocated trust funds from the Swiss and the Dutch governments to pilot test weather 
index insurance for farmers to complement its price risk management work in commodity markets. 
CRMG has been involved in many technical assistance projects with commercial entities in the 
developing world. CRMG was involved in its first index-based weather risk management 
transaction in India in June 2003, the first-ever weather insurance project in the country. Since 2003 
there have been several other pilot schemes around the world, including those completed in Ukraine, 
Ethiopia, and Malawi, and in Kenya, Tanzania, and Thailand. Success like the market growth in 
India had significant demonstration effects and showed that weather risk management for farmers in 
the developing world is possible through insurance-type instruments. There has also been some 
promising practical experience with weather index insurance in developed countries, although the 
market is currently still relatively small. In the USA, a rainfall index-based insurance scheme was 
used to hedge agricultural risk from drought and flood (Paulson and Hart 2006). In Canada, weather 
index-based insurance was developed to hedge the yield risk of corn and forage grass from high 
temperatures (Hellmuth et al. 2009). In Australia, a wide variety of weather index insurance 
products available for agriculture, including rain day index, dry day index, frost day index, heat day 
index, dry season index, rain season index, dry spell index (NRAC 2012). For instance, the Latevo 
International’s Certainty Insurance offers frost and drought insurance in 2014 (Trotter 2014). From 
these experiences, the World Bank’s Commodity Risk Management Group has begun to synthesize 
some best practices on how to create successful weather insurance schemes for farmers and how to 
make such initiatives sustainable and scalable, particularly in Africa. 
• Research on the basic principles and steps of insurance design  
For the insurance contract, substantial independence should exist in the incidence of random events 
(Spence and Zeckhauser 1971). If not, the law of large numbers10, on which premium and 
indemnity calculations are based, breaks down. However, unlike most other insurance situations, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  The law of large numbers (LLN) is a principal in probability theory, which describes the performing result of the 
same experiment by a large number of times. In line with the principal, the average of the results got from the large 
number of experiments should be close to the expected value, and will tend to become closer as more experiments are 
tested. 
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the incidence of agricultural risk is not independently distributed among the insured. Good or bad 
weather may have similar effects on all farmers in adjoining areas. Only insurance agencies 
covering greatly varying agro-climatic areas can hope to balance such risks. Some may argue that 
instead of spreading risk over space, insurance companies can spread risk over time. That is, local 
insurance companies can offer contracts so as to equate the premiums collected to the expected 
indemnity over a number of years. However, experience shows that for any meaningful program, 
risk spreading over both time and space is necessary. 
The final report to the Commodity Risk Management Group of the World Bank (Osgood et al. 2007) 
indicated that the first step should be to identify major weather events in an area and analyse which 
caused crop losses; second, to qualify the impact of bad weather on farmers’ income and set the 
index for the contract; third, price the contract and design a pilot study; fourth, prepare promotional 
material and improve public awareness; and fifth, monitor and evaluate the project. An additional 
step might be to confirm the implementation of appropriate laws and regulations. 
• Research on the prerequisites and restrictions of weather index insurance   
Technical prerequisites for weather index insurance are (USAID 2006): a) the weather must cause 
correlated losses, and these are not confined to isolated and random losses in different geographic 
areas; b) the index must have a strong relationship with the losses; c) the weather event can be 
observed and easily measured. More importantly, the weather records must be transparent and 
objective; d) the measurement of the weather variable should involve an independent third party, 
who cannot share benefits as a consequence of weather events; e) historic and reliable data exist to 
price the weather index insurance contract; f) stakeholders must be committed to the programme; 
and g) a stable political and economic environment is needed to maintain a long term plan, 
involving implementation and evaluation. If some of these conditions are not met, it may be unwise 
to advance to pilot stage development. 
Moreover, index insurance is not suitable for all types of risk. Some risks that cannot be managed 
using index insurance include: a) risks that can be influenced by human behaviour. If farmers are 
able to influence the index value, moral hazard will be a problem. Thus index insurance often uses 
weather variables as the index, because weather is the source of risk and cannot be influenced by 
people. It is harder to set up index insurance for something like a crop disease because human 
intervention plays an important role in controlling or delaying the development of those diseases; b) 
other risks that cannot be managed by index insurance include frequently occurring risks. If events 
causing heavy losses occur frequently, the probability of loss will be high, so the premium will also 
need to be high. The risks occurring regularly need other management strategies to mitigate them; c) 
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independent risks. If the risk is isolated, it cannot be correlated with losses, and index insurance is 
inappropriate. 
• Research on the future prospects of weather index insurance 
Index insurance can support several common development objectives, including protecting rural 
farmers’ livelihoods and reducing poverty, strengthening rural finance, and reducing need for 
disaster relief and safety net policies. But weather index insurance is dependent on certain 
principles and conditions: the real situation in different areas presents different challenges that will 
influence how weather index insurance is structured and implemented. Generally, it will be used at 
three different risk levels (Barnett and Mahul 2007): 
a. Micro-level 
This is the most common type for individual farmers, and the index that is the basis for payment of 
claims comes from the nearest weather station. Examples at household level include rainfall index 
insurance in India in 2003; severe winter livestock pilot project in Mongolia in 2006; and another 
rainfall index insurance pilot for groundnut farmers in Malawi in 2005. 
b. Mid-level 
In this case, the insured is an aggregated risk holder, like a bank responsible for local loans, or a 
company dependent on the output of a product. The index at this level may be based on data from 
among several weather stations such as the El Niño Southern Oscillation Index Insurance pilot 
study in Peru based on an index of sea surface temperatures. 
c. Macro-level 
Usually, the index at macro level is used to measure the effects over a large-scale region, such as a 
whole province, or an island. It can be measured by several weather stations, or sometimes by a 
particular station, such as a typhoon damaging a large region.  Risk allocation is important in the 
application to macro-regions because the impact of many weather events, especially typhoons, is 
complex and cannot be predicted at the local level. Because of the existence of basis risk, micro-
level applications of index insurance are not feasible, while the macro-level provides opportunities 
to develop weather index insurance, allowing risk transfer. The targets for macro level application 
are governments or banks aiming to avoid catastrophic loss (such as hurricanes). This kind of risk 
transferring instrument is expanding rapidly, particularly in the Caribbean. 
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Thus, the potential for weather index crop insurance is large, but the innovation and application of 
weather index crop insurance instrument will not happen without the appropriate satellite 
technology and government support. Local weather stations need to act as an impartial and pivotal 
third party, and accurate weather data is essential to the insurers and the insured. Developing an 
effective and sustainable insurance program requires time and commitment from each stakeholder. 
2.4.2  Chinese research on weather index crop insurance 
Since 2009, an experiment in weather based rice insurance has been implemented in Anhui 
province (He and Wang 2011). A cumulative rainfall index and a high temperature index were 
chosen as the weather triggers for drought and heatwave in this pilot study in Changfeng county of 
Anhui province. In 2011, weather index wheat insurance was pilot tested in Suzhou, Anhui 
province. These experiments were confined to a small region, and have not been scaled up for 
various reasons (no relevant policy, or funding support). 
There has also been some theoretical research on weather index crop insurance in China. For 
example, a set of weather-based indemnity indices was designed for rice insurance due to heavy 
rain damage in Zhejiang, China. The model was built upon the relationship between yield loss in 
rice, meteorological factors, and land surface factors in a county of Zhejiang (Lou, W, Wu and Yao 
2010b). This paper reported one heavy rainfall event, and lacks historical evidence to prove the 
applicability of the model in other parts of the province. Another example of weather-based rice 
insurance for the whole of Zhejiang province was established on the reduction in rice yield due to 
weather factors. Rainfall, temperature, sunshine hours, wind, and atmosphere circulation factors 
were chosen as weather variables (Lou, W, Wu and Yao 2010a). This data covers 68 counties in 
Zhejiang with 16 years of rice yield data from 1992 to 2007, but the paper did not show the detailed 
methodology, and there are no results of the reduction in rice yield due to weather factors. Instead, 
the paper focuses on the premium rate calculations. Since they are based on modelling the rice yield 
and meteorological factors, the latter part needs to be more carefully studied and explained.  
The application of weather index crop insurance in China is still novel and the literature limited. 
The literature falls into several categories. 
2.4.2.1 Advantages and disadvantages of weather index crop insurance 
Representative scholars in this field are Tuo (2008), Zhang Q. (2008), Zhang H. (2008), and Cao 
(2008). Tuo argued there are two obvious disadvantages of weather index insurance. The first is 
identifying the weather index.  Experiments have been implemented in other developing countries 
based on individual weather events, such as floods or droughts. However, meteorology is a complex 
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area, and current science has not yet developed a composite index to reflect crop failures. Secondly, 
the fairness of weather index insurance is questionable.  Some people receive no or insignificant 
compensation while others are over- compensated for the same risks in the same area. 
Zhang Q. (2008) grouped this second disadvantage with basis risk. He pointed out that the 
implementation of index insurance depends on a homogeneous relationship among farmers in the 
whole region. When the relevant level of risk is high, basis risk will be weak, and index insurance 
will provide better protection for farmers. This opinion was reinforced by Zhang H. (2008) who 
considered the main challenge of index insurance design was to reduce basis risk.  
Chinese experts broadly concur with the reviews of international research on the advantages of 
weather index insurance, but with some differences in expression. For example, Cao (2008) 
summarises weather index insurance according to different beneficiaries. For the insurer it makes 
sense in reducing costs, transferring risk, retaining high plasticity etc. while for the insured, its 
merits are simple procedure, and fair and equitable content.  
2.4.2.2 Implementing weather index crop insurance 
According to existing literature, opinions differ on the issue of whether China is already equipped to 
carry out weather index insurance. Chen (2010) argued that contract design for targeted weather 
index crop insurance needs a lot of engineering and systemic work corresponding with different 
research areas. Specifically, it needs social recognition, government support, technical knowledge, 
and organization protection. Most of these are due to China’s specific conditions: a) agricultural 
statistics and meteorological data are secured within government departments; b) most agricultural 
experts and meteorologists work in the government sector; c) the construction and maintenance of 
meteorological stations needs government funds; and d) the business of commercial insurance 
companies requires guidance and support from government departments.  
As meteorologists, Huo (2008) and Zhang (2008) believe that there is a good opportunity for China 
to start weather index crop insurance. Meteorological conditions have been basically met, and the 
required data can also be provided. The accuracy of atmospheric monitoring and weather 
forecasting has greatly improved, and extensive historical data has been accumulated, and this 
provides the basis of the development of weather index design. The Meteorology Law of the 
People’s Republic of China in 2001 defines the responsibilities of the various meteorological 
stations, ensuring the integrity of meteorological data, and providing the opportunity for 
organizations or individuals to pay to receive weather services. Currently, the central Bureau of 
Meteorology has collaborated with the insurance regulatory association to explore weather-related 
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insurance, and is preparing to deal with extreme weather events in disaster relief and related fields. 
However Tuo and Li (2003) believe it is hard to link the meteorological data with crop yields 
because of lack of precise data on crop production, even if historical weather information is 
available. 
Yu (2010) points out insurance companies could easily introduce weather index insurance because 
China has obvious geographical characteristics, and the market prospects are very optimistic. 
Weather index insurance payments are not based on the actual production of individual farms, so 
insurance companies do not need to pay the cost of information management, and can effectively 
reduce moral hazard and adverse selection arising from the asymmetry of information. The business 
risks of this insurance product with a low cost can also be passed onto the reinsurance market. Thus 
Yu argues that weather index insurance is suitable to shift the agricultural risk in developing 
countries. However, he also believes that farmers’ awareness about agricultural insurance in China 
is relatively low, and the costs of publicity and promotion are high, so it may require financial 
support in the initial pilot stage. In addition, the regions’ meteorological data are not sufficient, so 
the feasibility of these products may need to be verified. 
2.4.2.3 Farmers’ willingness to pay 
Turvey and Kong (2010) investigated weather risks and the viability of weather insurance in Gansu, 
Shaanxi, and Henan provinces to determine whether farmers would have a preference for weather 
insurance over other types of crop insurance. Their research data was based on a survey of 1564 
household conducted in 2007 and 2008. The results suggested that the greater risk for farmers was 
drought followed by excessive rain. Heat is less critical as a risk but more significant than cool 
weather. Farmers in the research area had a strong interest in purchasing precipitation insurance 
with 44% of respondents showing strong interest; farmers were willing to adopt new ideas; and 
where possible action has already been taken to self-insure through diversification and other means. 
Using the same data set, Yuan (2011) analysed the willingness to purchase of these households in 
two typical agricultural counties—Mei county in Shaanxi and Qingshui in Gansu. The comparative 
study showed the price that western China farmers could afford is generally low and that debt and 
proportion of income from farming significantly impact their decision. They argued that the key to 
increase farmers’ enthusiasm to purchase such products is providing subsidies and expanding the 
farming scale. 
Although shown in the literature that inaccurate ex-ante premium rates led to adverse selection, 
Chen (2005) examined whether participation in insurance encourages producers to abandon their 
crops. The results showed that the potential impact of the moral hazard effect was ambiguous 
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although the abandonment ratios for the insured producers were higher than for all farmers in most 
years. One interesting phenomenon was that not all counties had the same acreage ratio during the 
same period of time. It is possible that crop producers’ decisions to abandon a crop are made subject 
to environmental condition and some economic concerns. 
2.4.2.4 Obstacles to effective insurance market development  
Chinese crop insurance faces many problems blocking its development such as lack of awareness, 
inadequate legal and political support, dispersed management of the agricultural funds, and conflicts 
between supply and demand. In general, the reason this leads to such a dilemma is because the crop 
insurance system in China is incomplete (Wang,  Zhang and Zheng 2009b).  
Deng (2009) indicated that the biggest problem reflected in China’s policy-oriented agricultural 
insurance is that the huge losses are not balanced with the low compensation level. The 
compensation fund cannot meet the huge losses, and the current forms of agricultural insurance are 
unable to compensate farmers for the losses caused by agricultural disasters. This is unbearable for 
insurance companies, as well as heavy burden on national finance, as well as on famers.  
The failure of commercial insurance is attributed to two major reasons. One is farmers’ behaviour, 
and the other is purchasing power. Farmers’ participation in crop insurance is influenced by the 
expected return, and that they are concerned more about the price than the risk. In addition, 
potential disaster relief from the government, income levels, personal risk awareness, and other 
factors also affect farmers’ willingness to purchase insurance (Fei 2006). 
Systemic risk is another reason why crop insurance schemes fail. It is the risk an entire financial 
system or entire market collapsing, as opposed to risk associated with any one individual entity, 
group, or component of a system (Dwyer 2009; Kaufman 1999). Either the government must 
underwrite the risks, or reinsurance must be bought from global reinsurers to diversify the risks 
away from agriculture and away from China.  
2.4.3 Summary 
Based on the seemingly successful practice of weather index crop insurance in more and more 
countries, China is considering its application. For insurers, weather index crop insurance facilitates 
access to the reinsurance market, but requires the management and technical challenges facing its 
development to be addressed. In view of its relatively short operational history, there are still many 
problems to be dealt with. At the micro-level, attention needs to be directed at how to reduce the 
basis risk and how to calculate premiums and claim payments. At the macro-level, further study of 
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the construction of meteorological facilities and information systems to improve the weather index 
insurance system is needed. 
This study investigates these issues with respect to index-based crop insurance. In particular, 
differentiation is made between those factors that matter for economic reasons, and those reasons 
that have to do with social and cultural factors. 
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3 Methodology 
The review of literature in Chapter 2 revealed various insights on the risks that exist in crop 
production in China, the risk management strategies adopted currently, the evolution of various 
agricultural insurance products, and the status of weather index crop insurance. It emphasized that 
crop insurance in China has been actively considered for a long time, but has struggled to achieve 
the goals for a wide range of stakeholders. The review of literature highlights the inter-relations 
among government agencies, insurance companies, and farmers that have a vital influence on the 
promotion of weather index crop insurance in China and the realisation of its potential. An 
understanding of these interrelationships and the complexities and nuances associated with weather 
index insurance requires various techniques and levels of analysis. Specific techniques are outlined 
in forthcoming chapters. This chapter describes the research approach and shows how the different 
elements come together. Common elements of the analysis such as the choice of case study sites, 
data collection methods, and data analysis processes are also described. 
3.1 Research approach and methods 
“Methodology” is the research strategy that outlines the way one goes about undertaking a research 
project, and implies more than simply identifying means or modes the researcher intends to use 
(Howell 2013). Various aspects need to be considered in designing the research approach. A key 
aspect is the nature of the proposed research questions but other factors such as human resources, 
budget, and time constraints are also important because they affect the planning of the research. 
Research methods in social science have entered a new development stage characterised by inter-
disciplinary collaboration and mixed methods research, with improvements in computing 
techniques, databases, and software, statistical packages and formal analytical models helping to 
facilitate the process (George and Bennett 2004). Prior to this new stage, the use of qualitative 
methods and case studies has become more sophisticated, although their dominance in social 
science research gradually decreased with the increasing availability of new statistical analysis 
methods and application of formal quantitative research to social issues. Inter-disciplinary 
collaboration and mixed methods research is increasingly used being used by social science 
researchers. This study is based on a case study and mixed methods approach to investigate the role 
of weather index crop insurance within case study area.  
3.1.1 Case study approach 
Using case studies is a suitable research methodology when a comprehensive, in-depth investigation 
is required (Feagin, Orum and Sjoberg 1991). It has four main strengths as pointed out by George 
and Bennett (2004): a) to get high conceptual validity; b) to encourage new hypotheses; c) to 
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investigate the hypothesized role of causal mechanisms based on individual cases; and d) to solve 
causal complexity. Thus, even though the case study approach lacks formal structure compared with 
research methods used in scientific experiments, it continues to be used in various descriptive, 
exploratory, or explanatory research studies, particularly in sociological studies such as 
management science, public policy, social work, and decision-making (Yin 2009). 
According to the two-part definition of case study methodology by Yin (2009), case study research 
is “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-
life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident”. From the technical point of view, it is “an inquiry that copes with the technically 
distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data points, and as 
one result relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating 
fashion, and as another result benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to 
guide data collection and analysis”. Yin summarises a common process for case study research as 
“plan—design—prepare—collect—analyse—share” (see Figure 3-1), which is a linear but iterative 
process. In essence, this two-part definition and research process indicates that case study research 
must involve multiple methods of investigation about different aspect of the problem—including 
the logic of design, data collection techniques, and specific approaches to data analysis.  
 
Source: Yin (2009), p.1. 
 
In general, case studies can be classified into various types according to different dimensions (see 
Table 3-1). In this research, the feasibility of implementing a weather index crop insurance 
instrument in Huojia County was examined in detail using case study method. Such a study 
Analyse 
Plan Collect 
Share 
Design 
Prepare 
Figure 3-1 Case study research process 
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examines a large number of intervening variables and inductively observes any unexpected aspects 
of the operation in this case of a WII product, and helps to identify what conditions relevant to the 
case could promote the product and identify any challenges that might constrain use of the product. 
According to each criterion listed in Table 3-1, this study of weather index crop insurance included 
several different types of case study:  
a. A single, holistic case study for Huojia County;  
b. Instrumental study from motivation as the objective of this study is not only to understand 
the particular case itself but also to further scientific research;  
c. An exploratory study from an epistemological status perspective where the research design 
and data collection methods are not specified in advance;  
d. A research study, because the case study is used as a method of research, not teaching, or 
action/application;  
e. Quantitative and qualitative research because both kinds of data analysis are used;  
f. Structured around a specific research framework;  
g. Integrative study in synthesis. 
Table 3-1 Dimensions and classifications of case studies 
Dimensions Classifications 
Design Holistic or embedded; single case or multiple case 
Motivation Intrinsic or instrumental 
Epistemological status Exploratory, descriptive, or explanatory 
Purpose Research, teaching, or action/application 
Data Quantitative or qualitative 
Format Highly structured, short vignettes Unstructured or ground-breaking 
Synthesis Informal, empathic, or intuitive Formative or method driven 
Source: Scholz and Tietje (2002) (p.9) 
As with other research methods, the case study approach has both strengths and limitations. One of 
the most common criticisms of case study research is selection bias. Selection bias is usually 
understood to occur when some form of selection process in either the design of the study, or the 
real-world phenomena under investigation, results in inferences that suffer from systematic error 
(Collier and Mahoney 1996). Such biases occur when cases are self-choice or when the researcher 
unconsciously selects cases which stand for a truncated sample in regard to dependent variables 
among the relevant population of cases (George and Bennett 2004). George and Bennett also 
pointed out that there are two inherent limitations of case study research. First, the 
representativeness of selected cases is difficult to judge; second, the average “casual effect” of 
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variables for a sample is hard to estimate. To avoid the occurrence of selection bias and to ensure 
the representativeness of cases in our study, an adequate understanding of the population and an 
appropriate sampling design was done to ensure that the cases chosen would represent the 
population.  
In addition, when using the case study approach, researchers also need to consider the trade-off 
between a simple design and one with a richer structure, as well as the expected objective of the 
research which is to achieve a high level of internal validity and good historical explanations of 
particular cases as opposed to making generalizations that apply to broad populations. Both of these 
aspects should depend on the research questions and objectives of the study. In this study, the 
choice was to use a richer design because the feasibility of weather index crop insurance instrument 
needs to be assessed from different perspectives. The objective of this research is to make general 
recommendations about a weather index crop insurance instrument that applies to broad populations 
of farmers, at least for those of the central plains of China, rather than for individual farmers. Some 
of the limitations and trade-offs that apply to case study research may also be addressed by using 
mixed methods as in this study. The next section shows how mixed methods contributed to the 
research in this study. 
3.1.2 Mixed methods approach 
This research combined multiple methods from qualitative and quantitative evaluations as the most 
appropriate approach to address the research questions. In the literature, a variety of terms are used 
to describe essentially similar concepts. Creswell et al. (2003) provides an overview of the various 
definitions of mixed methodologies and summarises them into a single definition as “a mixed 
methods study involves the collection or analysis of both quantitative and qualitative data in a 
single study in which the data are collected concurrently or sequentially, are given a priority, and 
involve the integration of the data at one or more stages in the process of research”. This definition 
suggests that while the mixed methods approach can be applied in different ways, the design 
depends on the way data is collected, the priority given to quantitative or qualitative research, and 
the degree of integration.  
This study on weather index crop insurance can be divided into four separate sections. In the first 
section, quantitative analysis of secondary data was carried out to determine the weather-yield 
relationship, while qualitative information from household surveys was analyzed to explore the 
feasibility of weather index crop insurance contracts being taken up by farmers. The other three 
sections consisted of in-depth interviews with several different groups of individuals, designed to 
obtain more detail regarding the complexity of the decision for stakeholders who may have other 
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interests or responsibilities to participate in crop insurance. Each section was a separate study in its 
own but when brought together forms the essential components of the research program with the 
results of the integration reported in the final two chapters of the thesis.  
The detailed design of the study shows that it also involves some other types of mixed methods 
research, such as the survey conducted with a large group of individual farmers, and the in-depth 
interviews with a sub-sample of village leaders, seeking to find general trends in the population and 
also to provide greater detail regarding any unexpected findings that may arise. As another example, 
the survey conducted with individual farmers primarily used specific questions rather than seek 
open-ended responses, but some sections invited respondents to use their own words to follow up 
on responses given to the closed questions. These examples highlight that the mixed methods 
approach was used to influence more than one stage of this study, including the research design, 
data collection, and data analysis processes, following methods set out by Tashakkori and Teddlie 
(2003). 
In the academic literature, there is a recurrent topic of debate about mixed method approaches. 
Scholars from some disciplines highly recommended multiple methods as the best choice to study 
complex social phenomena, where they can mix and use different methods together according to 
their needs (Brewer and Hunter 1989; Maxcy 2003). However, research that requires mixed 
methods has specific reasons for its use. First, both data collection and data analysis methods have 
limitations, and the use of multiple methods can offset or compensate for some of the disadvantages 
while also capitalising on the strengths and complementarities of the methods. Second, the research 
problem is complex, and different methods of analysis are needed to be integrated for the best 
understanding of these complexities. Third, mixed methods can provide explanations for seemingly 
contradictory results that come from using different analytical methods. Fourth, they enable the 
researcher to answer confirmatory and exploratory questions at the same time and thereby facilitate 
construction and confirmation of theory. 
The main advantages of applying mixed research methods to study this problem were that the 
researcher can ask a broader set of questions, and will gain richer answers including expected and 
unexpected outcomes. This point has been identified by many researchers in the course of using 
mixed methods approaches such as Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998) who argued that the scope of 
any study could be expanded through mixed methods research, with many other aspects related to 
the topic also able to be taken into consideration. Mingers (2001) pointed out that mixed methods 
approaches could help provide more complete answers and increase the robustness of understanding 
about different aspects of a research problem. Hoyles et al. (2005) argued that the application of 
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mixed method in research provides an opportunity to discover new or paradoxical results which 
could be used to plan for future research.  
Conversely, some researchers have highlighted the challenges of implementing mixed methods 
research such as the cost of the studies. Brannen (2008) considered this an important factor 
influencing the design of a particular research project.  In some situations, the challenge arises 
because of the difference between qualitative and quantitative methods which was described as an 
incompatibility between methods by Cook and Reichardt (1979). This point has not been widely 
recognized because many researchers think that qualitative and quantitative methods, combined in a 
mixed methods study, will enhance and complement each other (Brannen 2008).   
3.2 Choice of case study area 
Henan province is located in central-east China and is situated in the lower-middle reaches of the 
Yellow River, east of the Taihang Mountains. According to the China Statistical Yearbook (2013), 
Henan province accounts for 1.7% of the land area of China; has over 100 million people making it 
the most populous and densely populated province in China, accounting for one-thirteenth of 
China’s population. At the end of 2012, the rural population of Henan Province accounted for 58% 
of the total population of the province a decline from 70% in 2005; the total number of households 
in Henan was 31.11 million at the end of 2012, with agricultural households accounting for two 
thirds of the households (NBSC 2013). The pressure to feed such a large population has been 
recognised and staple food crops such as wheat are given a high priority by policy-makers. Wheat is 
one of the most widely distributed and productive of the staple grains in China, and China has the 
largest acreage and the highest yield of wheat in the world. Henan province is the largest wheat 
producer in China and accounts for around one quarter of total national wheat production (Wang et 
al. 2010).  Thus Henan province has a particularly high status in the agricultural sector of China, 
and exerts an important influence on national food security. Many preferential agricultural policies 
and subsidies are trialled first in Henan including direct subsidies for grain, the phasing out of 
county level infrastructure fees for road construction and irrigation facilities, and the provision of 
funds to support major water conservancy projects.  
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Source: Google images 
Figure 3-2 Location of Huojia County	  
The study area of Huojia County is located in the northern part of Henan province, which is 600 km 
south of the capital Beijing, and 50 km north of the provincial capital Zhengzhou. The geographic 
coordinates are 35°02’-35°20’N, 113°44’E, approaching Taihang Mountains to the north, and next 
to the Yellow River in the south. The total population of Huojia County in 2013 was 430,000. The 
county is 21.4 km wide and 34 km long and 473 km2 in area. The terrain is typical of the Central 
plains of China, with an altitude of 74.2 to 87.5m. Huojia County comprises 11 towns (Chengguan, 
Zhaojing, Huangdi, Zhonghe, Xuying, Fengzhuang, Kangcun, Shizhuang, Weizhuang, 
Daxinzhuang Township and Taishan Township) and 213 villages. Winter wheat is one of the most 
important crops in this county, with a planting area of 360,000 mu, accounting for 45% of food 
crops and 38% of the total area sown to crops in Huojia County (2012). The terrain of Huojia 
County is typical of the central plains of China, and its crop production is relatively uniform. In 
terms of economic indicators, it is consistently in the middle of the 108 counties in the province. 
Huojia County 
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The location of Huojia County is shown in Figure 3-2 while key characteristics of the county appear 
in Table 3-2. 
Table 3-2 Key characteristics of Huojia County (2012) 
 Huojia County, Henan 
Total population  422461 persons 
Rural population 345779 persons 
Rural population/Total population 81.85% 
Total households 117910 households 
Rural households 82118 households 
Rural household/ Total household 69.64% 
Average household incomes 9972 yuan/person 
Wheat area  20150 hectares 
Average wheat yield  6994 kg/hectare 
Average rainfall 1981-2010  559.0mm 
Average temperature 1981-2010 14.6℃ 
Sunshine hours 1981-2010 2012hrs 
Electromechanical wells (number) 7645 
Effective irrigation area11/total wheat area 93.3% 
Sources: China Statistics Yearbook (2013); Henan Statistics Yearbook (2013). 
3.3 Data collection  
Assessing the feasibility of weather index crop insurance instrument requires evidence to support its 
technical feasibility, information to explore whether there is both potential supply and demand for 
the instrument, and information on the level of government support. To gather this evidence and 
information, this study has drawn on both secondary information (statistical data, yearbooks, policy 
documents, etc.) and primary information (surveys and interviews).   
A secondary source is a source of information collected by others and originally presented 
elsewhere, while a primary source is a document or database created at the time of the study. 
Primary data allows researchers to get as close as possible to original ideas, events, and empirical 
research, rather than relying on the achievements of others (Stewart and Kamins 1993). That does 
not mean the primary source is necessarily superior. Secondary sources are good for introducing 
background or historical information about an event and broadening the understanding of a topic by 
comparing the researchers’ perspectives and conclusions with others. Thus both primary and 
secondary data sources are essential to the study, and the researcher should choose either or a 
combination according to the research purposes. A detailed comparison of advantages and 
disadvantages of primary and secondary data sources is summarized as	  Table 3-3. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Effective irrigation area refers to the arable land that can be irrigated in normal years with basic irrigation facilities.	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Table 3-3 Advantages and disadvantages of data resources 
Data 
resources Advantages Disadvantages 
Potential 
problems  
Secondary 
information 
• Require relatively little money, 
time, energy and other resources 
to be devoted to data collection; 
• Assists researchers examine 
trends and changes in 
phenomena over time; 
• Data collection process often 
guided by expertise and 
professionalism that may not be 
available to individual 
researchers. 
• May not answer the 
researcher’s specific 
questions or contain 
specific information; 
•  Variables may have been 
defined or categorized 
differently; 
• Researcher does not know 
exactly how the data 
collection process was 
organised and how well it 
was done. 
• Definitions 
• Measurement error 
Biased sources  
• Reliability 
• Time scale 
 
Primary 
information 
• Flexible to the needs of the 
study; 
• Focuses on specific issues; 
• Reveals information not found 
elsewhere; 
• Can capture changes occurring 
during the course of time. 
• Consumes a lot of time; 
• Collects large volumes of 
data that need to be 
analysed; 
• Represents one point in 
time with no explanation 
of proceeding or 
following events; 
• May be biased or 
emotional because of a 
limited perspective. 
• Difficult 
• Time consuming 
• Costly 
 
Source: Boslaugh (2007) (p.3-5); Hox and Boeije (2005). 
Research involving human participation should comply with all legal and ethical requirements.  As 
Sales and Folkman (2000) noted, respecting the personal rights of confidentiality and privacy is an 
important criterion of every research project. Several ethical issues were taken into serious 
consideration in this study, including respondents’ privacy, confidentiality of statistical data, and 
any potential threats to their insurance businesses if confidential information on their businesses 
provided by participants was divulged. Insurance company staff could be anxious about discussing 
sensitive issues if their business had benefitted from government support. To address these 
considerations, all the respondents were informed verbally of the nature and purpose of the research 
as well as how the information they provided would be used. The interviews were conducted 
individually, without voice recording. All data were regarded as confidential and the privacy of 
individuals was protected. All information obtained from respondents was used anonymously and 
will not be accessible to anybody except the researcher. Hard copies of all information are stored 
safely with the researcher. The ethical clearance for this study was approved by the School of 
Agriculture and Food Sciences of The University of Queensland.  
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3.3.1 Secondary information collection 
The secondary information collected for this study includes historical wheat yield records from the 
Statistical Bureau, long-term weather information from the Meteorological Bureau, together with 
data from yearbooks, crop insurance policy documents from local government, as well as other 
books, journal and magazine articles, news reports, etc.  
The data used to establish the yield-weather relationship came from government statistics. The 
collection of individual households’ yields data for a long period was not possible. Households do 
not record their yields year by year. They were able to recall a rough estimate of yields for the past 
5 years, but data from much earlier years would not be reliable. The long-term historical weather 
data were collected from the local meteorological station (Houjia County) for four main weather 
indexes (rainfall, wind speed, temperature, sunshine hours) which the Meteorological Bureau record 
and keep but do not publish. Previous research into weather index insurance (Dick et al. 2011) 
suggested that standard meteorological observation sites could cover an area with a radius of 20km 
and so the Huojia station was broadly within this range.  
The study also used other information that is readily available like publically available yearbooks as 
well as less readily available information such as policy documents. Yearbooks published annually 
often contain statistical summaries for the past year. These sources include the national statistical 
yearbook, local statistical yearbooks, and insurance statistic yearbooks. Policy documents refer to 
the relevant policy preferences regarding implementation of crop insurance (sourced from Huojia 
County government office), the operating procedures of the current crop insurance product (sourced 
from PICC Huojia Branch).  
3.3.2 Primary information collection 
In order to understand the decision making process without assuming behaviour and motivation, 
different groups of individuals have to be contacted directly. The main methods of collecting 
primary information are fieldwork and experiments. In social sciences, primary sources often 
involve fieldwork—research where a survey is done or direct interviews are conducted. The 
primary information used in this study mainly comes from the household survey and interviews 
with village leaders, insurance staff, and government officers. Before the survey and interviews 
were conducted, the questionnaire needs to be constructed and the sampling methods need to be 
decided.  
A questionnaire is a study tool consisting of a series of questions and other prompts in order to 
gather information from interviewees (Sudman and Bradburn 1982). The answers to questions in 
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each questionnaire are used to measure the separate variables (such as preferences, behaviour, facts) 
and can also be aggregated into a scale or index to measure latent traits or the attitudes of 
householders towards risk and insurance (Foddy 1993). The questions can be written in many 
different ways, to be used in many different situations. In this research, the surveys involved four 
different kinds of questionnaire for representatives of different groups including questionnaires for 
households, village leaders, insurance company representatives and government officers.  
Information from questionnaires covered the past experiences, current situation, and future 
suggestions. In general, two types of questions were included in the questionnaires. One set were 
multiple choices, where the respondent chose a multiple answer from a given number of options but 
with the underlying premise that the questions were exhaustive and mutually exclusive (Labaw 
1981). Most of questions in the household questionnaire and village leader’s questionnaire were 
multi-choice. The other questions were open-ended where the respondent was asked to formulate 
their own answer. This approach was mainly used in the questionnaires for insurance company 
representatives and government officers. The questions were designed to flow logically from the 
least sensitive to the most sensitive, from the factual and behavioural to the attitudinal, and from the 
more general to the more specific following the advice of Oppenheim (1992). Difficult questions 
were placed towards the end of the questionnaire when the respondents became more comfortable 
with the communication process. This placement had two advantages: the respondents answered 
simple questions early in the interview; and when the respondent stopped to answer the hard 
questions, the bulk of the information had already been collected. Another helpful technique 
confirmed by the design of the questionnaire was categorizing questions, which put related 
questions together to avoid repeating similar questions or asking questions with a directly opposite 
meaning. Triangulation was also employed in terms of asking questions in different ways so as to 
systematically check the accuracy and consistency of the responses provided. This is an active part 
of the interview process as any inconsistencies that the interviewer becomes aware of can be 
checked with the interviewee.     
With data collection through questionnaires, the issue of sampling also needs to considered as it is 
impossible to survey all of the individuals within a given research area. In Huojia County, there 
were 213 villages and 118,629 households at the end of 2012, about 80% of which are agricultural 
households and so sampling was essential. Sampling has been widely employed in research for 
gathering information, in which an appropriate sample is used to represent the population and to 
allow the researcher to make inferences about the population being studied. The advantages of 
sampling are cheaper and faster ways of collecting information than contacting the entire population, 
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while the limitations of sampling are that errors may be introduced for small populations and it may 
not feasible for research problems which require very high accuracy (Stephan and McCarthy 1958). 
Thus, choosing an appropriate sampling method becomes an important factor in obtaining a 
representative and statistically valid sample of the whole research population. In statistics, sampling 
methods mainly include probabilistic and non-probabilistic. Probabilistic sampling methods are 
classified as random sampling, systematic sampling, and stratified sampling; while non-
probabilistic sampling methods include convenience sampling, judgment sampling, quota sampling, 
and snowball sampling. The difference between them is that each individual in the population has a 
known chance of being selected in probabilistic sampling, while individuals are chosen by non-
random methods (according to some subjective criteria) in non-probabilistic sampling (Schreuder, 
Gregoire and Weyer 2001).  The advantage of the former method is that the error of the sample, 
which differs from the whole population, can be estimated mathematically, while in non-
probabilistic sampling, the error is hard to predict. The selection of sampling methods in this study 
also needs to consider the differences between the groups being interviewed.  
3.3.2.1 Questionnaire survey 
Most population-based topics can be studied through questionnaire surveys and, therefore, 
households are appropriate to be used as sampling units in most area-based research (Siniscalco and 
Auriat 2005). Based on the previous interview experience of the author, farmers and village leaders 
were more likely to wander away from the topic when being interviewed; therefore a fully 
structured questionnaire was chosen for households and village leaders. The process of framing 
household questions logically started with an inquiry about the demographic characteristics of the 
respondent, an understanding of risk sources and risk perceptions, and an inspection of insurance 
awareness. This was followed by framing questions to obtain detailed opinions on weather index 
crop insurance. Understanding their planting and management practices was also important for 
contract design. The interview questions were discussed with agricultural professionals prior to the 
interviews in order to check the language and relevance of the questions. A copy of the interview 
questions is attached as Appendix 1. The questions in the survey of village leaders to assess 
insurance demand (see Appendix 2) comprised six sections: a) land area and use; b) crop activities, 
net returns and household incomes; c) irrigation; d) risk and risk management; e) policy-oriented 
agricultural insurance; and f) weather index wheat insurance. 
When conducting surveys, a substantial challenge is to obtain contacts relatively familiar with the 
culture and people so that the information collected can be used to represent the actual situation in 
the whole of the research area. Given the tens of thousands of agricultural households living in the 
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research county and the length of the questionnaire, it was decided to include households using 
judgment sampling. As Deming (1990) noted, judgment sampling means selecting respondents 
based on the judgment of the researcher thereby becoming a purposefully drawn “representative 
sample” that the researchers believed was appropriate. The sampling method did allow for 
unexpected contingencies if, for example, the respondents were special in some way and not 
representative of the population. Village leader’s help became important in avoiding households 
where the economic conditions were unrepresentative (particularly good or particularly bad). The 
author’s personal local knowledge of the county was also used to avoid selection of 
unrepresentative households.  
Stratified random sampling intends to classify the studied population into homogeneous but 
mutually exclusive sub-groups, and then follow the simple random sampling or systematic sampling 
to select appropriate respondents (Deming 1990). In this study, every village in the county was 
assigned to one stratum, and respondents were chosen by the simple random sampling method. That 
is, the village leader provided a list of all households in the village; the author used a random 
number generator to determine which households to sample based on this list. Thus the sample set 
was uniformly distributed within the study area, and could help identify whether distance did affect 
the coverage of weather reports and farmers’ attitudes towards crop insurance. The sampling 
method for the survey of village leaders was also based on the distance between the village location 
and the local county meteorology station. Specifically, two villages were selected within 2km 
around the meteorology station, two villages within the 2-4km band and so on. Choosing this 
stratified sampling method was deemed necessary following the identification of distance as a 
significant variable in the initial fieldwork. It also addressed the situation that respondents found it 
difficult to have an opinion about distance if they had no information to base that opinion upon.     
The head of the family usually makes decisions in the rural areas of China (Carlsson et al. 2009). 
They have busy daily work schedules in the harvest season and often work far from the hometown 
after harvest. Thus, the time for interviews could be hard to organize.  To add richness to the data, 
the interviews were conducted on site and preferably on their farm. The time with each household 
and village leader was around 2 hours. The on-site experiences did not only enrich the data but 
enabled the researcher to achieve a deeper understanding of the issues. 
3.3.2.2 Interviews 
An interview is a purposeful and face-to-face conversation between two or more people. It is 
probably the best source of data if the researcher wants to minimize non-response and maximize the 
quality of information (Kahn and Cannell 1957).  Face-to-face interviews are often used to solicit 
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sensitive information, especially when the respondent attempts to deliberately hide information. By 
far, the main advantage of the face-to-face interview is that the interviewer can record the 
statements as the interviewee speaks, but can also observe body language, expressions, and other 
reactions to the questions. This enables the interviewer to draw conclusions not evident from the 
verbal responses alone. 
This part of data collection targeted local government and insurance company staff and their 
perceptions about weather index insurance instruments. Face-to-face interview were chosen as the 
best option to achieve the target. They can be conducted in a semi-structured, in-depth (least 
structured) and structured way. When considering the way of conducting interviews, the key point 
is to maintain consistency between the research questions and the objectives of the study. Insurance 
staff may come from different departments (sales, manager, and actuary) or from different branches 
(village level, township level, county level) and government officers may assume different 
responsibilities in their different levels of government. Thus in-depth and fully structured interviews 
might not be suitable for them, as the flexibility to explore new issues according to their expertise 
might be desirable. Consequently the semi-structured interview was chosen as the best option for 
these respondents.  
After information about the preliminary contract that included the premium, trigger points, and 
payouts had been given, interview questions were based on this contract information to gain a 
visible and specific perspective addressing the issue to be researched. The questions in the survey of 
insurance staff (attached as Appendix 3) were to assess the insurance company’s willingness to 
offer contracts and started with gaining an understanding of currently offered agricultural insurance 
instruments. The questions then inquired about the potential demand for weather –related insurance 
instruments, followed by questions on three themes from a different perspective to evaluate the 
preliminary contract—data sources and processing, weather index identification, and calculation of 
premiums and payouts. The intention was to build understanding of the operational, technical, and 
financial aspects of insurance companies including insurance practices such as insurance products, 
reinsurance, underwriting, loss assessment, and their financial position.  
Appendix 4 includes the interview questions for government officers to assess the policy 
environment. First, the questions inquired about agricultural risk management strategies and support 
that the government currently provides to protect farmers’ incomes. Second, the respondents were 
asked to comment on the policy-oriented agricultural insurance instrument. Third, the interviewer 
guided the respondents to express their attitude to weather index crop insurance instruments, and 
finally they were questioned about the government’s commitment to support initiatives in weather 
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index crop insurance. Within these guidelines, the questionnaires for insurance staff and 
government officers had to be open-ended to encourage them to give their own answers and provide 
their own perspectives on the possibility of introducing a scheme and achieving further 
improvements. 
In the plan for fieldwork, the author intended to make contact with five or six people from China 
United Property Insurance Company (CUPIC) and the People’s Insurance Company of China 
(PICC) in Henan province, at county level, township level, and the assigned person in charge of 
insurance business at the village level if known. The interview targets were department manager, 
actuarial officer, and a salesman respectively. The aim of the survey of local government was to 
visit 3 to 5 officers from different levels of government. However, there were many challenges in 
accessing the targeted population. First, access to interview insurance company staff and 
government officers proved a big challenge. On the one hand, the targeted respondents are 
extremely busy with the daily running of their businesses, and it was very difficult to make 
appointments. On the other hand, a few local reporters and section of the media had secretly been 
investigating bad behaviour in recent agricultural insurance activities, and so the insurers and 
government officers were hesitant to be interviewed, or were wary about expressing their views and 
making comments. The challenges of obtaining as much as possible information from insurance 
company staff and government officers involved in this research forced the author to enlist the help 
of personal contacts, and then employ a snowball sampling method to conduct the survey. Snowball 
sampling relies of referrals to interview one or several people who have the required characteristics 
initially, and then rely on them to provide further qualified respondents among their acquaintances, 
and so on. This sampling method is often used in hidden populations that are difficult for 
researchers to access, an example of which would be government officials in this study. Finally, one 
of the managers of Huojia Branch of PICC who was in charge of crop insurance business agreed to 
assist with providing contact details of two other managers in this field. The process to access to the 
local government officer took more time than planned. Eventually the contact details for two 
officers who were likely to have a better understanding of crop production and crop insurance were 
provided. 
At the beginning of each interview, the purpose of each questionnaire was presented to participants 
and verbally explained to the persons to be interviewed in order to gain their permission. The 
interviews sometimes involved discussing their dissatisfaction with currently implemented 
agricultural insurance policy. The author was aware that different groups had their positions and 
interests. Thus, the author needed patience to explain the ethical requirements of the survey to each 
person. Through the interviews, the author found that it was important to establish a social rapport 
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with the respondents, because without such a relationship, the respondents were unlikely to talk 
fully and frankly about the questions being asked. To improve this situation, the author first 
introduced her personal living and education background from rural China, and then introduced 
how the project would be conducted, as well as the effort involved to meet respondents one by one 
for interview. As the respondents are usually concerned, in some cases strongly, about recording the 
discussion, each interview was done by taking notes. The time for insurance company and local 
government interviews ranged from 1 hour to 1.5 hours. The researcher was sometimes able to 
participate with insurance company representatives in the household’s on-farm damage assessment 
activities and observing their transaction procedures was able to gain additional information for the 
research. 
3.4 Data interpretation and analysis 
Developing an appropriate and context relevant crop insurance scheme requires an understanding of 
a wide range of variables (technical, economic and social), and the relationships between them. The 
emphasis was not only on the quantitative analysis, but rather to determine the nature of the 
phenomenon before the quantitative analysis, and to explain the reason for the results after the 
quantitative analysis. Thus qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis are both required in this 
study. The purpose of the qualitative and quantitative data interpretation and analysis is to transform 
the data collected into credible evidence to support the arguments and address the research 
questions. 
3.4.1 Qualitative data interpretation and analysis 
Qualitative data interpretation and analysis in this study was aimed to gather an in-depth 
understanding of different people’s attitudes to weather index crop insurance instruments and the 
reasons that govern such attitudes.  In other words, it investigated the what, why, and how of the 
decision-making.  Based on the various firsthand materials obtained from interviews, handwritten 
notes and participant observations, together with the subjective judgement and views of the 
researcher, induction, comparison, and creating structure in the information were the main methods 
to understand the meaning of the respondents’ comments and behaviour and to capture their view of 
the new crop insurance instrument.   
There are three major ways of analysing and interpreting the qualitative data as identified by 
Wolcott (1994). The first way is staying close to the data as originally recorded. This method treats 
handwritten notes or respondents’ words as fact, as the respondents themselves are telling their 
stories, where the hidden assumption is that the qualitative data can “speak for themselves”. The 
second way is by finding the key factors or relationships among these data. The third way is to 
70	  
	  
explore what goes on accepting what can be explained with a degree of certainty. This method is 
neither loyal to, nor limited by, the original data and it is no longer claiming to be convincing 
“science”. Thus, the third way may follow from the second way or be derived directly from the first 
way. These three methods of analysing qualitative data could be combined in various ways to 
achieve particular purposes, but there is no single combination that can be regarded as best, because 
the researchers need to apply all of them together.   
During the analysis and interpretation, some typical errors may be encountered. For instance, purely 
listing all answers from respondents without doing any analysis, and thus trying to generalize 
individual insights to the whole group, may not be legitimate. To avoid these errors, a five step 
analysis process as outlined by Bryman and Burgess (1994) can be used which involves:  
• Spending time to understand the data and checking the quality of the data (is it complete and 
understandable? was it collected in an unbiased way? and so on). Mason (2002) says the 
researcher must make sure that the data are appropriate for the research questions and that 
recording and analysis of the data has not been careless. Although there are many threats to 
objectivity and challenges to the validity of the research and its findings, several are 
particularly important, such as dealing with inaccurate or incomplete data, discounting 
irrelevant data, misinterpreting the data’s meaning or meanings, and failure to sufficiently 
document the chain of evidence. 
• Finding out what kind of questions are going to be answered in the study. This step requires 
the researcher to review the purpose of the study and to think of the research questions that 
you want your analysis to answer. A clear list of questions was presented in section 1.2 that 
enabled the researcher to focus the analysis on answering those questions. 
• Coding and categorizing the data. Flick (2008) suggested that coding and categorizing are 
two ways that can be applied to all sorts of data without regard to the methods of data 
collection. To allow individuals access to the full data set, and allow for different 
perspectives to be brought to the data analysis, the researcher has to use coding practices to 
maintain validity and objectivity. Having the same analyst recode material and another 
analyst independently code the same material can increase coding accuracy. However, this is 
very time-consuming. For instance in this study, all the responses need be read and given a 
code to allocate them to a different category. Some of them could be organized and 
categorized using Excel, while some had to be typed into a word processing file. At this 
point, it is important to highlight useful quotes and type category labels in the margins.   
• Identifying patterns within and between categories. The main goal of coding and 
categorizing is to find the relationships among them for further analysis (Flick 2008). For 
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instance, are there relationships in the two study areas in weather variation, planting habits, 
economic status; or relationships between the response to policy-oriented agricultural 
insurance and weather index crop insurance and premiums, payouts, risk coverage, 
operating mode? What are the household benefits, with and without government premium 
subsidies, in the weather index crop insurance scheme?  
• Interpreting the meanings of these categories and patterns and bringing these all together to 
think about what has been learned. For instance, the research objective for this study was 
identifying the feasibility of weather index crop insurance in central China. The research 
questions were broken down into four aspects—technical requirements, farmers’ demands, 
insurance company’s potential supply, and government coordinating role. By analysing 
separately the feasibility of the above four parts, the pooled conclusion of this study could 
finally be determined. One important point is that analysing across multiple group 
perspectives, and using different types of data, is not a simple matter of deciding who is 
right for which data are most accurate. Weighing the evidence is subtler, and involves 
hearing each group's viewpoint, while recognizing that any single perspective is partial and 
relative to the respondent's experiences and social position. However, if there is a reason to 
believe that some of the data are stronger than others (some of the respondents are highly 
knowledgeable on the subject while others are not), it is appropriate to give these responses 
greater weight in the analysis. 
3.4.2 Quantitative data interpretation and analysis 
Quantitative data interpretation and analysis refers to the techniques of processing the numerical 
data using complex mathematical measurement and statistical modelling to achieve meaningful 
interpretation and inference. Sapsford and Jupp (2006) argued that the raw quantitative information 
collected from different sources is of little use until it is processed intentionally. For example, the 
answers to the questions asked in a survey need to be well organized and given a numerical value, 
which is also a prominent distinction separating quantitative data analysis from qualitative data 
analysis. As Blaikie (2003) stated, quantitative studies data normally begins in words, which are 
transformed into numbers, are subjected to different levels of statistical manipulation, and are 
reported in both numbers and words. Thus it is a process from words to numbers and back to words. 
The commonly recognized statistical procedures of quantitative research to answer research 
questions fall into two main approaches: descriptive and inferential (Blaikie 2003). He asserted that 
which approach of data analysis should be used is determined by the aim and design of the research, 
the level of data collected, and the characteristics of the data. 
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Presenting descriptive statistics refers to the procedure of summarizing data after its collection. It is 
usually the first step of quantitative analysis and there are two main purposes for descriptive 
statistics as Cramer (2003) argued. One is to organise, summarise, and present numerical data, and 
the other is to describe the structure of the data for further inferential analysis. Furthermore, Blaikie 
(2003) classified descriptive analysis into two types—univariate and bivariate descriptive analysis. 
The former is used to represent the characteristics of some sociological facts by counting the 
frequency, grouping scores over a certain range into categories, and presenting these frequencies in 
pictorial or graphical form. Measures of central tendency can be calculated and the spread of 
frequencies around this centre point graphed. Bivariate descriptive analysis involves either 
establishing similarities or differences between the characteristics of categories of objects, events or 
people, or describing patterns or connections between such characteristics. 
Along the path from descriptive statistics to inferential statistics, there is an analysis step named 
explanatory analysis, which involves finding the cause or causes for the characteristics and 
relationships described and established in descriptive statistics (Bryman and Cramer 1994). This 
step is intended to reveal why some factors show positive or negative impacts while others may be 
unrelated.   
By contrast, inferential statistics are used to make inferences and test hypotheses about populations 
from representative samples (Byrne 2002). It is a way to comprehend a specific phenomenon and 
then infer what would be found in the total population because it allows the researcher to 
extrapolate to a group of individuals based on data obtained from a limited number of research 
subjects. Furthermore, inferential statistics can be categorized as parametric and nonparametric, 
where the parametric statistics use true numerical values and require large samples, while 
nonparametric statistics are usually used when the data represents a nominal or ordinal scale, when 
a parametric assumption has been greatly violated, or when the nature of the distribution is not 
known. The steps in applying inferential statistics include selecting appropriate tests of significance, 
determining whether the significance test will be two-tailed or one tailed, selecting the probability 
level for significance, computing the test of significance, and consulting the relevant table to 
determine the significance of the results.  
According to Fink (1995), the results of quantitative analyses are descriptions, relationships, 
comparisons, and predictions. These are the most common types of analyses done for surveys and 
interviews. As will be seen in the remaining chapters of this study, regression analysis was used to 
identify the relationship between crop yields and local weather indicators, and the factors 
influencing farmers’ decision-making about participating in the weather index crop insurance 
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scheme. Another section analyses a complex range of issues about contact design and 
implementation. The last section includes an analysis that aimed to investigate the impact of 
weather index insurance on household incomes relative to premium subsidies from the government.  
3.4.3 The combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis 
Case study and mixed methods research based on a combination of data collection and analysis 
were selected for this study. This study therefore combines the results of analysing both qualitative 
and quantitative data to compare the perceptions of households, village leaders, insurance company 
staff, and government officers towards the application of weather index crop insurance in China. As 
this insurance instrument may be a public/private partnership, it is important to consider the 
differences in perceptions between the different groups of stakeholders. 
The combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis runs through all the three stages of this 
study. First, secondary data and information were collected from the statistics and meteorology 
departments in order to build a significant relationship between yield and weather variables for the 
case study areas. This quantitative analysis was conducted with the SPSS statistical package. 
Primary data (including qualitative and quantitative information) were collected from the structured 
surveys, which were conducted with selected households in order to gain a deeper understanding of 
the issues from the farmers’ knowledge and perspective. The results from quantitative analysis and 
the findings from the household surveys were used to assist in the design of a weather index crop 
insurance contract, as well as the design of the other three interview questionnaires. Three different 
kinds of semi-structured interviews were undertaken as the second stage of this study, in order to 
explore the respondents’ attitudes to weather index crop insurance. The interviews were completed 
by village leaders, insurance company staff, and government officers. In this stage, quantitative data 
generated from the household survey and village leaders’ interviews was entered in an Excel spread 
sheet and analysed using the SPSS statistics package. Qualitative information from village leaders, 
insurance staff, and government officers’ interviews was transcribed and analysed. The third stage 
involved an integrative analysis of the results from the previous two stages to achieve a greater 
understanding of the issues.  
Mixed methods research as used in this study can produce consistent research results, but may also 
produce some discrepancies. The level of consistency is reflected not only in the within-methods 
comparison, but is also evident in the between-methods comparison (Jick 1979). When different 
analyses draw dissimilar results, the researcher has to reconcile these differences in some way. On 
the other hand, this divergence can often turn out to be an opportunity for enriching the explanation. 
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Results of both the qualitative and quantitative analysis are presented in the subsequent chapters of 
the thesis.  
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4 Policy environment for weather index crop insurance 
Governments in developing countries have become increasingly involved in the support of crop 
insurance programs. A striking example is China, where with premiums subsidised by different 
levels of governments, the agricultural insurance market (crops and livestock) grew dramatically to 
become the second largest in the world in 2008 outside of the United States (Mahul and Stutley 
2010). The government exerts a dominant role in crop insurance schemes in China. It provides 
policy and financial support and facilitates coordination between farmers and insurance companies. 
Government agencies at multiple levels are also key actors in both the demand and supply of 
insurance services (as discussed in Chapters 6 and 7). Even if the analysis in Chapter 5 reveals that 
weather index insurance is technically feasible, any scheme also has to be politically and 
administratively acceptable.  
This chapter investigates government roles and perspectives, in relation to weather index crop 
insurance and in the context of other types of insurance or support currently provided. The chapter 
comprises three sections. Section 4.1 examines how agricultural insurance developed, describes the 
major policy milestones, and examines the major drivers in this evolution. Section 4.2 discusses the 
shortcomings identified by key stakeholders with the current instruments, and explores the main 
reasons why the present implementation is less successful. Section 4.3 analyses whether weather 
index crop insurance can overcome or will exacerbate these issues and the role for government in a 
weather index crop insurance program. By eliciting these opinions from policy makers, the chapter 
plays an important role in setting some of the background to the assessment of the technical 
relationships between weather and yield (Chapter 5) and the demand and supply assessment of 
households and insurance companies in Chapters 6 and 7. 
The information in this chapter comes primarily from face-to-face interviews with officers in local 
government. They include the Deputy Magistrate of Huojia County responsible for agriculture and 
rural affairs as well as the finance officer of Huojia County, in charge of the implementation of the 
financial laws and regulations, research on major issues concerning the county’s financial situation, 
and organizing cooperation between the government and financial institutions. Both are influential 
members (leader and deputy leader) of “the leading group on agricultural insurance”; a special 
group responsible for the implementation of policy-oriented agricultural insurance and comprised of 
various departmental leaders who are in charge of finance, agriculture, forest, meteorology, water 
conservation as well as the 11 townships leaders in the county. Thus the respondents can provide 
unique insights from the government’s perspective on weather index insurance.   
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4.1 China’s crop insurance development and policy 
As the literature review in Chapter 2 suggested, the precedents of crop insurance could be traced 
back to 1950, and has proceeded through four intermittent stages. The developments in the past 
decade started in 2004 with a new round of pilot testing of crop insurance in various regions of 
China. Meanwhile, central and local governments were actively taking measures to encourage and 
support farmers to insure, and were making efforts to promote the healthy development of a crop 
insurance system. 
4.1.1 Modern development of crop insurance in China 
Despite its early origins and tortuous development path, the modern version of crop insurance in 
China is the result of significant progress. The central government first carried out pilot testing of 
policy-oriented agricultural insurance in 2004. Three years later, the central government provided 
one billion yuan for policy-oriented agricultural insurance involving corn, rice, soybeans, wheat, 
and cotton in the provinces of Jilin, Inner-Mongolia, Xinjiang, Jiangsu, Sichuan and Hunan., In 
2008, the subsidised area extended to most of the major grain producing areas across China, canola 
and peanuts were added as subsidised crops, and the proportion of central government subsidy was 
increased from 25% to 35%. In 2009, the subsidy from the central government increased to 40% for 
crop production in middle and western areas, while in 2010, sweet potato and barley were added as 
insured products, and the subsidised area expanded to 23 provinces. Since 2012, this policy has 
been extended to all provinces with the insured acreage of staple crops increased to over 1 billion 
mu by the end of 2013, accounting for 42% of China’s major crop acreage (CIRC 2013).  
For farmers, crop insurance claims have become a source of funds to resume production after a 
natural disaster. For example, large insurance payouts were made for frost damage in Hunan 
province in 2008. In 2009, PICC paid more than 500 million yuan for drought claims in Northeast 
regions.  
Protection of food security is another reason for government’s consideration of crop insurance. 
Originally food security was used to describe whether a country had access to enough food to meet 
dietary energy requirements, while more recently, it has been extended to refer to satisfying 
people’s dietary needs and food preferences for healthy and nutritional living (Pinstrup-Andersen 
2009). Although China has been trying to maintain the balance between the demand and supply 
sides of the food equation, the government has faced a number of new risks and pressures in recent 
years. First, reduced relative benefits of crop production as the prices of seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, 
farm rents, financing and labour costs rise has dampened the enthusiasm of farmers for crop 
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production (Yu 2013). Second, the demand of crop products in China displays firm growth, and 
short supply in some crops has led to increased food imports (Cheng 2013) as a result of increasing 
proportion of urban population, improving household consumption levels, and increasing industrial 
usage of crop products. Third, consumers are increasingly concerned about the quality and safety of 
crop products, heightening concerns over food security. Thus the government continues to focus on 
improving China’s crop insurance system. 
In addition, crop insurance can reduce pressure on fiscal expenditure and amplify the effect of 
government subsidies. Compared with crop insurance, post-disaster relief consumes vast funds, but 
still does not cover actual disaster losses (Yu 2013). Conversely, claim payouts from crop insurance 
often exceed the premiums paid by farmers requiring government subsidies. Apart from concerns 
over disaster assistance, and trying to engage insurance companies more in the mitigation of some 
of the financial impacts of these disasters, the push to insurance instruments, rather than more 
general agricultural subsidies and support may also be related to China’s accession to the WTO and 
its attempt to avoid ‘red box policy’12 (Meuwissen, Huirne and Skees, 2003; Duan and Wayne, 
2008; Xing and Lu, 2010; Thiesse, 2010). Conversely crop insurance, as a ‘green box policy’13, 
means it is widely recognized as indirect support for agriculture. Therefore, developing crop 
insurance will not only protect farmers’ incomes and provide incentives to increase production, but 
is also a mechanism by which government can legally support crop production.  
The implementation of crop insurance is effectively a form of disaster recovery mitigation, in which 
insurance companies have become active providers. For example, the PICC cooperated with local 
meteorology bureaus to purchase equipment for cloud seeding; installed automatic weather stations 
to monitor temperature, humidity, wind direction and other weather changes in real time, so the 
insurance company or the meteorology department can notify farmers to take some protective 
measures, such as irrigation; advise on adverse weather warnings; and conduct agro-meteorology 
analysis, pest and disease monitoring (Huang, Liu and Yu 2013).  
4.1.2 Central government policy 
In each of the eleven years from 2004 to 2014, as shown in Table 4-1, the central government No.1 
document has consistently included guidance for the development of China’s agricultural insurance 
system demonstrating the national emphasis on agricultural insurance. Even more important than 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Red box polices refer to a category of subsidies that is forbidden under WTO rules.  
13 Green box polices refer to a category of subsidies that is permitted under WTO rules.	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the No 1 document decrees, China Insurance Regulatory Commission14 (CIRC) issued a notice on 4 
June 2013 on implementing ‘Agricultural Insurance Regulations’, and improving agricultural 
insurance work. It encouraged insurance companies to consider and design innovative agricultural 
insurance products to meet the range of farmers’ demands, such as weather index insurance, price 
index insurance, yield insurance, income insurance, agricultural product quality insurance, and rural 
microfinance guarantee insurance. The CIRC will give priority to approving these new insurance 
products. These developments indicate the ongoing interest and commitment of the central 
government to promoting the development of crop insurance, and providing a policy environment 
for innovation in crop insurance instruments. 
4.1.3 Local government implementation 
Since the Agricultural Insurance Regulations were issued, some new crop insurance products have 
begun to be tested. These include: the first yield insurance scheme for rice in Hubei province in 
June 2013 (premium of 56 yuan/mu including government subsidy of 20 yuan/mu, with indemnity 
of 400kg/mu and 800 yuan/mu); the first price index insurance of vegetables in Sichuan province in 
November2013 (For a crop such as Lettuce, its premium is 135 yuan/mu but with an 80% subsidy 
of the premium from the government, farmers have to pay just 27 yuan/mu; and with a maximum 
payout of 900 yuan/mu); and the first product quality insurance for fruit in Jiangsu province (such 
as cherry, juicy peach, yellow peach and strawberry) has been introduced. However, these projects 
are still in the initial stage involving very small areas and their effects have not been fully tested. 
Nevertheless these innovative products have garnered varying amounts of government support and 
subsidies indicating that weather index crop insurance may also have access to government 
subsidies. 
Table 4-1 Crop insurance policy in central government No.1 document 2004-2014 
Year Content 
2004 
Accelerate the establishment of policy-oriented agricultural insurance system; 
select some products and some areas to pilot; where conditions permit, farmers 
who participate in scheme can be given a certain amount of premium subsidy 
2005 
Expand the scope of policy-oriented agricultural insurance pilot testing; 
Encourage commercial insurance company to carry out agricultural insurance 
business 
2006 
Steadily promote policy-oriented agricultural insurance pilot program; 
Accelerate the development of agricultural insurance in various forms and by 
multiple channels 
2007 Establish and improve agricultural insurance system in accordance with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC), established on November 18, 1998, is authorized by the State 
Council to conduct administration, supervision and regulation of the Chinese insurance market, and to ensure that the 
insurance industry operates stably in compliance with law.	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basis of “government guidance, policy support, market operation, farmers 
voluntary action”; all levels of government to provide premium subsidies for 
farmers to participate in agricultural insurance; improve agricultural catastrophe 
risk transfer-sharing mechanism, and explore the establishment of central and 
local financial-supported agricultural reinsurance system; encourage leading 
enterprises, intermediary organizations to help farmers to participate in 
agricultural insurance 
2008 
Sum up experiences and practices of piloting policy-oriented agricultural 
insurance; 
Establish and improve agricultural reinsurance15 system, and gradually establish 
a sound transfer and sharing mechanism for crop production risk  
2009 
Expand the pilot area and insurance products, increase the level of central 
government subsidy in middle and western areas; accelerate the establishment of 
agricultural reinsurance system and financial support for catastrophic risk 
sharing system; encourage the development of mutual assistance insurance and 
commercial insurance business in rural areas; explore mechanisms for 
interaction of rural credit and agricultural insurance systems 
2010 
Encourage local government to provide subsidies to carry on agricultural 
insurance with local characteristics; develop rural micro-insurance and improve 
the agricultural reinsurance system 
2011 Focus on the development of water reform 
2012 Encourage local government to carry out agricultural insurance for locally competitive crop products 
2013 
Improve agricultural insurance system and the premium subsidies policy; 
increase the proportion of subsidy for the central and western regions and major 
grain-producing counties 
2014 
Gradually reduce or eliminate the level of premium subsidies in major grain-
producing counties at the county level; continuously improve the insurance 
coverage area and risk guarantee level of three main crops (rice, wheat and 
maize); encourage insurance institutions to try new insurance instruments, where 
well-established local government can provide premium subsidies, and the 
central government provides support through financial incentives instead of 
subsidies 
Source: Summarized by author based on Dong and Lin (2014) 
As one official interviewed noted, local government usually responds positively to the call from the 
central government. Due to the importance attached to crop insurance in Central Government 
documents, this program could not rely solely on insurance company decisions. Government at all 
levels have set up special leading groups for crop insurance, comprising the heads from different 
sectors. During the process of implementation, the county government, county financial office, 
county agricultural office, township government, and village committees have borne a large part of 
the responsibility for promotion, on-farm assessment, and claims work. These additional tasks are 
carried out by deploying temporary personnel from different sectors of local government. In Huojia 
County, the conservative estimate of expenses on this work undertaken by local government rather 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Reinsurance is insurance that is purchased by an insurance company from one or more other insurance companies as 
a means of risk management.	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than central government is about 300,000 yuan each year, even after excluding 10% of the 
prescribed matching funds for premium subsidies from the county government. Thus local 
government has also contributed substantial human resources, funding, and other material resources 
to assist the development of crop insurance.  
4.2 Problems with current crop insurance system 
While the previous analysis suggests growth in coverage in the insurance market and a supportive 
policy environment, in practice, both insurance companies and farmers are dissatisfied with how 
crop insurance programs are working “on the ground’. This section provides examples of some of 
the concerns. 
At the current stage of crop insurance in China, there is no clear demarcation of the boundary 
between government and the market. On the one hand, the government undertakes some 
responsibilities and commercial activities that would normally be undertaken by private companies 
while, on the other hand, it appears to shirk responsibility for other activities or measures that would 
normally be facilitated by government.  Apart from the fuzzy boundaries between the government 
and market in the provision of crop insurance, there is a series of other problems that have emerged 
with the current arrangements. Despite the rapid and extensive rollout of crop insurance mentioned 
in the previous section, there is considerable disquiet among farmers and insurance companies 
about the current policy. This section highlights the major concerns and officials’ perspectives on 
them.  
4.2.1 Scope and coverage 
One concern among farmers is that current policy-oriented agricultural insurance has a narrow and 
uneven coverage, as well as a low protection level, so that it is not as attractive as they would like.  
4.2.1.1 Narrow and uneven insurance coverage 
Although crop insurance developed rapidly in recent years, its coverage is still relatively narrow. 
From a national perspective, policy-oriented agricultural insurance only covers about 42% of the 
main national crop acreage (China Insurance Regulatory Commission (2013). Thus there is some 
way to go on the central government’s objective of making policy-oriented agricultural insurance 
the most important safeguard for stabilising agricultural production and farmers’ livelihoods and 
thereby reducing its financial burden from disaster relief.  In some main crop producing provinces 
such as Jilin, Inner Mongolia, Anhui, over 70% of plant acreage is covered by insurance but in 
provinces like Tibet, Guizhou, Gansu, Ningxia, the coverage is less than 10% (Feng and Su 2012).  
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From a local perspective, Henan Province provides crop insurance for five separate crops: corn, 
cotton, wheat, rice, and oilseed crops (soybean, peanut, and oilseed rape). Because of the central 
government’s policy, and the limits to local financial capacity, some cash crops like vegetables and 
fruits have not yet been included in the scope of subsidised insurance, although farmers expressed 
strong demand for it. Up to the end of 2012, PICC underwrote insurance for about 28 million mu of 
wheat, which accounts for 35% of the area planted in Henan Province (CIRC 2012) although this is 
less than in provinces like Heilongjiang and Anhui. Past studies have suggested three reasons for 
this (Diao 2011; Feng 2009; Wang, B 2011). First, farmers have a traditional view that if they are 
located in the Central Plains with stable weather, they may not need insurance. Second, the rapid 
development of agricultural insurance needs financial support while the resources in many parts of 
Henan are not very strong impacting on the desire of local governments to become involved. Third, 
personnel, service capabilities, and network construction by insurance companies cannot meet the 
needs of the developing industry. These reasons may be the main obstacles to the adoption of 
weather index crop insurance. 
4.2.1.2 Low protection level 
The protection level of current policy-oriented agricultural insurance in China is too low to meet 
farmers’ requirements, which have needs in the following areas. 
Gap between premium, payout and actual loss  
According to the number (see Table 2-1) recorded in the China Statistics Yearbook(s) (1979-2012), 
about 40-50 million hectares of crops throughout China are affected by natural disasters each year, 
accounting for one third of the total sown area. The percentage of area affected and areas damaged 
are consistent across years.  As a result, about 50 million tonnes of grain (worth up to 100 billion 
yuan) on average are lost each year (Lu, Zhang and Xie 2011). Thus, if 42% of areas affected were 
covered by policy-oriented agricultural insurance (according to the national insured proportion in 
2013), the value of lost grain production would be more than 42 billion yuan. However, the total 
premiums collected in 2013 were 30.66 billion yuan, and the total payouts from policy-oriented 
agricultural insurance were 20.86 billion yuan (Zhang 2014). Thus there is a substantial gap 
between premium income, payouts, and actual losses, as the total premiums and payouts cited also 
include premium income and payouts for livestock insurance, forestry, and fisheries insurance. 
As the Table 4-2 shows, natural disasters also caused heavy losses in crop production of Henan 
province. There are about 2.8 million hectares of crops influenced by natural disasters each year on 
average, with about 21% of sown areas affected. Although there are no specific figures report the 
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annual loss of crop production in Henan province, if the percentages of covered and affected areas 
in Henan province are similar to the national level, it can be inferred that there is a bigger gap 
between premium income and actual losses in Henan province because its premium income is 
below the national average. In addition, while the areas affected, and damages incurred, in China 
are fairly consistent across years, different areas are affected in any year. Individual provinces such 
as Henan may have much greater variability across years. This has important implications for both 
the government and the insurance companies in the distribution of risk and payouts across regions 
or provinces.  
Table 4-2 Crop areas affected and damaged by natural disasters in Henan province 1995-2011 
Year 
Total sown 
area 
(thousand 
hectare) 
Area 
affected 
(thousand 
hectare) 
Area 
damaged 
(thousand 
hectare) 
Percentage of area 
affected (%) 
Percentage of area 
damaged (%) 
1995 12136.8 2347.0 1035.0 19.3 8.5 
1996 12196.8 3896.7 1599.3 31.9 13.1 
1997 12349.5 3751.3 2542.0 30.4 20.6 
1998 12567.1 3124.0 975.0 24.9 7.8 
1999 12659.9 3670.0 1890.0 29.0 14.9 
2000 13136.9 4608.0 2646.0 35.1 20.1 
2001 13127.7 2848.0 1825.0 21.7 13.9 
2002 13359.8 2807.0 1400.0 21.0 10.5 
2003 13684.4 4965.0 2739.0 36.3 20.0 
2004 13805.7 2234.4 863.8 16.2 6.3 
2005 13922.6 2111.8 1103.4 15.2 7.9 
2006 13995.4 1585.0 608.0 11.3 4.3 
2007 14087.8 2116.0 967.8 15.0 6.9 
2008 14181.7 966.7 652.9 6.8 4.6 
2009 14196.6 2987.4 1063.0 21.0 7.5 
2010 14248.7 1568.1 584.7 11.0 4.1 
2011 14258.6 1477.6 380.2 10.4 2.7 
Average  13406.8 2768.5 1345.6 21.0 10.2 
Source: Henan statistical yearbook 2012 
Limits on maximum payouts  
Problems also emerge when government sets limits on. Given the high risks of crop production, the 
provincial government may set limits under the claims policy in order to limit the financial burden 
and uncertainty on local governments. The administrative measures associated with policy-oriented 
agricultural insurance issued by the Finance Department of Henan province clearly state “the whole 
payment of individual crop insurance products over the province cannot exceed three times the total 
premium income in each year”.  Specifically, when total payments claimed in Henan province are 
less than twice the total premium income, the claims will be paid by the insurance company. When 
the total approved payout is more than twice the total premium income, the over-payment should 
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first be claimed through reinsurance if applicable (currently reinsurance is not required by 
government, but some powerful insurance companies will buy the reinsurance themselves for their 
business), and the part that reinsurance companies could not take up, or without reinsurance to be 
claimed, will be shared 1:1 between the government and the insurance company. If the payment is 
greater than three times the premium income, there will be a pro-rata reduction in payouts, as the 
total amount of compensation cannot be more than three times total premium income.  This is not a 
directive of central government, and the central government has not issued any explicit instructions 
to define the responsibility of government and insurance companies, but almost all of the provincial 
governments have similar clauses to limit claims. The central government shows an ambiguous 
attitude towards such measures, because there is no satisfactory solution for this issue. The rationale 
for the maximum payment standard is to ensure the stability or sustainability of the crop insurance 
business (Huo, Wang and Zhang 2014), but the effects are to reduce the level of protection provided 
to farmers by crop insurance. 
Treatment of deductibles  
Currently, policy-oriented agricultural insurance sets different deductibles in the contract in each 
province. The deductibles are not the same for all areas, all crops, or all insured events, but are 
jointly decided by the provincial government and insurance company.  The deductibles for wheat 
insurance in Huojia County in Henan province are set at 30% of the insured amount. Thus, if crop 
losses are less than 30%, the insurance company does not compensate farmers and they have to bear 
the losses themselves. If the approved loss is more than 30%, the insurance company only pays for 
the part over 30% (Diao 2011). Several respondents in the household survey mentioned that 
Kangcun Town of Huojia County suffered heavy wind damage in May 2012, a large area of wheat 
lodged, and farmers suffered serious losses. However, according to the inspection results from the 
insurance company, damage was assessed at 32%. After the 30% deduction, the compensation was 
only 3-4 yuan/mu. This treatment disappointed many farmers who were affected by the event, 
relatively few households could get compensation, and the payment was quite small. This 
influenced the enthusiasm of the insured farmers to pay for insurance in the following year. 
Low insured amount  
The insured amount is also called the face amount and is stipulated in the insurance contract to be 
paid to the beneficiary if the risk covered by the insurance occurs. In property insurance, if the 
insured amount equals the value of the insured property, it is considered to be sufficient, otherwise 
assets are considered underinsured. Generally speaking, the design of crop insurance is to protect 
income, protect yield, or protect costs. Income protection can guarantee a minimum level of income 
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for insured farmers, but requires strong financial support from the government. Yield protection 
determines the insured amount according to the value of crop yield.  It is based on a fixed price 
rather than the prevailing market price, which also protects farmers’ income to some extent. 
However, incomes are a function of both yields and prices, and where there is a significant market 
effect (i.e. low production may increase prices and vice versa), yield stabilisation/insurance may 
make incomes more, rather than less, stable.  Cost-protected insurance refers to using the input costs 
as the insured amount enabling farmers to recover their investments in the case of a severe event. 
The present policy-oriented agricultural insurance product in China is cost-protected insurance, and 
in practice, the insured amount only covers part of the cost, covering all the material costs (such as 
seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, machinery, irrigation, transportation on the farm), but not labour cost. 
Taking Henan as an example, crop insurance policies stipulate the insured amount of winter wheat 
is 311 yuan/mu, which is based on the average input costs per unit area across the province, 
excluding labour cost. This amount is far from the actual value (more than 800 yuan/mu on 
average), and lower than the actual costs observed during field work in May 2012 of 380-400 
Yuan/mu excluding own labour cost and land rent (of 200-400 yuan/mu/year). This indicates that 
cost insurance might not be enough to attract farmers to insure, and also suggests that China’s crop 
insurance scheme should be entering into other forms (income or yield insurance). 
Narrow risk coverage 
Insurance companies exclude some higher frequency natural disasters, which leads to a great 
deviation from the actual needs of farmers. Normally, the general liability of policy-oriented 
agricultural insurance covers a wide range, including the losses caused by natural disasters, pests 
and diseases, and accidents. In the implementation process, local government or the insurance 
company normally list the specific insurance liability for each species, according to the 
characteristics of local natural disasters. In order to avoid too much risk or to protect the benefits of 
insurance suppliers, crop losses incurred as a result of drought are excluded in many provinces in 
Northern China. For some areas with good irrigation and low probability of drought occurring, 
drought risk is often covered as an additional option, and a low insured amount set and high 
deductible amount. In the bad drought of 2009 in China, over 300 million mu of farmland in 
northern areas was affected (Cui 2009). Among more than 10 affected provinces, only Anhui 
explicitly stipulated drought as a policy-oriented insurance liability (Liu, X 2009). To some extent, 
this position is contrary to the original expectation of policy-oriented agricultural insurance design, 
that the product being designed as safety net insurance. 
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4.2.2 Financial pressures on local government 
The extent of production variability and the financial position of farmers in China mean that 
financial support is necessary to implement viable crop insurance in practice. Normally this 
includes providing a management subsidy, tax incentives, and a subsidy for reinsurance to the 
company involved, as well as subsidising the premiums paid by insured households. In the United 
States the government also provides these subsidies, and bears a large part of the cost of promotion, 
farmers’ education, and insurance agents’ training (Shi, H 2008). In China, the financial subsidy 
provided by different levels of government is mainly for the premiums of insured farmers, as well 
as some tax business tax and stamp duty incentives for the agriculturally related business of the 
insurance companies. 
 The scale of financial support for crop insurance businesses over the country (as shown in Table 
4-3) has expanded year by year from 2007. After modest growth in 2009 and 2010, two consecutive 
years of substantial growth in subsidies came in 2011 and 2012 (28.2% and 46.9%) to rollout the 
policy-oriented agricultural insurance even further.  However, this growth was from a very small 
base and the financial support from government, especially for the insurance companies, is still 
regarded as insufficient by many scholars (Shi, H 2008; Tuo 2011; Xiao et al. 2013). 
Table 4-3 Financial subsidies for policy-oriented agricultural insurance in China  
Year Scale of financial subsidy (Billion Yuan) 
Central government contribution 
(Billion Yuan) 
Yearly 
growth 
2007  2.15  
2008   8.80 4.00 86% 
2009 10.00 4.70 17.5% 
2010 10.10 5.07 1.4% 
2011 13.80 6.50 28.2% 
2012 18.80 9.55 46.9% 
Source: Diao (2011). 
Moreover, the operation of current policy-oriented agricultural insurance adopts a ‘linkage 
mechanism’ between levels of government in subsidising the premiums. That is, a prerequisite for 
central government to provide subsidies is for provincial government to provide a certain 
percentage of the premium subsidy, while the provincial government also requires municipal and 
county governments to contribute a certain percentage of subsidies for insured households in their 
area.  With wheat insurance in Henan Province, the local insurance company must collect the 20% 
of premiums from insured households first, and then apply for the appropriate co-funding from 
county government (10%) and city government (5%). As long as the subsidy from local government 
is in place, the provincial government will provide its contribution of 25% of the full premium in 
86	  
	  
Henan province, and finally the central government will make up the remaining 40% of the full 
premium. If the county/city does not meet the co-funding requirement, the premium collected by the 
insurance company from the farmer will be returned and the transaction cancelled. The insurance 
company need not check whether the various levels of government will provide the co-contribution 
before collecting premiums from farmers. In practice, if the uptake in the county exceeds the county 
government’s financial ability, they will delay or refuse to pay.  
As a result, the ‘linkage mechanism’ has failed to mobilize local governments’ enthusiasm to 
increase subsidies for insurance premiums, and led to some ‘gaming’ between different levels of 
governments.  Each agricultural county normally has a greater demand for agricultural insurance 
than non-agricultural counties. In order to stabilize crop production and farmers’ incomes, they seek 
more financial subsidies to develop crop insurance in their areas. However, if the local government 
cannot co-contribute, it presumably means the farmers, and county, also miss out on the 40% 
central contribution and 25% provincial contribution. On the other hand, the weak economy in 
agricultural counties means they cannot provide the same funding for premium subsidies. Because 
of the linkage provisions, areas with the most significant demand may not be supported by central 
government, which leads to the scale of insurance coverage being less than desirable. In these 
circumstances, the central government places pressure on these local governments to provide 
alternative support if there is a severe adverse production event. As Xiao et al. (2013) noted, the 
‘linkage mechanism’ brings a ‘regressive effect’ in subsidising premiums between central and local 
governments. 
Finally, in a major agricultural province such as Henan, the fiscal revenue of government is not high, 
especially at the county level. Although its GDP ranked fifth and total fiscal revenue ranked 10th in 
the country in 2012 (Guo 2013), the per capita value is lower than the national average, because 
Henan has the highest population and most rural villages in China. Thus Henan’s per capita 
expenditure in 2012 was 5324 yuan, ranking it at the bottom of China. In Huojia County, the local 
government has sought to expand the fund raising channels for policy-oriented agricultural 
insurance, asking some industrial organizations and leading agricultural enterprises to provide 
premium subsidies for farmers. However, this informal means is a voluntary act, without any 
policies or rules to bind companies. While crop insurance with heavy administrative costs, as well 
as a high loss ratio, will inevitably increase the government’s financial burden, the actual state of 
the Henan economy means the level of financial subsidy is insufficient, and the inflexible ‘linkage 
mechanism’, further adds to the current problems. 
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4.2.3 Policy implementation and propriety 
The third main problem with policy-oriented agricultural insurance is that there is too much 
intervention from local governments and suspect behaviour during its implementation. 
4.2.3.1 Local government intervention  
The problem with intervention is expressed in two major ways. Firstly, local government imposed a 
level of insurance coverage during the implementation stage. In the situation where famers are not 
familiar with the policy, local government set an enrolment rate for policy-oriented wheat insurance 
as a primary goal of performance appraisal for township and village cadres, devolving the task 
down to each level of the township and village by executive order, and asking them to complete on 
schedule. In turn, the county governments also have their own performance targets from higher-
level governments to meet. County governments often do not or cannot co-contribute to insurance 
in their areas, but have to make some compromises under the pressure of performance appraisal.  
Local government usually controls the number of insured within a range of financial affordability. 
For example, they may only advertise the crop insurance scheme in a few towns of the county, not 
in every town, but they also need to ensure some growth in the number insured so their performance 
appears to be improving.  
Responses in the survey in the study found that some villages linked policy-oriented wheat 
insurance to other farmer-friendly policies such as the Grain Direct Subsidy. If farmers are not 
willing to participate, the local government withholds their Grain Direct Subsidy until they agree to 
pay. These practices mean that normal contractual relationships like commercial insurance are hard 
to form between the insurance company and insured households. This can distorts commercial 
insurance business activities, and reduces the effectiveness, efficiency and service quality, and lead 
to misconceptions about insurance among farmers and lead to exclusion of some farmers.  
Secondly, local government can intervene or wield significant influence over the business 
underwriting of insurance companies. In the fieldwork in Huojia County, insurance staff indicated 
that local government often dominates the development and operation of insurance programs, 
including determining insurance liability, contract premiums, underwriting company selection, etc.  
In managing funds, local government set a series of qualifications for opening accounts, 
maintaining catastrophe reserve funds as well as determining utilisation of funds. Nevertheless, 
situations sometimes arise where local governments ask for or withdraw money from the insurance 
companies, relying on their monopoly over resources or administrative power, see Tuo (2012). This 
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can distort or damage the legitimate interests of farmers and impact adversely on the development 
of appropriate policy-oriented agricultural insurance.  
4.2.3.2 Cheating and misappropriation of financial subsidies  
Some local governments may deliberately refuse to pay the financial subsidy to the insurance 
company, especially when the branch in that area has a slight operating profit, or their claims paid 
are less than premium income in the past 2-3 years. Thus if the insurance company is considered to 
have earned too much money from agricultural insurance, the local government may default on the 
financial subsidies, even if they have funds to pay.  However, if the local government does not have 
enough funds to co-contribute, the insurance company basically would not use their surplus to 
advance funds for the local government, and instead return premiums to farmers and cancel their 
contracts. 
Misappropriation of special or targeted funds can also occur in townships in some areas, and can 
even be regarded as justifiable way to maintain the normal operations of the township government. 
Currently, the provision of policy-oriented agricultural insurance is still inseparable from the 
support of township governments and village committees, such as verifying crop acreages. Thus, 
local governments may ask the insurance company to use false insurance contracts (such as 
reporting more insured crop acreage than there actually is) to “cheat” higher levels of government 
out of financial subsidies, which are then used to meet the current expenses of local governments. 
For instance, Tuo (2011) cited several examples and states “in some areas, local government 
determines the premium income of insurance companies, determines the gain or loss of the 
insurance company, also determines how much farmers can get from insurance claims. They can 
give premium subsidies to the insurance company; or they might give less or nothing.  Sometimes 
the financial subsidies from central and provincial governments could also be pressed into their 
hand as a bargaining chip”. As will be highlighted in Chapter 7, interviewees from the insurance 
company frequently alluded to administrative coercion. 
In short, there are a number of problems in the current policy-oriented agricultural insurance 
scheme, in the design, capabilities, and implementation. Weather index crop insurance provides 
potential to overcome some of these issues, but as outlined in the next section, there are still 
difficulties to be addressed. 
4.3 Role of government in weather index crop insurance 
In general, both Central and local governments in China view crop insurance as an important risk 
management instrument and are keen to identify ways to introduce innovative products to make it 
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more effective. As discussed in the literature review, over 30 countries have successfully tested 
weather index crop insurance, guided by a number of organizations including the World Bank and 
the World Food Programme. Conceptually, weather index insurance has a number of advantages 
like reducing adverse selection, preventing moral hazard, cutting down operating costs, as well as 
transparency and timely payouts and so could solve some of the problems with the current crop 
insurance discussed in the previous section. And the subsidy for weather index crop insurance 
instrument is primarily to hedge the level of production risk, and there is only an indirect link 
between the subsidy and actual production. It is for these reasons that weather index crop insurance 
may be able to be specified as a green box agricultural support tool in WTO agreements. 
 As shown in Figure 4-1, a design feature of weather index crop insurance is its transparency. It 
does not pay compensation to farmers because of the decline in the quantity or quality of crops 
caused by adverse weather event but pays an indemnity on the evidence that pre-specified weather 
conditions in the insurance contract, that may cause crop yield losses, have been met. The 
transparency of the contract enables the compensation to be paid rapidly. In addition, if different 
protection levels (protection of cost, protection of income, etc.) are set instead of the single cost-
protection approach, much potential demand by households could be stimulated. Since there is less 
potential for adverse selection and moral hazard and no on-farm assessment procedure, the 
operating and transaction costs of the insurance companies will be reduced, and profits likely to 
increase. Furthermore, in a situation where both supply and demand are increasing, farmers will 
develop their awareness of crop insurance, become willing to pay a higher proportion of the 
premiums within their capabilities, and the financial burden on government will be eased. They can 
use the funds saved to provide other services. 
	  
Figure 4-1 Improvement process due to weather index crop insurance 
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An evaluation of the relative merits of a weather index crop insurance scheme, however, must 
extend beyond the potential benefits and examine the needs of different levels of government, 
because any economic activity needs to be carried out under a framework of institutional certainty, 
and the most powerful provider of that in China is government. Although government policy to 
achieve weather index crop insurance is supposed to be a least-cost approach, the government has 
mandatory capacity, organizing ability, and some efficiency advantages (Feng 2004b; Huang 2009). 
In China, the government has always taken the lead on crop insurance. They use their influence in 
allocating social resources to provide the necessary financial and policy support for crop insurance 
participants, such as organizing research, and mobilizing the administrative, financial, and fiscal 
departments involved in crop insurance. These advantages could be significant in reducing the costs 
and other obstacles delaying implementation of weather index crop insurance. Therefore this 
section includes detailed analysis of weather index crop insurance from a government perspective, 
including governments’ willingness to enhance farmers’ awareness on a large scale to realize and 
expand the potential demand, and their willingness to provide financial subsidies and other forms of 
support to promote the effective supply of weather index agricultural insurance.  In addition, 
government provides an enabling environment such as an effective legal and regulatory system to 
enforce contracts and behaviour between different parties. The government perspective can be 
separated into four points, role, funding, participation, and supportive legal and regulatory 
framework. 
4.3.1 Role orientation  
The idea of using commercial insurance resources to transfer public money from governments to 
farmers and rural areas through a crop insurance scheme could be efficient as it utilises their social 
development capacity in rural areas and the ability of insurance companies, as well as subjecting 
them to the special economic and cultural structures of rural society. It also subjects the various 
groups that are interspersed through all aspects of the process (including all levels of government, 
insurance companies, the insured farmers, agricultural businesses, meteorology stations, and water 
conservancy departments) to new ways of doing business. Thus, an assessment of weather index 
crop insurance involves more than cost and risk, but also involves a dynamic balance of efficiency 
and fairness. Central to the discussion is the role of government in facilitating weather index crop 
insurance. The officials interviewed expressed two different points of view. 
One view was that multi-party cooperation led by government is a necessary condition to introduce 
weather index crop insurance. Because of their small scale and large number of farmers, any 
insurance company could not be the independent contractor as revealed repeatedly in previous 
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experience in China. The design and implementation of weather index crop insurance is complex 
work and insurance companies must cooperate with a number of professional and technical 
departments in finance, civil affairs, meteorology, and agriculture. If an insurance company wants 
to lead such cooperation relying on its own strength, it takes a lot financial commitment. Thus 
multi-sector coordination and cooperation is likely to be achieved at a lower cost through the 
auspices of government. 
Another point of view was that the main role of government should be to provide the necessary 
infrastructure and a good external environment. In the context of weather index crop insurance, the 
necessary infrastructure is a series of basic public services (regulation, supervision, etc.) to 
guarantee sustainable development. The product itself should be provided by the market. In this 
case, some additional support may also be required, such as premium subsidies, tax incentives and 
credit support, because crop insurance has positive externalities. In economics, an externality is the 
cost or benefit that affects a party who did not choose to incur that cost or benefit (Buchanan and 
Stubblebine, 1962). A positive externality is an economic activity that imposes a positive effect on 
an unrelated third party (Varian, 2010). As the review of literature in section 2.3.2 highlights, most 
academics agree the nature of crop insurance lies between private and public goods, though it tends 
to be more towards the public end of the spectrum. Crop insurance has a positive externality 
because it provides various social benefits including risk diversification, resource allocation, and 
improvements in national economy and food security (Pi and Li, 2003). This also implies that crop 
insurance is not something solved by competitive markets. The government may have to step in 
with a collective solution, such as subsidizing or legally requiring crop insurance use. Otherwise, 
people who suffer from additional costs do so involuntarily, while people who obtain benefits do so 
without cost. From this point of view, some level of government intervention may be warranted. 
Thus, the interviewed officer said figuratively “in crop insurance, government is not ‘athlete’, but 
‘referee’, developing ‘rules of the game’ for the main stakeholders”. At the same time, he stressed, 
“crop insurance really needs government’s support, but the ‘strong support’ should not be fiscal 
contracting, attending to the job, or taking on everything. The role of government in crop insurance 
should be a policy provider, a financial backer, a coordinator, or a business advisor, rather than the 
programme leader”.  
Based on knowledge of the special nature of the crop insurance market (rural environment, 
institutional culture), the role of government in weather index crop insurance is complicated, but it 
should be acknowledged that in nearly all existing cases, the programs were initiated by the public 
sector or multilateral agencies (such as the World Bank and World Food Programme), not by 
private insurers. This suggests that there are important public goods involved with crop insurance 
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and the government’s role needs to be in place, without which private insurers may be unwilling or 
unable to enter or compete in the market. Yet, the government-driven policy-oriented agricultural 
insurance has exposed many problems as shown in section 4.2. Therefore, there is ongoing debate 
as to whether the government should be the leader.  
The author leans towards the second of these views that establishing insurance companies in a 
dominant position does not mean a lack of government oversight or influence in crop insurance 
matters. Conversely, even in a subordinate position, the government can still help coordinate 
cooperation among various sectors, and may achieve a more just outcome by developing 
supervision and management measures. Meanwhile, it can reduce the arbitrariness of government 
support for crop insurance. Furthermore, taking a leadership position could enhance enthusiasm 
within the insurance company. This leaves the question of how to define the scope of government 
intervention. Generally speaking, this requires the development of a relevant institutional and legal 
framework as discussed in section 4.3.4. 
4.3.2 Funding support 
The officials interviewed agreed that in principle some form of funding is necessary in the 
beginning to encourage and facilitate weather index crop insurance. However, both officials 
acknowledged the need to control the proportion of premiums subsidised, especially for lower 
levels of government. Funding is so difficult to provide that local government has to control the 
insurance coverage and scale. Its inability to support the more expensive weather index crop 
insurance, unless the farmers are willing to assume a greater proportion of premiums in weather 
index crop insurance, is obvious. Because policy-oriented agricultural insurance is cost-protected 
insurance, while weather index crop insurance is designed as an income-protected insurance, the 
premium is potentially higher.  
The interviews raised an additional question. The provision of premium subsidies for insured 
farmers is to improve affordability of insurance, to support crop production and to stabilize farmers’ 
incomes. But the aim of commercial insurance companies is to maximize profits, and setting a high 
premium to improve their profit is understandable. As a result, the ultimate outcome of government 
subsidies is to support the insurance company’s profits. Another issue is whether the resulting 
monopoly would disrupt the functioning of the insurance market and obstruct or crowd out the 
supply of commercial crop insurance products. More importantly, it may lead to a heavy financial 
burden on government, because all the losses of any state-owned insurance company need to be 
paid by government. 
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One of the respondents put forward a suggestion to reduce the proportion of premium subsidies 
coming from local government.  They could not give a clear opinion whether to adjust the 
proportion of premium paid by central government, and how much subsidy of the premium is 
appropriate. They believed that most farmers in their area did have sufficient ability to pay. They 
questioned whether it is necessary to provide the same subsidy for all farmers in order to be fair, 
and agreed that farmers’ willingness-to-pay would increase as long as the crop insurance product 
meets the actual needs of farmers. This discussion implies that using differential subsidies for 
weather index crop insurance might be a good idea although the transaction costs of doing so may 
be another matter.   
The deputy magistrate declared that the local government does not have spare capacity to guarantee 
the losses for any crop insurance business.  He understood that if the government does not 
compromise, the farmers will suffer, or the program cannot proceed.  In the case of government 
with limited funds, it needs to find a way to alleviate this contradiction. One suggestion proffered 
was for farmers to agree to use part of the various national agricultural subsidies (food subsidies, 
machinery subsidies, seed subsidies, etc.) they receive to pay for the insurance premiums. The 
finance officer interviewed put forward a different idea. He stated that weather index crop insurance 
is different from the policy-oriented agricultural insurance in place. It is more like a government-
regulated commercial insurance product, rather than a government-led policy-oriented insurance 
product. Thus the insurance companies should hedge or take on measures to secure their own 
business risks through the market, such as setting secure premiums, building a sound insurance 
contract, purchasing reinsurance, improving their management, etc. Governments have no 
responsibility or obligation to guarantee the losses from a commercial insurance product. Even if 
the product has some external effects, the government could provide assistance in promotion and 
organization. If the government is responsible for the losses of all crop insurance business, the 
superiority of weather index crop insurance over the other risk management strategies could not be 
demonstrated.  
4.3.3 Execution methods and participation rate 
In commenting on execution method, the deputy magistrate believed that policy-oriented 
agricultural insurance could be mandatory, or voluntary, while weather index crop insurance if 
defined as a commercial product, by convention, should be voluntary and not mandatory. The main 
reason for choosing the compulsory option in policy-oriented agricultural insurance was to solve the 
problem of adverse selection. Conversely, when adverse selection is not a significant issue in 
weather index crop insurance, there is no reason to force all farmers to insure. However, if the 
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voluntary method is chosen, the participation rate may be not ideal and sustainable development of 
the insurance difficult to achieve.  
The finance officer countered that voluntary implementation is an effective way to motivate the 
insurer to improve their design and service. Taking the opposite view, mandatory methods are 
equivalent to cancel the “right to vote” that farmers have under the voluntary condition. If the lower 
level supervision of this system was cancelled—this may be just what officials and insurance 
companies hope for - then this product will easily deviate from the target set. In other words, the 
mandatory method may protect the participation rate, but it brings with it the ‘moral hazard’ of 
insurance company and government collaboration. In addition, this official criticized the fact that 
governments habitually used their power advantage to reach certain goals, where when voluntary 
methods failed they adopt mandatory methods. If the mandatory approach does not work very well, 
they redouble the enforcement, ignoring the fact that there can be some unexpected consequences 
because of the complexity of ‘social systems engineering’. This opinion confirmed the view of the 
deputy magistrate, that voluntary execution might be the right choice for weather index crop 
insurance. The opinion of the finance officer can also be understood. If the possible moral hazard 
issues regarding insurance companies and government cannot be controlled within a certain range, 
non-voluntary execution methods could be considered, taking advantage of the law of large 
numbers and social objectives.  
Considering these observations, moral suasion might supplement the voluntary method, and become 
an indispensable safeguard in the execution of weather index crop insurance in the initial stages. 
Moral suasion is defined in the economic sphere as “the attempt to force private economic activity 
via governmental advice in directions not already defined or prescribed by existing statute law” 
(Romans 1966). In the context of weather index crop insurance, the moral suasion can be backed by 
explicit or implicit threats by governments in order to provide incentives to achieve a high 
participation rate. Farmers’ trust in government is better than their opinion of insurance companies 
according to the household survey (see section 6.2), and the government can continue to improve 
this trust through good governance, clear communication, and fulfilled promises. In addition, a 
variety of other policy instruments can be used together with moral suasion. For example, the local 
government can publish information in order to ‘shame or stimulate’ certain farmers into altering 
their behaviour because of farmers’ herding behaviour. 
Moral suasion can also influence the participation rate, because whether it is commercial insurance 
or policy-oriented insurance, both need to attract large numbers of producers to be successful. 
Without sufficient participation, it is difficult to achieve the desired level of social benefits. The 
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past experience with crop insurance illustrates this point. In fact, there is not a critical level of 
participation in practice, and the insurance company has raised the premium to avoid any business 
risk and guarantee their profit. In this case, the participation rate is still low with overrated 
premiums, leading some to suggest that subsidising the premium could improve the participation 
rate (Jaspersen and Richter 2013; Shi, H 2008), but the effect of a premium subsidy is limited 
because of the influence of other factors. Gao (2007) and Feng et al. (2012) believed that both 
premium subsidies and the management subsidies discussed in the previous section might solve the 
affordability problem on both the supply and demand sides, which means, “the insurance company 
can afford the costs, and farmers can afford the price”. But these measures might not play much of a 
role in guaranteeing a critical participation rate, because the farmers may not be certain to buy 
weather index crop insurance even when they can afford it. This is not necessarily related to the 
education of farmers, but closely related to their long time production and living habits (Feng and 
Su 2012). The habit of not being accustomed to or unwilling to take advantage of weather index 
crop insurance to avoid production risks would not change spontaneously or automatically. Thus a 
fully voluntary approach may not be the best choice, at least at the present stage of development.  
4.3.4 Legal and regulatory support 
For agricultural insurance, many counties developed special laws to begin it, such as “Federal Crop 
Insurance Act” in the United States (7 U.S.C. 1501 et seq., Ch.36), “Agricultural Insurance Law” 
(Law No. 68) and “Agricultural Disaster Compensation Law” in Japan. In China’s case, agricultural 
insurance law was included in the “Insurance Law” released in 1995, where item No. 158 of the 
Insurance Law states that “the state supports the development of insurance business which services 
agricultural production; agricultural insurance shall be governed by separate laws or administrative 
regulations.” There were no corrections in the following amendments of “Insurance Law’ in 2002 
(No.155) and 2009 (No. 186) indicating that the state was prepared to introduce agricultural 
insurance laws. 
Both of the respondents indicated that a sound legal and regulatory framework was a prerequisite 
for the sustainable development of crop insurance, and that this is a fundamental responsibility of 
the government. To date, China still has no specialized agricultural insurance law, not to mention 
even more specific laws for crop insurance or weather index crop insurance. In fact, the proposed 
legislation for agricultural insurance has been repeatedly mentioned in central government 
conferences since 2007. However, it was always shelved due to China’s agricultural insurance 
business being in a stage of exploration and experimentation. But the finance officer noted that a 
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related regulation16 for agricultural insurance was introduced on March 1, 2013. This is the first 
regulation on agricultural insurance issued by the central government. It is based on the general 
definition of agricultural insurance that includes crop insurance, livestock insurance, forestry 
insurance, and fisheries insurance. It is a legal document that regulates commercial agricultural 
insurance, policy-oriented agricultural insurance and other agriculture-related insurance products 
(including property insurance for rural housing, farm machinery, boats; and short-term accident 
insurance involving farmers’ lives and physical damage).  Thus, the regulation will have a certain 
guiding significance for weather index crop insurance. 
The interviewees pointed out that the absence of a specific law might become a serious impediment 
to the sustainable development of weather index crop insurance.  Without a strong law, or direction 
from central government concerning general institutional arrangements for the implementation 
measures, some local governments and insurance companies may doubt the central government’s 
long term commitment and support policy, resulting in inadequate efforts to construct relevant 
support policies and establish long term arrangements. It might take a long time for the central 
government to introduce a special law or regulation for weather index crop insurance, in the light of 
experience with policy-oriented agricultural insurance that took a decade (2004-2013) to bring in a 
regulation.  
Considering the rigidities of the regulation system with the flexibility needed to develop weather 
index crop insurance programs, each pilot province can set out their own plans and regulations in 
line with actual local conditions, but these should not conflict with the agricultural insurance 
regulation by central government. First, Central legislation could provide legal support, certainty, 
and facilitate developments in several key areas that need to be legislated for. The local regulations 
for weather index crop insurance should include the rights and obligations of each stakeholder 
(business entity, participating subjects, and beneficiaries). The project should explicitly indicate the 
areas where the government will provide support and in what way such as: a) how much money will 
central government provide as a premium subsidy, and how much will provincial governments 
provide to encourage farmers to insure; b) the manner in which the government encourages 
commercial insurance companies to offer weather index crop insurance might be based on the 
economic conditions in different regions, such as exempting companies from all or part of the tax 
burden, provide reinsurance;  c) how much funding the government can afford to contribute to the 
initial research investment?; and d)  whether the government will take measures such as a central 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Regulation is reviewed and adopted by the State Council. It applies in the case when it requires an advance and 
temporary solution while the legislation cannot be followed up in a timely manner. It is applicable in the whole country, 
but the effectiveness is less than the law. 
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government subsidy, or expect the insurance company to self-finance any losses,  if the company 
involved company makes serious losses? The responsibilities and interests of all parties should be 
consistent, especially for the local government and the insurance company, in order to avoid rent-
seeking behaviour. Second, under the national policy, provinces, autonomous regions, and 
municipalities should establish a reasonable and comprehensive institutional framework for weather 
index crop insurance, because it is necessary and important for each to choose their own mode of 
operation. Third, government’s financial support and tax incentives need to be confirmed and an 
appropriate regulatory approach established, although many of the parameters, such as the 
proportion of premium subsidized, would need to be flexible in the central law. Fourth, what kind 
of insurance company is qualified to operate weather index crop insurance needs to be defined? If 
non-qualified insurers become involved, the difficulties of supervision and management will 
increase. If there are few qualified insurers, it may easily lead to a non-competitive situation. Fifth, 
it is better to clarify the responsibilities of different levels of governments to implement weather 
index crop insurance in order to provide a stable policy environment for its development. The 
finance officer interviewed believed this to be the only way to avoid the arbitrariness of government 
support, or to avoid the situation where support is not provided because of financial difficulties.     
In summary, crop insurance in China has developed to a new stage with the combined efforts made 
by central government and local governments. Although some outstanding achievements have been 
made, the development of crop insurance in China has been hindered by various problems in 
product design, the subsidy system, and the execution process. Admittedly, these difficulties 
provide a good opportunity for the introduction of weather index crop insurance, but also bring new 
challenges for all levels of governments in role orientation, funding support, execution plans, as 
well as establishing a satisfactory legal and regulatory system. The government should not shirk its 
responsibilities in the crop insurance; but on the other hand, they cannot promise to meet all 
reasonable requirements of insurance companies or farmers due to capacity constraints as they have 
multiple roles in the scheme—provide and maintain the appropriate policy environment, support 
farmers in their demands, and possibly support the suppliers too. Therefore, the attitudes and 
perceptions of these various players are significant for the successful introduction of weather index 
crop insurance.	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5 Relationship between crop yields and weather parameters  
Critical to the overall feasibility of weather index insurance is in establishing a robust relationship 
between crop yields and weather. This chapter explores many dimensions of this relationship using 
relevant data from Huojia County in the central plains in Henan. Section 5.1 discusses a range of 
factors that impact on wheat yields including agronomic, technologic, biophysical management, and 
weather related factors. Section 5.2 then focuses on a more detailed presentation of the weather 
factors, including a discussion of their variation through time. One of the most influential factors in 
crop yields through time is technological progress and so in establishing any relationship between 
yield and weather variables using time series data, the technology trend must first be accounted for. 
De-trending of the data is outlined in Section 5.3. The relationship between the de-trended yields 
and a range of weather variables is investigated in Section 5.4 while Section 5.5 explores a general 
contract design based on this study of Huojia County.  
5.1 Analysis of possible influencing factors in crop production 
Crop yields are impacted by a number of other factors including soils, inputs, technology, and 
management strategies. Studies such as Jessop (1987), Barkley and Nalley (2007), and Carew et al. 
(2009) have investigated wheat yield and production risk as influenced by cultivar diversity 
characteristics, soil quality, fertilizer applications, varied weather conditions, and management 
practices, all of which may impact on the growth of winter wheat production in the study area.  
5.1.1 Wheat production in China 
The study focuses on weather index insurance for winter wheat, as this is the major crop in the 
Central Plains of China. Wheat production is distributed throughout China except for Hainan 
province. Each agro-ecological region, however, has its own wheat varieties, timing and agronomic 
practices as shown in Table 5-1.  
Table 5-1 Wheat production areas in China 
Main areas Sub-regions 
Northern winter (autumn sowing) 
wheat production area 
Northern winter (autumn sowing) wheat area 
Huang-Huai winter (autumn sowing) wheat area 
Southern winter (autumn sowing) 
wheat production area 
Yangtze river winter (autumn sowing) wheat area 
Southwest winter (autumn sowing) wheat area 
South China winter (late autumn sowing) wheat area 
Spring wheat production area  
Northeast spring wheat area 
Northern spring wheat area 
Northwest spring wheat area 
Winter-spring wheat production area Xinjiang winter-spring wheat area Qinghai-Tibet spring-winter area 
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Within sub-regions, however, differences arise in climatic conditions, soil type, cropping systems, 
breed type, and management techniques. Generally, the shortest period for wheat-growth is 100 
days, and the longest is 350 days.  Most spring wheat is sown in early March to mid-April, while 
the earliest winter wheat is planted in late August, with the latest winter wheat planted in late 
December. Wheat in southern China, such as in Guangdong and Yunnan provinces, is usually 
harvested in early March, followed by harvesting in July and August in a south-north transect. Most 
winter wheat in the main producing areas is harvested in May or June. Winter wheat is the main 
wheat in China, accounting for more than 90% of both sown area and total production (Lei 2001).  
Provinces with the largest wheat planting acreages in order of size are Henan, Shandong, Hebei, 
Anhui, Jiangsu, Sichuan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Shanxi and Hubei (NBSC 2011). 
The study area, Huojia County, belongs to the Huang-Huai winter wheat area (Table 5-1). Winter 
wheat is usually sown in early to mid October, and harvested during late May to early June. The 
whole growth period lasts for 210-250 days, and the crop’s growth has the characteristics of a long 
tillering stage, long jointing stage, and short heading stage. During its growing season, the main 
agricultural meteorological disasters include drought, floods, frost, and hot-dry winds. Drought is 
considered to be the most severe meteorological disaster in Huojia County by local farmers because 
of the high frequency of occurrence, wide-ranging impact, and long duration. Drought includes 
spring drought, late summer drought, and autumn drought. For winter wheat, the most serious is 
spring drought resulting from the uneven seasonal precipitation. Precipitation from November to 
March accounts for only 15% of annual precipitation. When temperatures in spring increase quickly, 
so too do windy days and evaporation, they intensifies the impact of spring drought which seriously 
affects the greening–jointing stage of winter wheat.   
The effects of drought on winter wheat in the study areas can be relieved to some extent by 
irrigation. However, surface water resources have become scarce with increasing over-exploitation 
of groundwater and climate change induced rising temperatures that have led to increased 
evaporation. The overuse of groundwater meets the demand for irrigation at the expense of the 
environment, groundwater level drawdown and land subsidence. In addition, the share of water used 
for agriculture compared to industry and urban uses is declining due to the higher economic benefits 
of using this water in other sectors. All of these factors exacerbate instability and the imbalance 
between the supply and demand for agricultural water resources. 
100	  
	  
 
Source:	  http://extension.psu.edu/agronomy-­‐guide/cm/sec7/sec74b	  	  
Figure 5-1 Winter wheat growth stages  
The growth period for winter wheat can be divided into 5 stages: tillering, jointing, boot, heading, 
and ripening (Figure 5-1). Some agronomists sub-divide the tillering stage into tillering stage and 
winter dormancy stage, since it is a key agronomic stage of winter wheat. During each growing 
stage, basic weather conditions are needed to maintain growth. Table 5-2 shows a rough duration 
and condition of accumulated precipitation, temperature, and sunshine hours in Henan required for 
these stages. If the basic requirement of water, temperature, and light cannot be met, wheat yields 
will be lower. 
Table 5-2 Weather conditions required by winter wheat by growth stages 
Stages Duration in days Precipitation 
Accumulated 
temperature17 Sunshine hours 
Seeding-tillering 55-86 days 18.04-121.8mm 455.8-709.8℃  271.8-433.3 hours 
Winter dormancy 39-75 days      5.0-74.0 mm 53.0-182.0℃  125.0-371.0 hours 
Jointing stage 30-50 days 18.04-121.8mm 455.8-709.8℃  271.8-433.3 hours 
Boot stage  21-35 days 8.4-81.6 mm 327.1-399.0℃  140.7-204.1 hours 
Heading-ripening 37-51 days 20.2-195.9 mm 766.6-922.7℃  242.2-329.7 hours 
Source: Wang et al. (2010) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  Accumulated temperature means the sum of daily average temperature that is equal to or more than 0℃ within the 
wheat growth stage.	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5.1.2 Soil quality 
Soil is a natural media to supply nutrients for crops and helps conserve moisture and provide 
aeration for root growth. It is also a carrier of water, fertilizer, gas, and heat.  Under similar weather 
circumstances, soil type, texture and fertility level become important factors affecting wheat yield 
and quality. Weir and Rayner (1984) found that there was a positive correlation between soil type 
and yield. Soil texture, pH, and chemical composition all affect crop growth. Loam soil (particle 
size between 0.02 and 2mm) with good drainage is the best texture for cropping in terms of 
retaining soil moisture and fertility. A value of soil pH of 6.5-7.5 is adaptable for most crops; 
although some acidic soil is suitable for growing rice, tea and pineapple; while alkaline soils are 
suitable for crops such as sorghum, cotton and canola (Lin 2002).  
Guided by soil genesis and properties, the Chinese soil classification system (Gong 1989) is divided 
into 14 classes, 39 subclasses, 138 soil groups and 588 sub-groups. Each type of soil has particular 
characteristics and distribution areas, but not all are suitable for farming or planting wheat. The soil 
in Huojia County is Fluvo-aquic, which is formed from river sediments by the movement of 
groundwater and farming activities. Its main features are flat, deep, generally neutral or weakly 
alkaline and is suitable for planting a variety of crops. The images in Figure 5-2 show soil profiles 
from Huojia County of three different textures of Fluvo-aquic soil. Soils with different textures 
have different water and fertilizer conservation capacities but can be adapted to particular crops to 
some extent by fertilization and management practices. A soil testing project carried out a census of 
nutrient content of farmland soil in Huojia County from 2006 to 2011 and found that the average 
content of organic material, nitrogen, phosphorus, available potassium, Cu, Zn, effective iron and 
manganese in farmland soil of Huojia County was classed as moderate and above (Guo et al. 2011). 
 
Source:	  Google	  image	  
Figure 5-2 Soil in Huojia County 
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Although no evidence of very poor lands in Huojia County was uncovered in the study, soil may be 
a potential factor in differences in wheat yields observed across villages. However, it is less likely 
to be a factor in wheat yield variation across years since the soil is relatively stable after slight 
changes for tillage, fertilization or other management activities over the past 30 years.  
5.1.3 Agricultural inputs 
Agricultural inputs include seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, as well as plastic sheeting, agricultural 
machinery, agricultural engineering facilities and equipment. Since the vast majority of farming in 
China is small-scale, most households do not have their own agricultural machinery or equipment 
and often contract out machinery services if needed.  
Numerous academic studies have examined the impact of fertilisers on soil and crop yields. Organic 
fertilizer has been used for thousands of years and continues to be used today. Although organic 
fertilizer has many advantages including complete nutrition that is easily absorbed, it has been 
increasingly replaced by chemical fertilizer since the 1960s and, in particular, urea, DAP (Di 
Ammonium Phosphate), NPK (compound fertilizer), ammonium bicarbonate, and ammonium 
chloride. The amount and timing of chemical fertilizer application affects the soil and crop yield. 
Wheat needs to absorb different amounts of chemical elements during its different growth stages. 
During the whole growth period of winter wheat, application rates might average 12-15kg nitrogen, 
4-8kg phosphate fertilizers, and 3-6kg potash fertilizers per mu (Wang et al. 2010). As a general 
guide, organic fertilizer and two thirds of the chemical fertilizers are applied during land tillage 
before seeding. The other one third of the chemical fertilizer is usually applied as top dressing 
during plant growth and development stages.  
While farmers do not necessarily optimise fertiliser types and application, there have been measures 
to improve fertilization methods. From 2011, Huojia county government has promoted new 
fertilization techniques based on soil testing rather than just the personal experience of farmers. 
This aims to reduce the cost of wheat production, especially given increasing fertilizer prices. The 
specific measures are: to increase the amount of organic fertilizer to improve soil fertility; to choose 
appropriate fertilizer and base fertilizer application rates on soil characteristics and winter wheat 
requirements; and to change the fertilizer method from surface application to deep fertilizing. For 
the purposes of this study, common fertiliser types and application rates are unlikely to be the 
reason for yield differences between villages or towns in the same period although application 
practices and fertiliser management may impact on individual yields.  
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5.1.4 Irrigation 
Irrigation is an artificial supplement of water to crops for the purpose of increasing production. It is 
supplied from river water or groundwater, and can be classified as surface irrigation, sub-surface 
irrigation, sprinkler irrigation, or drip irrigation. For winter wheat in Huojia County, farmers only 
use surface irrigation as it is considered the most economical and practical despite the potential 
irrigation efficiency of the other methods.  
Different crops require different amounts of water, but different growth stages of the same crop also 
have different water demands. Normally, there is no fixed time for irrigation; the village committee 
organizes the irrigation schedule according to water requirements of winter wheat and local 
precipitation. The first critical time to supply water to a wheat crop is middle or late February, 
normally before the jointing stage. The other two alternative irrigation times (one is after sowing in 
October, or around overwintering in December) are less important and depend on farmers’ 
individual judgement. If farmers think soil moisture before sowing is poor, they can jointly request 
an irrigation application.  If some farmers think it is not necessary in October, they can apply for it 
in December. The preferred irrigation water is river water, but it is not available during severe 
drought periods.  The second source is pumping groundwater from wells drilled with funds raised 
by the villagers. The cost of the ground water is pushed up by the pumping with the fee shared by 
actual irrigation areas. Thus, before making irrigation decisions, farmers whether neighbouring 
farmers object or do not request the irrigation.  
Observations of yield and weather data from the study areas indicate that yield is not lowest in the 
year of poorest precipitation, while the year of highest rainfall does not have the best yield. Thus the 
availability of irrigation can alleviate, to some extent, the effect of drought on crops. However, it 
does not substitute perfectly for low precipitation because prolonged, below-normal rainfall impacts 
on the availability of irrigation water in the river or from groundwater/wells, and because of the cost.  
Farmer interviews revealed that the current irrigation fee is about 15-25 yuan/mu/irrigation in 
Huojia County. Thus if winter wheat needs two irrigations on average per season, the cost is about 
30-50 yuan/mu. Combined with labour cost, this dampens the enthusiasm of farmers to irrigate. The 
vast majority of farmers use irrigation only to save crops and not to enhance their yields, and the 
irrigation market is gradually shrinking. 
Since differences arise in the choice of irrigation across farms, this may help explain some of the 
variation in wheat yields across villages or towns. Yield variation between years may also be 
explained by farmers’ attitudes and technological development. The evolution in water supplies for 
winter wheat from the reliance on precipitation, to water from the nearby river, to the digging of 
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wells and extraction of groundwater, is an example of technological development and more pro-
active farm management.  
5.1.5 Management capability 
Management also influences yields. With continual technological development, a number of 
mechanical devices, chemical products, and useful cultivation practices have evolved and will 
continue to influence crop yields. The operations need to be performed with appropriate equipment 
at the appropriate time, such as when to prepare the land for sowing, the selection of deep 
ploughing or sweep tillage, optimum seeding rate, appropriate fertilizing time, depth and amount, as 
well as irrigation supply. 
The management strategy for winter wheat is very similar between villages because of the similarity 
in agro-ecological zone and the similarity in farming systems. Differences in management ability 
among farmers, however, may explain some of the variation in yields. Furthermore, production 
methods and technology have progressed in many ways over the past 30 years and accounting for 
this technological change in the time series yield data will be crucial. Modern agricultural 
production is more reliant on mechanical and electrical power rather than human and animal power 
and on science and technology rather than inherited farming experience. Agricultural management 
is an important factor to be considered in relation to changes in crop production across villages. 
5.1.6 Weather 
Factors such as soil, fertilizer, irrigation, management methods, as well as seed planted and 
pesticides used, act individually on wheat production, and also interact with each other to affect 
yield. All these factors can be controlled to some degree by human beings, and most management 
practices are directed at balancing the levels of control to obtain maximum returns. When such 
controls are successful, these factors are not limiting the growth of winter wheat, and productivity 
depends principally on the remaining uncontrollable factor—weather.   
Weather can be considered a basic input in crop production but cannot be controlled by farmers. 
Weather asserts an important influence on crop growth, development and yields, the incidence of 
pests and diseases, water needs, and fertilizer requirements. Similarly, the farming practices of each 
household—such as ploughing, harrowing, land preparation, seeding, weeding, irrigation, spraying, 
harvesting and storage of crop produce—are inevitably affected by weather. Ali-Nezhad and 
Eskandari (2012) highlighted that more than half the variation in crop yields resulted from rainfall, 
temperature and solar radiation differences. Wind velocity and relative humidity also influence crop 
growth. Lobell et al. (2008) found that maize area in southern Africa could decline by more than 30% 
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by 2030 due to climate change despite technological advances; while in South Asia, which currently 
has 30% of the roughly 800 million of the malnourished people in the world, many crops, including 
wheat, rice, millet and maize, have more than 75% chance of incurring losses from climate change. 
Cai et al. (2013) using principal component analysis method demonstrated the linkage between 
weather and crop yields, the study found that the future drier weather conditions are likely to 
negatively impact the southern states of United State. 
Huojia County belongs to the climatic zone with a continental monsoon climate with distinct 
seasons and precipitation periods. The overall weather during the wheat-growing season can 
generally be described as experiencing rapidly rising temperature in spring, when sunlight is 
adequate, but with little rainfall. In summer, the temperature is high and the crop vulnerable to hot-
dry wind hazards. In autumn, the temperature is moderate, but precipitation across years varies 
during wheat sowing, while in winter, temperature is low and precipitation is rare. 
To summarise, even if yield is influenced by soil, inputs, irrigation, improved management skills 
and social factors, because of the similarities in the agro-ecological and socio-economic conditions, 
the inter-annual yield change after taking technological progress into account is mainly attributable 
to weather. The following two sections analyse weather conditions in the study area after adjusting 
the wheat yield to account for the influence of non-weather factors. 
5.2 Weather conditions in Huojia County  
As a significant factor, weather influences crop production in both temporal (seasonal) and spatial 
(regional) dimensions. To analyse the crop yield–weather relationship for Huojia County in the next 
section, 30 years of weather data from 1981 to 2010 were collected from the local weather station 
and are discussed below.  
An overview of climate conditions over the past three decades is shown in Table 5-3. Huojia 
County has an increasing precipitation and temperature but decreasing sunshine on average.  It had 
the least precipitation in the 1980s with higher precipitation in the 1990s and 2000s. Average 
temperatures have increased while sunshine hours measured in this region shows a decline between 
1981 and 2010, where sunshine hours gradually fell in Huojia County.  
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Table 5-3 General climate changes during the past three decades 
 Periods Precipitation Temperature Sunshine 
Huojia County 
1981-1990 513.5 mm 14.1℃ 2166 hrs. 
1991-2000 579.5 mm 14.8℃ 2013 hrs. 
2001-2010 584.0 mm 14.8℃ 1856 hrs. 
Average 559.0 mm 14.6℃ 2012 hrs. 
Evaporation and transpiration are increasing as temperature rises. The annual indicators cannot 
express the weather fluctuations during the winter wheat growing season since as the season spans 
two calendar years, while differences arise in weather patterns during the year and across the wheat-
growing period. The following discussion is a comparison of two different time measures-calendar 
year and an agronomy year18-from October to May for three key weather elements. 
5.2.1 Precipitation  
Precipitation includes rainfall, snow, hail, fog and dew. Rainfall is the primary source of soil 
moisture. Historical data of precipitation in Huojia shows it is distributed unevenly during the year 
and between years. Within a year, there is a large gap between July (highest rainfall) and January 
(lowest rainfall). The lack of regularity of precipitation exacerbates the difficulties of farmers in 
making decisions to control weather risks, such as the timing and amount of irrigation.   
	  
Figure 5-3 Annual precipitation and precipitation in the winter wheat growth period in 
Huojia County (1981-2010) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  Since the growth of winter wheat in our study regions steps across the calendar year, it makes the winter growth 
period as the agronomy year, that is, 1 October—31 May.	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Note: in Figure 5-3, the blue line denotes the variation of yearly total precipitation in Huojia 
County from 1981-2010; the solid black line is the trend line in precipitation values; the dotted 
black line denotes the 30 years’ average annual precipitation. The green line denotes the variation 
of total precipitation during the winter wheat growing period (from last October to the May); the 
solid black line is the trend in growing season precipitation; the dotted black line shows 30 years 
average rainfall during winter wheat growing season. 
The precipitation of Huojia County recorded at the meteorological station exhibited a weakly 
increasing trend, as these R-square values are so low that indicate no obvious trends. The upper 
dotted black line shows average annual rainfall from 1981-2010 in calendar years was 559 mm, 
while the bottom dotted black line shows the pure precipitation available for winter wheat 
production is only 163.8 mm on average, less than 30% of average annual rainfall. The bottom line 
is far below the water demand by winter wheat in North China (shown in Table 5-4), accounting for 
about 1/3 of water consumption in the whole winter wheat growth period.   
Table 5-4 Water demand of winter wheat in different regions (mm) 
Crop name Region Year Category        Dry year      Normal year       Wet year 
Winter 
wheat 
North China 375-750 300-600 240-525 
Central and Eastern China 375-675 300-525 225-420 
Spring 
wheat 
Northwest China 375-525 300-450 - 
Northeast China 300-450 270-420 225-375 
Source: Henan Wheat Cultivation (Wang et al. 2010) 
The focus of the weather-yield relationship in this study is on the year-to-year precipitation changes 
during the winter wheat growing season. Observing the green line in Figure 5-3, the highest 
precipitation was 293.6mm in 1990 and the lowest was 82.8 mm in 1999. Even the years with most 
precipitation barely reach the minimum demand for water in a normal year (Table 5-4). When soil 
moisture is insufficient to meet the water demands in any stage of winter wheat growth, there is a 
potential reduction in yield. For instance, if soil moisture is lacking at sowing, seeds do not 
germinate completely. If water shortage happens during the seedling stage, it grows slowly with 
fewer tillers, and the seedling may not survive winter. When the water shortage happens at the 
jointing to heading stage, it will affect wheat spike differentiation, forming a small panicle and less 
grain.  
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Figure 5-4 Coefficient of Variation of monthly precipitation comparison in Huojia County    
However, annual precipitation shows considerable year-to-year variation and monthly precipitation 
is similarly distributed. Figure 5-4 highlights: 1) the dispersion in eight-monthly data is greater than 
the dispersion in full year precipitation data in Huojia County, which means the year-to-year 
variation across the accumulated monthly precipitation is stronger than the variation in yearly 
precipitation; and 2) in Huojia County, the most variable precipitation occurs in January, and then 
December, February, April, November, October, March and May successively. 
In summary, the accumulated precipitation during winter wheat growing season remained stable 
and without an apparent upward or downward trend. However year-to-year variation exists in both 
the monthly data sets and the yearly data. Natural precipitation is far from sufficient to supply the 
average water demand of winter wheat in this region, and so it is useful to analyse whether unstable 
and scarce precipitation will restrict winter wheat production. Although rainfall during the June-
September period immediately prior to seeding may be correlated with yield, Wang (2003) claimed 
such effects are small and short acting compared with those of the current season's rainfall, and 
consequently suggested they can be ignored.   
5.2.2 Temperature  
Temperature is a crude measure of heat energy mainly determined by the latitude and altitude of a 
region. Each crop has its own minimum, maximum and optimum temperatures at different growth 
stages. According to Wang et al. (2010), the wheat leaf begins to turn green when the daily average 
temperature is more than 3℃. When wheat enters the jointing stage, daily average temperature 
should be around 8-10℃. The impact of temperature on crops includes chilling, freezing and heat 
injury. If the daily average temperature drops to zero or below during the jointing stage, winter 
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Huojia	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   0.648	   0.25	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wheat suffers freezing damage to varying degrees. In addition, temperature at one location is 
continuously changing during each day, week, month, and year or for any period.  The 
meteorological information available for this analysis, however, is restricted to using monthly and 
annual average temperature variation. 
Table 5-5 Seasonal average temperature variation in Huojia County over past three decades  
Year (℃) Spring Summer Autumn Winter Full year 
1981-1990 14.7 26.04 14.62 0.99 14.09 
1991-2000 15.11 26.58 15.20 2.39 14.83 
2001-2010 15.66 26.28 15.09 2.04 14.77 
Seasonal average temperature variations in Huojia County are shown for the last three decades in 
Table 5-5. For Huojia County, seasonal average temperatures increased from 14.09℃ to 14.83℃  between   the   1980s   and   1990s, and declined slightly in the following decade. Temperature 
variation in spring and winter is larger than in summer and autumn. The warming trend is obvious 
in winter that may affect plant growth in spring. For instance, the average temperature increase 
could lead to early jointing and affect the crops over-wintering ability. 
 
Figure 5-5 Average temperature of full years and winter wheat growth period in Huojia 
County (1981-2010) 
Figure 5-5 displays the annual average temperature changes during the calendar year (top blue line) 
and agronomy year (bottom green line) for Huojia County. The solid and dotted black lines 
represent the trend and average lines respectively. The blue line indicates that the annual average 
temperature before 1993 was below average except in 1982. After 1994, there are a few years over 
15℃, and most years were above the average, which is consistent with the seasonal changes 
described in the previous paragraph. The green line (average temperature during the growing season) 
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generally fluctuates below the average for the first half of the period, and changes to above the 
average in the latter half. The variation in growing season temperature is remarkably similar to the 
full year’s variation, but the warming trend is stronger, increasing 1.5℃ over the past 30 years.  
As for year-to-year variation in monthly average temperature, the relatively unstable months in 
Huojia County are January, February and December. Many researchers have evaluated the possible 
impact of global warming on crop yields using crop simulation models (Youa et al. 2009). Lobell 
and Asner (2003), Peng et al. (2004) and Youa et al. (2009) found that each 1℃ increasing in 
temperature in crop growing season, would reduce yield of corn and pea (grouped together), rice, 
and wheat, by 17%, 10% and 3-10% respectively. Thus temperature may be a critical variable in the 
wheat yield-weather relationship. 
5.2.3 Sunshine hours  
Hours of sunshine also impact on crop yields. Solar radiation is a necessary energy source for 
physical and biological processes of crop production. It is needed for all growth stages, including 
seed germination, growth of leaf and stem, as well as flowering and fruiting. Sunshine plays a 
dominant role in crop quality due to the diverse nature of light intensity, wavelength, photoperiod, 
and direction.  
Figure 5-6 shows the changes in sunshine hours for Huojia County in calendar years and the winter 
wheat growth period from 1981 to 2010. The blue line represents the fluctuations in accumulated 
sunshine hour in full years from 1981 to 2010, and the green line shows it for the winter wheat 
growing period from October to May as agronomy year. The solid and dotted line represent the 
trend and average respectively.  
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Figure 5-6 Accumulated sunshine hours of full years and winter wheat growth period in 
Huojia County (1981-2010) 
The blue line indicates that the annual sunshine hours of Huojia County exhibits a downward 
change but that began rising again from around 2000. The average annual sunshine hours over the 
30 years are 2,010 hours, a level seldom reached after 1998 with a range from 2,508 hours in 1986 
to 1472 hours in 2001. The reduction of sunshine hours may be because temperature increases 
evaporation and cloud cover or because of higher precipitation.  
The variation of sunshine hours in winter wheat growing periods (green line) is similar to the annual 
variation. The rate of decrease is about 99 hours for each 10 years, which is smaller than 144 hours 
per 10 years in the full year variation (blue line). Average sunshine hours are 1,250 hours during the 
winter wheat growing season. The reduction in average sunshine hours during the winter growing 
season will impact negatively on crop photosynthesis, which in turn affects the actual yield of 
winter wheat.  
The year-to-year variation in sunshine hours is also described by the Figure 5-7. The coefficients of 
variation of most months during winter wheat growing period in Huojia County are presented by 
Figure 5-7. It shows: 1) the dispersions in eight different monthly data sets are all greater than the 
dispersion in full year data set in Huojia, which means the year-to-year variation across the monthly 
accumulated precipitation is stronger than the variation across yearly precipitation; 2), the most 
unstable accumulated sunshine hours in Huojia County occur in December, January, November, 
February, October, March, May, and April successively.  
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Figure 5-7 Coefficient of Variation of monthly sunshine hours comparison of Huojia County    
Li (2007) found the crop yield would increase gradually if accompanied by adequate sunshine. He 
believed that a positive correlation is mainly reflected in the later stages of winter wheat growth. 
When wheat grows up to the heading stage, plenty of sunshine would be conducive to grain filling 
and increasing yield, provided soil moisture is adequate. If sunshine hours are not sufficient, it will 
have a major impact on the quality of wheat starch, which can reduce the seed weight and yield. 
This suggests that the impact of sunshine hours across the whole growing season on wheat 
production is not correlated with yield, but may be relevant in particular stages. 
In summary, total precipitation in the wheat-growing season for Huojia County did vary from year 
to year over the past 30-year period. Furthermore monthly variability may be a more significant 
factor than aggregate annual changes in analysing weather-yield relationships. Average 
temperatures during the winter wheat growing season show an increasing trend for both study 
regions, especially in winter and spring. High temperature in the mid and late stages of wheat 
growth can severely inhibit wheat production in the study areas. Normally a positive relationship 
between accumulated sunshine hours during the growing season and wheat production arises but 
this appears to be decreasing in Huojia County. All three indices are considered by farmers, 
agronomists and meteorologists to be closely related to wheat growth and physiology, and 
perceived as the most important factors influencing wheat production. Other weather indices such 
as daily precipitation, highest temperature and lowest temperature in each month, as well as the 
number of hot-dry wind days, may also be important in predicting crop yields but data on these 
factors was not available from the weather stations. Thus the focus is on these three indices on 
which data is available, and which are relevant to the analysis of a weather index insurance scheme.  
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5.3 De-trending wheat yield for technological progress 
When using extended time series to investigate factors impacting on crop yields, the impact of 
technological progress must first be taken into account. Technology accounts for much of the 
increase in yields over time, and so much of the variation in wheat yields over an extended time 
period will be due simply to technological progress. Thus in identifying the contribution of weather 
factors on wheat yields by using time series data, the impact of technology must first be taken out. 
Under normal circumstances, the impact of agricultural technology on crop yields is a gradual 
process that occurs through informal and incremental changes to farming practices and where 
adoption varies among farmers and through time. Without detailed knowledge of social 
development, crop management, and the ability to model these complexities, explicit modelling of 
the underlying technological processes cannot be conducted. However various functions or models 
using time-related parameters as independent variables can be used to approximate the impact of 
factors such as agricultural technology on crop yield. Three methods are commonly used to extract 
the technology trend from the long-term crop yield. The first approach is the moving average 
method, which is a technique to smooth out the time series, by averaging the yields of immediately 
prior years. The number of years used in the moving average varies from three years to five years. 
Lian et al. (2007) and Ma et al. (2009) used a 3-year moving average, while Jiang et al. (2006) and 
Shi et al. (2008) used a 5-year moving average. The method illustrates trends in average yield over 
time, softening the effects of irregular points within the data. As a result, the effects of weather 
changes might be distinguished from the impact of technology.  
The second method applies linear regression to fit the time series production data (Just and 
Weninger 1999). The method simulates crop yield as a function of change over time, separating the 
actual yield into three parts—trend yield, fluctuations, and random noise. Trend yield is considered 
as a component reflecting the level of technology (including soil, fertilization, irrigation, 
management, pest and disease control, improved varieties and other agricultural practices that 
increase production) over a long historical period. Random noise can represent random error in the 
statistics, but also involves some occasional events like adjustment in agricultural structure. 
Because occasional events do not affect crop production regularly and frequently, and because they 
are hard to identify and measure, the impact of random factors on crop production, the component 
of random noise, is generally assumed to be negligible in decomposition of actual yield. Taking the 
trend and random noise from the actual yield leaves the remaining fluctuation in yield as primarily 
being contributed by changes in weather given that other crop inputs are relatively uniform. This 
method is straightforward but the absolute value of yield variation calculated in accordance with the 
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linear regression is usually heteroscedastic, and does not comply with the homoscedastic 
assumptions for linear regression. To avoid this heteroscedasticity problem, Vedenov and Barnett 
(2004b) used the relative fluctuation in yield by logarithmic transformation instead of absolute 
value, to reduce the heterogeneity of the variance.  
The third method is non-linear regression when the scatter of yield over time is nonlinear. For 
instance, Yin (1998) used a cubic exponential smoothing method, Lin et al. (2008) adopted a Cobb-
Douglas production function to fit the trend, and Lian (2005) and Hao et al. (2007) used logistic 
functions to simulate the technology trend. The non-linear regression method is more in line with 
the actual situation than the moving average or linear regression method in most cases. De-trending 
has a significant impact on the adjusted yields that are then used to explore the impact of the 
weather related factors. Fang (2011) proposes a series of standards to more accurately calculate the 
trend. First, the technology trend curve should be consistent with the development process in social 
technology. Second, the variation characteristics should be the same or similar over the whole 
research region or country (namely the development of social and technical level is not significantly 
different in the same region), and different administrative regions with similar climatic conditions 
should have strong correlation. Third, key weather factors obtained that affect the crop yield should 
be consistent with crop productive characteristics and its general response to the weather factors.  
This section reports on de-trending the data from Huojia County using linear, logarithmic, quadratic 
and cubic methods respectively. The results are shown in the	  Table 5-6. 
Table 5-6 Regression coefficients to estimate technology trends 
Coefficients 
 
 R2   
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
 
 B Std. Error Beta 
Huojia 
County 
Linear 
.547 
t 105.800 1.359 .740 77.850 .000  
(Constant) 5008.062 21.152  236.769 .000  
Logarithmic 
.671 
ln(t) 1074.575 10.620 .819 101.182 .000  
(Constant) 3926.978 26.359  148.980 .000  
Quadratic 
 .685 
t 
t ** 2 
(Constant) 
332.531 
-8.390 
3989.905 
4.967 
.179 
27.974 
2.325 
-1.628 
66.952 
-46.887 
142.627 
.000 
.000 
.000 
 
 
Cubic 
 
 
.685 
t 
t ** 2 
t ** 3 
(Constant) 
334.997 
-8.614 
0.006 
3983.841 
12.573 
1.066 
.026 
39.861 
2.343 
-1.672 
-.027 
26.644 
-8.082 
0.214 
99.942 
.000 
.000 
.831 
.000 
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Both the parameter estimates and goodness-of-fit statistics for quadratic and cubic regressions 
exhibit a better goodness-of-fit than the linear and logarithmic models, and so the linear and 
logarithmic models are disregarded. The estimation of parameters in the cubic regression is not as 
good as the quadratic specification, because the P value of t3 is larger than 0.05. Thus the quadratic 
model was considered to be best suited to both sets of data. All of the functional types are shown 
against the actual data points in Figure 5-8.  
	  
Figure 5-8 Trend curve fitted for wheat yield in Huojia County 
 
The trend reflects all impacts on wheat production, not only technological improvement.  China’s 
economy including the agricultural economy developed rapidly in the 1980s because of the reforms, 
especially the household contract responsibility system, which increased incentives for farmers to 
increase crop production. The yield curve may be expected to show a relatively rapid growth in the 
few years after the reform and then slow down in subsequent years. Taking this factor into account, 
a quadratic model was considered the best to adjust the wheat yield of Huojia County, and a simple 
de-trending procedure was implemented in the analysis by fitting a quadratic trend model. The de-
trended wheat yield is calculated based on the estimated wheat yield of the final year in the data 
range as: 
Function (1)                                         Y!!"!"#$% = Y!× !!"#"!"!!!"       
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Since the yield is constantly changing over time, the final year’s wheat yield level is expected to be 
the closest to the following year’s wheat yield. Thus the adjusted wheat yield was used to predict 
the wheat yield in the following year. In this case, the final year of the estimated wheat yield is 
2010, and so the adjusted wheat yield represents the predicted wheat production level for 2011 
based on 2010.The scatter plot of adjusted wheat yields over time in the research county is shown in 
Figure 5-9.  
	  
Figure 5-9 De-trended wheat yields of Huojia County  
 
Figure 5-9 suggests that the de-trended yield variation across the villages or towns may be stronger 
than the variation across years. This is also evident in Table 5-7,	  which	  highlights	  that	  the	  standard 
deviation of cross-section data in specific years is larger than the standard variation of average yield 
across time series data, such as the years marked as red in the table. Thus if village data is pooled 
with time series data, the contribution of weather change on year-to-year wheat yield variation may 
be undermined by the yield variation across villages.  
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Table 5-7 Descriptive statistics of de-trended yield data of Huojia County 
Year Min. (kg/ha) Max. (Kg/ha) Mean (kg/ha) Variance S. D. 
1985 3268.9 10826.5 5885.4 1894117.2 1376.3 
1986 5012.9 12378.3 7862.5 1944249.1 1394.4 
1987 4552.8 12269.2 7821.1 1527978.0 1236.1 
1988 3926.4 13380.1 7081.1 1773307.8 1331.7 
1989 2878.0 11227.6 7050.5 1065887.6 1032.4 
1990 3860.1 10265.2 6587.1 910767.6 954.3 
1991 6082.6 8449.9 7197.1 194531.9 441.1 
1992 4817.6 8381.0 7089.3 123445.2 351.4 
1993 5937.6 10884.8 6985.5 147406.9 383.9 
1994 6168.0 10284.6 6832.9 136803.2 369.9 
1995 4163.0 7496.4 6715.7 102708.8 320.5 
1996 5525.6 7461.5 6530.3 78284.1 279.8 
1999 4919.4 8091.1 7299.5 87835.1 296.4 
2000 5399.3 9096.1 7143.5 88679.8 297.8 
2001 6297.6 7525.4 7054.2 24155.1 155.4 
2002 4136.3 7748.8 6705.5 359298.5 599.4 
2003 4115.4 8328.4 6904.4 548789.9 740.8 
2004 3518.7 9297.2 7032.2 361889.9 601.6 
2005 3723.7 9410.1 7058.7 631439.1 794.6 
2006 5910.1 8392.4 7234.5 44227.2 210.3 
2007 5933.8 8705.3 6744.7 51483.8 226.9 
2008 5989.6 7805.1 6873.8 36261.2 190.4 
2009 5832.6 7971.9 6909.6 116267.5 341.0 
2010 5505.2 8457.1 7022.2 95610.0 309.2 
S.D.   393.9   
 
5.4 Adjusted Yield and weather regression 
After de-trending the yield data, the relationships that may exist between yield and weather 
variables are investigated using a multi-linear regression model that incorporates the weather 
indices analysed in the previous section and which have been used in previous studies are used 
(Turvey, Calum G. 2001; Vedenov and Barnett 2004a; Yu 2011). In addition, the distance effect 
between yield and the weather indicators obtained from the county meteorological stations is 
examined as part of the relationship as it is a critical factor in the design, relevance, and uptake of 
weather index crop insurance instrument.  
Preliminary analysis revealed strong collinearity between some independent variables, especially 
rainfall and sunshine hours (variance inflation factor >5) 19, which means that choices that needed to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Variance inflation factor (VIF) quantifies the severity of multi-collinearity in an ordinary least squares regression 
analysis. It provides an index that measures how much the variance of an estimated regression coefficient increased 
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be made about which of these independent variables are to be used based on previous studies and 
from information obtained from the local weather station.  The highest levels of collinearity occur 
between rainfall and sunshine hour variables and it was considered preferable to maintain the 
rainfall variable in the analysis. Rainfall and temperature are also frequently and extensively used 
indices in weather index insurance schemes around the world, as shown in the examples below. 
Although sunshine hour is a key factor in determining the time of “earring” in wheat, long sunshine 
hours need to be combined with high temperatures to promote maturity in wheat from late March. 
After earring, long sunshine hours also play a significant role in grain filling and increasing grain 
weight. Even if there is no strict requirement of sunshine hours relative to precipitation for the 
whole growing period of winter wheat, the sunshine hours during wheat earring to harvest (S3, S4 
and S5)20 is taken into consideration.   
Weather observations are not made on each farm or each village but at discretely located 
meteorological observation station. In the study area, there is only one single recording station in 
the centre of the county as is the case in most rural areas in China. Weather index insurance needs 
to be based on weather indicators from stations that are trusted both by the insurance companies and 
by farmers. Thus the strength of the relationship between local yield and weather indicators 
obtained from this county meteorological station needs to be explored, especially as the farm 
distance from the weather station increases. To explore the distance effect, this study uses weather 
data from the county meteorological station, located in the centre of Huojia County, together with 
yield data from all of the 213 villages scattered throughout the county. Using data from villages 
throughout the county enables investigation of how robust the relationship between yield and 
weather indicators will be for locations at varying distances from the meteorological station. In 
order to do this analysis, the distance variable (abbreviated as “D” in Table 5-8) is treated in the 
model as discrete ranges or bands rather than as a continuous variable. The linear regression model 
calculates the strength of the adjusted yield--weather relationship as the farm distance increases as 
shown in Table 5-8. 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
because of collinearity. A commonly given rule of thumb is that VIFs of 10 or higher may be concern as a sign of 
severe or serious multi-collinearity (O’Brien 2007).	  	  
20	  Ri represent the total rainfall amount in the month of “i”, Ti represent the average temperature in the month of “i”, Si 
represent the accumulated sunshine hours in the month of “i”, for example, R3 means the rainfall value of March, R5 
means the rainfall value of May.	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Table 5-8 Linear regression result of the adjusted yield-weather relationship	  
Coefficients of variables entered 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 11280.715 511.251  22.065 .000   
R12 -33.712 2.767 -.249 -12.182 .000 .408 2.452 
T10 -506.705 21.508 -.694 -23.559 .000 .197 5.077 
T1 287.162 14.398 .468 19.944 .000 .311 3.218 
R3 37.104 1.680 .713 22.082 .000 .164 6.093 
R11 -11.761 1.019 -.227 -11.543 .000 .443 2.257 
T4 394.331 24.571 .426 16.049 .000 .243 4.116 
T2 -128.546 9.848 -.296 -13.054 .000 .332 3.016 
T3 150.709 11.387 .335 13.235 .000 .268 3.737 
T12 121.934 14.016 .181 8.699 .000 .393 2.545 
R1 -21.316 2.277 -.241 -9.361 .000 .258 3.878 
R4 -4.333 .540 -.135 -8.019 .000 .604 1.656 
T5 -128.438 17.713 -.183 -7.251 .000 .270 3.705 
S4 -5.692 .853 -.199 -6.672 .000 .193 5.186 
D 6.882 1.816 .050 3.789 .000 1.000 1.000 
Adj-R2 = 0.179 F = 75.87 
 
An initial regression analysis for Huojia County, shown in Table 5-8, investigated the relationship 
of distance variable and 19 weather variables using yield and distance data from 213 villages over a 
24 years period. The results revealed: (a) significant F-test (F=75.87) and t-test (Sig.=0.000) for 
parameters in the model; (b) from the Adj-R2, weather variables together with the distance factor 
explained only 17.9% of the adjusted wheat yield variation of Huojia County (all of which were 
significant at the 0.05 level); (c) collinearity was not a serious problem as the variance inflation 
factors were all less than 10; and (d) that the residual of the model is almost in line with the normal 
distribution based on the normal P-P plot (Figure 5-10) and scatter plots of unstandardized 
residual—standardized predict value (Figure 5-11).  However the scatter plots revealed evidence of 
heteroscedasticity where the residual in predicted yield varies as the value of predicted Y increases.  
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Figure 5-10 Normal P-P plot of regression 
standardized residual of Huojia County 
	  
Figure 5-11 Scatter plot of residual with 
predicted value in Huojia Count
 
Heteroscedasticity means that the variance of the residuals is not constant across observations, 
which is common in cross-sectional data. It does not violate the unbiasedness of Ordinary Least 
Squares regression, but OLS is not the best linear unbiased estimator in this context. An efficient 
estimator can be devised by re-weighting the data appropriately to take into account 
heteroscedasticity. First, the value of the residuals is saved using the same independent variables by 
OLS estimation and then the original regression equation is re-estimated using weighted least 
squares, with the reciprocal of the absolute value of residual estimates used as weights. The 
weighted regression result is shown in Table 5-9 and reveals an improvement in the goodness-of-fit 
compared to the OLS estimation, which means the estimation of the contribution of weather 
variables to wheat yield variation improved significantly after heteroscedasticity was accounted for.  
The F test of the model and t test of parameters are both significant at the 0.05 levels, and the 
coefficient of each explanatory variable entered in the model was adjusted within a small range. 
Table 5-9 Weighted estimation of adjusted yield—weather relationship 
Huojia County 
Adj-R2 F Sig. Model 
0.676 751.34 0.000 
Y= 7274.663-56.682R12-15.888R11+7.584S3-187.218T11+ 
21.026R3-14.59R2+222.199T4-139.786T5-39.766T12-3.081R4-
6.114R1-1.734R5+5.327D  
 
Notionally a variety of more complex models employing nonlinear regression and associating 
individual or combinations of weather variables measured over different periods of time could be 
investigated to improve the goodness of fit. However, the ultimate success or use of weather-index 
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crop insurance schemes depends on the extent to which farmers and insurance agents believe that 
the weather variables used in the index impact on yields. Thus in a practical design setting, trade-
offs will occur between complexity and rigour as potential users may find it difficult to relate their 
yield experience to the complex synthetic modelling behind the index. Thus both the choice of 
variables and functional form in the regression results reported in Table 5-9 to express the weather-
yield relationship needs to be based on an empirical analysis of the data as well as the qualitative 
analysis of agronomic and other factors outlined earlier in this chapter, as the foundation for a 
workable and relevant weather index insurance programme. It indicates that the adjusted wheat 
yield variation in Huojia County is correlated with most weather variables during the wheat growth 
season, such as all rainfall variables except R10, average temperatures for April (T4), May (T5), 
November (T11) and December (T12), as well as the sunshine hours in March (S3).  
First, the months in Huojia when rainfall has an impact are November (R11) through to May (R5), 
which are the critical months for water demand in wheat growth. November to December is the 
period when the plant prepares for winter dormancy. With sufficient water in this stage, the plant 
will be strong enough to resist water deficiency and low temperatures during the next stage. 
February to April is the jointing and booting stage, which is the time of peak water demand for 
winter wheat, and farmers irrigate at the beginning of this stage if conditions permit. Thus it is not 
surprising that these rainfall variables appear in the model. It is surprising, however, that the impact 
of rainfall during the wheat growing season is almost negatively correlated with the wheat yield in 
Huojia. This suggests that rainfall will decrease wheat production in Huojia County. One possible 
reason for this result is that the late autumn winter months show a negative relationship when too 
much water (freezing/thawing effect) might be bad whereas the strong positive effect is in March 
where extra rainfall may have an impact. In addition, the endogeneity problem is a technical issue 
for consideration in the current study and one that was grappled with during the course of the study. 
Notionally farmers could offset any shortfall in precipitation with irrigation but, in practice, in 
Huojia County and similar counties, while many farmers have access to irrigation in normal years, 
they do not always have access in dry years while the current irrigation infrastructure is not always 
reliable or cost-effective. Thus the weather indexes such as precipitation not only reflected the level 
of precipitation but also implicitly the access and level of irrigation associated with that 
precipitation. Ideally it would be good to disentangle the effects and to account explicitly for the 
potential endogenous impacts but the information required to do so is not available.  
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Second, the impact of temperature on wheat production is mainly concentrated in two time periods, 
April to May and November to December. According to previous research (Zhao 2010), the 
accumulated temperature (the sum of the daily mean temperature above 0 degrees) needs to reach 
1,800-2,000 degrees Celsius during the whole winter wheat growing period. Based on data from 
weather station, the accumulated temperature in Huojia County is around 2,200 degree Celsius. This 
is sufficient for the growth of winter wheat but the temperature during the changing seasons is 
usually unstable, and so farmers must pay attention to damage from freezing in particular months. 
That is, continuous low temperature in winter is not normally a problem, since the winter wheat has 
strong cold resistance characteristics, but freezing and thawing alternatively due to adverse weather 
during the transition from autumn to winter or from winter to spring, has a very large impact on 
winter wheat growth. This is reflected in model results, where the temperature change in winter and 
spring has a significant impact on wheat yields. 
Third, the total sunshine hours of March shows a positive impact on wheat production in Huojia 
County. It coincides with the observation that long sunshine hours play a significant role in grain 
filling and increasing grain weight in the late stage of growth.  
Finally, the distance variable also shows a significant correlation, which suggests there is a distance 
effect between local wheat yield and the weather indicators obtained from the county 
meteorological station. This poses several problems in the design of a WII scheme. Farmers may 
question if weather information from their local station accurately represents the weather situation 
on their own farm. Insurance companies may question how much area around the weather stations 
can be incorporated into a uniform insurance policy. This may prompt the government to consider 
the construction of further stations, or provide meteorological equipment to help the farmers (and 
insurance companies) detect weather changes at a more local level. 
 
5.5 Weather-yield relationship and the design of weather index crop insurance  
Establishing the relationship between weather variables and crop yield is a fundamental aspect of 
weather index insurance.  However within the domain of these relationships, there are different 
ways in which the weather index insurance instrument can be structured. Section 5.5.1 reviews the 
different types of weather index insurance instruments that have been developed elsewhere. This 
provides the basis to explore a hypothetical weather index insurance instrument for Huojia County 
in Section 5.5.2. It would be based on the technical relationship and discussion presented in the 
previous section but it is important to stress that the instrument is hypothetical and illustrative only 
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to highlight the type of scheme, premium payable and likely payout that might be possible. 
Developing more realistic instrument and assessing the viability of this instrument requires a much 
more elaborate discussion of the attitudes and incentives of all the key stakeholders (households, 
insurance companies and managers, government agencies and officials) and that is the focus of the 
remainder of the thesis. 
5.5.1 Types of weather index insurance 
The literature reveals different types and structures for weather index insurance. Some of the 
differences arise from the underlying weather-yield relationships and some derive from the needs 
and preferences of both farmers and insurance companies.  
5.5.1.1 Rainfall index crop insurance 
1) Aggregate rainfall index insurance 
Mishra (1995) revisited Chakravati’s (1920) work on agricultural insurance, especially crop 
insurance. Chakravati in 1920 was the pioneer in the conception of agricultural insurance based on a 
rainfall index for India. In one of Chakravati’s books Agricultural insurance: a practical scheme 
suited to Indian conditions, he described the nature of this insurance contract in the following way 
“if the aggregate rainfall from the beginning of the agricultural year as measured at the rain-gauge 
at the taluka headquarters up to a certain date is less than a certain amount, then a certain sum of 
money will be paid in respect of the insured field as compensation”.  
Table 5-10 Aggregate rainfall index for Mahabubnagar, India 
Rainfall (1 June to 30 September) Claim payment (Rupee/mm) 
0-42 mm 21.1 
42-85 mm 21.0 
85-128 mm 20.93 
128-170 mm 20.87 
170-213 mm 20.78 
213-256 mm 20.65 
256-298 mm 20.56 
298-341 mm 20.45 
341-384 mm 20.4 
384-426 mm 20.35 
426-469 mm 18.3 
469-512 mm 16.47 
512-554 mm 14.8 
554-597 mm 13.32 
597-640 mm 11.99 
640-682 mm 10.77 
Note: average historical rainfall was 853mm. Source: Clarke et al. (2012) 
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The payment of a claim with his rainfall insurance product depends on whether the total rainfall 
during a whole growing season is less than a given critical value, which is often calculated from the 
historical average rainfall. By 2004, an aggregate rainfall index had been applied by the Agriculture 
Insurance Company of India in 125 locations over 10 states in Kharif (see Table 5-10), but it was 
dropped from the market quickly after that due to limitations of the product. In particular, the 
product’s focus on aggregate rainfall over a whole crop-growing season did not take rainfall 
distribution into consideration. As discussed in Section 5.2, crop growth experiences seasonal 
changes, and the rainfall also varies with the seasonal changes. Even if there is no variation in 
aggregate rainfall, reduced production will result if dry periods occur at critical stages in crop 
growth.  
2) Weighted rainfall index insurance 
Weighted rainfall index insurance represents a step up in sophistication over aggregate rainfall 
index insurance (in the latter case, weights for each period are set to the same level). This weighted 
index is defined as a weighted summation of the difference between actual rainfall and average 
historical rainfall. The weight for each period is normally calculated through a statistical procedure 
that maximises the correlation between yields and rainfall variables. Agronomists and farmers can 
also adjust weightings in accordance with their knowledge and local conditions. An example of 
weighted rainfall index insurance for wheat in Morocco appears in Table 5-11.  
Table 5-11 Example of weighted rainfall index insurance for wheat in Morocco 
Month November December January February March 
10-day period 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Rainfall weighting 2 2 2 0.5 1 1 1 0.5 0.5 1 1 1.5 1 0.5 1 
Historical rainfall 10 10 10 7 14 14 15 7.5 7.5 12 12 6 12 6 12 
Actual rainfall 0 15 10 10 0 10 15 10 10 15 10 0 15 10 5 
Weighted rainfall -20 10 0 1.5 -14 -4 0 1.25 1.25 3 -2 -9 3 2 -7 
Weighted rainfall index= 34mm (deficit) 
Source: Hess et al. (2002) 
Although weighted rainfall index insurance is able to account for the importance of rainfall in 
different growth stages, it faces similar problems to those for aggregate rainfall index insurance. In 
particular, the weighted rainfall index can account for differences in response across the periods, 
like the negative number in the row of ‘weighted rainfall’ showing that low rainfall in this period 
was more important than at other times of the year. Indeed only by using much shorter periods 
(daily rainfall data), can the aggregation problem fundamentally be addressed, but this adds a level 
of complexity to the analysis and design of weather index insurance that is unnecessary.  
3) Phased rainfall index insurance 
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Phased rainfall index insurance may overcome some of the deficiencies in aggregate and weighted 
rainfall index insurance.  It divides the whole crop growth stage into several phases by the normal 
calendar, a crop calendar, or other agricultural experiences (like the twenty-four solar terms21 in 
China). The designer sets various trigger points and a payment schedule for claim during each phase.  
A linear relationship expresses the water requirements of the crop during that phase with a 
corresponding payment to be made if the total rainfall is in deficit or surplus (Clarke et al. 2012).  
Table 5-12 shows a phased rainfall insurance contract for maize in Malawi in which payment is 
made by linearly increasing to the maximum value of 5800 MKW22 once the total rainfall during 
the sowing and establishment phase is less than 40 mm, with separate triggers for the other two 
phases.  
Table 5-12 Malawi weather index crop insurance in Lilongwe research station 
Crop Maize 
Phase Sowing and establishment 
Growth and 
flowering 
Yield formation to 
harvest 
Trigger level (mm) 40 130 25 
Payment/mm deficient rain 580 MKW/mm 58 MKW/mm 1160 MKW/mm 
Maximum lump-sum payment 5800 5800 5800 
Actual rainfall 38 100 24 
Actual payout per acre 1160 1740 1160 
Final insurance payment = min (max payment, phase1+phase2+phase3 payments)=4060 
Source: Livata (2009) 
This kind of product considers water requirements of the crop and accounts for prior phases. 
Another advantage of the product is that the insured can claim the payment in stages, rather than 
wait until the crop is harvested. The method may also reduce the basis risk in terms of the 
difference between the claim payment as measured by the contract and the actual loss incurred by a 
farmer (IFC 2007). However, phased rainfall index insurance may not capture the long term effects 
of rainfall deficit, particularly for phases with durations exceeding a fortnight (Clarke et al. 2012) 
because the insurance product artificially separates crop growth into several phases that are not 
discrete in biological terms and therefore assumes that the impact of weather in various phases of 
crop growth are independent of each other. For example, if the actual monitored rainfall in all three 
phases is low, but not low enough to trigger any maximum claim payment, the farmer will receive 
the corresponding payment of each stage as defined (phase1 + phase2 + phase3 payments). 
However the total payment will be less than 5800 MKW even if the long-term drought in all three 
phases destroys the whole crop.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Twenty-four solar terms is a calendar of twenty-four periods and climate to govern agricultural arrangements in 
ancient China and functions even now.	  	  
22	  MWK (Malawi Kwacha) is the currency of Malawi as of 1971.	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Another type of phased rainfall insurance promoted in India overcomes the disadvantage of the 
Malawi case. As shown in Table 5-13 three triggers in order are set with different payouts. Rainfall 
in each phase less than 50% of the first trigger level is set as the second trigger, which means the 
rainfall deficit will influence crop growth in the next phase even if it does not trigger the payment 
point and so provide a much higher payout at the next stage. 
Table 5-13 Terms of phased rainfall insurance contracts for Anand Tehsil district in India 
Crop Generic crop 
Phase  Jun 16—Jul 15 July 16— Aug 20 Aug 21— Sep.30 
First trigger level  80 mm 160 mm 60 mm 
Payment/mm deficient rain 3 rupee/mm 1.5 rupee/mm 2.5 rupee/mm 
Second trigger  30 mm 75 mm 20 mm 
Payment/mm deficient rain 24.16 rupee/mm 9.96 rupee/mm 20 rupee/mm 
Exit 0 mm 0 mm 0 mm 
Maximum payment 875 rupee 875 rupee 500 rupee 
Total possible payment 2250 rupee 
Actual rainfall (mm) 12 mm 84 mm 177 mm 
Actual payment (rupee) 434.88 rupee 114 rupee 0 rupee 
Source: Cole et al. (2011) 
 
4) Consecutive wet/dry days Index 
Continuous wet or dry days may cause severe damage to crops, particularly during maturity and 
harvest phases. Thus an index based on consecutive wet/dry days is another approach to estimating 
the potential risk of adverse rainfall events. This insurance product offers protection for long dry or 
long wet periods and can be designed as a single product or as a special part of another weather 
index insurance contract.  
5.5.1.2 Temperature index crop insurance and others 
Temperature is another important variable that has been used in weather index insurance. Lou et al. 
(2009) designed a freezing damage index based on weather station temperature recordings for citrus 
in Zhejiang Province in China, as shown in Table 5-14 (the scheme has not been put into practice). 
The author de-trended the yield of citrus according to the yield change rule of perennial fruit, age of 
tree and environmental factors, determined the temperature index based on the historical literature 
review, and established the loss risk analysis model by information diffusion theory. The freezing 
damage index in this product takes a various factors into account, such as the intensity and duration 
of low temperature and the crop’s antifreeze capacity. The scheme aims to reduce the risk of low 
temperature or frost that can cause severe loss in a short period of time for crops like potato, some 
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fruits and vegetables. The potential problem of this research is that with a single index it would be 
difficult to quantify the relative importance and the interaction of other weather factors. 
Table 5-14 Freezing damage index for citrus in Zhejiang Province, China 
Crop Citrus 
Index Freezing damage index 
Trigger -7℃— -7.9℃ -8℃— -8.9℃ <= -9℃ 
Payment 50% of sum assured 70% of sum assured 90% of sum assured 
An experimental wheat weather index insurance contract for excess temperatures was proposed in 
India in 2007 (Clarke et al. 2012). The scheme is similar to the phased rainfall index product, where 
the claim paid to farmers in respect of each phase is a function of the mean temperature for that 
phase (see Table 5-15).  
Table 5-15 High temperature index for wheat in India  
Rising in mean 
fortnightly 
temperature 
Payout (percentage of sum assured) 
Period 1-15 Jan. 16-31 Jan. 1-15 Feb. 16-29 Feb. 1-15 Mar. 16-31 Mar. 
1℃ 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2℃ 0 0 0 3.82 4.31 4.31 
3℃ 0 0 0 6.76 6.57 6.57 
4℃ 0 3.99 3.53 9.92 8.39 8.39 
5℃ 4.66 5.70 4.92 12.68 9.52 9.52 
6℃ 0 7.04 9.2 15.17 10.78 10.78 
Max. Sum assured 5400 rupee 
Trigger (℃) 21 23 24 25 29 32 
Actual Temp. 24 28 28 29 35 37 
Sum of payouts of various fortnights=5400× (0+5.7+3.53+9.92+10.78+9.52)%=2130.3 rupee 
Source: Clarke et al. (2012) 
5.5.1.3 Weather Indices for Pests and Diseases 
Pests and diseases are influenced directly and indirectly by weather. These influences can be 
immediate or cumulative, and can act either at the production site or at locations distant from it as in 
the case of migrant species. In Australia, the high variability of rainfall is very significant 
determinant in the size and quality of pest populations (Drake 1994). In Zimbabwe pest problems 
reduced markedly after six consecutive years of drought (WRI 1999). Any increase in the frequency 
and severity of weather changes including floods, droughts, heat waves, windstorms, or long rainy 
periods can also affect food chains that keep pest populations within a normal range. 
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Weather factors (temperature, rainfall, winds) affect how pests and diseases grow and develop. The 
relationship between meteorological data and pests and diseases has been investigated both in the 
laboratory and in the field. Most studies have established that the key factors influencing pests and 
diseases in a particular locality are temperature and moisture (Agrawal and Mehta 2007; Drake 
1994). Therefore, creative insurance designers tried to estimate the exposure of crops to pests and 
diseases based on relative humidity, temperature, or some mixed weather index. Some relationships 
between weather, pests and diseases and crop production are more complex than others. Martinat 
(1987) found that weather and climate effects may account for no more than about 30% of the 
variation in pest and disease incidence. In sum, there has been little research in this area and no 
strong analytical basis to show that weather indices capture a high proportion of yield losses due to 
pests and diseases.  
5.5.1.4 Mixed indices crop insurance 
The impact of weather on crop production is the result of various factors, and this coupled with the 
interaction between factors, makes it difficult to quantify the relative importance of each. Given the 
objective to reduce the basis risk of weather index crop insurance, the weather index aims to capture 
production losses to the maximum extent, thus there may be merit in designing a combination 
structure with different indices suited to the local situation. Table 5-16 provides an example that has 
been applied in a project in Changfeng County, Anhui Province of China. The pilot study 
implemented in the project involved 482 households of Yanhu Village and started in September 
2009 with total insured amount (for all households) of 381,234 yuan. 
Table 5-16 Mixed index crop insurance for rice in Anhui Province of China 
Crop Rice 
Premium 12 RMB/mu  
Phase 15 May—31 August 1 Sep.—15 October 30 July—15 August 
Index Accumulated rainfall Accumulated rainfall Accumulated temperature 
difference 
Trigger <230mm <15mm >8℃ 
Payout 1.2 yuan/mm 6.7 yuan/mm 20 yuan/℃ 
Max. Payout 150 yuan/mu 100yuan/mu 240 yuan/ mu 
 
5.5.2 Preliminary analysis of illustrative weather index insurance instruments 
As shown in Sections 5.2 to 5.4, Huojia County is particularly exposed to the risk of low rainfall, 
low temperatures, or frost. Weather index crop insurance for this study area would be designed to 
offer some protection against these events, and an example will be designed as a mixed index 
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contract of several significant weather events in a defined time period. Since a weather index 
insurance contract may be structured in many different ways with different coverage layers and 
provisions, this study focuses attention on rainfall, temperature, and sunshine hour that the previous 
research indicated were significant. For each index, the contract pays the claim according to the 
following: 
Equation (1)                          𝑓 𝑥 𝑚, 𝑥∗ =       0                                                      𝑖𝑓  𝑥 ≥ 𝑥∗    𝑚 ∗ 𝑥 − 𝑥∗             𝑖𝑓  𝑥 < 𝑥∗                                 
Where f (x) represents the claim payments paid to policyholders in the insurance contract year. 
Claim payments are realized whenever the actual index 𝑥 falls below a specified trigger  𝑥∗, with 
payment proportional to the difference between the index and the trigger. Thus a contract is defined 
by fixing two parameters in each phase: trigger  𝑥∗, and payment standard      𝑚. 
In the hypothetical weather index insurance contract proposed in this section, the structure of the 
contract is a mixed index type that combines several indices. From the regression results in Section 
5.4, rainfall (November to May, R11, R12, R1, R2, R3, R4, R5) temperature in two periods 
(November-December and April-May, T4, T5, T11, T12) and sunshine hours in March (S3) were 
shown to have significant impact on the adjusted wheat yield of Huojia County. The basis of the 
contract is structured around the “phased index insurance” approach, where the cover period is 
divided into months in order to account for the differences in tolerance of winter wheat during 
different growth stages. Each contract phase provides an independent payment according to 
realization of the specific trigger. However, if more than one phase triggers a payment, the total 
payout for all phases cannot exceed the maximum defined for the whole growing season. Table 
5-17 reproduces the regression equation from the previous section: 
Table 5-17 Regression function for chosen weather indices and wheat yield 
Location Model function 
Huojia 
County 
Y= 7274.663-56.682R12-15.888R11+7.584S3-187.218T11+21.026R3-14.59R2+222.199T4-           
139.786T5-39.766T12-3.081R4-6.114R1-1.734R5+5.327D 
Crop producers in China are numerous, small-scale and scattered. Studies have shown that small 
farmers in Asia generally suffer from low productivity, variable yields, and are highly risk averse 
and pursue utility maximization in their decisions (Liu 2008). The contract design therefore 
proceeds on the assumption that potential insurance clients are risk averse and that there will be a 
natural demand for insurance. Policyholders will receive compensation when any loss of wheat 
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yield occurs in this year, so the maximum payment per hectare of land should be equal to their 
expected wheat yield multiplied by the expected price. Here the average adjusted wheat yield and 
the wheat price of the previous year (2010) are used to formulate their expectations: 
Equation (2)                                               𝑀𝑎𝑥 = 𝑦!"#×𝑝!"#" 
Although wheat prices vary due to differences in varieties, quality, and market movements, in this 
simplified analysis, an average wheat price in the local market was assumed. In December 2010, the 
price of winter wheat recorded by Huojia Food sales departments was 2.20 yuan/kg. Thus the 
expected income was calculated as the average adjusted yield during the data sample period 
(7745kg/ha) times the average price, which is equal to about 17039 yuan/ha (1136 yuan/mu); and 
the maximum payment is going to equal expected income when there is a complete crop failure. 
The trigger value for each specific index is set at the expected wheat yield for 2011, which will be 
represented by the average level of the adjusted wheat yield of 2010. How much precipitation is 
needed to achieve the expected wheat yield can then be determined from the relationships in 
Section 5.4 when the other meteorological factors stay at a fixed average level. According to the 
regression function in Table 5-17, the triggers 𝑥∗ for the indices are as shown in	  Table 5-18: 
Table 5-18 Triggers calculated for each index 
Huojia County 
Rainfall index (mm) Trigger 
R11          R11>12 
R12          R12>5 
R1          R1 >5 
R2          R2>11 
R3          R3<28 
R4          R4>33 
R5          R5>57 
Temperature index (℃) Trigger T11          T11>6.3 T12          T12>0.8 T4          T4<13.9 
T5          T5>18.9 
Sunshine index (hrs.) Trigger S3          S3<149 
 
After establishing the trigger points and the maximum payment amount, the payment standard 
associated with deficiencies or surpluses of the weather index values can then be determined. 
However, the payment standard does not have to be calculated according to the average yield. 
Instead, different yield loss values can be set to satisfy different customer demands.  Depending on 
attitude to risk, potential buyers of this type of insurance may only be interested in covering against 
severe yield losses. In that case, the payment standard could be set at a point that provides the 
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equivalent income from say 50% of the average wheat yield. In this case, the farmers themselves 
may need to bear a higher proportion of the risk from low wheat yields compared to the payment 
standard set when yield losses are fully compensated.  Thus understanding farmers’ attitudes to 
risks is an important component in designing such an insurance scheme, which is discussed 
particularly in Chapter 6 (see section 6.2). A possible weather index insurance design for wheat for 
Huojia County appears in Table 5-19. 
Table 5-19 Weather index wheat insurance contract design for Huojia County 
Weather index crop insurance contract 
Crop Winter wheat  
Reference weather station Huojia weather station 
Rainfall (mm) 
  R11 R12 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 
Trigger R11>12 R12>5 R1>5 R2>11 R3<28 R4>33 R5>57 
Payment (yuan/mm/ha) 35.0 124.7 13.5 32.1 46.3 6.8 3.8 
Temperature (℃ ) 
 T11 T12 T4 T5 
Trigger T11>6.3 T12>0.8 T4<13.9 T5>18.9 
Payment (yuan/℃/ha) 411.9 87.5 488.8 307.5 
Sunshine hour (hrs.) 
 S3 
Trigger S3<149 
Payment (yuan/hour/ha) 16.7 
Sum payment 17039 yuan/ha (1136 yuan/mu) 
 
Under this contract for weather index insurance for wheat in Huojia County, when the total 
precipitation in November is more than 12 mm, the insured can claim 35 yuan per hectare of wheat 
farming land per millimetre precipitation over 12 mm. Likewise when the rainfall in March is less 
than 28 mm, the compensation standard is 46.3 yuan per hectare per millimetre deviation from the 
trigger, and so on for the other rainfall indices R12, R1, R2, R4 and R5. For the temperature index, if 
the average temperature in November is higher than 6.3℃ and average temperature in December is 
higher than 0.8℃, the insurance company pays 411.9 and 87.5 yuan per hectare for each degree 
Celsius over the trigger. For average temperatures below 13.9℃ in April and above 18.9℃ in May, 
the insured farmer would receive a payment standard at 488.8 and 307.5 yuan/℃/ha respectively.  
Sunshine hours in March lower than 149 hours will reduce wheat production and the insured farmer 
will receive compensation per deficit hour of 16.7 yuan/ha. The maximum payment for the whole 
contract, assuming all indices during the whole wheat-growing season violate their trigger points 
would be 17039 yuan/ha. 
A high correlation can exist among the weather variables. For example the rainfall index and 
sunshine index in March both have a positive effect on wheat production, which means wheat yield 
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would increase with the increasing rainfall and sunshine hours. In the model, the yield-decreasing 
effect from rainfall below 28 mm in March would be offset by the yield-increasing effect from 
increased sunshine above 149 hours, but this may not occur in practice since high sunshine hours in 
that month would be matched with low rainfall which may limit crop growth.  
5.5.3 Weather index crop insurance pricing 
In an insurance contract, the insurer promises to pay for the claims when the covered risk is 
triggered, and the insurance client pays a pre-determined amount, the premium, to the insurance 
company for the risk coverage. The premium should establish an expected return to the insured. The 
premium has three components:  pure premium, net premium and gross premium.  The pure 
premium is the estimate of the expected claims to be paid by the insurer, similar to the concept of 
basic cost for a weather index insurance contract. Net premium is the pure premium with an added 
loading by the insurer to cover statistical uncertainty and the risk of acquiring capital, while the 
gross premium is the sum of net premium and administrative expenses, and is similar to the concept 
of the selling price for a weather index insurance contract. The amount the farmer pays to the 
insurance company is the gross premium, shown by the following formula (Ozaki 2009): 
Equation (3)            Gross premium = pure premium + risk loading + administrative expense 
A verified pure premium should be equal to the expected loss by farmers. Using the historical 
weather observations at weather stations, the predicted yields were calculated based on the 
regression model presented in Table 5-17. Each difference between predicted yield and expected 
yield is assigned an equal probability to construct the empirical distributions. The pure premium can 
then be calculated as Equation (4): 
Equation (4)                                   𝐸 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 =    !! (𝑌!!"#$%&'!!!! − 𝑌!"#!$%!&)×𝑝 
Here, the loss denotes expected yield loss; n is the number of wheat yield data sample, !! denotes the 
probability of each level of yield loss occurrence in the data history, 𝑌!!"#$%&' represents the weather 
index predicted wheat yield in year  𝑖  during the data sample period, 𝑌!"#!$%!& represents the 
expected yield of the contract year, which is substituted by the average yield during data sample 
period (7745 kg/ha), and p is the expected wheat price in the contract year (p=2.2yuan/kg). If the 
predicted yield is larger than the expected yield, the loss will be marked as zero, which means the 
insurance company do not need to pay anything. While if the predicted yield is smaller than the 
expected yield, which means the insurance company would pay for the potential loss, and the 
payment is equal to the difference. 
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Table 5-20 Pure premium calculation of weather index wheat insurance for Huojia County 
Year Predicted yield
23 (kg/ha) 
(Daverage=11km) 
Difference (kg/ha) Loss (yuan/ha)  
1985 6181 -3441 -3441 
1986 7563 -400 -400 
1987 7753 18 0 
1988 8016 597 0 
1989 8190 980 0 
1990 7031 -1570 -1570 
1991 7768 51 0 
1992 7523 -488 -488 
1993 8100 781 0 
1994 8016 597 0 
1995 7916 376 0 
1996 8016 597 0 
1999 7823 171 0 
2000 8016 597 0 
2001 8016 597 0 
2002 7189 -1223 -1223 
2003 8001 564 0 
2004 8119 822 0 
2005 7851 234 0 
2006 7947 444 0 
2007 7459 -629 -629 
2008 7685 -132 -132 
2009 7719 -58 -58 
2010 8016 597 0 
Average   -331 
 
If risk loading and administrative cost of the insurance company are not considered, the pure 
premium of the weather index wheat insurance design for Huojia County is calculated as equation 
(4), which is about 331 yuan/ha (as shown in Table 5-20) representing the contract premium that 
potential buyers need to pay, with a maximum potential payout of 3441yuan/ha (230 yuan/mu) 
according to data sample. 
However, a risk loading has to be added to the pure premium given the uncertainty over the 
parameters in the model. To avoid these risks in the weather index insurance design process, the 
authenticity of statistical data, the partitioning of weather risk exposure periods, and the distance 
between any available weather station and insurable farming land needs to be carefully checked.  
Even assuming the data is valid, the weather index chosen processes are perfectly fitted in the 
model and the wheat price is a fixed value which is very close to the market price, consideration 
still needs to be given to the coefficient uncertainty of the regressor, which can be expressed by the 
standard deviation. If there is a certain range of uncertainty in the regressor coefficient, the weather 
index predicted wheat yield corresponding to the regression model will change, which will lead to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  Predicted yield is calculated according to the weather-yield regulation model in Table 5-17, with a scenario of an 
average distance of village to weather station (D=11km).	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an uncertainty in the expected wheat yield loss, and so the trigger and payment standard in Equation 
(1) will also change. If there is a large interval in the regressor coefficient, insurers have to consider 
sharing the risk with policyholders by adding a risk premium or transfer the risk to reinsurers or to 
other insurance markets. Given the potential for adverse selection, the insurer will need access to 
long time yield and weather data if a high risk loading is to be avoided. Furthermore, wheat price 
volatility should also be considered in the contract design, as the premium needs to be linked to a 
standard wheat price known by both farmers and insurance companies. 
Ultimately determination of the risk loading is in the domain of actuarial science. The proportion of 
risk loading in the premium also reflects the risk preference of insurance company. If the insurance 
company or its management is highly risk averse, the risk loading would be as high as possible 
within a range permitted by the industry. Conversely, if the insurance company or its management 
is risk preferring, it may set the loading at a relative low proportion and gamble on a low risk level.  
For illustrative purposes, an average value of 15% of pure premium is chosen as the risk loading of 
the insurance product (it is often chosen to be between 10% -20% in the agricultural insurance 
industry in China). 
Administrative expenses also differ between insurance companies, including business-operating 
costs and the information gathering and monitoring costs. In the results presented below, an average 
proportion of 20% of pure premium is applied according to the industry convention. This proportion 
is assumed to be the same as the traditional transaction cost ratio. It does not calculate the cost of 
weather monitor station, because the author thinks that this cost could be controlled at a lower level 
with the coordination of local government. At the very least, the saved transaction cost and on-farm 
loss assessment cost of weather index crop insurance could offset the cost of weather monitor 
station to some extent. Thus, 35% is still considered as a suitable hypothetical proportion. In 
accordance with the proportion of 15% for risk loading and 20% for administrative expenses 
respectively, the gross premium and premium rate for weather index wheat insurance of Huojia 
County are calculated as 447 yuan/ha (=331×(1+15%+20%)). That is to say, farmers in Huojia 
County would pay about 447 yuan per hectare (30 yuan/mu) of farmland for weather index crop 
insurance. When the trigger point in the contract is reached, they can claim compensation of up to 
15,449 yuan per hectare (1136 yuan/mu) for winter wheat. However, if more appropriate weather 
information can be obtained, the most suitable structure would appear to be a continuous payout 
triggered and limited by a cumulative measure of the weather variable for each of the different crop 
growth stages. From a technical point of view, the design of weather index crop insurance contract 
is the most challenging part of developing a pilot program. Due to a lack of actuarial knowledge, 
the contract design process shown in this study only highlights what a preliminary weather index 
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crop insurance instrument would kook like for the involved stakeholders, based on the limited 
information gained from the household surveys and from the broad literature review. 
Table 5-21 compares the hypothetical weather index wheat insurance proposal described here with 
the policy-oriented wheat insurance currently in place in Huojia County.  
Table 5-21 Comparing weather index insurance with policy-oriented wheat insurance  
                                        Huojia County 
 Policy-oriented wheat insurance  Weather index insurance 
Maximum 
payment 311 yuan/mu 1136yuan/mu 
Premium 18 yuan/mu 30 yuan/mu 
Actually 
paid24  3.6 yuan/mu 6
25 yuan/mu 
Risk 
coverage 
For irresistible natural disasters 
including heavy rains, floods, 
windstorms, hail, freezing, drought, 
pests and diseases etc. which caused 
losses to insured wheat  
Monthly rainfall in November, December, 
January, February, March, April and May; 
monthly average temperature in November, 
December, April and May; accumulated 
sunshine hours in March.  
 
As shown in the Table 5-21, under current crop insurance system, farmer in Huojia County pays 
only 20% of the premiums to participate in the policy-oriented wheat insurance. That is because the 
governments at all levels contribute a large subsidy, where the share of premiums paid by national, 
provincial, city, and county governments is 35%, 25%, 5%, and 15% respectively to meet the full 
cost of this scheme. If weather index crop insurance scheme can get the same proportion of 
subsidies from all levels of governments, the farmer with WII only needs to pay 6 yuan/mu (20% of 
full premium) for winter wheat in Huojia County. However, given the local government has 
financial difficulties in providing subsidies which has been discussed in Chapter 4, the premium 
paid by farmers after the government subsidy may be higher than the value marked in red in Table 
5-21. Apart from this, these insurance schemes have their own advantages and disadvantages. The 
wheat insurance program advocated by government has the advantages of lower premiums and 
wide risk coverage, but the risk coverage is defined ambiguously in the contract. The weather index 
crop insurance product designed here has the advantage of specifying a maximum payment and a 
clear risk liability, but the disadvantage is the premium is higher than the current scheme.  
	  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  It is the premium paid by farmers after the government subsidy.	  	  
25	  It refers to a case that farmers pay 20% of the full premium. 
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6 Demand for weather index crop insurance: Household attitudes and perceptions 
As potential policyholders, farmers represent the demand for weather index insurance. Studies on 
their attitudes and opinions can provide some reference for governments and insurance companies 
and so underpin the development of a weather index insurance market. This chapter investigates the 
potential interest in weather index crop insurance from the perspective of households, including 
their attitudes to risk, willingness to pay, and other characteristics. A conceptual model of farmer’s 
demand for the insurance is presented in Section 6.1. The findings from a survey of farmers about 
their risk perceptions and awareness are presented and discussed in Section 6.2. A logistic 
regression analysis is presented in Section 6.3 that relates various household characteristics to their 
desire to participate in weather index insurance. Finally, Section 6.4 reports on discussions with 
village leaders that analysed the findings from the household survey and regression analysis.   
6.1 Conceptual overview of farmer demand for weather index crop insurance 
Crop insurance is one tool for farmers to deal with natural risks. There are three main 
considerations or questions for farmers in deciding whether to choose weather index crop insurance. 
First, should the farm household expend their income on insurance premiums or on other 
consumption goods? Second, if the farmer chooses insurance products to avoid risk, how important 
are risk and insurance for crops compared with other household insurance needs? Third, if crop 
production risks are considered important relative to other household risks, how does crop insurance 
or weather index crop insurance in particular, compare with other risk management strategies and 
instruments?  
6.1.1 Choice between insurance products and household consumption goods 
Assume farmers are rational and their goal is to maximize utility, then the optimization of a 
household’s consuming behaviour can be modelled as: MaxU = EU C, S,A,R                                                                (6.1) 
s. t. Y = P ∗ C+ Q ∗ S    C ≥ C!                                            S ≥ 0                                                
Where Y is the estimated income of the farmer; C is the farmer’s consumption amount on 
conventional goods and P is the price of the goods; Cm is the minimum amount of goods necessary 
for normal living; S is the farmer’s expenditure on the insurance, and Q is the price of the insurance; 
A is farmer’s attitude towards risk; and R denotes a collection of factors such as social culture, 
customs and traditions.  
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According to Maslow’s hierarchy of needs (Maslow 1934), human needs are arranged in a 
hierarchy from low to high: biological/physiological needs, safety, love/belonging, esteem and self-
actualization comprise the steps in the hierarchy. Insurance belongs to the level of safety 
requirements, which is normally sought after the achievement of biological and physiological needs. 
That is, when the estimated income of a farmer is low, the demand for insurance depends primarily 
on whether conventional necessities have been met or not. According to expected utility theory 
(Neumann and Morgenstern 2007), farmers will compare the utility of paying for risk avoidance 
with spending on other goods. Only if the marginal utility per unit expenditure on insurance is equal 
to the marginal utility per unit spent on other goods, will utility maximization be achieved. The 
corresponding equilibrium can be expressed as follows:   
!!"!(!∗!) = !!"!(!∗!)                                                                          (6.2) 
Analysing the demand for insurance products involves two other considerations. First it is not just 
farmer’s attitude towards risk (A), but also the level of risk associated with particular activities that 
will determine actions and the demand for insurance. That is, risk-averse farmers may not 
necessarily undertake insurance depending on the cost of insurance, the level of risk, and their level 
of risk aversion. Conversely risk-preferring farmers may still engage in insurance if the risks are 
large enough relative to their level of risk preference. Second the factors captured in the variable R 
(such as economic condition, social culture, customs and traditions, consumers’ perceptions) also 
can exert a significant effect on farmers’ needs and demand for insurance.  
6.1.2 Importance of crop insurance among other insurance 
The current policy-oriented agricultural insurance scheme only covers farmers’ costs, not the 
income or yield losses caused by natural risks during the production season. This impacts on the 
attractiveness of crop insurance to farmers. Moreover, risks facing farm households are multi-
faceted including health, income in old age, children’s education, property risk, which will be 
further examined in Section 6.2.2.1.  Theoretically, farmers will only be attracted to insurance if the 
marginal net benefits of crop insurance exceed the marginal net benefits of other insurance products 
such as medical insurance and education insurance, or possibly even other forms of expenditure. In 
practice, risks that exert a significant impact on farmers’ livelihoods will attract farmers’ attention 
first and the influence of insured coverage on farmers’ livelihoods will determine the attraction of 
the insurance product. 
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6.1.3 Cost and benefits of risk management strategies  
If natural risks encountered in crop production occupy an important position in the livelihoods of 
households, farmers will consider ways to disperse these risks and reduce uncertainty in their crop 
production. A key consideration is whether to buy crop insurance to cope with natural risks or to 
employ other strategies such as crop diversification, advanced technology, good management, 
savings accumulation or credit access. Even if crop insurance weighs highly in these considerations, 
the type of crop insurance will impact on the net benefits and demand for insurance from farmers.  
According to (Neumann and Morgenstern 2007), if a random variable X equals Xi with a 
probability of Pi, where i=1, 2….n, and U (Xi) is the utility of the case when X=Xi, the utility of 
random variable X is: U X = E u X = P!u x! + P!u x! +⋯+ P!u x!                                           (6.3) 
Where E [U(X)] denotes the expected utility of random variable X, and U(X) is called the expected 
utility function or Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. If a farmer believes that the expected 
utility in the case where they do not have insurance is greater than the expected utility in the case 
where they do have insurance, they will not buy the insurance. 
If the risky event does not happen, farmers can generate a fixed income W in the absence of risk. 
However, crop planting does face risk of natural disasters. If the risky event does occur, assume a 
loss for the farmer of L Yuan with a probability of occurrence of P. Furthermore, assume the farmer 
is willing to pay S Yuan to the insurance company as premium to avoid the risk of crop failure, and 
when the risky event happens, the insurance company will pay R Yuan to the household as 
compensation.  
Leaving aside government intervention or subsidies, in the case where risk exists, farmers 
participating in the insurance scheme want to secure an income W-S, regardless of whether the risk 
occurs. Under this scenario, how much farmers are willing to pay for the premium is:  W− S = P ∗ W− L + 1− P ∗W                                                        (6.4) 
That is, the secure income W-S after insurance is equal to the expected utility without insurance or 
how much farmers are willing to pay for insurance should be equal to the expected loss of their crop 
production, namely: S = P ∗ L+ 1− P ∗ 0 = P×L                                                               (6.5) 
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Further considering the condition with risk, farmers’ expected utility with crop insurance should be 
P (W-S-L+R) + (1-P) (W-S). For the farmer to decide to participate in the crop insurance scheme, 
the inequality shown in equation 6.6 has to be met: P ∗ W− L + 1− P ∗W ≤ P ∗ W− S− L+ R + 1− P ∗ (W− S)                   (6.6) 
Then:                                                     P ∗ R ≥ S 
That is, the probability of risk occurring times the payout from the insurance company should not 
be less than the premium paid to the insurance company. As long as this condition is met, from a 
rational perspective, farmers will choose to insure. This inequality function relates to three variables 
P, R and S. Thus, there are three main factors that impact on this inequality and so on farmers’ 
demand for insurance, namely identifying the weather event with a high probability of occurrence, 
setting a high payout standard, or charging a low premium. However, the premium S normally 
increases with the risk probability P and the payout R. Thus the probability, payout, and premiums 
are interrelated and farmers need to weigh them up. The function P ∗ R ≥ S also can be seen as a 
frame of reference for the insurance company to define the premium and payout standards 
according to farmers’ demand.   
Apart from the price, or direct cost of crop insurance, there are also indirect and transaction costs 
and fees associated with paying premiums or making claims, as well as other losses associated with 
deliberately delaying or falsifying the on-farm assessment. Of course these indirect and transaction 
costs may also arise in other methods or strategies farmers employ to manage their risks and so 
farmers need to make an assessment of both the direct and indirect costs. As long as the net benefits 
from crop insurance are more than the benefits from any other risk management tool, farmers 
should choose to participate in crop insurance. 
6.2 Analysis of perceptions from household surveys 
To explore the factors raised in Section 6.1 impacting on farmers’ perceptions and demand for crop 
insurance, especially for weather index crop insurance, a survey of farmers in Huojia County was 
undertaken. Information was collected through face-to-face interviews with individual households 
to gather their views on risk, risk management, insurance, crop insurance, and weather index crop 
insurance, as well as the factors that may affect farmers’ purchase intentions and perceived 
problems with existing instruments. The questionnaire used for the household survey is included in 
Appendix 1while other information about the survey was presented in Section 3.3. This section 
consists of five parts: (a) respondents’ basic characteristics, including gender, age, farming 
experience, education level, farm and family size, and household income and expenditure patterns; 
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(b) risk faced by household and their awareness of general insurance; (c) farmers’ awareness and 
attitudes to policy-oriented agricultural insurance; (d) farmers’ impressions on present wheat 
insurance policy; and (e) farmers’ awareness of weather index crop insurance.     
6.2.1 Basic characteristics of respondents 
All the household surveys in this study were done in January and February of 2012, which is around 
Chinese Spring Festival. This provided an opportunity to interview different people in the 
household (including the household head) as even those who work away from home most of the 
year, return home to celebrate this festival. When visiting a household, the author did not request to 
interview a particular decision maker in the family, but instead to interview the household 
member(s) most engaged in agriculture and who are in charge of farming at home. Households were 
given the choice as to who would be interviewed and this was usually designated the one with 
higher education to be interviewed by the author. The basic characteristics of respondents include 
gender, age and farming experience, education level, family size and farm scale, and income and 
expenditure patterns.  
6.2.1.1 Gender   
From a gender perspective, there were 87 males and 65 females in the 152 respondents (57.2% and 
42.8% respectively) who are responsible for farming and can make the decisions in the family about 
crop insurance. The survey found that males tend to be more willing to express their own views are 
confident enough to put forward their evaluation and like to make a further comment on the issues 
raised in their answers, while females in rural area tend to be restrained and shy to express their 
own views and usually give short answer without further explanation.  This is related to the 
traditional concept of rural life in China where the male was trained from childhood to be the pillar 
and mainstay of the family, and was given more responsibility and obligations to support the family 
when they grew up. Thus there is an underlying notion that “the man is head of the family” with 
more right to speak and to decide on issues affecting the family whereas women are required to 
speak and act cautiously about home affairs. From the author’s opinion and experiences or rural life 
in China, however, this does not necessarily bias the responses from males and females as females 
were, because the females were able to articulate their perspectives while with more-and-more 
males now involved in off-farm work, females are becoming increasingly responsible for crop 
production.  Indeed from the perspective of gathering detailed and accurate information from the 
survey, the females who stay at home know more about the farm than their husbands who works 
outside. However the extra information from the males helped the author to understand household 
choices and attitudes.   
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6.2.1.2 Age and farming experience  
The age distribution of respondents appears in Table 6-1. The youngest was 21 years old and the 
oldest 58 years. Only a small proportion of respondents were younger than 30 years with most 
respondents aged 30 to 50 years. Young people tend to work in the city given the small-scale rural 
farming system, the surplus of family labour, and the opportunities afforded off-farm. Interval time 
was chosen over specific ages because of its personal nature and how this might impact on the 
willingness and openness of the respondents. Based on the literature review in section 2.4, age 
usually was not identified as an important influence factor for farmers’ decision-making and so the 
author traded off willingness to cooperate and gain trust of the interviewees against precise age 
characteristics.  
Reflecting the age distribution, more than half of the survey respondents had 20 years or more 
farming experience. Respondents with less than 5 years experience accounted for only 5% of the 
overall sample. Generally, the longer the experience in farming, the more thorough the 
understanding of agricultural production, and respondents were more conducive to communication.  
Table 6-1 Age characteristic and farming experience of respondents 
 Classification  Sample  Proportion (%) 
Age  
Less than 30 years old   4 3 
30-40 years old 49 32 
40-50 years old 84 55 
50-60 years old 15 10 
Farming 
experience 
Less than 5 years   8 5 
5-10 years 16 11 
10-20 years 47 31 
More than 20 years 81 53 
 
6.2.1.3 Education level  
The education level of respondents is shown in Table 6-2. The vast majority (85%) of respondents 
have secondary school education because China’s nine-year compulsory education system 
(including 6 years of primary school and 3 years of middle school) began in 1986. Therefore, all 
people under 45 years old should have benefited from this system. High school and higher-level 
education were not covered by this system, so the ratio of people with high school and higher 
education accounts for only 20% of the research sample. 
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Table 6-2 Education level of the respondents 
 Classification  Sample  Proportion (%) 
Education 
level 
Primary school 23 15 
Middle school 99 65 
High school 26 17 
University and higher 4   3 
 
6.2.1.4 Family size and farm scale  
Among the 152 respondents, the smallest family size is 3 people, while the largest is 9 people 
(Table 6-3). On average there are 5 people in a household and households with 4 to 7 people 
accounted for 91% of the sample, while households of 4 people accounted for more than one third 
of the survey. Each household has at least one member engaged in crop production, and the 
common situation is two people, often the women and senior members of the household, as the 
adult males usually work outside the village. In addition, on average there is one migrant worker in 
each household; while 3 people in the household work outside year around and are usually the 
younger, healthier, or better-educated members of the household. Some families still choose not to 
let family members work outside the hometown. Nevertheless, even for people who stay at home 
for crop production, most still do some other non-agricultural business during the off-peak period. 
Table 6-3 Family size and farm scale of the respondents 
 Classification  Sample  Proportion (%) 
Family size 
3 people and less 6   4 
4 people family 51 33 
5 people family 34 22 
6 people family 36 24 
7 people family 18 12 
8 people and more 7   5 
Farming 
scale 
4 mu and less 52 34 
4-7 mu  79 52 
7-10 mu 19 13 
10 mu and more 2    1 
 
The farming scale of each household is extremely small with an average arable land area of 5.3 mu 
(or 0.35 hectare) in total. “Small scale” households with less than 4 mu account for 34%, “middle 
scale” households of 4-7 mu account for 52%, and “large scale” households of 7-10 mu account for 
12.5% of the sample, with only 2 households farming more than 10 mu (only two-thirds of a 
hectare). Thus the arable land available to the average household is extremely small and the income 
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that can be generated from the limited land is insufficient to meet the expenditure needs of the 
whole family. 
6.2.1.5 Income and expenditure characteristics  
The maximum total household income (including both farm and non-farm income) among the 
sample households was 100000 RMB, the minimum 10000 RMB and the average annual income 
28879 RMB. As the classification in Table 6-4 shows, households with annual incomes of less than 
20000 RMB accounted for 41% of the 152 respondents, while households with incomes between 
20000-30000 RMB accounted for around one-third of respondents. Only 11 households or 8% of 
the sample had annual incomes above 50000 RMB. This income inequality in China exists not only 
between urban and rural households but also among rural households.  The average per capital 
income of RMB 5775.8 (28879/5 people) is low compared with the national farmers’ per capita 
income of RMB 7917 in 2012 (China Statistical Yearbook 2013). In addition, there is a significant 
difference with the national per capita income of non-farm households, which was RMB 24565 in 
2012 (China Statistical Yearbook 2013). Some income gaps can inspire farmers to create wealth, 
but if the income gap is too large, more-and-more farmers will abandon crop production, and the 
development of agriculture and national food security may be threatened. The Chinese Rural 
Research Institute (Wang 2012), pointed out the main source of farmers’ income in the past was 
land, and the amount of land determined the degree of differentiation of rural society. Now, the 
income gap between farmers and urban residents is mainly the result of non-farm income meaning 
that providing equal employment opportunities for farmers has become an important measure to 
close the gap.  
The household’s total annual consumption figures, were a maximum of 59000 RMB, the minimum 
was 5000 RMB, and the average annual expenditure 19400 RMB. Households with a total annual 
consumption less than 20000 RMB account for 71% of respondents while only 4.6% of respondents 
had a total annual consumption more than 40000 RMB. Thus most households live within their 
means as shown in Table 6-4 (Total expenditure as % of total income). There are about 8% of 
respondents living beyond their income who need to draw down on savings or borrow money from 
friends or relatives. 
From the figures for agricultural inputs  (all outgoings except own labour), and outputs (cash sales 
except own consumption), one third of households spend less than 2000 RMB on agricultural 
production, but more than half of the respondents earn 5000-10000 RMB from agricultural 
production. The average values are RMB 3174 and RMB 8502 respectively, the maximum 25000 
and 65000 RMB; and minimum 350 and 1500 RMB. This means agricultural production generates 
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a positive cash flow although to determine profitability would need account for unpriced inputs 
especially labour and land. As shown by agricultural input as a % of agricultural income, about 92% 
of respondents deem crop planting can generate a significant cash surplus, more than 40% on input 
costs.  
Table 6-4 Income and expenditure characteristics of the interviewed households 
 Classification Sample  Proportion (%)  
Total income 
20000 RMB and less 62 41 
20000-30000 RMB 49 32 
30000-40000 RMB 21 14 
40000-50000 RMB 9 6 
More than 50000 RMB  11 7 
Total 
expenditure 
10000 RMB and less 24 16 
10000-20000 84 55 
20000-30000 27 18 
30000-40000 10 6 
More than 40000 RMB  7 5 
Agricultural 
income  
5000 RMB and less 45 30 
5000-10000 RMB 84 55 
10000-15000 RMB 16 10 
More than 15000 RMB 7 5 
Agricultural 
input 
2000 RMB and less 53 35 
2000-3000 RMB 44 29 
3000-4000 RMB 30 20 
More than 4000 RMB 25 16 
Agricultural 
income as % of 
total income 
<=20% 53 35 
20%-40% 57 38 
40%-60% 28 18 
60%-80% 8 5 
80%-100% 6 4 
Total 
expenditure 
as % of total 
income 
<=20% 1 1 
20%-40% 13 9 
40%-60% 46 30 
60%-80% 34 22 
80%-100% 46 30 
>100% 12 8 
Agricultural 
input as % of 
agricultural 
income  
<=20% 10 7 
20%-40% 86 56 
40%-60% 44 29 
60%-80% 12 8 
80%-100% 0 0 
Total 
expenditure 
as % of 
agricultural 
income  
<=100% 9 6 
100%-200% 58 38 
200%-300% 52 34 
300%-400% 22 15 
>400% 11 7 
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Agricultural income represented only 20% or less of their total annual income for more than one 
third of respondents (Table 6-4). Only 10% of respondents indicated more than 60% of their total 
income came from crop production. On average, agricultural income accounts for one third of the 
total income among the 152 survey households. Thus, agricultural income is no longer the main 
income source. This trend will intensify in future as farmers’ income outside agriculture increases. 
Total expenditure as % of agricultural income in Table 6-4 indicates only 6% of respondents 
believe their agricultural income can cover their total expenditure, while the other 94% do not rely 
on agricultural income to meet their household expenditure. More than half the households need 
two to four times their agricultural income to cover their whole family expenditure. Even if weather 
index crop insurance stabilizes agricultural income, it may not have an overwhelming influence on 
the capacity to meet current household expenditure. Nevertheless it may still help in securing basic 
living expenses and improving existing living standards for rural households.  
6.2.2 Risks faced by household and their awareness of insurance 
Households face many risks during the production process that can be derived from many sources 
including natural conditions, market, policy, labour, technology, finance. Apart from these risks 
associated with their agricultural activities, they also encounter other life risks including those 
related to health and medical conditions, age, children’s education, and housing construction.  
6.2.2.1 Risks farmers face 
The questionnaire first identified the important risks to farmer livelihoods and then focussed on 
their crop production, (see section B “Risk Sources and Risk Perceptions” in the household survey 
questionnaire in Appendix 1). In Table 6-5, the first section covers all risks that household face, 
including those associated with health, aging, children’s education, house construction, children’s 
marriage, grandchildren’s birth, and agricultural production. With production risk, the second 
section of the table describes natural risk, market risk, and others related to policy, labour, 
technology, and finance. Of the natural risks, identified in the third section, key ones included 
drought, flood, wind, hail, frost, pests and diseases, and fire. Respondents could list several risks 
and so the sum of proportions in Table 6-5 does not equal 100%.  
The four main livelihood issues for households identified in the survey were children’s education 
(48%), medical issues (42%), production risk (39%), and problems related to aging (36%). 
Subsequent interviews with village leaders referred to in Section 6.4 reinforced these results. Issues 
of education, medical conditions and aging have become more prominent in rural areas according to 
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the respondents. However, the aging problem is likely to become more prominent in the future as 
more and more ‘only children’ become the main workforce of the family.  
The survey found many parents in the county have high expectations for their children’s education, 
regardless of household income. As long as the child is willing and able to get into higher-level 
education, they will make every effort to support them. In order to meet their children’s education 
cost, other spending by the family may have to be cut repeatedly. Despite this, some low-income 
families still need to borrow from friends or relatives, or take a loan from rural credit cooperatives. 
Some university students who meet the qualification of poverty can apply for student loans with a 
very low interest.  
The ‘new rural cooperative medical insurance’ policy, which is a basic health and social security 
system that combines insurance and social assistance targeting all farmers and rural residents, 
intended to alleviate medical costs in rural areas. It was set up by the central government in 2003. In 
2013, individual farmers pay about RMB 60 per person per year, another 240 RMB subsidy is 
provided by the government at all levels. However, one important constraint of the new policy is the 
low reimbursement rate and high co-payment at each visit (Yang 2013). Low-income farmers are 
already burdened with a premium, while substantial co-payments due to the limited coverage 
further aggravate the inequity in health care access (O'Donnell et al. 2008). As a result, the poor 
were more likely to use more informal and less qualified providers, or resort to self-treatment when 
they were ill, while the better-off seek financial protection by participating in commercial insurance 
(Yang 2013). 
Under the current level of economic conditions and traditional cultural patterns, children’s support 
is still the mainstream way of dealing with the old age issue in China.  Along with age and loss of 
ability to work, there is no social security, so elderly people have no source of income, but rely on 
their children’s aid. Although it states clearly in the “Marriage Act” (No 21), “Constitution of the 
People's Republic of China” (No 49), “The elderly rights and interests protection of the People's 
Republic of China” (No 11, 12 and 13), and “Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China” (No 
261) that “the adult child has the duty to support and assist the parents”, supporting elder relatives 
has become a major social problem in China because a couple may need to take care of four elderly 
people and a child. The first generation of “only children” have moved into the stage of marriage 
and child rearing so a “new rural social pension insurance” policy has been piloted in China since 
2009. This policy provides a basic pension of RMB 55 per person per month for the elderly who are 
over 60 years old. Rural residents who are between 16-60 years can participate in this policy 
voluntarily, with a regular payment for at least 15 years. There are different premium grades to 
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choose. However, this policy is still in the pilot stage, and there is no large-scale deployment in the 
country. 
For other events that occur unexpectedly like housing construction, children’s marriage and 
grandchildren’s birth, the central government does not have relevant support policies. Farmers have 
to bear the burden by themselves, or seek commercial insurance if available. For example, parents 
can pay a certain premium each year for ‘child’s marriage insurance’, and when their child reaches 
a given age, they can obtain a one-off payment higher than the total premiums paid to use for 
children’s wedding or housing. This type of fixed-term deposit is popular in some places. 
Table 6-5 Importance among survey respondents of different risks encountered by households 
Tier 1: Household risk 
 
Medical 
risk 
Elderly 
relatives 
Children’s 
education 
Housing 
construction 
Children’s 
marriage 
Grandchildren’s 
birth 
Agricultural 
risk 
Numbers  64 54 73 41 24 9 59 
Proportion (%) 42 36 48 27 16 6 39 
Tier 2: Production risk 
 Natural risk 
Market 
risk Policy risk Labour risk 
Technique 
risk Financial risk Other risk 
Numbers   139 40 15 12 7 0 0 
Proportion (%) 91 26 10 8 5 0 0 
Tier 3: Natural risks 
 Drought Flood Wind Hail Frost Pests and diseases Fire 
Numbers   123 70 59 32 10 71 1 
Proportion (%) 81 46 39 21 7 47 1 
Risks in farming mainly focus on natural risk and market risk (essentially price risk).  91.4% of 
households mentioned that natural risk poses a threat to crop production followed in importance by 
market risk. In the questionnaire (Appendix 1), a question about their impression of the most recent 
events affecting crop production revealed that 89.5% of households recall that as a natural disaster. 
Risk from policy changes, labour and technology that have been defined in Section 2.1 were 
mentioned less frequently. In recent years, the government support policy improved steadily, which 
is reflected in three aspects—stronger investment, expanding the scope of subsidies, and optimizing 
incentives policy (Wu, Wu and Ren 2012). The possibility of production losses caused by 
technological progress is small, because wheat growing is a very mature production process in this 
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area. Conversely, households are confident with national policy and science-technology and take an 
optimistic view of changes of agricultural policy and technical progress. However, a series of 
studies indicate that the large flow of agricultural labour to urban areas and aging of the agricultural 
workforce presents a serious trend (Liu and Zhang 2009; Qian and Zheng 2011; Tian et al. 2010), 
but the risk of labour shortage was not reflected in this survey. Farmers may not be aware of this 
risk or this risk is not important to them compared with others.  Financial risk involving interest 
rates and access to finance was rarely mentioned during the interviews, possibly because they are 
small-scale producers and have more off-farm income and use little formal credit while interest 
rates are stable. Natural disasters affecting their crop production and livelihoods appear to be the 
agricultural risk households are most concerned about.  
Tier 3 in Table 6-5 reveals perceptions of the respondents on 5 main weather events that potentially 
impact on farming: drought, pests and diseases, flood, wind, and hail. Although farmers have a 
certain view of these risks based on their own knowledge and experience, the questionnaire sought 
to provide some consistency by providing a general definition, whether the weather event was 30% 
lower or higher than the 30-year average. The survey results showed that: drought is the most 
common risk perceived by respondents (80.9%). Pests and diseases and floods have a similarly 
perceived importance of 46.7% and 46.1%, followed by wind, hail and frost. In the subsequent 
survey of villager leaders, little difference in impact of natural risks was noted across the villages 
because of the short distances between them.  
Table 6-6 Farmers’ awareness of natural risks 
Tier 1: Possibility of natural disaster 
 Most likely More likely General Less likely Unlikely  
Number  9 29 74 37 3 
Proportion (%) 6 19 49 24 2 
Tier 2: Possibility of crop production loss 
 80-100% 60-80% 40-60% 20-40% 0-20% 
Number  13 32 50 48 9 
Proportion (%) 9 21 33 32 6 
Tier 3: Possible impact on your livelihood 
 Most serious More serious General Less serious No effect 
Number  15 66 56 14 1 
Proportion (%) 10 43 37 9 1 
Note: “Most likely” refers to the highest probability that something will happen compared to 
several possible risks; “more likely” refers to a higher probability that something will happen 
compared to something else; “general” refers to a medium probability that something will happen 
with 50% chance; “less likely” refers to a lower probability of something happening than of 
something else happening; “unlikely” means that it is probably not going to happen. 
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As Tier 1 in Table 6-6 shows, almost half of households think the probability of natural disaster is 
in the medium range which means there is the same probabilities it may occur as not occur. There 
are 25% (19% and 6%) of households who consider that natural disaster is more likely to occur 
while 26% of households said natural disaster is unlikely to happen in the near future. However, if 
natural disaster occurred, 64% of households think that more than 40% of income will be lost from 
crop production (see Tier 2 in Table 6-6). More than half of households (53.3%) said these crop 
losses will impact their family lives moderately or most seriously (Tier 3 of Table 6-6) while less 
than 10% of households believe that natural disaster will have less influence on their lives. 
Natural risks are considered by farm households to be an overwhelming influence on crop 
production, although agricultural risks were ranked only third in importance in terms of risks to the 
farmer’s livelihoods. Nonetheless a viable agricultural insurance product may be an important 
component in household’s overall strategy to manage risks. 
6.2.2.2 The priority for crop insurance 
Insurance instruments for several of the risks identified in the previous section are available to 
households. Table 6-7 outlines the demand for different types of insurance among the respondents 
by having them indicate whether they have purchased the specific insurance previously and whether 
they would like to. Medical insurance shows the highest participation rate, purchased by 76% of the 
surveyed households, while the second most widely sourced insurance was crop insurance at 31%. 
Children’s insurance for education or wedding accounts for 21%, while 11% of households have 
previously purchased pension insurance, and 8% of households have bought vehicle insurance. 
Other forms of insurance included livestock insurance (pigs and cows), accident insurance bought 
mainly by migrant workers engaged in hazardous work like construction, life insurance and other 
forms of insurance which had been purchased by 17% of respondents.    
Table 6-7 Household demand for different kinds of insurance  
Insurance Category Medical  Pension  Children’s  Crop  Vehicle  Other  
Has ever 
purchased 
Number 115 17 32 47 12 26 
Proportion (%)  76 11 21 31 8 17 
Want to 
purchase 
Number 123 82 44 87 14 1 
Proportion (%) 81 54 29 57 9 1 
 
In terms of what households want to purchase, medical insurance again came out on top as being 
desired by 81% of households. Some households indicated that they not only wanted to have rural 
cooperative medical insurance which is supported by central government, but they also want to 
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supplement it with other health insurance that offers better protection, provided it is affordable. The 
proportion of respondents who wanted crop insurance was 57% compared with 31% who had 
previously purchased it. An even larger gap between previously purchased (11%) and wanting to 
purchase (59%) arose for endowment insurance. Children’s insurance and vehicle insurance 
exhibited only slight differences between actual purchases and desire to purchase. 
The comparison between “Has ever purchased” and “Want to purchase” highlights the perceived 
importance of medical insurance to farmers, but crop insurance (and endowment insurance) also 
emerges as important to households. Nonetheless, there is a considerable gap between wanting to 
purchase and previously purchasing crop insurance.  
6.2.2.3 Farmers’ risk management strategies  
Various risk management strategies are open to farmers and the questionnaire (Appendix 1) sought 
to establish the importance of them. The strategies considered (see Table 6-8) were diversification, 
contract production, government programs, maintaining financial reserves, and off-farm 
investments. Diversification included crop diversification (such as planting different crop varieties, 
fruits or vegetables), plot diversification (planting on different plots), and market diversification 
(selling at different times or through different markets). In response to each of the strategies, 
farmers were asked to point out their importance according to their experience. For example, they 
gave a number between 0-5 to represent the degree of importance, where ‘0’ denotes ‘Do not use’; 
‘1’ denotes ‘Not important’, ‘2’ denotes ‘Less important’; ‘3 ’denotes ‘either important or 
unimportant’; ‘4’ denotes ‘More important’; and ‘5’ denotes ‘Most important’. 
As the first three columns show, 39% of surveyed farmers do not use crop diversification or plot 
diversification as a risk management strategy, while about 30% of respondents thought   crop and 
plot diversifications are not important, with only 23% of respondents considering them to be 
important or the most important tools. Conversely 44% of respondents felt that market 
diversification was important to avoid cropping risks although 22% indicated they do not use 
market diversification. Overall, diversification is not a popular strategy to reduce production risk in 
the surveyed area. The plots in the village are usually adjusted every 30 years and farmers would 
like to ask the village committee to assign their farmland in the same location as far as possible, as 
that is convenient for using planters or harvesters. If the land area is too small or too narrow, they 
have to plant and harvest by hand. As there are only 5.3 mu (or 0.35 hectare) arable lands in total 
for each household on average, and they believe there is not much difference in soil quality, they 
reject plot diversification as an effective instrument. In addition, the farming system of two crops a 
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year (wheat and corn) has become a tradition in this area and is considered by respondents as the 
best crop combination and farming system after years of experience.  
Table 6-8 Importance of each risk management strategies  
 Crop 
diversification  
Plot 
diversification 
Market 
diversification 
Contract 
production 
Government 
programs 
Maintain 
financial 
reserves 
Invest 
off-
farm  
Tier 1: Do not use 
Number  60 59 33 46 37 37 32 
Proportion 
(%)  
39 39 22 30 24 24 21 
Tier 2: Not important  
Number  26 26 11 12 21 14 13 
Proportion 
(%) 
17 17 7 8 14 9 9 
Tier 3: Less important 
Number  20 19 20 8 4 15 11 
Proportion 
(%)  13 13 13 5 3 10 7 
Tier 4: Neither important nor unimportant  
Number  12 13 21 29 29 14 4 
Proportion 
(%) 8 9 14 19 19 9 3 
Tier 5: More important 
Number  31 31 56 38 34 45 47 
Proportion 
(%) 20 20 37 25 22 30 31 
Tier 6: Most important 
Number  3 4 11 19 27 27 45 
Proportion 
(%)  2 3 7 13 18 18 30 
 
Market diversification obtained more positive responses from surveyed households than crop or plot 
diversification. According to respondents, there are only two channels for selling grain; private 
grain dealer or through the township grain management office. The acquisition price from the 
township grain management office is set in accordance with national minimum standards, and 
requires the farmer to deliver the grain to a designated location whereas the private dealer picks up 
the grain at the households’ place but at a lower price (normally just a few cents per kilo). Thus, 
households with the vehicles and labour would choose the township grain management office 
whereas the private dealer is popular with the households who do not have labour or vehicles.  Zhu 
(2011) found that farmers' grain selling behaviour in major grain production areas of China was 
changing significantly from ‘only consider the price’ to ‘consider the price, convenience and 
opportunity cost as a whole’.  This helps explain why 44% of households chose market 
diversification as an important instrument for agricultural risk management.  
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Contract production involves farmers agreeing to sell or deliver all of a designated crop raised in a 
manner set forth in the contract to a processor (such as big agro-processing factories) and getting 
paid according to the price specified in the contract (Shepherd 2013). Formal production contracts 
usually specify in detail the production inputs to be supplied by the processor, the quality and 
quantity of the particular crop involved, the planting methods to be used, and the manner in which 
remuneration is to be paid to the farmer. However, since such contracts are often very specific in 
their requirements about the planting process and crop quality, farmers need to pay more attention 
to take care of the crop. If there are adverse conditions during the growing period, the quality of the 
crop may be relatively poor and farmers receive a discounted price. This may be the major reason 
why 30% of respondents indicated that they did not want to use contract production to sell their 
crops with a further 13% of farmers rated it as not important or less important as a risk strategy. 
Nevertheless there were some mixed responses, with 25% of respondents listing it as important and 
13% of farmers thinking it was the most important strategy.  
Similar to contract production, farmers’ attitudes towards government supported production 
programs are split between supporting and opposing. Whereas 24.3% of respondents said they do 
not use government programs to avoid farm risks, about 16% of farmers rated this strategy as not 
important, another 22.4% of farmers think it is important and 7.8% of farmers think it is the most 
important strategy. The local government support program focuses on the modern protected 
agriculture—defined as “modification of the natural environment to achieve optimal growth” 
(Jensen and Malter 1995), so cultivation of high-value vegetables or other horticultural crops like 
flowers in greenhouses have become popular. These crops usually have special requirements on 
farm size and initial investment. Small-scale farmers find it hard to meet such qualifications and so 
are largely excluded. The eligible large-scale farmers like to participate in government programs, 
but they also need the government to provide appropriate financing and technical assistance.  
The final two columns in Table 6-8 reveal the general agreement among surveyed farmers that 
maintaining financial reserves and investing off-farm to generate other sources of income are 
important. Some 30% of farmers think saving money is more important and 18% think it is the most 
important strategy, while 31% think broadening income sources is important and 29.6% of farmers 
think it is the most important strategy. Nevertheless almost a quarter of them did not use financial 
reserves or invest in off-farm sources of income possibly  because this group are very small scale 
farmers who cannot afford the large up-front costs, or simply think other strategies are more 
relevant.  
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Without crop insurance, 88% of households bear the losses themselves when suffering natural 
disasters. If they cannot do that, 78% of households chose to ask for help from relatives and friends; 
9% of households would apply for small loans from banks; 5% seek assistance from government 
subsidies; and another 8% of farmers do not have any channel for assistance. Thus most farmers 
still rely on their own resources to cope with natural disaster risks or seek assistance from relatives 
and friends. The geographical scope of a natural disaster may impact on the capacity for mutual 
help. These traditional management strategies also face a variety of challenges, such as local 
conditions, up-front costs, and the opportunity cost. Thus depending on the product design, and cost, 
crop insurance may be attractive to farmers. 
6.2.3 Farmers’ awareness and attitudes to policy-oriented agricultural insurance  
The demand by wheat farmers to buy insurance depends partly on their awareness of the different 
instruments. The analysis of factors impacting on farmers’ awareness is discussed in this section. 
Because of farmers’ minimal or non-existent exposure to weather index insurance, a stepwise 
approach was taken to identify farmers’ awareness of various insurance instruments. Initially 
farmers were questioned about their awareness of general insurance, and then on their awareness of 
crop insurance, and finally on weather index crop insurance. The premise was that if farmers in the 
area had a good understanding of general insurance and crop insurance, they may be in a better 
position to assess the weather index crop insurance instrument.  
6.2.3.1 Main information channels  
With the launching of policy-oriented agricultural insurance, different levels of governments 
explored a range of possible channels to provide relevant information, including advertising on TV, 
radio broadcasts and newspaper advertisements, a website, SMS messages, as well as personal 
channels such as information by villager leaders, relatives or friends, insurance salesman, and so on. 
As shown in Table 6-9, however, the survey revealed that the main information source used by 
farmers is still village cadres, followed by relatives or friends, and then information or advertising 
material provided by insurance companies. Advertising through both the traditional and modern 
media has little effect on the spread of relevant information. The survey revealed that farmers 
generally had an antipathy or suspicion against media advertising, doubted the authenticity of media 
advertisements with complex and professional words or documents, and thought the advertising has 
exaggerated the effects of the product in order to cheat them out of their money. In contrast, they 
are more willing to believe in informal conversations with acquaintances. This result suggests that 
interpersonal communication was the main channel for farmers accessing crop insurance 
information. One of the key characteristics of an effective information dissemination plan is to 
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orient it towards the needs of the audience, using appropriate language and information levels 
(Harmsworth and Turpin 2000). Personal contact was found to be an effective way to understand 
the complicated, unfamiliar, and technical terms, especially with farmers (Goswami and Sarkar 
2009). But this channel is strongly affected by personal characteristics and transmission quality, 
which inevitably constrains farmers’ understanding and implementation of policy. 
Table 6-9 Main channels of the surveyed farmers access to insurance information 
Channels Frequency 
TV, Broadcast or newspaper   17 
Network, SMS messages     3 
Village cadres 127 
Relatives or friends    55 
Insurance company’s propaganda 113 
	  
6.2.3.2 Farmers’	  awareness	  of	  agricultural	  insurance	  	  
Table 6-10 shows that of the 152 households in the survey, 47 households, or 31%, bought policy-
oriented agricultural insurance for winter wheat. When asked about the reasons for buying wheat 
insurance: 64% of insured farmers indicated that it was because the government requires them to 
purchase (Section 4.2 highlighted how local government had “promoted” this insurance instrument 
on behalf of higher levels of government); 17% of households indicated uptake to take advantage of 
the subsidised premiums; while 19% of households felt it could compensate for losses and protect 
reproduction. When asking the other 105 farmers (69%) about reasons for refusing wheat insurance, 
32% of households mentioned “they were not aware of policy-oriented agricultural insurance for 
winter wheat”, while 27% of respondents picked the option of “Do not trust the insurance 
company”.  Further questioning revealed that they did not have personal experience dealing with 
the insurance company, but had heard negative examples from others about how the insurance 
company did not always follow the agreed contract for compensation. Thus insurance companies 
have a serious image problem and will need to improve this image and link into word-of-mouth 
marketing to establish sufficient levels of satisfaction, trust, and commitment. Another 17% of 
households did not participate because the people around did not participate. In addition, 16 
respondents believed the risk is not likely to happen, leaving 9 respondents who think the risk can 
be solved through other means and so would not participate in the wheat insurance scheme. 
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Table 6-10 Reasons for households to participate in agricultural insurance 
 Number  Percentage (%)  Reasons Number 
Percentage 
(%) 
Insured 
household  
47 31 
Local government require 30 64 
Enjoy premium subsidies 8 17 
Protect production 9 19 
Uninsured 
household 
105 69 
They don’t know too much about 
agricultural insurance 34 32 
Don’t trust insurance company 28 27 
There are nobody buy around them 18 17 
The risk is not likely to happen 16 15 
Solve the risk through other means 9   9 
 
6.2.3.3 Farmers’ awareness of premium subsidies 
Policy-oriented wheat insurance was piloted in Henan province, and the central, provincial, city and 
county governments provide 80% of the premium for wheat insurance with households paying only 
20% of the premium. While notionally the subsidy may be large and make the premium affordable 
to farmers, the adoption of this insurance also depends on farmers’ awareness of these subsidies. 
The survey results highlight that only 11% of respondents knew about the subsidies and their level 
(Table 6-11). Another 36% knew there were a subsidy but not the level. Thus over half of the 
farmers were not aware of the subsidy even though the scheme had been operational for a number 
of years. Even the respondents, who knew about the subsidies and the proportion of the government 
contribution relative to theirs, were less clear about which level of government was providing the 
subsidy. 
Table 6-11 Farmers’ awareness of premium subsidies 
Awareness Number Percentage (%) 
Know there is subsidy, but don’t know the proportion 55 36 
Know there is subsidy, and understand the proportion 17 11 
Do not know there is subsidy for wheat insurance 80 53 
 
6.2.3.4 Farmers’ awareness of insurance contract 
The survey examined farmers’ awareness of eligible varieties, insured amounts, risk coverage, 
underwriting process, and contract terms in section (Section C of household questionnaire, 
“Understanding and perceptions of insurance”, Appendix 1).  
While respondents had relatively poor awareness of the level of premium subsidies, they had a 
greater awareness of which varieties/crops were covered by insurance and the amount of coverage 
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(Table 6-12).  This may be because policy-oriented agricultural insurance was executed as a task of 
the government, but the government did not explain very clearly about this policy to the farmers. 
Alternatively, the farmers think that what they pay is the full premium. When the author told them 
they actually only paid 20% of the full premium with 80% contributed by government, while they 
were grateful for the government subsidies, they still complained the premium was too high in 
regard to the low insured amount.  
Although they did not know their premium was being subsidised, about 68% of surveyed 
households knew which crops in their area were covered by insurance, and about 65% of surveyed 
households knew the insured amount for winter wheat was 311 yuan/mu. This directly related to the 
maximum compensation they could receive when the loss occurs. Farmers’ awareness of insurance 
coverage can help the work of underwriting and reduce the level of disputes in claims.   
Table 6-12 Farmers’ awareness to subsidised varieties and insured amounts 
Know insured 
varieties 
Number Percentage 
(%) 
Know 
insured 
amount 
Number Percentage 
(%) 
Know  104 68 Know  98 64 
Do not know 48 32 Do not know  54 36 
 
Surveyed households, however, had a poor awareness of risk coverage, contract terms and the 
underwriting process. As Table 6-13 shows, households who have a better understanding of risk 
coverage about wheat insurance accounts for only 7% of respondents.  Most farmers do not know 
what kinds of risk are covered by their insurance and this is a major reason behind disputes with the 
insurance companies. As the majority of people did not comprehend the liability of the insurance 
company, some farmers claim compensation for risks that were not covered by the contract. If the 
claim is refused, they then complain of bad faith on the part of insurance companies. Similarly, 
some farmers might miss compensation because they do not know they can claim for certain risks 
included in their contract. 
Table 6-13 Awareness of surveyed farmers to risk coverage 
Understanding of risk coverage Number Percentage (%) 
Completely don’t understand 62 41 
Less understanding  40 26 
General understanding 39 26 
Better understanding 9   6 
Best understanding 2       1 
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The latest version of ‘Insurance Law of the People’s Republic of China’ (No.17) clearly states that 
insurance businesses must give a written or oral explanation to the insured. In practice, the clause 
on exemption for liability only appears in the final insurance policy (a formal document including 
all clauses, riders, endorsements which expresses the terms, exceptions, and conditions of the 
contract of insurance between the insurer and the insured) (Belete and Mahul 2007). It is not the 
contract itself, but evidence of the contract that is issued when the insurance contract is confirmed. 
When farmers submit the application and pay the premium, they only have a payment receipt, on 
which there is no liability exemption clause. Thus, the vast majority (88%) answered “no” when 
asked about whether they know the disclaimer terms in their contract. This damages the insured’s 
rights to know as a party to the contract. Moreover, 51% of surveyed household did not know about 
the underwriting process. In some villages, this business was undertaken by the village committee, 
so farmers do not need to deal directly with the insurance company. 
Table 6-14 Awareness of surveyed farmers to contract terms and underwriting process 
Whether know 
contract terms 
(disclaimer) 
Number Percentage (%) 
Whether know 
underwriting 
process 
Number Percentage (%) 
Know 18 12 Know 74 49 
Do not know 134 88 Do not know 78 51 
 
Although the data showed that the surveyed farmers’ awareness of policy-oriented agricultural 
insurance is poor, they do not have any effective channels to learn about this new policy. They have 
poor awareness of the level of premium subsides and are not clear about the risk coverage or 
contract terms. However, the later survey of village cadres (see questionnaire in Appendix 2) 
revealed a different result. In the interviews with 20 village leaders, all of them had seen the leaflets 
about policy-oriented agricultural insurance for winter wheat; 9 of the leaders have a good 
understanding of the insurance contract, and also expressed some doubts about the implementation 
of the existing policy. They also questioned the effects of this policy. In their words, governments at 
all levels invested considerable funds in this policy, as well as effort to organize and promote its 
implementation, but the benefits for farmers currently were not proportional to the effort expended 
by government. Thus villager leaders have taken an active interest in the policy oriented crop 
insurance but see the need for further refinements in the design of this insurance. 
6.2.4 Evaluation of policy-oriented agricultural insurance policy 
Ultimately households are the purchasers of the insurance and their needs must be met if they are to 
take up the insurance and so any investigation needs to take account of the farmer perceptions.  
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6.2.4.1 Farmers’ evaluation of the designated insurance companies 
PICC and CUPIC are the designated policy-oriented agricultural insurance suppliers in Henan 
Province. The survey found that all of the insured households (47 respondents) know the company 
name that they bought from, but only 29 households (62%) have ever seen any insurance company 
staff. When asked to evaluate their satisfaction with the insurance company: 19% of surveyed 
households said ‘satisfied’ (17%) or ‘very satisfied’ (2%); 34% of households said ‘dissatisfied’ 
(28%) or ‘very dissatisfied’ (6%); while 47% of surveyed insured households hold a neutral attitude 
to the insurance company.  In terms of evaluation of the process of claims and damage surveys, 
only 11 households (23.4% of insured households) received a payment. 8 households belied that the 
insurance company often pay less than expected or nothing. Only 1 household believed it received 
reasonable treatment while the 2 remaining households thought the damage survey reasonable and 
the claims process not too bad.  
When the 105 households currently without policy-oriented agricultural insurance were asked for 
their impression of the services of the insurance company, 9% said they had a good (6%) or very 
good impression (3%) of the company; 64% of households hold an average view; and 27% of 
households have a bad (19%) or very bad (8%) impression. With no practical transaction experience 
for such farmers with PICC and CUPIC insurance companies, the answers are based on hearing 
about or seeing experience of others, but as mentioned above it does highlight the poor reputation of 
the designated insurance company in the area. 
Table 6-15 Impression of households with the services of insurance company 
Degree of Satisfaction  Insured households Uninsured households Number Proportion (%) Number Proportion (%) 
Very good impression 1 2  3 3 
Good impression 8 17  6 6 
General 22 47 67 64 
Bad impression 13 28 20 19 
Very bad impression 3 6  9 8 
Total  47 100 105 100 
 
6.2.4.2 Farmers’ evaluation of premiums 
The survey investigated the affordability of current policy-oriented agricultural insurance premiums 
on winter wheat (currently set at 3.6 yuan/mu). Among both insured and uninsured households, 
there are 23% who said they do not have a financial burden with the premium; 66% of households 
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said the premium for them is very light (38%) or so-so (28%); only 11% of households think the 
premium is heavy (10%) or very heavy (1%) for their family to bear.  
Table 6-16 Financial burden of agricultural insurance premiums to surveyed households 
Financial burden Number Proportion (%) 
Very heavy 1   1% 
Heavy 15 10% 
Neutral 43 28% 
Small burden 58 38% 
No burden at all 35 23% 
 
When asked whether they would continue to buy crop insurance for winter wheat if the premium 
increased to 7.2 yuan/mu (that is farmers pay 40% of full premium), 21 (45%) of the 47 insured 
households said they will continue, 10 households (21%) indicated no, and the remaining 16 
households (34%) were unsure.  This question received a more positive result from the uninsured 
households, and 61% of them said they could afford the premium, 28% of households said it is hard 
for them to pay; and 11% of households said they could not make the decision at the moment. Thus 
it may be feasible to raise the insurance premium while the premium may not be the main factor 
that is limiting uptake. 
Table 6-17 Household willingness-to-pay if the premium increases 
Willingness-to-pay Insured households Uninsured households Number Proportion (%) Number Proportion (%) 
Be willing to pay 21 45 64 61 
Be unwilling to pay 10 21 29 28 
Uncertain 16 34 12 11 
Total  47 100 105 100 
Linking back to the discussion on awareness of premium subsidies in Section 6.2.2.3, more than 
half of the surveyed households did not know that the current premium they paid only accounts for 
20% of the full premium cost of policy-oriented agricultural insurance. Once they knew that all 
levels of governments provided 80% of the premium for their insurance, it was unclear what their 
maximum acceptable price would be. When the researcher told them that 14.4 yuan/mu in premium 
was paid by government, the farmers who chose “Be willing to pay if the premium increased to 7.2 
yuan” tended to change their minds as they think the full premium of 18 yuan/mu is already high. 
When they did not know the level of premium subsidy, they were more likely to accept an increase 
in it.  
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6.2.4.3 Farmers’ evaluation of insured amount and risk coverage 
Nearly half of households (48%) said the insured amount of 311 yuan/mu is too low and that this 
significantly dampened their enthusiasm to try it. About 30% of households think it is low; and 18% 
of households think it is acceptable while 5% of households thought the insured amount is high 
although nobody agreed it was very high. On risk coverage in the current policy, 34% of households 
think it is not reasonable; 10% of households said it was reasonable (9%) or very reasonable (1%); 
55% of households think the risk coverage is reasonable on some grounds but unreasonable on 
others and so chose the option of ‘neutral’ or uncommitted.  
Table 6-18 Farmer’s evaluation on the insured amount 
Insured amount  Number Percentage 
(%) 
Risk coverage Number  Percentage 
(%) 
Very low 73 48 Very unreasonable 0 0 
Low 45 30 Unreasonable  52 34 
Normal 27 18 Neutral  84 55 
High 7   5 Reasonable  14   9 
Very high 0   0 Very reasonable   2   1 
 
The survey found that the premium is not the main obstacle to the adoption of the current insurance 
policy; the main obstacle is that the policy does not match their expectations.  Even if they can 
afford to, they will not choose what an unsatisfactory product from their perspective is. The 
insurance product is often complicated (recall the responses in the discussion on awareness of the 
insurance contract in section 6.2.3.4), and they do not know much about the policy, while they 
perceive frequent disputes about claims.  
6.2.5 Awareness of weather index crop insurance 
For the surveyed households, weather index crop insurance is a new concept. In this part of the 
survey, the concept of weather index crop insurance was explained as providing indemnity against 
adverse weather events but only through a weather index specified in the contract based on weather 
measurements monitored at a local weather station. To reinforce their understanding, the example 
of weather index insurance for rice in Changfeng county of Anhui province was explained. During 
the interviews, the author gave the example of a new type of agricultural insurance piloted in 
Changfeng County, Anhui Province, for rice cultivation in drought conditions, with a premium of 
12 yuan/Mu. The rule of indemnity is that (see table 5-16 in the thesis), if the accumulated rainfall 
during 15 May and 31 August is less than 230mm, then the insured household could get 1.2 yuan 
for per mm less than 230mm, and the maximum payment of this phase is 150 yuan/mu. If the 
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accumulated rainfall during 1 September and 15 October is less than 15mm, then the insured 
household could get 6.7 yuan for per mm less than 15mm, and the maximum payment of this phase 
is 100 yuan/mu. If the accumulated temperature difference during 30 July and 15 August is less 
than 8℃, the insured household could get a compensation of 20 yuan for per ℃ less than 8, and the 
maximum payment of this phase is up to 240 yuan/mu. This was followed by a discussion that new 
types of insurance products based on excessive rainfall, deficit rainfall, excessive heat or cold 
weather are being evaluated for potential use in agriculture.  For example, if you buy deficit rainfall 
insurance, you will receive a payment if the number of millimeters of rain that fall in your farm 
during a month or a season is less than what you expected. The money you will get is based only on 
how much shortfall in rainfall you will experience. It is not based on how much yield shortfall you 
experience. Your insurance contract will be written based on the historical rainfall data at your local 
weather station or if possible on a weather station on your farm. The example was given to all of the 
respondents to ensure they understood what was meant by index insurance. 
Following the explanation, 97 households showed an above average interest in the product and 25 
households showed a very high interest. Some 27 households held a neutral attitude towards this 
new crop insurance product, which was interpreted at the interviews as a “wait and see” attitude. 
Another 3 respondents had negative attitudes regarding the idea. In addition, more than 80% of 
households indicated they would trust the weather reports from their nearest (county) weather 
station as the basis for the insurance. 
Among the 30 respondents who held a neutral or negative attitude, 5 considered extreme weather as 
an occasional event with a very small probability and no one was able to predict its timing, and so 
they did not want to waste premiums in what they considered mainly safe years. Eight households 
said they would resolve the risk by other means, such as crop diversity, or they would transport well 
water to irrigate their crop in a drought season. For example, one respondent said that his wheat 
suffered from low temperature and drought at the flowering stage in 2010. After much 
consideration he decided to destroy the wheat, and then plant sweet potatoes and seasonal 
vegetables. His income that season increased rather than decreased compared to others. The 
households who didn’t destroy the wheat and switch to other crops suffered heavy losses. Thus, he 
believed that some crop risks could be overcome through advanced technology and industrious 
hands. While anecdotal, the story reveals an example of a class of farmers who prefer to make up 
for crop losses by investing more time and labour, rather than pay the premium to an insurance 
company to transfer the liability for the risk.  
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Another 8 respondents believed that the government would give disaster relief once a weather 
disaster affects a widespread area. However, when asked if local government officials or village 
committees ever provided any kind of compensation after a serious natural disaster, 78 respondents 
(51%) said no, and 65 households (43%) said they did not know. Thus natural disaster payments are 
prevalent in this area, but appear to have strict access thresholds. Another 4 respondents were 
indifferent to weather events or disasters because their livelihoods were not dependent on 
agriculture. Many farmers continue farming to supply a natural and healthy crop for their family 
rather than commercial farming. If the risky event happens, their loss will not be great because of 
the small area planted and they have other income sources to maintain their living standard. 
Conversely, they do not feel the premiums are excessive and so are indifferent to the prospect of 
weather index crop insurance. Another 5 respondents did not want to buy weather index crop 
insurance because they did not understand it from the explanation nor did they trust insurance 
companies. Their main concern was deception whereby they lose the premium but cannot get 
payouts for insured events.  
Table 6-19 Problems expressed by farmers about weather index crop insurance  
 Nobody 
buy 
around 
me 
The claim 
is too 
difficult 
Procedures and 
terms are 
complicated 
Bad experiences 
with insurance 
company 
The 
premium 
is high 
Don’t know 
insurance 
Number  20 36 27 9 12 18 
Proportion 
(%) 16 30 22 7 10 15 
 
For the respondents who expressed a positive interest in weather index crop insurance, they also 
gave reasons to explain their anxiety about weather index crop insurance products as shown in 
Table 6-19. About 30% of these households also expressed concerns with difficult claim procedures 
as experienced with many other insurance products. They argued insurance companies were adept 
at finding excuses to shirk their responsibilities to pay compensation. Another 9 respondents 
indicated they had a biased view against insurance because of bad examples described by others or 
through the media while 27 respondents expressed concerns about complicated transaction 
procedure and insurance policy terms.  Around 18 respondents were anxious about the insurance, 
simply because they did not know enough about it. Inadequate information can lead to a cycle of 
blame whereby farmers blame the insurance company as irresponsible and the company complains 
that the farmer is unreasonable. Around 10% of positive respondents expressed concern about the 
premium because if the premium was too high they could substitute it for other expenses such as 
children’s education, or family medical fees.  Although the premiums were not a big issue for most 
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farmers, there will be a number who are below average income who will have difficulty paying the 
premium. About one sixth of respondents were concerned whether their neighbours would purchase 
or not, consistent with the responses in Section 6.2.3.2 that personal contacts were an important 
source of information among Chinese farmers. Thus, weather index crop insurance would likely 
receive widespread coverage if a successful pilot program were implemented.  
The survey also investigated whether government subsidies may influence households’ attitudes 
towards weather index crop insurance. Table 6-20 reveals that most households (64%) were hesitant 
about committing to weather index crop insurance in its absence while 14% of farmers said they 
would consider it even if it was provided without a subsidy. The prospect of a subsidy did have a 
marked impact on the number willing to consider weather index crop insurance, increasing from 14% 
to 57% of respondents. Nevertheless well over one-third of respondents were still undecided and 
would need to see a lot more details about weather index crop insurance to be convinced of its 
merits before committing to the scheme.  
Table 6-20 Household’s attitudes towards WII with subsidy and without subsidy 
 Willing Undecided Unwilling 
Without 
subsidy 
Number 21 98 33 
Proportion (%) 14 64 22 
With subsidy Number 87 55 10 Proportion (%) 57 36 7 
 
To gauge some idea of what farmers may be prepared to pay for weather index crop insurance, a set 
of questions in the survey sought farmers’ responses to three different premium options namely 25, 
15 and 5 yuan/mu.  About 46% of households are unlikely to pay 25 yuan/mu while this proportion 
drops to 20% at 15 yuan/mu (see Table 6-21). Around 63% of farmers are likely to pay at a 
premium of 5 yuan/mu. Thus farmers appear conducive to the idea of weather index crop insurance 
at premiums below 15 yuan/mu while their interest wanes as the premium increases. 
Table 6-21 Farmers’ attitudes to uptake of WII at various premium levels 
Premium  Most 
likely 
More 
likely 
Likely Less 
likely 
Impossible 
25 
Yuan/mu 
Number  5 19 58 58 12 
Proportion (%) 3 13 38 38 8 
15 
Yuan/mu 
Number  18 50 53 29 2 
Proportion (%) 12 33 35 19 1 
5  
Yuan/mu  
Number  96 24 23 9 0 
Proportion (%) 63 16 15 6 0 
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6.3 Regression analysis of factors affecting farmers’ interests in WII 
The previous sections reported farmers’ general attitudes to weather index crop insurance along 
with the characteristics of these farm households. In this section, the study evaluates whether there 
is a relationship between their attitudes and characteristics. The information used for the analysis 
comes from the preliminary survey of household at the start of the study to identify broad factors 
and interest. It is a general analysis because it does not relate to specific contract details such as 
premiums and indemnity, but only in respect of examples and background given in the 
questionnaire. Factors that may influence famers’ interest to pay for weather index crop insurance 
include household characteristics, family members, traditional risk sharing, and social assistance. A 
binary logistic regression analysis was used to investigate these responses. 
In statistics, logistic regression is used to predict the probability of an event’s occurrence by fitting 
data to a logistic function (Walsh 1987). It is a generalized linear model used for binomial 
regression; a technique in which the response (usually identified as Y) is the result of a series of 
factors that have one of two possible outcomes (buy =1 and don’t buy = 0) (Burinskiene and 
Rudzkiene 2007). It uses several predictor variables that may be either numerical or categorical, for 
example, the probability that a farmer will buy weather index crop insurance within a specified 
situation might be predicted from information about the farmer’s demographic characteristics, risk 
perceptions, and their understanding of the insurance product. Logistic regression is used 
extensively in social sciences, as well as in marketing applications such as predicting customer’s 
preferences to subscribe to a new product or abolish a subscription. A simple logistic regression 
model has the form: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 𝑌 = 𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠 = 𝑙𝑛 !!!! =  +  𝑋                       (6.7) 
Where 𝑃 = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦   𝑌 = 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑒 𝑋 = 𝑥,𝑎  𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐  𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝑋  
Then, 𝑃1− 𝑃 = 𝑒 ! ! 
                                                                      𝑃 = ! ! !!!! ! !                                                               (6.8) 
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A graph of this function is shown in Figure 6-1: 
 
Figure 6-1 Shape of logistic function 
The logistic function is useful because it can take as an input any value from negative infinity to 
positive infinity, whereas the output is confined to values between 0 and 1. As shown in Figure 6-1, 
this is difficult to describe with a linear equation for two reasons (Peng, C-YJ, Lee and Ingersoll 
2010). First, the extremes do not follow a linear trend. Second, the errors are neither normally 
distributed nor constant across the entire range of data. Logistic regression solves these problems by 
applying the logit transformation to the dependent variable. In fact, the logistic model predicts the 
logit of Y from X. The variable x represents the exposure to some set of independent variables, 
while P represents the probability of a particular outcome, given that set of explanatory variables. 
The variable X is a measure of the total contribution of all the independent variables used in the 
model (Allison 1999).  
The variable X is usually identified as:  𝑋 = 𝛼 + 𝛽!𝑥! + 𝛽!𝑥! + 𝛽!𝑥! +⋯+ 𝛽!𝑥!                                          (6.9) 
Therefore, 
  𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 𝑌 = 𝑙𝑛 !!!! =   𝛼 + 𝛽!𝑥! + 𝛽!𝑥! + 𝛽!𝑥! +⋯+ 𝛽!𝑥!                                (6.10)                              𝑃 = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦   𝑌 = 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑒 𝑋! = 𝑥!,𝑋! = 𝑥!  ,⋯𝑋! = 𝑥!                     (6.11)= 𝑒!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!⋯!!!!!1+ 𝑒!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!⋯!!!!! 
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Where α is called the intercept and β1, β2, β3, and so on, are called the “regression coefficients” of 
x1, x2, and x3 respectively. The intercept is the value of X when the value of all independent 
variables is 0 (e.g. the value of X for someone with no risk factors). Each of the regression 
coefficients describe the size of their contribution to the decision; a regression coefficient greater 
than zero represents that the independent variable increases the probability of the dependent 
variable, while a regression coefficient less than zero refers to the independent variable decreases 
the probability of the dependent variable (Steyerberg and Harrell 2001). A large regression 
coefficient means that the independent variable strongly affects the probability of the dependent 
variable, while a small regression coefficient means that the independent variable weakly influences 
the probability of the dependent variable (Dayton 1992). Overall, logistic regression method is 
suitable for describing and measuring supposes about relationships between one or more 
independent variables and a categorical dependent variable and expressed as a probability, which 
has only two values, such as "desire" or "no desire" (for weather index crop insurance in this study) 
(Peng, C-YJ, Lee and Ingersoll 2010).  
6.3.1 Dependent variable: desire for weather index crop insurance   
Because of the lack of exposure and hypothetical nature of the weather index insurance presented to 
the survey respondents, it was not possible to obtain direct responses concerning uptake or 
willingness to pay for such an instrument. Thus the dependent variable was defined as “a desire for 
weather index insurance” and was derived from one of the survey questions that asked, “What is 
your expectation of purchasing weather index crop insurance in terms of improving your 
livelihoods?”  The question provided for 5 responses namely: “obviously worse than before”, 
“slightly worse than before”, “almost the same”, “slightly better than before”, and “obviously better 
than before”. Since this section is going to measure households’ desire for weather index crop 
insurance, those who choose the responses of “slightly better than before” and “obviously better 
than before” were considered to reflect a desire for weather index crop insurance (with the 
dependent variable assigned a value of 1), while responses of “obviously less than before”, “slightly 
worse than before” and “almost the same” were considered as indicating no desire for weather 
index crop insurance (with the dependent variable assigned a value of 0). 
Table 6-22 Description of dependent variable (N=152) 
Variables Description Number Percentage (%) 
Y=1 Desire for weather index crop insurance 87 57.2 
Y=0 No desire for weather index crop insurance 65 42.8 
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As shown in Table 6-22, some 87 households (or 57.2% of respondents) indicated a positive 
demand for weather index crop insurance in the survey where they considered weather index crop 
insurance as an important potential tool for avoiding natural disaster related risks.  The remaining 
households held the opposite opinion, namely that weather index crop insurance could not play a 
potentially important role against natural risks and improve their livelihoods.  
6.3.2 Independent variables 
Because of the limited number of samples in the study, consideration was given to not including too 
many independent variables to ensure sufficient degrees of freedom. On the other hand, having 
more variables would increase potential colinearity in the regression. Thus, the 7 key independent 
variables in the model were chosen based on the information gathered during the literature review 
in section 2.4 as well as from the surveys. They are: education level (X1), farming area (X2), risk 
recognition (X3), understanding of insurance (X4), previous annual loss (X5), the proportion of 
agricultural income to total income (X6), and the proportion of migrant workers to total family 
members (X7). Table 6-23 provides the descriptive and the summary statistics for each of these 
variables. 
Table 6-23 Descriptive statistics and regressors used in logistic model (N=152) 
Variable Min Max Mean Std dev Skewness Kurtosis 
X1: Education level  
(Primary school =1, middle school=2, 
high school=3, undergraduate and 
higher=4) 
1.00 4.00 2.0724 0.65207 0.508 0.938 
X2: Farming acreage 1.20 12.00 5.3031 2.09233 0.533 0.222 
X3: Risk recognition  
(not likely=1, less likely=2, 
neutral=3,more likely =4, most likely=5) 
1.00 5.00 3.0197 0.87247 0.204 0.283 
X4: Understanding of insurance  
      (No=1, Yes=2) 1.00 2.00 1.3026 0.46092 0.868 -1.264 
X5: Previous annual loss  
(0-20%=1, 20%-40%=2, 40%-60%=3, 
60%-80%=4, 80%-100%=5) 
1.00 5.00 2.8947 1.01745 0.290 -0.599 
X6: Proportion of agricultural income 
to total income 0.02 1.00 0.3395 0.20298 0.998 1.128 
X7: Proportion of migrant workers to 
total family members 0.00 0.75 0.2455 0.13311 0.937 2.092 
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The rationales for these variables are discussed below.  
X1: Farmers with a higher education level tend to participate in weather index crop insurance 
because of a better understanding of risk and insurance.  In addition, people with a higher 
educational level in rural areas would generally be engaged in sideline business to broaden the 
family income, thereby enhancing their capacity to participate. 
X2: Farmers with larger farms are more likely to participate than farmers with a small farm area, 
because natural risks may impact the livelihoods of households dependent on agricultural 
production more severely than those independent of agricultural production. Conversely, larger 
farmers have more financial capacity to cope with risk. 
X3: Awareness and beliefs about natural disasters will influence farmers’ willingness to participate 
in crop insurance. When farmers believe that weather disasters are unlikely to occur in their area, 
they will be less inclined to participate in insurance. 
X4: A good understanding of weather index crop insurance was supposed to have a positive impact 
on farmers’ willingness-to-join.  Furthermore, if farmers had a pleasant experience working with 
insurance companies or heard some good examples from others, they would be more inclined to 
accept the weather index crop insurance product because of trust in their acquaintances or the 
reputation of a particular insurance company. 
X5: Households may be more likely to participate in weather index insurance if they have suffered 
crop losses in past years. The household that has been subjected to a serious weather disaster may 
be more reluctant to undertake risks and more likely to seek the protection of risk management 
instruments, while households who have experienced successful past harvests are more willing to 
accept risk (Yesuf and Bluffstone 2007).  
X6: Households’ economic situation reflects their ability to pay but also determines their ability to 
tolerate risk. In general, lower income households are more sensitive to risk than higher income 
households. However, as the Pratt-Arrow hypothesis of decreasing absolute risk aversion shows 
(Arrow 1965; Pratt 1964), wealth accumulation tends to reduce risk aversion and move lower 
income households from high risk aversion to moderate risk aversion, risk-neutral, or even risk-
loving categories. According to that proposition, the degree of risk aversion is high when people are 
in the poverty stage, but aversion to risk declines as financial resources increase. When wealth 
accumulates beyond a certain level, farmers’ risk aversion starts to decline, because farmers can 
protect themselves from the outcomes of uncertain events (Yesuf and Bluffstone 2007). However, 
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economic status can produce both positive and negative effects on farmers’ willingness to accept 
risk and preference for risk reducing instruments.  
X7: Whether the household has a member working off-farm will affect their off-farm income and 
reliance on farm income. Theoretically, if the main labour force works outside year round, they face 
a high opportunity cost to apply some risk management strategies. These households are considered 
to have a higher desire for weather index crop insurance. 
6.3.3 Regression analysis 
A seven-predictor logistic model was fitted to the data using logistic analysis function in IBM SPSS 
Statistics 20.0 in the Windows 7 environment. SPSS gives seven options for specifying the way 
independent variables come into the regression model. This study used ‘Forward: Likelihood Ratio’ 
where that refers to the way variables are tested for entry into the model one by one. The removal of 
variables from the model is according to the significance value of the change in the log-likelihood. 
Variables with significance less than 0.05 were kept in the model. When no more variables satisfy 
the entry or removal criterion, the regression analysis stops. This process would substantially 
increase computational time, but the likelihood-ratio statistic is the best criterion for deciding which 
variables are to be removed (SPSS 2013). The result (Table 6-24) showed that,  
  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑  𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡  𝑜𝑓   𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑒  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟  𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥  𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝  𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 = −1.776+ 0.707 ∗ 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 + 0.515 ∗ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘  𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 2.733 ∗ (𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜)  
 
Table 6-24 Evolution of logistic regression results 
Variables in the Equation 
        B  S.E.        Wald           df           Sig.     Exp(B) 
Step 1 Income ratio X6 -2.020 .853 5.607 1 .018 .133 Constant .984 .337 8.502 1 .004 2.675 
Step 2 
    Education level X1 .567 .274 4.285 1 .038 1.762 
Income ratio X6 -2.160 .865 6.242 1 .012 .115 
Constant -.135 .628 .046 1 .830 .874 
Step 3 
    Education level X1 .707 .291 5.916 1 .015 2.028 
 Risk Recognition X3 .515 .225 5.237 1 .022 1.674 
Income ratio X6 -2.733 .929 8.650 1 .003 .065 
Constant -1.776 .963 3.398 1 .065 .169 
 
As the last step in Table 6-24 shows, there are 3 significant independent variables (Sig. <0.05) in 
the binary logistic regression model, namely education level, risk recognition, and income ratio. 
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Both education level and risk recognition had a positive impact on farmers’ interest in insurance 
which confirms the hypotheses mentioned earlier that the households which have educated 
members who are risk aware are more likely to buy weather index crop insurance.  The variable for 
income ratio displayed a negative impact on farmers’ interest in weather index crop insurance. That 
is, households’ demand for weather index crop insurance is inversely proportional to the ratio of 
agricultural income to total household income. Households relying on crop production are less 
likely to participate in weather index crop insurance than households where agricultural income 
provides a small share of total income. For some small-scale farmers in the surveyed area, where 
agricultural income is the main income source for the family, the economic condition of these 
families is usually not very good. While a loss in agricultural income may be extremely serious for 
such families when it occurs, they will tend to use their limited income for more immediate family 
needs such as medical and children’s education expenses rather than on premiums for insurance. 
Conversely, households dependent on agriculture may be more willing to spend time and effort to 
manage their crops, thus affecting their desire for weather index crop insurance. 
Table 6-25 Evolution of regression variables: Variables not in the equation 
Variables not in the Equation 
 Score df Sig. 
Step 1 Variables 
Education level X1 4.448 1 .035 
Farming acreage X2 .467 1 .495 
Risk Recognition X3 3.700 1 .054 
Insurance knowledge X4 2.579 1 .108 
Previous loss X5 .971 1 .324 
Worker ratio X7 2.288 1 .130 
Overall Statistics 14.990 6 .020 
Step 2 Variables 
Farming acreage X2 .366 1 .545 
Risk Recognition X3 5.464 1 .019 
Insurance knowledge X4 2.032 1 .154 
Previous loss X5 .966 1 .326 
Worker ratio X7 2.026 1 .155 
Overall Statistics 11.018 5 .051 
Step 3 Variables 
Farming acreage X2 .408 1 .523 
Insurance knowledge X4 2.225 1 .136 
Previous loss X5 1.763 1 .184 
Worker ratio X7 2.358 1 .125 
Overall Statistics 5.612 4 .230 
 
Other variables (see Table 6-25) such as farming acreage, farmers’ understanding of insurance, 
previous losses experienced, and ratio of migrant workers to the family were not significant in 
explaining farmers’ willingness to participate (Sig.>0.05). Some of these independent factors vary 
little between farmers (see Table 6-23) with the standard deviation of the insurance knowledge 
factor and migrant worker ratio very small. That farming area was insignificant means that farming 
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scale does not influence farmers’ decisions about willingness-to-join. In addition, if farmers 
experienced a recent disaster, some of them might anticipate a high probability of another disaster, 
while others would expect a low probability of another disaster. In this case, a theoretical insurance 
instrument with no specific details about premiums or payouts or risk coverage was presented in the 
questionnaire. Another reason may be because respondents found it too difficult to respond. 
Table 6-26 Evaluations of the logistic model 
Step  -2 Log likelihood 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test R Squared (Cox 
and Snell) 
R Squared 
(Nagelkerke) Chi-squared df Sig. 
1 201.567 14.764 0.038 0.052 0.038 0.052 
2 197.000 11.109 0.067 0.090 0.067 0.090 
3 191.277 1.966 0.101 0.136 0.101 0.136 
	  
Table 6-26 shows the soundness of this logistic regression result as illustrated by: (a) overall model 
evaluation (-2 Log likelihood); (b) statistical tests of individual predictors (Wald chi-squared 
statistic); and (c) goodness-of-fit statistics (the Hosmer-Lemeshow test, Cox & Snell R Squared, 
and Nagelkerke R Squared). A logistic model offers a better fit to the testing data if it shows an 
improvement over the null model (sometimes it is called the intercept-only model) (Peng, C-YJ, 
Lee and Ingersoll 2010). In Table 6-26, the value of -2 Log likelihood (=191.277) is much bigger 
than the threshold Chi-squared value (CHIINV (0.05, 3) =7.8147). Thus at a significance level of 
0.05, the logistic model proved to be more effective than the null model. The statistical significance 
of individual regression coefficients is tested using the Wald chi-squared statistic. According to 
Table 6-24, X1, X3, and X6 were significant predictors of farmers’ willingness-to-join the insurance 
scheme (Sig. <0.05). The test of the intercept (the constant in Table 6-24) suggested that an 
alternative model without the intercept should be applied to the data. Goodness-of-fit statistics 
assess the fit of a logistic model against actual outcomes. The inferential goodness-of-fit test is the 
Hosmer-Lemeshow test that yielded a Chi-squared value (8) of 1.966 and was insignificant 
(Sig.>0.05), suggesting that the model fitted the data well. Two additional descriptive measures of 
goodness-of-fit presented in Table 6-24 are the Cox & Snell R2 and Nagelkerke R2 indices.  The 
values 0.101 and 0.136 indicate the goodness-of-fit is not satisfactory. However, these indices are 
variations of the R Squared concept defined for the OLS regression model. In logistic regression, no 
index corresponds to predictive efficiency or can be tested in an inferential framework. Thus, Peng 
et al. (2010) suggests that researchers treat them as supplementary to other more useful evaluation 
tests, such as the -2 Log likelihood and Hosmer-Lemeshow test. Therefore, the regression results in 
Table 6-24 were considered as generally valid.     
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6.4 Findings from subsequent interviews with village leaders  
The household survey identified broad factors and interest based on the concept and background 
information about weather index crop insurance given in the questionnaire. A subsequent set of 
interviews with village leaders (see Appendix 2) with more details about the weather index 
insurance contracts was conducted in the second period of fieldwork. It was difficult to elicit 
responses from individual farmers about hypothetical insurance instruments. And because of the 
crucial role village leaders would play in promoting and implementing any such instruments, these 
additional interviews were conducted. The interviews were strategically located across the county to 
identify further factors that would impact on the uptake of weather index crop insurance. (More 
detailed information about the design of this fieldwork was given in Section 3.3).  The interviews 
were also used to triangulate information and help understand some of the responses from 
households reported in Section 6.2.  
According to the village leaders, affordability of weather index crop insurance is not a problem for 
most households in this area. Based on information from the Statistics Bureau of Huojia County, the 
net income per capita was 6561 yuan/year in 2010 compared with 2273 yuan/year in 2000. Much of 
this is from the increase in non-farm income. Most villagers are no longer reliant on farming for a 
living, and more adult men and women have wages and small business incomes which are gradually 
increasing as a proportion of the net income per capita. As shown in the statistical yearbook of the 
national economy of Huojia County(2010),  rural net income per capita (6561 yuan/year) consists of 
four parts: wages income (1754 yuan/year), business income including income from agriculture 
(4453 yuan/year),  property income (98 yuan/year), and transfer payments, such as pensions and 
subsidies (256 yuan/year). Although business income is the highest part (67.8%) among all the 
components of rural net income, the remuneration from outside agriculture is usually higher than 
from crop production. The majority of farmers are now reluctant to invest time and energy in their 
farm. Farmers’ living standards have improved significantly, and the mechanization of crop 
production has progressed rapidly in the past decade. The compilation of national economic 
statistics of Huojia County (2000) and the statistical yearbook of the national economy of Huojia 
County (2010) shows that machine-sowed acreage and machine-reaped area increased from 26.1 
and 27.1 thousand hectares in 2000 to 30.7 and 35.5 thousand hectares respectively in 2010. 
According to the village leaders, crop production has become much simpler. Some necessary but 
lighter farming tasks during the growing season like fertilizing, irrigation, or spraying pesticide 
often are left for the elderly and women who stay at home, or alternatively the household will hire 
casual labour to perform these tasks. Adult men working outside the village often come back in 
June and October for this season’s harvest and next season’s planting, while household members 
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who work too far away from the village and are unable to return for harvest/planting activities will 
often organise or employ their relatives or friends to do the farming work in their place. Thus risk 
management strategies such as diversification, contract planting, or participating in government 
programs may not be as popular among households in the area simply because they usually require 
a lot of time and effort, and the opportunity cost of that time and effort is high. Countering this is 
the fact that as households become wealthier, they can be expected to take a more commercial 
attitude to insurance. Furthermore, agricultural income is becoming less important in overall 
household income and opportunity costs are high, so households have little interest in taking the 
time to investigate or consider insurance closely.  
This finding contradicts the regression result from the household survey (see Section 6.3), which 
indicated that the cost of premiums may be an important influence in the decision-making of 
households. That showed household with income sources other than farming are more likely to 
participate in weather index crop insurance than the households living on crop production. A 
possible explanation is that the surveyed farmers may overestimate the premiums for weather index 
crop insurance, resulting in an exaggerated influence of the cost, or that the ability to pay the 
premium is better for households that supplement their income from crop production. 
Second, village leaders believe that the importance of government subsidy as an influence on 
farmers’ willingness-to-participate (as reported in Section 6.2.5) is probably exaggerated since 
commercial insurance companies have long been plagued by issues of integrity. According to the 
village leaders, farmers look to governments to provide a secure policy environment to regulate the 
behaviour of insurance companies and ensure that their interests are not violated, rather more than 
financial incentives. Much of the bad reputation was caused by representatives of insurance 
companies, especially life insurance companies, which have been unprofessional and dishonest for a 
long period. Regaining the trust of farmers will be crucial. However the village leaders also felt that 
farmers’ lack of insurance knowledge and correct understanding of the relevant policy was also 
crucial.  Thus the leaders believe that the priority should be to spread objective, independent 
knowledge about weather index insurance in rural areas as soon as possible and to design an 
attractive product to fit farmers’ needs as much as possible. This will help build awareness of crop 
insurance and confidence in the insurance companies.  However, from the standpoint of a county, 
the central government has an obligation to subsidize crop insurance, because the aim is to reduce 
production costs, stabilize farmers’ incomes, encourage farmers to grow more crops, and achieve 
food security objectives.    
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Third, village leaders highlighted that in recent years, the central government has allowed farmers 
to transfer their land contracts and management rights in various ways so as to develop scale of crop 
production. The county has successfully re-allocated nearly 48604 mu (3240 hectares) of rural 
collective land by various forms of subcontract, leasing, share farming, and exchange (Zhang and 
Sun 2013). Ultimately, this policy will change the traditional pattern of small-scale farmers with the 
emergence of larger grain producers and other forms of specialisation.  This raises a series of 
questions whether these larger more specialised farmers will be more inclined to buy weather index 
crop insurance and whether these large farmers need or should receive government subsidies.  
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7 Analysis of the supply of weather index crop insurance 
Weather index crop insurance could be provided by either the public sector (e.g. state-owned 
companies, or quasi-state or shareholding companies but with officials or agencies being major 
shareholders in the companies) or the private sector (fully commercial companies with private 
shareholders only). The nature of these providers will have a big impact in how they interact with 
government and how they supply the insurance instrument. The public sector normally has clear 
lines of communication within various government agencies with influence over access to financial 
and other resources. Based on previous experience with insurance instruments, however, public 
provision of insurance has also exhibited inefficiency, abuse of resources, and poor service and 
protection for farmers. Thus some form of co-operation or engagement with commercial insurance 
companies in the provision of weather index crop insurance may be beneficial.  
In this chapter, interviews and discussions with insurance industry managers or representatives in 
the research area are reported. The primary insurance company supplying agricultural insurance in 
Henan is the PICC (People’s Insurance Company of China). Managers at the three different levels 
or branches of the PICC (township level, county level, and city level) were interviewed. The general 
consensus from these interviews was that strong national policy support has opened a new and 
broad market for the development of crop insurance. Insurance companies have been encouraged to 
develop new crop insurance products, but due to the specific characteristics of crop production and 
crop insurance, for which the loss ratio is always high, many insurance companies have been wary 
to date of entering the weather index crop insurance market. This chapter explores four questions 
from the perspective of the insurance companies, namely: (1) what is the current status of the crop 
insurance market in Henan province?  (2) What are the commercial incentives for an insurance 
company to introduce weather index crop insurance? (3) Do they have the ability to operate such a 
program? And (4) how would they go about implementing a program of weather index crop 
insurance? Insights into these questions will go a long way to assessing and understanding the 
viability of weather index insurance that is the subject of Chapter 8.  
7.1 Current status of crop insurance market 
Assessing the prospect of a new insurance product depends on the product itself, and on the demand 
and supply of all types of crop insurance, especially the situation with similar products. In this 
section, the crop insurance market in Henan Province is described, and then the concerns of 
insurance companies are analysed. 
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7.1.1 Crop insurance market in Henan province 
The insurance manager of PICC Huojia branch explained that total value of agricultural insurance 
premiums in Henan had increased since 2008. Nevertheless, Henan ranks only eighth in China for 
total agricultural insurance premiums, which is inconsistent with its pivotal position as the major 
agricultural province in China. In response, the CIRC (China Insurance Regulatory Commission) 
has indicated that they will endeavour to set up an experimental zone in Henan province for 
agricultural insurance reform to explore new models and pathways that better serve the agricultural 
economy of provinces in the central plains such as Henan.  
As with any other insurance product in China, crop insurance products must obtain approval of the 
CIRC through a strict examination of its internal controls, solvency, reinsurance practices, and 
response plans for catastrophic risk. For government subsidised agricultural insurance, the clauses 
and premium rates need to be reported to CIRC (the supreme regulatory agency of Chinese 
insurance) for approval and reference as the design of the terms and rates cannot be decided 
completely by the insurance company. Before July 2013, there were 35 companies approved by the 
CIRC to operate crop insurance businesses in China. In Henan Province, 5 companies are registered 
to provide crop insurance: PICC (People’s Insurance Company of China), CUPIC (China United 
Property Insurance Company), CLIC (China life insurance Company), CPPI (China Pacific 
Property Insurance), and YAPI (Yong’an Property Insurance). PICC and CUPIC are comprehensive 
national insurance companies established by the central government in 1949 and 1986. Their 
predecessors are both state-owned companies while a majority stake is still controlled by the central 
government after restructuring in 2003 and 2004. Thus they are neither real public sector insurers, 
nor real commercial insurance companies. From their perspective, difficulties arise in handling the 
relationship with government, as being neither a fully commercial company solely focused on 
profits, nor a state-owned enterprise unconcerned about the level of profit; they still have to take 
care of other shareholders’ benefits whilst still pursuing non-commercial objectives. These 
characteristics impact adversely on the practical implementation of agricultural insurance, because 
it is ambiguous whether the relationship between insurance companies and the government is an 
equal partnership or superior-subordinate relationship. The remaining three companies are newly 
approved by CIRC to operate agricultural insurance in Henan Province in 2013, because it is 
attractive to have the tax incentives which are applicable to crop and livestock insurance. Although 
there are modest benefits for the insurance companies in providing crop insurance, a growing 
number of commercial insurance companies want to join due to the strong promotion from 
government. As commercial insurers, they may be more independent of government intervention. 
While five companies mentioned above are all subordinate branches of comprehensive insurance 
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companies, the provincial government in Henan is actively organizing the “central plains 
agricultural insurance company” to be set up as a legal entity in Henan that will specialize in 
agricultural insurance. It is not a state-owned enterprise or quasi-state enterprise, but is being 
actively organized by Henan government and in 2014 was waiting for approval from the CIRC. 
The municipal branch manager mentioned that competition in the crop insurance market is 
increasing due to the gradual liberalization associated with the market access policy and the 
perceived potential benefits existing in policy-oriented agricultural insurance. Prior to 2007, 
commercial insurance companies had no interest in crop insurance as they perceived it as loss 
making. Only the PICC and CUPIC intermittently operated this business. After 2007, the crop 
insurance business became profitable as a result of policy support and financial subsidies provided 
from all levels of government. The respondents strongly supported the gradual liberalization of 
market access policy in statements like: “Despite the increase in the intensity of competition in the 
crop insurance market, it will bring new ideas, new management techniques, and constantly 
improve the service level, if more insurance companies can join the area of crop insurance.” In the 
long run, moderate competition will have a positive impact on the development of the crop 
insurance market, such that it will encourage the dominated insurance companies to improve their 
management efficiency and service quality, etc. In addition, the rules of the CIRC encourage 
innovation in crop insurance products, calling for companies to research and develop new products 
to meet the growing farmers’ demands. Weather index crop insurance is the first option to be 
advocated, and the CIRC will give priority to its application. However, the manager was concerned 
that “if the competition leads to disorder or predatory market behaviour, the resulting decline in the 
quality of service will have a negative impact on the industry”. Thus he suggested CIRC to control 
the number of agricultural insurers given the size of the market.  
7.1.2 Major concerns about crop insurance  
Because of the continuous development of the national economy and steadily improving living 
standards, an increasing number of people are taking out insurance. As shown in Table 7-1, growth 
in premium income for both total insurance and agricultural insurance business has grown since 
2003. However, agricultural insurance accounts for a very low proportion of total insurance, only 
around 1% on average from 2007 to 2012. The premium income from total insurance exhibits an 
even greater increase over the corresponding period given the development of the national economy. 
Conversely, the claims from total insurance have increased only gradually while payouts for 
agricultural insurance have risen steeply. The proportion of payouts to income in agricultural 
178	  
	  
insurance has always been high (66% on average, ranging between 47% and 86%), compared with 
an average proportion of 26% in total insurance over the same period.  
Table 7-1 Comparison of premiums and payouts between total insurance and agricultural 
insurance (billion yuan) 
 Year Total insurance Agricultural insurance Premiums Payouts Proportion (%) Premiums Payouts Proportion (%) 
2003 388.0 84.1 21.7 0.5 0.3 60.0 
2004 431.8 100.4 23.3 0.4 0.3 75.0 
2005 493.2 113.7 23.1 0.7 0.6 85.7 
2006 564.0 143.8 25.5 0.8 0.6 75.0 
2007 703.6 226.5 32.2 5.3 3.0 55.9 
2008 978.4 297.1 30.4 11.1 6.4 57.9 
2009 1113.7 312.6 28.1 13.4 9.5 71.1 
2010 1452.8 320.0 22.0 13.6 9.6 70.6 
2011 1433.9 392.9 27.4 17.4 8.2 47.0 
2012 1548.8 471.6 30.5 24.1 13.1 54.6 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (various issues) 
In response to the relatively high payouts in agricultural insurance, the interviewee from PICC 
Huojia branch explained, “it is caused by dual specificity of agriculture and insurance industry”. 
The vulnerability of crop production has been mentioned on many occasions in the thesis.  For the 
insurance industry, they said the “high payout ratio leads to high premiums, and then the high 
premiums make the insurance unaffordable to many farmers, so that crop insurance enters into a 
vicious circle of shrinking for a long time”. Different levels of government have subsidised 
premiums to address the affordability issue. However the insurance company interviewees 
identified other problems leading to the high payout ratios including adverse selection and moral 
hazard that were both discussed in the literature review.  
Generally speaking, moral hazard is often seen as relating to individual action whereas adverse 
selection is seen as a property of the whole insured group. For other types of insurance, moral 
hazard and adverse selection occurred more often with the insured party, while for crop insurance, 
these problems might also affect the insuring party. Taking policy-oriented agricultural insurance as 
an example, both moral hazard and adverse selection are likely to occur at different levels of 
government involved in the operation of agricultural insurance business, as well as in the 
management process of the crop insurance company. They arise from the optimizing choices of 
individuals, where people are making rational choices in light of the constraints facing them and in 
a situation where information is imperfect. In the case of adverse selection, the choice is an ex-ante 
decision of whether or not to insure. In the case of moral hazard, the choice is an ex-post decision of 
how to act given that insurance has been taken out. Irrespective of where the moral hazard or 
adverse selection happens among the three parties, it can have a serious negative effect on the 
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development of a viable insurance instrument.  In this section, problems identified by the 
interviewees with the existing agricultural insurance instruments are analysed systematically to see 
whether the problems can be overcome by adopting weather index crop insurance.  
Insured households:  Insurance managers, reflecting on the policy-oriented agricultural insurance 
schemes for winter wheat, indicated that farmers are more likely to insure plots with a relatively 
high risk of loss, such as crops on low-lying land or poor soil. Non-insured plots may be used to 
make fraudulent claims using the insured’s plot name if damage occurs beyond their expectations. 
This substitution can happen when damage is not assessed on farm, or the acreage is not cross-
referenced against the insurance contract. In addition, some of the insured households do not 
employ normal farming or management strategies after taking out the insurance, but instead may 
take on riskier practices which can exacerbate losses (i.e. exploit moral hazard). For instance, they 
may use low-cost, low-quality, ‘fake’ seed that result in a low germination rate, provide less than 
usual irrigation, fail to apply insecticides when they should, or apply less (or low quality) fertilizer 
to the insured crop leading to poor growth. However, insurance staff working at the township level 
pointed out that applying less inputs is not such a problem as the payout level is too low to make up 
for the resulting loss, and that farmers are not certain insurance companies will comply with their 
commitments. Weather index crop insurance has the potential to suppress moral hazard as well as to 
protect farmers’ interests as the payout depends on an objective weather index and not a subjective 
judgement.     
Insurance companies: Problems of moral hazard in insurance pricing are prevalent because of the 
limited historical data and claims experience coupled with the intervention of government 
departments who are not well versed in technical and professional insurance issues.  The nature of 
the moral hazard problem here is that insurance company together with local government may use 
information and professional advantages to set unfair prices, because they have “hidden information 
in advance”, which causes the imbalance and injustice of insurance contracts. The behaviour of 
insurers can result in low compensation levels and bad operating practices. In a fully competitive 
insurance market, price may be fairer and operating procedures more efficient as the competition 
should lead to a price consistent with the costs of supplying the insurance and the preferences of 
farmers. Thus competition may address some aspects of the moral hazard and adverse selection 
issues, but the critical issue is still the level of information and the asymmetry of information. 
However, the crop insurance market is not competitive, and insurance companies that provide 
policy-oriented agricultural insurance products are usually designated by local government. 
Furthermore, as all levels of government provide premium subsidies, some insurance agents issue 
fake insurance policies in order to extract these subsidies. After the damage occurs, they do not 
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honour the compensation specified in the contract, or depress the damage in the on-farm assessment 
to pay less or nothing at all and so deceive the insured farmers. Since farmers often lack knowledge 
of their insurance rights, and do not negotiate directly with the insurance company, they are 
particularly vulnerable. If a widespread disaster occurs, it is impossible for the insurance company 
to conduct a systematic on-farm assessment for each household. Under this situation, they will 
revert to asking village cadres, meteorologists, and agricultural specialists to help review the 
damages or losses. After that, the insurance company performs a sample survey to complete their 
assessment. It is inevitable that some fraud, abuse and misrepresentation problems will arise during 
these processes. On the other hand, these issues provide an opportunity for weather index crop 
insurance, because it does not need on-farm damage assessment; but it also poses challenges, in 
terms of how to make the transaction and claims processes transparent and how to lessen local 
government’s intervention.   
Local government: Local government finances in many rural areas of China are simply not strong 
enough to carry out large-scale policy-oriented agricultural insurance in their area. Thus they 
choose areas to be insured under the pressure of higher-level governments. For instance, areas more 
prone to be damaged in Huojia County (notably the south and west) were strongly encouraged to 
participate in policy-oriented agricultural insurance, while efforts to promote policy-oriented 
agricultural insurance in the north and east of the county were very small.  Furthermore, in some 
villages, if farmers do not want to pay for policy-oriented agricultural insurance, local governments 
conspire with insurance companies to engage in “unified insured unified compensation”, where the 
local government or village committee pays the premiums instead of individual farmers, and then 
the local government and village committee make false or inflated claims at the end of the cropping 
season to collect the insurance premium paid by the local governments or village committee, along 
with the governments subsidies, out of the inflated claims..  
Given the complex nature of agriculture and its insurance, the enthusiasm shown by insurance 
companies for crop insurance business is affected by the potentially high payouts, which represent a 
high proportion of the gross premiums. With such a high payout proportion, insurance companies 
struggle to generate profits from insurance, especially after accounting for management fees and 
other costs. The claim payout ratio in mature markets, such as Europe, America, and Japan, can be 
more than 100% (Mahul and Skees 2007) as other sources of income (e.g., investments, real estate, 
and capital gains) usually boost their income. Furthermore, the average payout of 66% in 
agricultural insurance does not exceed the fair insurance loss ratio (70%) acknowledged by 
international companies, but in China, the insurance company still needs a profit margin on their 
underwriting business to ensure an overall profit for the company, and the payouts ratio in the 
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insurance industry is strictly controlled, to be below 60%. Because the bond markets are 
underdeveloped, there are few options available to invest premiums, and there are a lot of 
restrictions in the law on how insurance premiums can be used. Thus in China, the average income 
from premium funds is mostly less than the 5-year bank deposit rate, which does not make an 
obvious contribution to the profits of insurance companies. Second, the sales and management 
expenses swallow a large part of insurance premiums, making the total cost of business to the 
insurance companies (including the commissions paid to insurance brokers) difficult to maintain at 
less than 30% of premiums. Thus in order to ensure profits, insurance companies try to avoid 
business with high payouts, and have to assess claims carefully, to leave sufficient margin to make a 
profit. 
7.2 Commercial incentives for insurance companies 
This section discussed the perceptions of insurance staffs on weather index crop insurance 
instruments first, and then explores the profit margins in weather index crop insurance scheme from 
insurance company perspective. 
7.2.1 Perceptions about weather index crop insurance 
Insurance company staffs were interviewed about the prospect of introducing weather index crop 
insurance into the study area and their views can be summed up as three practical problems.  
First, geography, weather, and farmers’ traditional concepts help explain the enthusiasm of farmers, 
or lack of interest, in insurance. The manager of the PICC Huojia branch emphasised that Henan is 
located in the central plains where weather condition are not as bad as in more western areas of 
China, while also indicating that farmers traditionally have little trust in insurance companies. He 
stated participation in insurance is a rational choice in economic analysis, but the ability or 
willingness of farmers to pay for insurance in reality is a different matter. He also explained that 
this phenomenon is not limited to rural areas or to farmers—many homeowners in developed 
countries might not carry home insurance unless it is a mandatory requirement of their financing 
agreement (even after allowing for relatively low premium rates). He believed that most farmers in 
the county do not have much awareness of insurance. Thus, most farmers might not be willing to 
pay for the premium, especially if the local government has a history of providing compensation. 
Given the complexity of explaining how weather index crop insurance works and how the claims 
are settled, the difficulties in promoting it are easy to imagine. 
Second, the weak financial ability of areas dependent on agriculture will lessen the desire of local 
government to provide financial support to facilitate the weather index crop. Without the support of 
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government, insurance companies are more cautious to ensure profits will be generated if they offer 
the insurance.  
Third, existing staff and service capabilities and the underdeveloped network of current insurance 
companies do not align with the specific needs associated with implementation of weather index 
crop insurance. The insurance staff at township level suggested there was demand for new crop 
insurance products, but the insurer could not offer the appropriate professional products, and so it 
was difficult to achieve a competitive situation among insurance companies. 
The manager working at the city level, however, noted that “the risk of crop production will be 
further concentrated with the concentration of land and capital investment in recent years”. With the 
diversification of farmer’s income sources into non-agricultural activities and the relatively low 
profit from crop production, some farmers will choose to transfer or lease their farm to people who 
are willing to plant crops for a living, and this phenomenon will likely become increasingly popular. 
In this way, some people will move out of crop production, while other people will specialize in 
crop production and consolidate their land areas.  Farms on larger areas face more extensive risks, 
and they need more capital to invest, with more farmers choosing to borrow from local banks. The 
local banks may require crop insurance to be taken in order to prevent repayment defaults in bad 
years. He estimated there would be a potential need for crop insurance in the credit department soon, 
which may also apply to agricultural input suppliers. Given that insurance coverage of winter wheat 
in Henan province was just 35% of planting acreage in 2012 (CIRC 2012), the respondents saw a 
significant potential for the growth of the crop insurance market.  
7.2.2 Profit margins in weather index crop insurance  
Although the insurance company respondents did not rule out the feasibility of implementing 
weather index crop insurance, they indicated that a demonstration would need to be in place before 
that would happen. The interviews with insurance company staff indicated that insurance 
companies are most concerned about how to realize a profit with a new insurance product. Despite 
having major state shareholders, many of the incentives driving the insurance companies are 
commercial in nature.  For instance, the performance indicators used in the insurance companies 
interviewed included premiums collected, profit, economic value added, and comprehensive costs. 
The performance assessment determines staff wages or operating funds of a team for next season or 
next year. Since most indicators are directly associated with operating profit, if branches incur 
annual operating losses, their performance bonus is reduced to zero, and their wages and operating 
expenses for the following year may even be cut. 
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Wheat production in Henan Province is usually considered high risk with frequent losses. Thus in 
previous crop insurance schemes, the contracts have often been bundled with several associated 
risks to ensure profitable operation for the insurance companies. Nonetheless, as the manager of 
PICC working in the city level noted, management costs associated with these contracts are high. 
Policy-oriented agricultural insurance covers a fairly comprehensive list of risks including heavy 
rains, floods, windstorms, hail, freezing temperatures, drought, and pest and diseases. It has a strong 
policy-oriented and non-profit character that is unlikely to align with the character of commercial 
insurance companies seeking to maximise benefits. More importantly, the government does not 
provide any direct subsidies for these companies. While there are some limited tax incentives, 
currently the main attraction for the insurance company offering these products is to help expand 
the company’s reputation in rural areas. The difficulties in providing this insurance to date, however, 
mean that it is not attractive enough for the companies to continue providing the insurance in the 
long run.  
Moreover, the interviewee mentioned that insurance companies have to allocate part of the collected 
premiums as a contribution to ‘the leading group of agricultural insurance’ that is established by the 
local government to help the work of the insurance companies. The local government would not pay 
the members of the leading group for their extra work in agricultural insurance, and could not pay 
for the expenses incurred (transport, accommodation, etc.). While insurance companies are aware of 
their role and happy to contribute to what they perceive as a good policy to help farmers, they also 
believe that they are shouldering too much of the burden with the government providing insufficient 
benefits commensurate with their role. Conversely, governments perceive the insurance companies 
are deriving benefits from both households and governments, and no longer need to be subsidized. 
In order to protect their own interests, insurance companies have cut the claims paid; yet steal 
premium subsidies from all levels of government through non-standard operating procedures. Other 
companies, which applied for new licenses to operate agricultural insurance, are also linked to these 
vested interests. Thus it is not just the companies and governments positioning, there is a range of 
potential and actual conflicts between insurance companies and governments. One manifestation of 
this is that insurance companies are reluctant to do much promotion of crop insurance because they 
believe they will not receive their due rewards from such promotion. Thus participation rates in 
policy-oriented agricultural insurance in Henan Province are relatively low. 
Theoretically, as self-financing units, each insurance company has an incentive to maximise profits. 
If the natural risk or production loss specified in each contract does not occur, the insurance 
company will not pay the indemnity to the insured household, and so they will retain the premium 
income S*Y-B (where S is the premium for per unit farmland, Y is the total acreage of insured 
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farmland, B is the fixed cost that includes cost of office space, facilities, and human resources). 
Once the particular natural risk occurs, the insurance company needs to pay compensation of the 
amount R, in addition to any extra daily operations and management fees C (variable cost that 
denotes cost of processing claims, office expenses etc.). The income of the insurance company 
becomes S*Y-B-C-R. For the case where the probability of the specific natural risk occurring is P, 
the insurance company’s expected return would be: 𝑃 ∗ 𝑆 ∗ 𝑌 − 𝐵 − 𝐶 − 𝑅 + 1− 𝑝 ∗ 𝑆 ∗ 𝑌 − 𝐵  
                                           = 𝑃 ∗ 𝑆 ∗ 𝑌 − 𝐵 − 𝑃 ∗ 𝐶 + 𝑅 + 1− 𝑃 (𝑆 ∗ 𝑌 − 𝐵) 
                                           = 𝑆 ∗ 𝑌 − 𝐵 − 𝑃 ∗ (𝐶 + 𝑅) 
Therefore, the insurance company will undertake the business, as long as  𝑆 ∗ 𝑌 − 𝑃 ∗ 𝐶 + 𝑅 −𝐵 ≥ 0. In other words, if      𝑆 ∗ 𝑌 ≥ 𝐵 + 𝑃 𝐶 + 𝑅 , the incomes from premiums should be more than 
or equal to the sum of fixed costs plus the probability of a loss P times the sum of the variable cost 
C and indemnity R, in order for a profit to be generated for the insurance company. For the weather 
index crop insurance program, where crop production is considered to be high-risk, the insurance 
company will try to ensure or increase profits in four ways: (a) set a high premium S; (b) expand the 
acreage of insured farmland Y; (c) reduce the compensation R; and (d) control the costs of B and C.  
One of the merits of weather index crop insurance is that it can reduce the operational cost because 
it does not need any on-farm loss assessment, and this is seen as a major advantage by the insurance 
companies. Despite this advantage, given the lack of awareness and poor understanding of 
insurance in rural areas (as discussed in Chapter 6), rapid growth cannot be expected in the acreage 
of insured farmland in the short term. The other means of raising profits involve setting a high 
premium S and reducing the compensation R, face serious resistance from households.  If the 
premium is too high to be accepted by farmers, or the indemnity is too low to attract farmers’ 
interest, the weather index crop insurance program will inevitably fail. In addition to the factors 
mentioned above (S, Y, P, C, B, and R), the insurance company and the insured households are 
likely to have different preferences for the same risk.  
In a competitive market, the premium S (including profit margin and operating costs) calculated by 
the insurance company will be driven down to average costs plus a risk premium, and will also be 
equal to a uniform price H that a rational average farmer is likely to pay. However, utility is 
subjective, and insurance companies are no exception. Interviews with three managers of different 
level insurance companies noted that insurance companies are also risk averse and will reject 
business with high risk of losses (where P is large). Thus the different risk environments faced by 
insurance companies and insured households need to be investigated. 
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Consider that the probability that a farmer loses income R is P, and the probability that he retains 
income R is Q=1-P. That is, the household may obtain an income R with a probability Q, or lose R 
with the probability P. The security coefficient26 of households receiving income R is marked as 
SC1(Q). In practice, farmers only have an expectation of the production loss, specific to themselves, 
and that expectation is uncertain. Their aversion to uncertain risk is normally stronger than to 
known risks. Thus their expectation of risk occurrence will be higher than the objective probability 
P, which means households subjectively consider the possibility that they would keep the income R, 
but could not reach Q, where SC1(Q)<Q . 
For insurance companies, the risk will be transferred from the household to the insurance company 
after underwriting the contract. In this case, the risk borne by the insurance company (when it is 
insuring) is the same as the risk the household faces (when it is not insured). However, in 
considering the whole environment, the situation changes. The risk households faced is single and 
unstable, while insurance companies take a lot of homogeneous or similar risk. Thus, the risk faced 
by the insurance company is relatively stable in accordance with the law of large numbers in 
probability theory. Thus the insurance company considers the risk occurrence probability is less 
than or close to the objective probability P, and the security coefficient of the insurance company 
would exceed Q, where SC2(Q)>=Q. In this way, the price can be decided and the contract for 
weather index crop insurance could be signed because of SC1(Q)< SC2(Q)(shown as Figure 7-1).  
 
Source: He and Tan (2004) 
Figure 7-1 Security coefficient curves for insurance company and households  
The characteristics that support a viable weather index crop insurance contract between insurance 
companies and households are: first, the insurance company must gather a large number of 
homogeneous or similar insurance policies so as to make its own risk environment as stable as 
possible; and second, the insurance policy must be tailored to address risks of most concern to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  Security coefficient represents a sense of security coming from receiving something with a certain probability. 
Generally people will be more sensitive as the probability of receiving increases, so SC(P) is a convex 
function(0<=P<1), where SC(P)>=0, SC’(P)>0, SC’’(P)>0. (He and Tan 2004)	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farmers based on a full analysis of households’ psychological characteristics. These are the most 
important issues to be resolved from the insurance companies’ perspective in regard to weather 
index crop insurance but, there is a gap between theory and practice or ideals and reality. A full 
psychological analysis of every farmer is not feasible in practice (and has not been done in this 
research). Second, the intention to meet farmers’ individual needs may not be reconcilable with the 
practical requirement for a large number of uniform policies.  
Furthermore, the profit on weather index crop insurance also depends on the specific competitive 
situation and the internal management efficiency of the insurance companies. There are two 
potential risks for weather index crop insurance in addition to the speculative risk, management risk, 
and financial risk that confront other insurance products. The first is large scale risk, where natural 
disaster often leads to a large number of crops being damaged or destroyed at the same time, 
resulting in a large number of claims accumulating in a short time, which would affect the insurance 
company’s financial stability and may lead to a crisis. Second is the severity of the risk, where the 
losses could substantially exceed the maximum compensation, even the financial capacity of the 
insurance company. In these cases, the diversity in risk profiles of the households that the 
companies rely on does not operate. In essence, the insurance company faces the same risk as 
households. Thus they need to re-insure against this outcome, so as to maintain financial stability in 
the event of a large number of claims. 
From another point of view, the manager of PICC city branch explained how the profit margin in 
weather index crop insurance is realised by commercial insurance companies. While it partly 
overlaps the preceding discussion, there are also some new perspectives. He stressed, insurance 
companies should have the right to deny cover to high-risk policyholders, or adjust the premiums to 
make the charges more consistent with risk exposure. For the risk that has been underwritten, 
insurance companies should pass on responsibility for some of it through reinsurance, ensuring the 
risk retained matches their financial resources. He further commented that this is a cost effective 
way to ensure the profit margin of commercial insurance companies. Otherwise, it would be 
necessary to establish a compensation mechanism for the benefit of insurance companies. For 
instance, some compensatory gains are obtained to compensate for losses on agricultural insurance, 
by specifying the franchise rights for certain products to the agricultural insurers.  
In summary, weather index crop insurance may be seen as consistent with government policy and 
agricultural development objectives. However, in practice, and from the interviews conducted, 
insurance companies are hesitant to offer this insurance product based primarily on concerns over 
its profitability. The theoretical analysis reveals that weather index crop insurance policies 
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(including the premium, indemnity, contract, and implementation) must target the risks of most 
concern to households, and must be drawn up on the basis of a thorough analysis of the 
psychological characteristics of interested householders, so as to attract enough households to buy 
the insurance to ensure a large premium pool to manage for the insurance company to profit. 
Concurrently, the insurance company can stabilise profit risk to some extent through undertaking a 
large number of homogenous risks. For a stable weather index crop insurance program, insurance 
companies would also need to consider reinsurance to avoid correlating their risks with those of the 
households, because a large number of homogeneous risks likely cause instability for the company 
when all insured parties claim at the same time.  
7.3 Capability to implement weather index crop insurance 
Identification of the weather-yield relationship and the analysis of farmers’ and insurers’ attitudes 
and preferences is the first step in evaluating if weather index insurance is a potential option for 
farmers in Henan province. However, given the technical complexities and data requirements of 
weather index insurance, a number of preconditions conducive to creating a suitable environment 
for weather index crop insurance also need to be assessed. This is not an absolute assessment but 
does involve an awareness of the necessary and sufficient conditions for weather index crop 
insurance and how to identify cases and conditions as being “ideal,” “sufficient,” “insufficient,” or 
“unsuitable”. As discussed below, the prerequisites and conditions are a mixture of both qualitative 
and quantitative factors.   
7.3.1 Weather data and monitoring 
Given that any weather index depends on sound data, any data that is to be used must adhere to 
strict quantity and quality requirements. According to the program guide from the World Bank 
(Bryla-Tressler, Syroka and Dana 2011), long and continuous weather records are needed for a 
proper actuarial analysis of weather risk—ideally at least 30 years of daily data. Additionally, it 
must have high ratings on the authority and accuracy of the data. Furthermore, there needs to be a 
dense network of high technology weather stations in rural areas if the program is to be 
implemented. Normally such a network would consist of automated stations that can monitor the 
weather and report daily to the insurance company. 
To make an assessment, the meteorological office of Huojia County was interviewed as described 
in Chapter 5. The manager indicated that there was no technical problem in providing weather 
information or sharing weather data. Indeed they now provide a public service for crop production 
and for government decision-making, while they also offer professional services for enterprises, and 
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the communications, transport, and construction industries. If the insurance company has special 
requirements for data, they try to comply based on the capability of relevant departments. However, 
this service needs to be requested personally, and would be provided at a cost. The person in charge 
of the local meteorological office explained that “due to the large differences in the category and 
amount of meteorological data, the department could not provide a uniform fee, but it can be 
negotiated”. Table 7-2 outlines some of the questions or a checklist that an insurance company 
would need to consider before committing to weather index crop insurance, and reference this 
against the case of Huojia County.   
Table 7-2 Checklist for assessing weather data and equipment  
Location of station and 
radius of coverage 
Located at near the centre of Huojia County; 204 of 213 
villages are within a 20km radius of the weather station  √ 
Are the weather stations 
reasonably close to 
farmlands? 
Yes, the weather station is close to the farmlands, as the village 
and farmlands are compactly located √ 
Weather parameters being 
recorded 
Rainfall, environment humidity, soil humidity, soil water 
potential, evaporation, carbon dioxide, environment 
temperature, ground temperature, sunshine hours, total solar 
radiation, ultraviolet radiation, wind direction, wind speed, 
barometric pressure, visibility, extreme weather events  
√ 
Time series Complete records for all variables from 1971 until now (> 40 years); incomplete records 1961-1970 √ 
Type of equipment used Automated equipment used √ 
Sufficient quality standard 
of data and access 
Professional staff do the data cleansing; Use of special weather 
data provided for a fee √ 
Is the weather station secure 
from tampering?  Tampering is extremely improbable √ 
Huojia meteorology weather station is a national meteorological observing station27, located near 
the centre of Huojia County. Around 96% of villages are within its coverage radius of 20 km. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, there is no standard radius for insurable area around a weather station and it 
is an empirical matter of the relationship between weather and crop yields. The degree to which a 
station truly represents weather for a given area depends on topography and existence of 
microclimates. However, as Huojia County is located in typical Central plains landscape, where the 
village and farmland are distributed very uniformly, the climate is typical of these intensive 
agricultural counties on the Central Plains. In addition, the construction of another two automatic 
observation stations is nearing completion, and automatic rainfall stations were built in each town 
from 2013. After the completion of these stations, each township will establish a meteorological 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  National Meteorological Observing Station is a platform for the country to access to basic meteorological data. It is 
built by the provincial meteorological bureau according to the need; it’s observed information and monthly record 
statements are sent to the regional and provincial meteorological bureau.	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service station and each village will have a meteorological communicator, in charge of the daily 
management of automatic observation stations and maintenance, providing timely and accurate 
information on various types of meteorological data. Thus, bases on site visits and local interviews, 
Huojia County will have adequate meteorological facilities and systems to enable the operation of a 
weather index insurance scheme. On the other hand, future developments also indicate that the 
village communicator could be the authority on whether a trigger in the weather index crop 
insurance has been met or not and communicate it in some way to members of the village. 
In addition, the station retains complete weather records from 1971 until now, and some incomplete 
records from 1961 to 1971. Many old records were lost because of manual equipment and 
handwriting in the past. After the installation of automated equipment and computers, the records 
from 1971 were sorted and re-archived. Weather parameters being recorded include rainfall, 
temperature, sunshine hours, wind speed, atmospheric pressure, as well as some extreme weather 
information like the occurrence and place of rainstorms and hailstone damage. Currently the Bureau 
of Meteorology provides professional positions and staff responsible for the agricultural 
meteorological observation and service (data acquisition, data cleaning, and data transmission). The 
director of the weather station stated that “Just because our service of provision of data for contract 
pricing and data monitoring for determining potential payouts will be charged, the fee of which can 
be signed between the weather station and insurance company, this will benefit for its transparency, 
accountability and sustainability and should not be tampered”. Furthermore, “the weather station 
perennially bears the important task of accumulating valuable meteorological data for the national 
data exchange, and providing decision services for local disaster reduction, disaster prevention and 
economic development.”  
At this stage, the meteorological bureau of Henan province also plans to extend agro-meteorological 
services to townships and villages, by building an experts association of agro-meteorologists, 
meteorological personnel, technicians and academics in the agricultural sciences, large crop 
producers and cultivation experts. It has established high altitude meteorological observation 
networks, recently constructed a satellite remote sensing data collecting system, and is going to 
establish a modern provincial, three-dimensional visual agricultural meteorological observation 
system.  Thus, the requirements for weather data and monitoring needed for weather index crop 
insurance can be assessed as ideal.  
Another potential issue is the ability of the insurance companies to easily and accurately interpret 
weather data, because they are not meteorological officers or agronomists, but they need it to design 
(including ongoing refinement) the instrument as was done in Chapter 5. In implementing weather 
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index crop insurance, the weather metrics should be set, clear and objective so there will not be a lot 
of interpretation required. This is a two-stage issue and the meteorology officer interviewed said 
data interpretation would be part of the service with providing historical data. If necessary, they can 
send technical personnel to support the design of insurance products.  
Apart from the general question of availability, there are also questions in regard to the overall 
quality of the data, especially its consistency. Due to the use of automated equipment, the 
meteorological data possibly has three types of error: gross error, random error, and micro 
meteorological error (Ren and Liu 2005). Gross error is generated in the process of data coding, 
processing, transmission and storage because of abnormal observation of instruments. It rarely 
occurs, and can easily be found. Random error is due to the large number of small random effects, 
measuring similar data for the same object under the same conditions over several times. This 
cannot be estimated or avoided, but usually obeys the normal distribution. Micro meteorological 
error is caused by small local weather systems. Because of the spatial and temporal resolution in 
observation facilities, these weather systems generally are not fully observed, but when a micro 
weather system is observed, the observational data might be mistaken as abnormal data. Against 
these possible problems in data quality, the weather staff interviewed argued that the existing 
technology and equipment at their site can ensure the data quality absolutely. He explained: first 
they have set thresholds in the weather observing software according to long-term weather statistics 
for this site, and if the measured value exceeds the threshold, it will be marked as suspect; second 
the software system will check and compare the spatial continuity with surrounding sites; third is 
using manual methods to inspect any suspicious data that appears in the previous layers.  The 
overall quality of the weather data, as well its consistency, can be improved by improving the 
quality of the instruments, the observation methods, and applying uniformity correction, etc. 
7.3.2 Availability of historical crop yield data 
Crop yield data is also crucial for the supply of weather index crop insurance to meet the demand at 
contract design and pricing stages, yet few countries have the records needed for robust modelling. 
To be able to design an index that truly represents crop production losses, a long and continuous 
series of crop yield data is needed.  Fortunately, the local Department of Statistics in Huojia County 
has historical records of crop yield data by village from 1978 to 2012. It is reported by individual 
village and aggregated by the Bureau of Agriculture in Huojia County.  However, the quality of 
yield records is questionable for the needs of the insurance companies, because of the missing yield 
data in some years (1997-1998, 1983-1984), and also because of its authenticity.  
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The manager of Huojia PICC branch raised several potential sources of bias with the production 
data and questioned whether anybody knew precisely how each village collected the overall yield 
data or average yield data. He surmised that because of these problems, it may be better to base the 
average yields on a more scientific approach, rather than base them on farmers’ estimates or farmers’ 
recall of the average crop yield per unit area by a random sampling strategy. Farmer recall and 
estimation are easier and less costly to carry out, but also have disadvantages (Fermont and Benson 
2011). First, farmers may forget to include in-kind payments to laborers or gifts to family and 
friends in their production estimates, especially when the hand out occurs before grain storage or 
sale. This may result in the underestimation of yield. Second, farmers’ estimates are generally 
carried out with a small number of households.  It may be casual, as strict supervision of the 
enumerators may be impossible. This may affect data quality, as enumerators are not corrected for 
sloppy work. Third, farmers may report historical average production figures for their crops instead 
of specific production in the season or year. Fourth, as mentioned in section 5.3 the average wheat 
yield varied considerably between years and among villages. The coefficient of variation within 
Huojia County ranged between 2%-23% after de-trending the data for influence of technology (see 
Table 5-7). It can be inferred that crop performance in smallholder farming systems is highly 
heterogeneous, both within plots and between plots, villages, and regions. Thus, the use of one 
“average” for each village may result in serious errors in crop production and yield estimates. It 
should be noted that when such wide ranges in yields are obtained from farmer estimates, some 
authors might discard the data, as they question the reliability of farmers’ estimates. In all, these 
problems may result in large non-sampling error (measurement and response errors) when the 
survey design is poor and enumerators are not strictly supervised. There is also limited information 
to record the actual losses due to natural disasters or corresponding to weather parameters on some 
days, so that it is hard to establish the correlation between crop yield loss and weather index. All 
these issues inevitably increase the basis risk (a significant disadvantage of weather index crop 
insurance as mentioned in Section 2.4) of weather index crop insurance. The basis risk cannot be 
eliminated completely, but should be avoided as much as possible.  
When the interviewed manager of PICC Huojia Branch was asked about their requirements for 
quality crop yield data, he indicated that it would be better to have authorised historical crop yield 
records in relation to the specific variety being planted in the given area, as opposed to more general 
data that might not represent the crop development characteristics of the actual farmer’s crops. In 
addition, detailed information is required on the crop cycle, as this will be an important input to the 
crop model that will be used for estimating the index. In regard to this high requirement for quality 
crop yield data, there is another tool for measuring effects of weather change on crop yields—crop 
192	  
	  
modelling. It integrates knowledge on physiology, agronomy, soil science and agro-meteorology 
into the model, using mathematical equations to describe physiological, physical and chemical 
processes to simulate crop growth and development over time (Miglietta and Bindi 1993). Crop 
modelling can predict how a plant will grow under particular environmental conditions, and show 
the response of a crop to its environment and management practices, so it is an alternative way that 
could be used to assess the potential effects of weather change on agro-ecosystems rather than draw 
on a historical data. However, crop growth is a very complex process, and the results of crop 
models are sensitive to soil conditions, weather, and management conditions. Thus the production 
data obtained by such a method is also unreliable or imprecise.  
Extension staff or field technicians also have a lot of experience with crops and can estimate crop 
yields by visually assessing the field or estimating yields on the basis of a combination of tools 
(Bradbury 1995). This method can be applied on a relatively large scale; it does not require area 
estimations and does eliminate a source of potential bias. However, visual estimations of crop yield 
require practical and technical familiarity with the yield potential of different varieties and their 
relative performance in different environments (Fermont and Benson 2011). The accuracy of the 
yield assessment, therefore, will depend strongly on the level of expertise of the assessor.  
Thus obtaining real and trustworthy records of historical crop yield still is a challenge for any 
weather index crop insurance program.  As the office manager noted:  “this is the inherent flaw of 
crop insurance, for which there is no good solution until now. All of the policy is also designed to 
rely on statistical data, but we know that there is such a risk in the data itself”.  
7.3.3 Technical capacity of the local insurance industry 
From the interviews, it was evident that the local insurance industry had little experience of or 
capacity to underwrite weather index crop insurance. Lack of technical capacity will become a 
serious constraint to the scaling up and further development of weather index crop insurance in 
terms of risk identification, risk measurement, risk prediction, and risk warning, as well as handling 
statistics and information management techniques. For example, since there is no established 
natural disaster warning system, disaster management and loss prevention being very passive 
processes. The respondents proposed a practical approach in dealing with this problem, in terms of 
establishing a partnership with an agricultural college or institutes with expertise in this area. This 
inclusive approach will ensure data provision and aid sustainability, especially through ongoing 
support in ensuring rigorous contract design.  
193	  
	  
In addition, note that weather index crop insurance products might not offer indemnity in some 
cases—the client may suffer a loss but not receive a payout because a payment was not triggered 
due to lack of severity, or because the loss was caused by a variable that was not covered by the 
index (for example, the contract covers drought risk but the crop is destroyed by a pest). 
Theoretically, it is possible to structure weather index crop insurance with multiple indexes. While 
this is complicated, and would likely end in expensive premiums, and be plagued by basis risk 
issues in relation to multiple indexes, it could be attractive if the technical problems could be 
resolved. The high premium might however bring this program back into the cycle of “high 
premium, few people afford to—few people participate, high risk—high risk, high premium”. At 
this point, whether it could attract premium subsidies from government appears to be very critical. 
More fundamentally, many of the risks faced by farmers are unrelated to weather and so weather 
index insurance may be irrelevant. Thus the issue of how important weather related risks are in 
terms of all risks faced by the household is crucial. Generally, what farmers actually want is an 
indemnity from loss, and full indemnity, no matter what the cause. 
It is also important to identify who will be the local driver for this activity. The implementation of a 
weather index crop insurance product requires coordination of a large number of stakeholders and a 
large number of activities to be undertaken. All interviewees agreed that it is imperative to have a 
local stakeholder take the lead on these activities; otherwise the activities are unlikely to be initiated 
from an external source or able to be sustained. However, from their experience of operating policy-
oriented agricultural insurance, insurance companies who are supposed to be in a dominant position, 
have been in a subordinate or agent’s position, becoming increasingly dependent on local 
government. Combined with a lack of competition between the two eligible insurance companies, 
the current policy-oriented agricultural insurance is only conducted as a task assigned by local 
governments. They do not promote or use market awareness to push this product forward. They 
have little enthusiasm to develop new insurance products or new technology and, indeed, they do 
not have the right to determine who can participate in the insurance. In other words, their objective 
is not to service the needs of farmers, but instead to meet the requirements of government. Although 
insurance companies would like to recapture their leadership position in the crop insurance program, 
they realize it is difficult to carry out weather index crop insurance over a large area and involve 
most households without government support.      
7.3.4 Product positioning 
If weather index crop insurance can indemnify farmers against loss, a decision on the loss that is 
going to be covered needs to be made by the insurance company. In any event, data will be needed 
194	  
	  
to calculate the level of loss in the area covered by the index. In practice, there are three types of 
potential loss that an insurance product could seek to cover. First is the input cost, based on input 
usage and unit cost for all inputs used in crop production; second is the loss of income based on the 
estimated yield loss and a fixed price per unit of yield; third is a credit amount based on input costs 
plus any additional financing that the household required.  Therefore, if the contract is going to 
cover the input cost or credit amount, data will be required on input costs, costs of labour, interest 
rates, and so on.    
Respondents from the three different administrative levels of the insurance companies 
spontaneously rejected the first option, and then expressed their own opinions on the other two 
options.  They highlighted that the present policy-oriented agricultural insurance was designed to 
cover input costs, which is 311 yuan/mu for winter wheat in Huojia County (although average input 
cost in Huojia County is 380-400 yuan/mu excluding labour cost and land rent fee).  This indemnity 
aims to protect farmers’ recovery capacity by bringing farmers back to their status before the 
natural disaster. However, farmers would like to see a much higher level of amount insured, and the 
input-cost-protected insurance product seriously affects the enthusiasm of farmers to insure.  Thus, 
weather index crop insurance could seek to cover the loss of income, rather than the loss of input 
costs or loss of production.  
As for the third option of a credit amount, the insurance company managers considered this as 
unsuitable for the current stage of development in crop production. At the moment, the vast 
majority of farmers is still small scale and normally do not rely on bank loans to cover their input 
costs, especially with the growth in non-farm incomes. “I might consider this option after a few 
years” one of the insurance company respondents stated, “when the land transfer policy is in 
operation for a longer period and more-and-more big scale producers emerge”.  Until then, even if 
farmers themselves are not anxious to buy the insurance, the inputs suppliers (seed and fertilizer 
suppliers, etc.), banks or other financial institutions that provide loans for them, and the processors 
who need farmers’ produce, will push farmers to participate.  Thus the indemnity for a credit 
amount would be the best choice, when the suppliers often lend cash or agricultural inputs to a wide 
group of farmers and are therefore exposed to the risk that repayment will not be made. The use of 
crop insurance to cover their credit amount could be effective in reducing their exposure to this 
repayment risk. However, this proposal needs to be further studied, as many risks that actually drive 
farmers to default on repaying these credit advances cannot be fully covered by a weather index.  
They might involve market price risk that cannot be covered by a weather index. It is possible, 
however, that a bank might receive a payout under the insurance scheme; yet still seek to collect the 
debt from the farmer. This could be a challenge if farmers were aware that their counterparty has 
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insurance, as they might be more likely to default, even in the case where the default occurs because 
of a risk not covered by the index. 
Furthermore, weather index insurance seeking to cover the loss of income can effectively improve 
the level of protection. However, as the respondents noted, the premium is bound to increase 
corresponding to the improvement in the insured amount. Even if governments agree to provide 
subsidies to cover the same percentage of premium as with the policy-oriented agricultural 
insurance, the premium subsidized by governments and the part paid by farmers would still be high.  
Since it is going to cover the loss of income, one respondent working at the township level 
suggested that the weather index insurance product could offer several different choices for their 
production income or for yield and price separately. For instance, in the case of winter wheat 
production, a farmer could be asked to choose between discrete losses, or to insure for 1000 
yuan/mu, 900 yuan/mu, or 800 yuan/mu. Alternatively the yield options could be selected as 600kg, 
500kg, and 400kg, with the price at 1.9 yuan/kg, 2.0 yuan/kg and 2.1 Yuan/kg respectively. 
However the suggestion for some more innovative, multi-variable instruments was downplayed by 
the other insurance company respondents who thought that farmers in the area do not have such 
diversified demands for crop insurance as reflected in the statement:  “Needless to discuss its 
feasibility in technical, overly complicated insurance products is likely to scare away your potential 
buyers of weather index crop insurance, who are always somewhat suspecting you are cheating”. 
This has implications for the weather metric in the weather index crop insurance scheme as well. 
The product itself should be simple, clear and practical. The respondents concurred that the most 
likely way forward was to calculate the income by using the average crop yield in this area and crop 
purchase price of the local government, as long as the yield and price gaps in this area are within a 
reasonable range.     
7.3.5 Delivery channels 
A delivery channel is defined as the path or route along which goods move from producers or to 
ultimate consumers (Kotler and Keller 2009). In other words, it is a distribution network through 
which the insurance company puts its products into the market and passes them on to the actual 
users (farmers). A channel consists of insurance companies, farmers or users, and various 
middlemen who intervene between insurance companies and farmers. The channel serves to bridge 
the gap between the point of production and the point of consumption thereby creating time, place, 
and possession utilities. The choice of a suitable delivery channel is very important for a product 
because it affects the time and costs of distribution, the volume of sales, pricing, and promotional 
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efforts. Such a decision will also determine the profitability of the business and also the long-term 
sustainability of those profits. 
The insurance practitioners further explained that a delivery channel depends on a series of factors 
such as the nature of the product involved, the legal constraints, competitive environment, the 
capacity of insurance companies to deliver, and the interest of the stakeholders (Kotler and Keller 
2009). Weather index crop insurance is a new product that needs greater promotional effort in the 
initial stages and hence few middlemen may be required. After the initial stage, it should be sold 
through middlemen since it is a low unit value and common use product. If the number of 
prospective customers is small, or the market for the product is geographically located in a limited 
area, direct selling is possible. In the case of weather index crop insurance, with a large number of 
potential customers, although the product would be sold in small quantities, use of middlemen 
would be necessary. A small specialist crop insurance company may need to involve one or more 
middlemen in order to promote this product, while a large and well established firm like PICC with 
a good market standing may sell its product directly to the farmers, because the small or new 
insurance companies cannot invest in setting up its own distribution network, and so will depend on 
middlemen to sell their product. In addition, if the demand for the product is high, more channels 
may be used to distribute the product profitably to a maximum number of customers.  
In general, the respondents suggest the primary product delivery channel should be established at an 
early stage, and that the principle for determining the delivery channel is to control and reduce the 
transaction costs as far as possible. The widely promoted approach in China’s insurance market is 
by multi-delivery channels, which include the banks, brokers, Internet, and corporate agents28. 
Apart from geographical spread, the socio-cultural and economic segmentation of the market is very 
wide, exhibiting different traits and needs. Thus different multi-delivery channels would be 
appropriate for different insurance products.  
In the case of weather index crop insurance, the companies perceived that the optional delivery 
channels could be insurance companies, local government (Bureau of Agriculture), and 
intermediary insurance or financial institutions. According to past experience, direct delivery 
channels were considered as the best choice by the respondents, in which the insurance company 
delivers their products to the farmers by their own salesmen and branches. The interviewees were 
from a big and comprehensive insurance company; they have branches in most parts of the country 
and have attracted local people to become their agents. Their agents know which product will 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  Corporate agency is a cross selling type of channel, by which insurance companies bundle with business houses in 
other industries to sell insurance either to their employees or their customers. Corporate agents have become a major 
force to reckon with in distributing insurance products.	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appeal to customers, and also know their competitor’s products. For the average household, 
perceptions about the insurance company are also cemented in their minds, while an insurance 
agent can create a good image of company. Thus, it is reasonable for the insurance company to 
choose its existing channels of distribution for an innovative product. The existing branches or 
salesman will help the company to further understanding of the market, gradually establishing a 
good image of insurance company.  
Local government guidance influences farmer’s decision-making but was placed in a secondary 
position because of the dislike of insurance companies in too much government intervention in their 
business. However, delivering and servicing crop insurance in rural areas, particularly to scattered 
small and marginal farmers, can be expensive and can significantly affect the insurance premium 
(Iturrioz and Arias 2010). This cost can be high whatever type of crop insurance is offered (policy-
oriented or weather index based). Thus local government should promote the role of intermediaries 
(for instance, marketing groups, cooperatives, banks, and mutual groups) that could aggregate 
clients and service these products at low cost. As experience accumulates and market demand 
builds, the cooperatives, producer associations, rural banks, and microfinance institutions all can be 
developed in future as potential delivery channels for weather index crop insurance. These 
institutions can play an important low-cost role in delivering weather index crop insurance to small 
farmers. They operate at very low overhead costs compared with the insurance company branches 
or salesman, and could form the basis for future development and scaling-up of weather index crop 
insurance provision in China.  Insurance companies would like to get rid of government 
intervention in insurance delivery to deliver the product more effectively and economically to small 
farmers by tight cost control. 
7.4 Operational challenges in weather index crop insurance  
Alongside the broad capability assessment described above involving the consideration of multiple 
factors like weather data, crop yield data, circumstances and capacity of the local insurance industry, 
product positioning, and delivery channels, it is also critical to identify the business processes that 
will drive the program.  
Previous literature has identified various issues and challenges for weather index crop insurance. 
For instance, start-up costs for product research and development, lack of rural branch networks, 
and high administrative costs to deliver weather index crop insurance to small farmers were 
reviewed in Mahul et al. (2009), while farmer demand and affordability issues, weather station 
density and data availability, problems with intercropping, and the lack of capacity, outreach and 
training were raised by Assah et al. (2011) and Bryla-Tressler et al. (2011). Some of these 
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challenges are not unique to weather index crop insurance and are common in the rollout of many 
new insurance products. Other challenges are unique to weather index crop insurance, and perhaps 
less widely understood or appreciated, such as the administrative costs of dealing with small 
farmers, demand and affordability, and weather station density and data availability.   
7.4.1 Crop and peril suitability 
Crops suitable for weather index crop insurance include rain-fed field-scale crops (e.g. food crops 
wheat, maize, sorghum; and cash crops such as cotton, groundnut, etc.) (Barnett and Mahul 2007), 
while irrigated crops are less suited to weather index insurance since supplemental irrigation partly 
offsets the risk of insufficient rainfall, and reduces the correlation between crop yields and rainfall 
changes to some extent. However, a major issue which needs to be addressed in Huojia County is 
that many farmers have access to irrigation in normal years, although the current irrigation 
infrastructure is not always reliable, or cost-effective, and is not available to all households in dry 
years. The manager responsible for agricultural insurance in PICC Huojia Branch suggested that it 
would not make sense to regress precipitation against crop yield (as shown in section 4.5) or, at 
least, that the influence of supplemental irrigation on crop yields should be eliminated. This is 
difficult to do precisely, because the irrigation system in Huojia County depends on water reservoirs, 
well water or river water if necessary. Furthermore the annual household-level irrigation allocation 
is hard to estimate and collect. Even if the effect of irrigation can be solved technically, the manager 
was concerned that weather index crop insurance would generate disincentives for governments or 
households to invest in irrigation systems because farmers are more likely to get insurance if 
production takes place on non-irrigated land (Fuchs and Wolff 2011).  
Insurance staff working at township level argued that Huojia County might have advantages that 
other regions may not have. For instance, nearly all development work to date on weather index 
insurance in developing countries has been conducted on single stand or sole crops (Assah, Iturrioz 
and Stutley 2011). With the corn-wheat two crops a year farming system, farmers in Huojia County 
seldom grow several crops on a single plot of land in the same season, and so intercropping issue 
does not exist in this region. Another advantage of this region is that changes in topography are 
relatively small and the reasons for crop failure are relatively consistent.  
Most weather index insurance research and applications until now have been directed at rainfall 
deficit (drought index) insurance, followed by rainfall excess, high temperature, low temperature, 
high wind speed/wind direction, and sunshine hours (Bryla-Tressler, Syroka and Dana 2011). Index 
insurance is most suited to slow-onset hazards (such as drought) which can be measured through a 
continuous rainfall deficit index with defined trigger and exit rainfall levels, as opposed to sudden-
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event climatic perils (such as hail, floods, or windstorms) (Assah, Iturrioz and Stutley 2011). Low 
temperature or frost and relative humidity are other perils which are relatively easily indexed for 
crop insurance purposes, while other perils such as fire and pests and diseases in agriculture are 
difficult to adapt to weather index insurance according to Assah et al. (2011). As the household 
survey results showed in section 6.2.2 (see Table 6-5), the key natural risks to which households 
were exposed were drought, pests and diseases, floods, windstorms, hail, and frost. Thus, the 
second most important cause of loss is pests and diseases, which does not lend itself to indexation 
under a weather index crop insurance scheme except where there is a very close correlation between 
say rainfall and relatively humidity levels and incidence of fungal diseases in particular crops 
(Assah, Iturrioz and Stutley 2011). Flooding, windstorms and hail are considered as sudden-event 
climatic perils. River flood is very difficult to index because historical river flow gauge data is often 
lacking and it is a complex task to relate river flow data to crop damage (the area of the crop which 
will be affected by flooding, and the depth of the water and the duration of flooding, are factors 
which have a direct bearing on the severity of crop losses). Windstorms and hail are difficult to be 
indexed for the same reason. Research into flood index insurance is being conducted using remote 
sensing applications, but there are no commercial flood index schemes for crops implemented 
anywhere in the world (Assah, Iturrioz and Stutley 2011). However, excess rain can be measured at 
a weather station and is sometimes used as a proxy for flooding, but this has the same caveats as 
river flooding. A handful of the micro-level weather index insurance schemes in India, Thailand, 
Central America, and Africa have attempted to insure “torrential excess rain” for example more 
than 50 mm in a 24 hour period (Mahul and Stutley 2010), but there is a high potential for basis risk 
as excess rain damage is highly related to the vegetative growth stage of the crop, local soil type, 
water holding capacity and drainage etc. Thus, the challenge is that several of the main perils faced 
by crop farmers in the case study area are that they are not suitable for indexation. 
7.4.2 Start-up and administrative costs  
The major start-up costs for any new crop insurance program includes the spending on design, 
rating, and pilot testing of new products and programs. Embarking on a weather index crop 
insurance program will require serious financial resources and dedication of a specialist team for an 
extended time period. For Huojia County where there is very little experience in the design and 
rating of crop insurance programs, such costs may be prohibitive for individual commercial insurers. 
In addition, the respondents stressed that uncertainty associated with the impact of future climate 
trends may increase the risk loading that insurers charge in their pricing, as well as change the 
distribution of the underlying weather risk, which means weather index insurance programs may 
need to be adjusted frequently according to climate changes. Given the high start-up costs of 
200	  
	  
developing a weather index crop insurance instrument, and the continued costs of revising the 
instrument, the willingness of insurers to offer such products is inevitably going to be reduced. In 
this context, it is recommended that central government consider establishing and funding the 
interested insurance company, which would assume key responsibility for data and acquisition of 
information and for designing and rating weather index crop insurance products on behalf of all 
commercial and cooperative insurers.  
As Collier et al. (2009) noted, government investments are likely to be most effective in funding 
risk assessments and market development start-up costs, and whatever investments governments 
make to support insurance markets should be carefully considered in light of their opportunity costs 
as adaptation needs far outweigh current funding levels. Moreover, beyond the step of financing the 
design, rating, and pilot testing described above, governments can finance activities such as 
disseminating the risk assessment findings to local stakeholders, improving access to weather data, 
enhancing weather recording infrastructure, improving agricultural infrastructure, creating an 
enabling legal and regulatory environment for weather insurance markets, and educating household 
decision-makers about the use of insurance. These efforts should stimulate the development of 
weather index crop insurance markets without distorting insurance prices and creating disincentives 
for insured individuals to adopt other risk management strategies. Furthermore, these activities 
would generate public benefits that extend well beyond addressing the high start-up costs through 
more robust support for crop insurance companies to research and develop weather index crop 
insurance products. 
Another challenge identified by respondents is the very small size of farms, less than 0.33 ha on 
average (see Table 6-3), which means the costs of insurance delivery, underwriting, and claims 
administration are potentially very high. Thus any concept of individual farmer sales needs careful 
consideration and it might be necessary to identify group sales (e.g., village as a unit), or link 
weather index crop insurance for small and marginal farmers with other products and services (such 
as input supply or seasonal production loans). World Bank experience in Bangladesh, India, Malawi, 
Senegal, and elsewhere shows that crop insurance cannot operate in isolation and that it often ranks 
very low on the list of priorities of small and marginal farmers and herders (Mahul et al. 2009) as 
crop producers’ priorities are first to ensure that they have timely access to inputs of seeds, 
fertilizers, and often credit with which to buy these inputs. Only then can they consider purchasing 
crop insurance. The priority of crop insurance in this study (see Table 6-7) does rank reasonably 
highly on farmers’ lists, ranking third after medical insurance and pension insurance, but this was 
not necessarily reflected in household demand for crop insurance. Bundling with financial services 
(credit) and input supply (seeds and fertilizer) may help facilitate the demand. 
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7.4.3 Coordination and timing  
Although weather index crop insurance is novel in Henan and even within China, it impinges on 
some broad national goals and social responsibilities like stabilizing agricultural incomes and 
maintaining national food security. Thus various key government agencies including national 
finance, civil affairs, meteorology, and agriculture will have an interest in its development. Weather 
index crop insurance also requires co-ordination and co-operation across different agencies and 
economic actors both in the public and private sector (such as local governments, insurance 
companies, meteorological departments, and research institutes), as well as some other stakeholders 
such as the China Insurance Regulatory Commission. For such a multi-sector project, cooperation is 
necessary to finalize the agreements between stakeholders to clarify the responsibility of each party 
and to safeguard their benefits. 
Some coordination problems had previously been experienced by the respondents. For instance, 
crop insurance businesses would have a certain allocation of funds that needed to be disbursed, 
which often required joint help from different levels of governments, as well as agriculture, finance, 
or other sectors in local government. However, there is no clear regulation that defines how to pay 
for the related qualifications and services.  Thus some insurance branches paid by alternative 
methods, such as charging other expense accounts, which is a big risk in administrative compliance. 
As one of the respondents noted, when an affair co-managed by a number of departments, the 
executive power is low, and it is very hard to achieve anything. This is due to the lack of a clear 
accountability mechanism and a smooth information exchange process. Therefore, decisions and 
actions that need to be taken before a successful program is in place include who is responsible for 
product design? How and when the product will be marketed? Who is in charge of collecting 
premiums and distributing payouts? How should policy documents be developed? How can internal 
management information system and accounting systems be adapted? All stakeholders need a clear 
understanding of their roles and responsibilities and have the incentives to carry them out. A key 
aspect would be to clearly delineate the role of weather index insurance in relation to policy-
oriented agricultural insurance. In the initial phase, it is unrealistic to expect that the existing policy-
oriented agricultural insurance would be immediately suspended since the merits of the new 
insurance product will not have been demonstrated while farmers might question the consistency of 
government policies. Thus weather index crop insurance is likely to complement rather than replace 
policy-oriented agricultural insurance in the initial stage.  There could also be government support 
for weather index cop insurance as a component of the government supported agricultural insurance 
system. “This is the key to successful promoting weather index crop insurance,” one of the 
managers said.   In addition, one of the crop insurance manager stressed the policy should be 
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designed with simple and clear words and framed to the situation, circumstances, and capabilities of 
farmers. The contract needs to be improved regularly based on feedback from the insured farmers 
and this will also provide a means of enhancing the reputation of insurance products among farmers. 
7.4.4 Promotion and delivery 
All of the insurance company respondents highlighted the need for promotion and awareness 
campaigns for crop insurance. Currently the system does not provide relevant and accurate 
information to farmers. Insurance company salespeople are at the front line of public awareness of 
insurance, but because their commissions relate directly to their sales volume, their wording, 
description and sales pitch may be biased from the perspective of a more overarching public 
awareness campaign, while their own insurance knowledge is sometimes not comprehensive. 
Imperfect information, however, is also a problem in publicity provided through government 
channels or the village committee, as the relevant staffs are not familiar with the insurance products. 
If the government uses a top-down approach that tries to coerce farmers to buy the product, it is 
likely to have a counter-productive effect, generating resentment among farmers about the 
insurance product and insurance company.  
Insurance companies and governments therefore need to pay close attention to the promotional mix 
that involves private promotion, moral suasion, and education/information campaigns. These three 
channels of promotion are not mutually exclusive. Private promotion can also be called personal 
selling. If the salesman is aware of the art of informing, sensing and persuading the potential 
policyholder, the task of product promotion will be simplified considerably.  One cannot deny the 
fact that insurance business is substantially influenced by private promotion.   It focuses attention 
on the ability of an individual to influence another by activating the persuasion process. Salesman 
should have attributes such as patience, communicative ability, attractive personality and 
commitment to the profession. Although it is hard to find such qualified sales teams in rural areas at 
present, it is not infeasible, just takes time to build.  
Romans (1966) defined moral suasion in the economic sphere as “the attempt to coerce private 
economic activity via governmental exhortation in directions not already defined or dictated by 
existing statute law”. It can be backed by explicit or implicit threats by authorities in order to 
provide incentives to comply with their wishes. Hence, the use of moral suasion depends largely on 
the attitude of government. Moral suasion can also involve information and education campaigns 
that comprise a series of extensive awareness activities or training to inform potential policyholders 
about weather index crop insurance. It can use community-based and multimedia strategies for the 
instilment of knowledge, to ensure that farmers understand the product and to encourage their 
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participation if it is suitable to their needs.  The respondents proposed that a wide-scale education 
and information campaign should start by sending professional staff into the rural villages and 
distributing various forms of publicity material to enhance market visibility of this new product. 
The form of this material is important. Timing will also is crucial. A good time for the campaign 
could be during the spring festival or the harvest season to take out insurance in the following 
season. The place could be village markets or farm fields. It is best to communicate directly with 
the farmers, to understand their expectations about this product, and to listen to their ideas. Through 
whatever means, the purpose of the campaigns is to provide basic knowledge of insurance, the 
precautions when buying insurance, and the claims procedure of the insurance company. Despite its 
importance, the costs inherent in promotion campaigns are often considered prohibitive by most 
local insurance companies and therefore represent a major constraint to product development. 
Besides promotion and information campaigns, networks also need to be established in rural areas. 
Although most insurance companies have regional branch offices in the major cities, few have retail 
sales outlets in individual townships. Based on past experience of policy-oriented agricultural 
insurance reflected by the interviewees, an important factor behind the low participation rate is that 
the insurance company had no ability to achieve door-to-door delivery and services. Even if they 
knew that many kinds of fraud, abuses and misrepresentation problems were reported, they did not 
have enough personnel or equipment to investigate the authenticity of transaction and claims 
procedures. The insurance company respondents indicated that if insurance companies would not 
build their own networks, the promotion and operation of weather index crop insurance will 
inevitably depend upon and be constrained by local government.  
Normally, these networks can be divided into direct marketing and indirect marketing. The 
fieldwork identified that almost all of the large comprehensive insurance companies have their own 
branches at the county level through long-term development, and are making gradual efforts to 
extend their networks to township level.  The respondents constantly stressed the importance of 
expanding personnel and branches and believe that retail sales outlets conducted in the local 
villages are generally most effective. It is critical they be carried out by local staff in dialects, as this 
will increase understanding and build trust, and encourage take-up. However, a network relying 
solely on their staff and affiliates is not economic.  Irrespective of the insurance company’s 
financial strength, it is impossible to establish a marketing team to accommodate the entire rural 
area, as it would involve excessive transaction costs for the weather index crop insurance product. 
Some emerging insurance companies that have specialized in crop insurance do not have the 
advantage of scale, personnel or funding, and may not have branches at the county level. These 
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companies may need to rely on indirect marketing with insurance agents or insurance brokers 
selling their products. For weather index crop insurance, existing financial network in rural areas 
may be a suitable channel. Because banks are permitted to act as insurance brokers, the entire 
network of bank branches can be utilised to increase penetration. In the fieldwork, branches of the 
Rural Credit Union and Postal Savings Bank of China were observed in every township of Huojia 
County and they also have very high presence in Henan province, where there were 5326 and 2152 
outlets respectively at the end of 2013 (Henan province administers 556 districts, 1452 towns, and 
219 townships) (Ma, Z 2009). As the main force in rural finance and the main settlement channel 
for rural residents, the Rural Credit Union undertakes almost all of the work of distributing 
subsidies for agriculture and farmers, such as direct subsidies for grain producers, reimbursement of 
the new rural cooperative medical costs, subsidies for low income families, etc. Although the Rural 
Credit Union is involved in so many things, this should not hinder its interest in weather index crop 
insurance products. The model of “insurance + credit” is conducive to reducing its business risk in 
agricultural credit and protecting its financial security, prompting it to increase lending, alleviating 
the difficulty of lending to rural households. If linked with its credit business, even only as a partner 
or agent for an insurance company to sell weather index crop insurance, this would help to extend 
its services and earn commissions. 
In the long term, a competitive insurance company can continue to expand its marketing network in 
rural areas, supplemented by indirect marketing, while young insurance companies should use 
indirect marketing. The insurance company must consider its own conditions, and compare or 
evaluate the cost, risk, and profit of individual delivery channels. An effective distribution network 
will solve the “last mile” problem in crop insurance services, and be independent of government 
intervention.  
7.4.5 Reputation and services 
The insurance industry plays the role of providing timely help in most cases, and so should easily 
win people’s respects. However, the reality is that the image of the insurance industry is the worst 
among all the financial services industries (banking, security, insurance, and trust funds). This is 
due to its previous “unique” marketing approach and a variety of problems that exist in processing 
claims. Some may appear to be minor or trivial problems, but they create a bad image of the 
industry, shaping people’s attitudes about the insurance. In the past several years, insurance 
companies worked with local government or agencies to underwrite policy-oriented agricultural 
insurance using old statistical data from government offices. Sometimes the underwriting acreage 
did not match the real situation. The seasonal nature of agricultural insurance is very strong, and so 
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it is difficult to acquire accurate information on time given labour constraints and there are many 
disputes when disaster occurs.  
One of the respondents working in the PICC county branch summarized the situation that insurance 
in China is operated by people who do not play by the rules and is sold by people who do not 
understand insurance, resulting in the inevitable crisis of credibility evident at present. He said that 
in the past 30 years, expansion was the overriding objective of the insurance industry, because the 
regulatory authorities considered that as long as the extent of insurance expanded, the industry 
would have a position and right to speak in China’s financial sector, and to weaken the dominance 
of banks. Influenced by this aim, insurance companies found ways to expand their scale by 
targeting high growth rates, rapidly setting up institutions, recruiting agents, and using various 
lawful and unlawful means to stimulate their access to premiums. Due to the lack of effective 
training and long-term education, these inappropriate marketing approaches adversely impacted the 
environment of the insurance industry. The city level manager predicted that if the business 
objective of only focussing on premium income, regardless of whether the process of obtaining it is 
reasonable or standard, could not achieve adjustment, the largest insurance companies would face a 
crisis in reputation in three to five years with the potential for big structural changes: large 
insurance companies may find themselves in financial difficulties, but individual small and medium 
size insurance companies may rise if they adopt modern marketing strategies. The most important 
aspect is playing by the rules. For instance, the lower-tier salespeople in the PICC are paid by 
commission without basic salary. This payment method forces them to do everything possible to 
promote the products encouraging illegal sales practices. In addition, many salespeople working in 
the rural area are temporary or part-time, do not have a formal relationship with the insurance 
company, and do not have a sense of identity and belonging to the company. They also lack 
responsibility to maintain the reputation and brand of company. Currently the most important thing 
for PICC is to eliminate agents who do not meet the requirements, and provide systematic and 
professional training for the qualified agents and salesmen. A bad reputation is produced and its 
influence spreads gradually, with a lot of inertia and so improvement or change will require time 
and effort. 
An important and effective strategy to increase the insurance company’s credibility is to improve 
service quality. The insurance company cannot simply look at the density of its outlets and staff 
numbers, but also the suitability of its product and services. Their services should always put 
customer satisfaction as the goal, where the insurance company must provide systematic services 
throughout the whole process from product positioning, design, developing, underwriting, data 
storage and evaluation, after-sales tracking and claims processing, so that customers are satisfied 
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with any process or transaction experiences, to reverse the bad reputation of “easy to insure, 
difficult to claim”. As the manager of PICC city branch stressed, their reputation depends on the 
payout. When the claims become as convenient as withdrawing a deposit, the insurance company 
can win the trust, and occupy a place in financial services. Another strategy proposed during the 
interview was to optimize the transaction process, to simplify the approval procedure, and to give a 
clear time frame for each procedure. In addition, due to the special nature of weather index crop 
insurance, farmers’ demand for services, especially for customers’ inquiries and claims, may be 
concentrated into the same time period.  Thus it is important to ensure that there is enough staff and 
equipment to deal with these matters. On the whole, insurance companies are gradually improving 
their service, becoming more responsible, and adopting more standardized processes.   
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8 Feasibility of implementing weather index crop insurance 
Understanding the technical realities and perspectives from households, government, and insurance 
companies, as outlined in Chapters 4 to 7, is a crucial aspect in assessing the relative merits and 
implementation of weather index insurance. However, there is a need to look beyond the responses 
from these separate groups and see how the mosaic of responses fits together; that is, to view the 
range of analyses in an integrated way. For example, is there a politically feasible level of premium 
subsidy that is actuarially sound for insurance companies and that can entice large numbers of 
farmers to participate in weather index insurance? If not, what subsidies would be required from 
government that is within their means and consistent with their broader objectives? How should 
government and insurance companies promote and implement a sustainable, cost-effective, market-
based weather index crop insurance program and what macro-environment is needed to facilitate 
the program? What specific activities are crucial for implementing weather index crop insurance 
and how will they operate within this macro or facilitative environment? Thus this chapter seeks to 
integrate the perspectives from the analyses in Chapters 4 to 7 to assess weather index insurance 
from a more holistic perspective.  
8.1 Summary of perceptions about weather index crop insurance  
A synthesis of the main advantages and disadvantages from the government, technical, household 
and insurance companies’ perspectives are provided in this section. It provides the background 
needed for the integrative analysis in Section 8.2 by highlighting where perspectives and 
requirements align and the main synergies and barriers across stakeholders and with the technical 
characteristics.  
8.1.1 Pros and cons from government perspective 
Discussion with local government officials revealed several advantages and disadvantages of 
weather index insurance from a government perspective. The advantages of weather index crop 
insurance from the government perspective were: 
• Local governments are actively looking for innovative crop insurance products in response 
to pressure from the central government. Officials in local government expressed interest 
and their expectations for weather index crop insurance. Thus they are willing to provide 
support in terms of propaganda, promotion, organization and coordination between 
departments.  
• The development of weather index crop insurance is seen as consistent with longer-term 
goals and trends about restructuring and modernisation of the agricultural sector. That is, the 
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instrument is perceived as particularly relevant to larger “professional” farmers as a key 
element of their risk management that may lead to various benefits such as access to finance. 
Thus different levels of government are amenable to support and encourage insurance 
companies to introduce weather index crop insurance in the belief that it will accelerate the 
appearance of “professional farmers”. In turn, “professional farmers” will increase the 
demand for weather index crop insurance.  
Conversely, government perceptions identified in the analysis that may hinder development of the 
weather index insurance include: 
• Weather index crop insurance was not seen as being able to replace the current policy-
oriented agricultural insurance product as the weather index crop insurance product is not 
mature and the premium that most farmers can afford is still uncertain. The current policy-
oriented agricultural insurance is designed as a safety net policy to compensate for non-
labour costs under adverse production conditions enabling households to recover as quickly 
as possible. Thus governments are cautious about removing this safety net without a well-
designed, tested and improved instrument in place.  
• The financial capacity of local government in many rural areas is very poor and so they do 
not have the capacity or willingness to direct large subsidies towards weather index crop 
insurance at the expense of other financial commitments and development priorities. 
Furthermore these priorities and objectives may not necessarily be the same at all levels of 
government. Thus even if high subsidies are only required in the initial stages to promote 
awareness and achieve a critical level of participation, local governments cannot commit to 
these subsidies or guarantee that all reasonable and unreasonable requirements of insurance 
companies or farmers are met.  
8.1.2 Pros and cons from a technical perspective 
A significant correlation between weather variables and crop yields was observed in Chapter 4 
providing a sound underpinning for a weather index crop insurance instrument. However, insights 
gained in conducting the investigation revealed several advantages and disadvantages associated 
with the design of the weather index insurance instrument. The advantages can be summarized as: 
• Weather index crop insurance requires no on-farm loss assessment. This is a primary 
advantage as on-farm loss assessment can be complex and costly and may not be a credible 
process in practice. Weather index crop insurance based on measurements of weather station 
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data and with no field loss assessment allows rapid payouts which will be welcomed by 
households. 
• Weather index crop insurance can avoid adverse selection and moral hazard as all insured 
farmers within the defined area have the same insurance payout conditions regardless of 
their specific risk exposure. With weather index crop insurance, actions of individual 
farmers that may have left them exposed to higher levels of risk but that were hidden from 
the insurance companies or government agencies under previous insurance arrangements, 
would now be felt by farmers. Similarly there is no benefit in individual farmers trying to 
influence or present fraudulent claims. All policyholders in the defined area will be treated 
equally.  
• The operational and transaction costs are potentially low. Weather index crop insurance 
requires limited individual underwriting. It can be distributed, and claims settled, at a 
relatively low cost. The policyholder has direct access to the information on which the 
payouts will be calculated. Trust will be strengthened by transparency and timely payments. 
• The weather index crop insurance contract, as framed in this study, is designed to go beyond 
the low safety net provisions and coverage of production costs with the current policy-
oriented agricultural insurance product and instead provide a level of income protection and 
encourage farmers to manage their own risks.  
The disadvantages of weather index crop insurance product from a technical and design perspective 
are: 
• Basis risk in weather index crop insurance is a key constraint. Basis risk is the difference 
between the loss experienced by the farmer and the payout triggered by the weather-yield 
model. This means that affected farmers might not receive compensation, while non-
affected farmers might receive compensation. The basis risk is influenced by several factors: 
(1) local variations in the weather within the defined area surrounding a weather station; (2) 
accuracy of the empirical weather yield relationships may be influenced by the quality of 
cross-sectional and time series crop yield data and weather information, as well as the 
correlation between weather factors; (3) the impact of non-weather factors and the 
interaction of weather and non-weather factors could influence the stability of weather-yield 
correlations, such as crop varieties, technology, different management skills, and climate 
change. In practice, crop varieties are often mixed, farming practices are often suboptimal 
and highly variable, and information on actual planting dates is often inaccurate and lacks 
conformity in any given area. Therefore choosing the right weather variables in the model is 
critical but is also conditional on choosing a set of variables that align with agronomic 
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knowledge and that are tractable from a design perspective. Furthermore, the model must be 
statistically robust and be scientifically grounded and have the confidence of insurance 
companies and policyholders (farmers). 
• To be a tractable instrument, the weather index crop insurance contract normally covers only 
one or, sometimes, several weather indexes. If farmers are exposed to a large number of 
influential weather variables, weather index crop insurance may not be able to provide the 
coverage to satisfy their comprehensive risk management needs. 
• To limit the extent of basis risk and devise a tractable instrument, the triggers, premiums, 
and payouts for a specific product need to be carefully designed around the weather 
parameters of each weather station. Furthermore different crops will be exposed to different 
weather risks necessitating different designs. Thus substantial technical design work and 
ongoing assessment of the instruments are needed if they are to be sustained.  
8.1.3 Pros and cons from householders’ perspective 
Analysis of the interviews with households and village leaders as reported in Chapter 6 revealed 
several favorable perspectives on weather index crop insurance including: 
• The current policy-oriented agricultural insurance product has some serious problems 
including on-farm damage assessment and low compensation levels which discourages 
farmers to insure.  Since policy-oriented agricultural insurance has not captured the attention 
of farmers, publicity about weather index crop insurance and the design of a rational and 
targeted contract will be essential in the promotion of weather index crop insurance.   
• Crop production is no longer the only source of income for many farm households with 
younger members of many households finding jobs in the city. Correspondingly, from the 
village leader interviews, the opportunity costs of farmers’ time are increasing because they 
have more income sources from non-agricultural activities compared to before. Households 
are seeking time-efficient risk management strategies and weather index insurance fits into 
this category relative to many of the other risk management strategies described in Section 
6.2.2.   
Among the major adverse perspectives on weather index crop insurance by households and village 
leaders were: 
• The survey revealed that the important risks farmers faced were medical, pension, children’s 
education followed then by crop production risk. Furthermore the survey revealed that the 
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strategies households use to cope with crop production risks most commonly involve 
absorbing the risk themselves or receiving help from relatives or friends.  
• Major factors affecting farmers’ interests in weather index crop insurance were identified as 
education level, risk recognition, and the ratio of agricultural income to total household 
income, as well as the level of premiums and government subsidies. Although the ratio of 
agricultural income to total household income was shown in Section 6.3 to have a positive 
impact on farmers’ interest in weather index crop insurance, and the affordability of 
insurance is growing with the improvement in farmers’ incomes, the effective demand from 
farmers for weather index crop insurance will still be influenced by their limited education, 
generally poor awareness of insurance products, small areas, and relatively low profitability 
of crop production. 
8.1.4 Pros and cons from insurance company perspective 
The interviews with the insurance company representatives highlighted several favourable 
perspectives on weather index insurance namely:  
• Crop insurance has always been plagued by problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. 
As insurance companies are most likely to be impacted by the information asymmetries that 
lie behind these problems, they have been reticent to fully engage with crop insurance in 
China. Weather index crop insurance can eliminate much of the adverse selection and moral 
hazard problem, and reduce the business risk of the insurance companies through 
transparent procedures and cost savings.  
• From the insurance companies’ perspective, the main data prerequisites in the defined area 
are considered sufficient to implement weather index crop insurance. More than 40 years of 
historical weather data and 30 years of crop yield data are available. The weather station is 
usually close to the farmlands with a 20km radius covering the vast majority of villages. 
More than 16 weather parameters can be monitored by automated equipment, while there 
are professional meteorological staffs that can provide services for data cleansing and 
interpretation.  
• Insurance companies are interested in covering the loss of income based on yield losses at a 
fixed value per unit of yield and weather index crop insurance is perceived as a potentially 
useful way of doing this, although this is not specific to weather index crop insurance.  
• Insurance companies have begun to expand their distribution networks in rural areas and 
perceive that establishing a direct delivery channel for weather index crop insurance would 
212	  
	  
be preferable to depending on local government or insurance intermediary or financial 
institution.  
The primary concerns of the insurance companies relate to: 
• Expansion of the crop insurance market in China is being driven by the strong support of 
national government with payouts remaining high. This is caused by the specificity of 
agriculture and the insurance industry and will affect profit margins for insurance companies 
offering crop insurance.  
• Farmers’ trust of insurance companies is not great and is a serious problem for weather 
index crop insurance given the lack of basic knowledge of such products. Running a strong 
promotion and demonstration campaign and building trust is seen as crucial to implementing 
the scheme. 
• The high initial investment in research and development of weather index insurance 
products might not be recouped given the ease with which competitors could copy products 
if they prove profitable. This non-excludability discourages many companies from making 
the initial investment in new product development especially in underdeveloped markets. 
Private insurers may be particularly wary of this issue as they may not be subsidized and 
may miss the opportunities and any benefits that public insurers have as early movers. While 
there is still a belief that weather index crop insurance may enable costs to be reduced, 
experience has shown that the upfront development costs of this product are very high. 
Various factors are behind this including the need to hire expensive consultants and have 
them present in the local area to work with stakeholders, the extensive costs associated with 
building the capacity of the local insurers, and the costs incurred in educating potential 
policyholders about these products so that they can make an informed decision on whether 
to buy the product or not. Without a dramatic scale-up in the number of policyholders, 
amortizing these upfront costs will be challenging and may dissipate any real advantage that 
this product might have over other traditional forms of insurance.  
 
8.2 Integrative analysis  
Weather index crop insurance is a complex insurance product requiring a high degree of technical 
and actuarial knowledge, financial skill, and public-private enterprise capacity. These requirements 
are necessary at the design stage, as well as during monitoring and product adaptation to real 
cropping situations. Furthermore the perceptions of the many different stakeholders about weather 
index crop insurance highlighted in Section 8.1 need to be taken into account. This section attempts 
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to integrate these factors to reveal insights into the feasibility of introducing weather index crop 
insurance to China. 
 
Figure 8-1 Schematic diagram of four main stakeholders’ interaction 
 
The four overlapping circles in Figure 8-1 represent the interests of government, insurance 
companies, technology providers, and farmers separately and in an integrated way. This figure also 
attempts to display a dynamic nature of their relationships and especially in relation to the feasible 
region for weather index crop insurance as shown in the enclosed area ABCD on the right hand side 
of	  Figure 8-1.  
First, analysis of the farmer surveys, village leader interviews, and insurance company interviews 
indicated that the overlap of interests between households and insurance companies might be absent 
at present. This means that a weather index crop insurance product is unlikely to be sustained or 
operate at a widespread level due to the limited level of education, weak awareness of crop 
insurance, lack of trust in insurance company, and small-scale and low profit character of crop 
production of the farmers, while the insurance companies are profit-oriented, concerned about the 
data authenticity as well as the high initial investment. Without the influence of government (blue 
circle), the overlap portion of farmers and the insurance company would be smaller or not evident at 
all. The purely commercial operation of weather index crop insurance program is unlikely to be 
realized without some form of government involvement. Thus, under the current conditions, as 
displayed in the left graph of Figure 8-1, there is no intersection between the household circle and 
insurance company circle in the left. Over time, however, the education level of rural farmers will 
upgrade because of the nine-year compulsory education policy while the scale of crop production 
will be expanded because of the recent land transfer policy. On the other hand, insurance companies 
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are committed to improve farmers’ trust in the product and company. Thus, the circles or sets 
representing households and insurance companies are most likely to move together in the future, 
although the overlap portion (enclosed area MABNCD in Figure 8-1) may still be small.  
Second, the analysis of the macro policy environment and interviews with local government 
officials indicated a strong overlap in interests between farmers and government. Thus weather 
index crop insurance product is likely to be financially supported by central government and 
administratively promoted by local government. Given the importance the Chinese government has 
attached to the “farmer, agriculture and rural” issues in recent times, and specific concerns relating 
to supporting crop production and stabilizing farmers’ income, government at all levels are actively 
promoting the implementation of policy-oriented agricultural insurance, while the central 
government is positively guiding and supporting local government to develop their own specialty 
crop insurance products. Therefore, in Figure 8-1 the overlap of interests between households and 
governments is shown as large at present (as shown on the left), and growing bigger in future 
(enclosed area EJBCDM). 
Third, interviews with insurance practitioners and government officers revealed that the overlap of 
interests between government and insurance company is small. In the right hand side of Figure 8-1 
this intersection becomes moderate, although it is smaller than the overlap of interests between the 
government and farmers (enclosed area HMABCK compared with EJBCDM in Figure 8-1). 
Farmers are considered a vulnerable group and crop production a disadvantaged industry, needing 
and dependent on government’s protection and support, while the collaboration between insurance 
companies and government is more likely to be built on a commercial basis. Even for quasi-state 
companies (or shareholding companies with officials being major shareholders), the government 
has no obligation to protect or guarantee their profits. To date, the programs that affect this enclosed 
area EJBCDM include policy-oriented agricultural insurance, rural cooperative medical insurance, 
and rural social endowment insurance. One common feature of these three programs is that they 
attract high premium subsidies from the central government, because they were seen by government 
as an important means of transfer payments for farmers.  
Fourth, the analysis finds that the interests among household, insurance company and government 
change from a ‘non-overlapping state’ to an ‘overlapping state’ shown as the enclosed area 
MABCD in Figure 8-1. Weather index crop insurance is seen as a supplement to rather than 
replacement, at least in the short run, to the current crop insurance market. It is difficult to foresee 
how much the central and provincial government would subsidize weather index crop insurance, 
and there is no empirical evidence to prove that if the current funding used for policy insurance was 
215	  
	  
transferred instead to weather index insurance that a premium acceptable to farmers but which 
allowed insurance companies to operate at a profit could be achieved. In the future, however, a 
weather index crop insurance product is likely to be sustained with government support, because the 
central and provincial government are conducive to providing ongoing policy support and funding 
while the local government can play a role in promotion and organising activities such as 
departmental coordination. On the one hand, government involvement and premium subsidies from 
central and provincial government will stimulate the uptake of weather index crop insurance by 
farmers, (and so the circle/set of farmers in Figure 8-1 will shift to the right), while, on the other 
hand, tax incentives and assistance in implementation by local governments will motivate the 
insurance companies (moving the circle of the insurance company in Figure 8-1 to the left).  
Fifth, because of the advantages in timeliness and a transparent claims procedure, no on-farm 
damage assessment, and having an attractive payment standard, weather index crop insurance can 
overcome the shortcomings of existing policy-oriented agricultural insurance, and is well positioned 
to meet the needs of contemporary farmers. However, the overlapping interest between farmer 
group and technology will be influenced by the basis risk and relatively narrow risk coverage of 
weather index insurance products. Due to the merits of avoiding moral hazard and adverse selection 
as well as reducing operational and transaction costs, insurance companies should be interested in 
weather index insurance products (enclosed area ABNFKD in	  Figure 8-1), although basis risk and 
technical challenges with the products will weaken the enthusiasm of insurance companies to 
participate. Thus the technical design of weather index insurance products needs to meet the 
requirements of farmers, as well as provide incentives or a new market option for insurance 
companies to supply.  
In summary, the integrated analysis discussed in this section indicates that purely commercial 
weather index crop insurance without government support is extremely unlikely to develop in China 
but may be possible if some of the premiums could be subsidised, given the otherwise favourable 
perceptions of weather index insurance by farmers and the insurance companies. Based on the 
empirical analysis in Huojia County, and using the calculated premium of 30 yuan/mu for weather 
index wheat insurance used in Chapter 4 as an example, the central and provincial government are 
likely to provide a similar proportion of premium subsidies for farmers according to the policy 
adopted by the central government and national insurance regulatory commission. An interpretation 
of that policy is that farmers only need to pay 35% of the premium or 10.5 yuan/mu. The interviews 
conducted with individual farmers and villager leaders indicated this price is within the acceptable 
range of most farmers. Under these circumstances, there is potential for the enclosed area ABCD to 
grow and the introduction of weather index crop insurance products should be feasible. 
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8.3 Activities, roles and responsibilities of key stakeholders 
Section 8.2 examined the feasibility of a weather index insurance program for wheat in Henan 
based on an integrated analysis of the policy environment (Chapter 4), technical relationships 
(Chapter 5) and the perceptions of farmers (section 6.2), village leaders (section 6.3), and insurance 
companies (Chapter 7) as well as the synthesized analysis in Section 8.1. While viability of the 
scheme is a necessary condition to introduce weather index crop insurance, it is not a sufficient 
condition. That is, there may be political and economic consensus, but the successful operation of a 
WII scheme also requires a conducive macro/institutional environment as well as detailed micro 
level initiatives and settings. This section focuses on the necessary macro settings.   
The analysis in Sections 8.1 and 8.2, and discussion in previous chapters, indicates that a public-
private partnership is likely to be at the core of any viable weather index insurance scheme in 
Huojia County. Figure 8-2 illustrates some key elements of how this public-private partnership 
might work.  
 
Figure 8-2 How public-private partnership works in a viable WII scheme 
This framework displays the mutual assistance process, and the process of transferring risk between 
the public and private actors. The insurance company sits at the centre of these arrangements and is 
a key driver of the weather index crop insurance program with feedback required both from farmers 
(in terms of the demand for the insurance and premiums they are prepared to pay) and from the 
government (in terms of institutional support and levels of premium subsidy) that will lead to 
successful introduction of the scheme. Farmers transfer their weather risk to the insurance company 
by paying a premium, but that premium is insufficient to cover the potential actuarial losses of the 
insurance company who have accepted the risk. Thus the government becomes a partner with the 
insurance company in sharing the risk through providing an operational subsidy.  
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Since weather index crop insurance is guided by both commercial and social objectives, the 
complex relationships between stakeholders will need to be addressed to make the project 
sustainable in the long run. In other words, it must be supported by all of the stakeholders who have 
differing roles and responsibilities for program success. Thus it is vital that the roles and 
responsibilities of the stakeholders are set out from the beginning. Key elements of these roles and 
responsibilities are highlighted in Figure 8-3.  
 
Figure 8-3 Key roles and responsibilities of stakeholders involved in promoting the feasibility 
of WII 
All of the activities and responsibilities outlined in Figure 8-3 and discussed below are not static but 
dynamic and are not independent of other stakeholders. Instead, they are intrinsically linked. Some 
roles and responsibilities are interchangeable, such as the roles of insurance companies and local 
government, while some cannot be replaced such as the role of central government. While having 
access to government support is important, the insurance companies emphasized that they do not 
want the government to intervene in the crop insurance and reinsurance business. The author 
believes that moderate government intervention is still necessary, at least in the initial stage, since 
weather index crop insurance is a complex business that requires technical expertise, both in 
development and operational phases. If insurance companies want to establish and maintain a 
leading position, they would have to complete the task as much as possible by themselves, such as 
setting up their own distribution channels in rural areas, so as to avoid involving the local 
government. 
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8.3.1 Activities, roles and responsibilities of central government 
If the central government is keen to incorporate weather index crop insurance into its support 
system for rural areas, along with provincial government, it will need to create a favourable 
environment conducive to the development of weather index crop insurance.  This could involve the 
following steps: 
Developing an enabling legal and regulatory system: Although there are some differences 
between weather index crop insurance and other forms of insurance, the general principles 
governing the regulation and supervision of insurance and insurance contracts are largely applicable 
to weather index crop insurance. Since there is no specialized crop insurance law in place, the 
general ‘Insurance Law’ and the ‘Agricultural Insurance Act’ (No 629) should be applied to 
weather index crop insurance, allowing for different provisions to be made where appropriate. For 
weather index crop insurance, several issues need to be considered in the development of provisions 
supporting or governing weather index crop insurance:  
• Should cooperatives or financial institutions such as microfinance institutions act as insurance 
agents and eventually retain some of the risk or pass excess risk on to the insurance industry, 
under proper supervision?  
• How to promote the ‘moral suasion’ approach in providing weather index crop insurance 
products? This product needs to be attractive to farmers as well as meeting the public and 
national interests. Voluntary insurance may not be able to achieve adequate spread of risk, and 
guarantee the healthy operation of its supply and consumption.  
• Whether to regulate market access and competition through legislation, judicial and executive 
supervision. The survey showed that regulators have realized the potential social benefits and 
are very supportive of efforts to develop weather index crop insurance, which has meant that 
obtaining operating permission from CIRC has been given priority. To ensure that products are 
fair to both buyers and sellers, the government should encourage all qualified insurance 
companies to participate in the pilot testing of weather index crop insurance, rather than have 
one insurance company designated by local government. In reality, there are only five 
insurance companies in Henan province with the qualification and capacity to be interested in 
offering weather index crop insurance. If there are no relevant provisions in place to determine 
business qualifications, more marginal and less reliable companies may be attracted to the 
industry increasing the risk of unfair practices. 
• Some authority should independently audit and regulate the behaviour of insurance companies 
and local government to prevent collusion between them and to avoid misuse of government 
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funds. In principle, weather index crop insurance is an effective mechanism designed to 
manage the risk of natural disasters. However, if the insurance company operates illegally, or 
if the regulatory measures of government fail, it is likely to become a high-cost option.  
Improve the financial support system: The survey findings did not support the argument that 
premium subsidies are always necessary to induce farmers to purchase crop insurance, and so the 
central government should carefully analyse the fiscal implications of the policy-oriented 
agricultural insurance program since as much as 80% of the original premium is subsidised. Such 
expensive public policy programs can place a major financial burden on government, particularly 
on local governments. Moreover, provision of large subsidies can distort price signals and provide 
inappropriate incentives to farmers to invest in unprofitable or excessively risky farming activities 
(Mahul and Stutley 2010). If introduced, new financial support for weather index crop insurance 
would compete with the co-funding by county and municipal governments and cause potential 
financial difficulties. The ‘bottom-up’ linkage mechanism (order of payment of premium subsidies 
is from county level to central government, see section 4.2.2) to subsidize policy-oriented 
agricultural insurance products can continue to be used for weather index crop insurance as the 
central and provincial government generally could afford to subsidy funds. As a result, the 
financing arrangements for weather index crop insurance could operate in the way that farmers pay 
their share first, followed by provincial government, and then central government. In order to 
improve the efficiency of subsidy funds, and avoid corruption at the county level, the unified billing 
system should originate in the provincial insurance company. The local insurance company would 
then transfer the premium income to the provincial insurance company, and any special subsidy 
funds would be transferred to the provincial insurance company.  If this financial support system 
could be supported by the regulator, it would encourage the partnership between high-level 
counterparts in this arena, leading to an official risk management environment, as well as market 
growth. 
Expand the range of government support: One necessary area for central government support is 
to continue improving weather station infrastructure and data systems. New technologies and better 
infrastructure can involve significant costs; however the benefits can also be substantial. It would 
help to improve the overall quality of meteorological data and strengthen agro-meteorological 
monitoring, forecasting and service systems, as well as accelerate projects in weather modification 
and enhance the ability to respond to climate change and improve the ecological environment. 
For a long time, the Chinese government has committed to “meteorological modernization” across 
the country. The improvement in meteorological services is not because weather index crop 
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insurance may be introduced but mainly for natural disaster planning and to improve weather 
information. Nevertheless, as the meteorological service is expanded and weather data improves, 
there will be spill over benefits in facilitating weather index crop insurance scheme. To fill data 
gaps, and enhance data availability and authenticity, new technologies and improved analytics 
should be encouraged which might include some or all of the following: remote sensing (of rainfall 
and vegetation), rainfall modelling and simulation, seasonal forecasting, techniques for modelling 
risk over time and space, modelling of long-term processes and trends, systematic communication 
tools, agricultural systems modelling and water resources modelling techniques.  
Facilitate access to reinsurance: While risk exposure may be small in the initial stages, the 
weather index insurance product is new and untested by many insurers, and so insurance companies 
are cautious about underwriting on their own. In order to alleviate the financial pressure of 
government and the operating risk on insurance companies, central government should investigate 
ways and means of engaging with reinsurance companies and other relevant organizations to 
provide favourable support for the dispersion of risk and secondary transfer. However, private 
commercial insurers often face reinsurance capacity constraints to underwriting systemic risks 
(Mahul and Stutley 2010), particularly for specialized lines of business, such as crop insurance. 
China Reinsurance (Group) Corporation has performed the function of “national reinsurance 
company” over the years in China, offering a number of reinsurance services for “quota share” and 
“excess of loss” for domestic insurance companies. As the insurer of insurers, China Reinsurance 
(Group) Corporation was jointly founded by Ministry of Finance of China and Central Huijin 
Investment Corporation with 15.1% and 84.9% shares respectively is the only state-owned 
reinsurance group in China with a paid up capital of RMB 36.408 billion (CRC 2014). It has long 
played a dominant and leading role in China’s insurance market, and has played a positive part in 
cultivating China’s reinsurance industry, facilitating the growth of the direct insurance market and 
supporting social and economic development. China Reinsurance (Group) Corporation has high-
level expertise in actuarial work, underwriting, claims procedures, risk management, product 
development and strategic research and development. .  
8.3.2 Activities, roles and responsibilities of local government 
Although central government has been actively promoting the development of crop insurance, the 
effect of policy is felt most at the local level and depends on the execution by local government. 
Thus, various kinds of support by local government need to be in place. The recommendations 
discussed here provide decision-makers with some basic activities, roles and responsibilities of 
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local government in four areas: coordinating local cooperation, reserving subsidy funds for 
insurance companies, increasing the local incentives, and educating farmers on the role of insurance.  
Coordinating local cooperation: Local government pays salaries to county level officials in line 
agencies (such as the Agricultural Bureau, Statistical Bureau, Meteorology Bureau, Finance Bureau, 
etc.) and so has some leverage in bringing officials from the different line agencies together. If the 
local government commits to help coordinate these sectors, a centralized database of historical 
agricultural and weather statistics could be created and managed, and it would be helpful to make 
the database available to all crop insurance practitioners. In regard to the subsequent provision of 
weather index data, the insurance companies can negotiate with the weather bureau to get an 
appropriate fee with the coordination of local government. Although they will not primarily service 
the needs for weather index crop insurance, the weather stations need ongoing maintenance, as well 
as skilled staff to process the raw weather information. Government funding may not be sufficient 
to cover all of these expenses, which is why the stations were allowed to charge a fee for providing 
weather information to commercial users. But the cost has been high, according to the information 
from this investigation. More importantly, such a long and complete set of historical weather data is 
considered confidential in China, which needs to be approved for release at any time. If local 
government could encourage the finance office to pay fully and on time, problems of arrears in 
premium subsidies would be reduced.  Coordination among government departments could help 
solve some of the bottlenecks that may hinder the future development of weather index crop 
insurance, as well as reduce the initial investment and management costs to the insurance company.  
Insurance company reserve funding: The fundamental reason why insurance companies are 
hesitant about developing crop insurance is their concern about huge losses in some catastrophic 
years, although the extent of their exposure and likely payout depends on the specific insurance 
contracts. Presumably the insurance companies should have reserve funds as a provision for high 
payouts in difficult years, but no company expects to sell a product that generates the risk of a high 
loss. With the existing policy-oriented agricultural insurance, the government has already assumed 
the obligation to compensate when the total payout in an area is more than twice their total 
premiums collected in that year. However, this guarantee is viewed as insufficient by the insurance 
companies who think that the government attempts to transfer most of its responsibility to support 
agriculture and protect farmers onto the insurance company. One proposal for weather index crop 
insurance may be that city and county governments offer a fixed management subsidy to the 
insurance company each year. In adverse years, the subsidy can be used to compensate partly the 
loss by the insurance company and ease their financial pressures. In profitable years, insurance 
companies need to retain any surplus as a catastrophe reserve fund to respond to future emergencies, 
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which could be monitored and managed by CIRC (China Insurance Regulatory Commission). Both 
catastrophe fund reserves and reinsurance should ensure the timely payment of claims for major 
losses, but as Muhul and Stutley (2010) noted, even with reinsurance in place, it may be necessary 
to develop catastrophe protection layers that involve government intervention. This protection 
depends on the comparison between the opportunity cost of holding reserves and the reinsurance 
premium. 
Increased tax incentives: Offering tax incentives to crop insurance companies are a common 
international practice. In China, the current policy of local government only mitigates the business 
tax and stamp duty for crop insurance business for the insurance company. The insurance company 
suggested that if the local government can increase the extent of tax incentives, such as giving 
preferential corporate income tax, should encourage commercial insurance companies to participate 
in this business.  It might also enhance their ability to provide compensation, but there are costs and 
benefits to this especially if local governments have few funds and many development projects. 
Reduced taxes may have a high opportunity cost, and so this policy recommendation depends on 
whether this is an effective use of the forgone revenue and whether local governments would be 
prepared to forego the income.  
Educate farmers on role of insurance:  While insurance companies will invest in promoting and 
delivering their products, they may be less willing to invest at socially optimum levels in educating 
farmers on the appropriate role of insurance. Thus support from government will increase the 
likelihood that information is presented in a balanced way and that sufficient investments are made 
in a broader educational effort for untested insurance products (Dick et al. 2011). Farmers have 
exhibited an interest in pursuing insurance that they perceive to have real benefits. However, one of 
the biggest obstacles to achieving scale in weather index crop insurance is the low level of 
awareness of insurance among small farmers. Thus improving farmers’ awareness of insurance in 
rural areas is critical. Weather index crop insurance is rarely mentioned by radio, television, 
newspapers and other news media to which farmers are usually exposed. Friends and relatives may 
know even less, because is harder to gather the relevant information on weather index crop 
insurance than for other types of insurance common in their daily lives. This does not automatically 
mean the government should use mass media to guide the whole society’s attention to weather 
index crop insurance. However, they should make full use of mass media to lay a good base on 
which to raise the enthusiasm of the majority of farmers to learn about this product.  
One piece of feedback from the fieldwork was to bring farmers together and pay them for their 
presence to learn about insurance, not only weather index crop insurance. It can be organized by 
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local government in each village, but the training should be done by technicians from the insurance 
companies, using simple but vivid words. This suggestion sounds attractive and is likely to help 
achieve the desired effect, although from an economics perspective, this education may not be cost 
effective, and it may not be adopted in most cases. 
8.3.3 Activities, roles and responsibilities of the insurance companies 
Through the interviews it was evident that insurance companies are interested in seeking the support 
of different levels of government to foster future sales of weather index crop insurance and possibly 
have it replace the current policy-oriented agricultural insurance product. The largest insurer that 
was interviewed, the People’s Insurance Company of China (PICC), also has a strong interest in 
entering this market. However, there are issues to be overcome before these insurance companies 
enter the market. 
Collect data and define transmission procedures:  The data used to construct the underlying 
weather indexes should meet several requirements, including reliability and trustworthiness, be 
collected daily with regular reporting procedures, periodic checks for quality control, and be subject 
to independent verification (e.g. with surrounding weather stations). Areas without access to 
weather data satisfying these criteria, or areas with poor spatial coverage, may not benefit from 
weather risk management products. Beyond the quality of data, definition of the boundaries of the 
area covered by the weather station is critical, so that weather index crop insurance contracts can be 
written for a specific area tied to a specific station. A general rule is to consider a specific weather 
index crop insurance contract marketable within a 20km radius of the weather station (Dick et al. 
2011), but in many cases the applicable area is smaller, because with variable terrain , the 
acceptable distance from a station decreases. 
Procedures must be defined for weather data collection and dissemination during the period covered 
by the contract. Insurance and reinsurance industries tend to require the use of automated weather 
stations and fall-back verification measurements from nearby stations with comparable weather 
patterns (Dick et al. 2011). Manual measurement of weather variables (e.g. through manual rain 
gauges) is not usually regarded as sufficiently reliable or secure. As a result, the installation of 
automatic weather stations in the pilot areas is encouraged. However, any installation of new 
weather stations must be accompanied by a comprehensive plan to build the supporting capacities 
for monitoring and maintenance.  
In addition, if local government is able to coordinate the cooperation of various sectors, the 
meteorology bureau could be appointed to facilitate the provision of weather data. Meteorological 
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technicians, agricultural scientists, crop modellers and economists would need to work together on 
the task of index calculation. However, it is important to ensure that any data purchased from the 
meteorology bureau can be shared among all parties involved in the project, including the insurers, 
insured farmers, local intermediaries, and so on. One strategy may be for the local government or 
higher level government to purchase the data (or meet any meteorological bureau costs) to ensure 
the data is shared, and this may be a better strategy or use of funds than providing tax incentives to 
the insurance companies. 
Design and validate weather index crop insurance contract: The aim of contract design is to 
define a structure that effectively captures the relationship between the weather variable and the 
potential crop loss and to select the index that is most effective in providing payouts when crop 
failures are experienced, while eliminating basis risk as far as possible. As shown in section 5.5, a 
number of structures have been developed around the world in pilot testing weather index insurance. 
In the design of a weather index crop insurance contract for winter wheat in Huojia County (see 
section 5.5), this research used an automatic payout triggered by a monthly measure of the weather 
index as an example. If more appropriate weather information can be obtained, the most suitable 
structure would appear to be a continuous payout triggered and limited by a cumulative measure of 
the weather variable for each of the different crop growth stages. From a technical point of view, 
design of weather index crop insurance contract is the most challenging part of developing a pilot 
program.  
From observation during the fieldwork, the local insurance company does not have the capability to 
conduct the necessary research and development activities but needs to work alongside research 
agencies and external experts. They can help to develop the specialized design skills among local 
insurance company staff.   
After the initial design, the contract needs to be evaluated by several rounds of discussion with 
village leaders, agricultural experts, industry leaders, as well as villagers, talking over the technical 
accuracy and practical considerations of the contract, a process likely to facilitate farmer’s 
acceptance and the marketing process simultaneously. The contract also needs approval by the 
China Insurance Regulatory Commission and given an operating license. The interviews revealed 
this to be a relatively straightforward task but a necessary step to access the market.  
Develop product distribution channels: The insurance industry noted that farmers are at different 
stages of development and demand for insurance, because of the income growth in the population 
and the demand for food safety, as well as the concerns about environmental deterioration and food 
quality. Thus some proactive insurance companies have started to expand their own networks in 
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rural areas, such as establishing sales offices at the township level and appointing sales 
representatives in each village. Although this distribution channel is not only for crop insurance, it 
will benefit the direct sales of weather index crop insurance, and so avoid over-reliance on local 
government or the village committee.  However, there is concern that the reputation of insurance 
companies in rural areas, including the study area, is poor, even if it is gradually improving. The 
majority of farmers interviewed either do not understand or lack awareness of insurance products, 
and most of them have little trust in insurance companies. To improve this situation, insurance 
companies that operate programs in these areas should settle claims quickly and identify partner 
organizations that farmers already trust, such as farmers’ own cooperatives, agricultural 
associations, and other similar non-governmental organizations. These services cannot be provided 
without cost or rely on an executive order. Instead the insurance company should pay certain costs 
or commissions to these organizations, as otherwise interference by local government will remain. 
Using existing networks would help reduce transaction costs and improve cost effectiveness by 
facilitating marketing and promoting local ownership activity, while avoiding local government 
intervention. 
Train salesman and educate farmers: The importance of raising awareness among farmers of 
insurance or crop insurance generally has been discussed previously. Information and education 
about more specific products may be the responsibility of the insurance company as ultimately they 
will be designing and selling these products. In a pre-implementation stage, insurance companies 
need to invest in training salesman, since farmers are more likely to believe an introduction by 
relatives and friends, village leaders, or other highly respected people in their village. Thus if 
insurance companies choose a respected person as a “champion” for their products, the first 
important thing to do is educate these village “champions”. They also need to educate their 
salespeople about their code of conduct, so they do not mislead farmers. 
Given the farmers’ distrust of insurance companies, initial information sessions could benefit from 
hiring agricultural experts and meteorologists to introduce the concept of weather risk in crop 
production, rather than have it promoted by the insurance company. After households are made 
aware of the opportunities, insurance salesmen or village “champions” can use typical cases taken 
from “neighbours” to help the farmers understand the function and significance of weather index 
crop insurance.  
Access to re-insurance: After introducing weather index crop insurance product, the insurance 
company usually bears the costs of responding to large-scale disasters, which is transferred to it 
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from government. If the risk can be reinsured, it might ensure ex-ante risk dispersion and a rapid 
response by the insurance company in the event of a disaster.  
Reinsurers (which almost always operate internationally) can also provide some technical support to 
the insurer. In many cases, it is important to have the interest of at least one reinsurer in order to 
promote the necessary enabling environments at the macro level.  This might be done jointly with 
the government. As mentioned previously, the role of central government can facilitate access to 
reinsurance, and the central government may be able to assist in gaining the interest of China 
Reinsurance (Group) Corporation to partner in a comprehensive index insurance program.  The 
insurance companies have also been encouraged to attract the interest of some major international 
reinsurers including Munich Reinsurance Company, Swiss Reinsurance Company, and LIoyd’s 
Reinsurance. These three companies are the top three reinsurance companies in the international 
reinsurance market. They have long coveted the Chinese reinsurance market, and received permits 
to set up branches in China in the second half of 2003. Such international reinsurers may want to 
understand the business development plan, as well as the prospects for long-term business and 
relationship development. They will be interested in a programme that is properly designed and 
adequately priced, using international standards. However, the initial stages in establishing 
reinsurance can be a barrier if underwriting research or assistance needs to the insurer are high, but 
anticipated premium volumes are still relatively low.  
 
8.4 Operational matters for weather index crop insurance 
Apart from the broad roles and responsibilities of central government, local governments and 
interested insurance companies, a series of detailed operational matters needs to be in place before 
an effective weather index crop insurance product could be introduced These matters are often 
overlooked in the discussion about the relative merits of different insurance and risk management 
instruments but are integral to their feasibility. The operating framework for weather index crop 
insurance in a local area is shown in Figure 8-4.  
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The key micro-level aspects surrounding the operation of weather index crop insurance are: 
Farmers’ payment of premium 
The process of farmers paying the weather index crop insurance premium is broken into six steps, 
as marked in Figure 8-4. 
1) Interested insurance companies, including branches in the county and retail sales outlets in the 
townships, deliver and hand out promotional material (including the significance of crop 
insurance, introduction of weather index crop insurance, purchase processes, preferential 
measures, principal terms, and so on) as well as application forms to the sales representatives in 
the village. If possible, as discussed in section 7.3.5, they can also deliver the promotion 
material to other possible intermediaries like fertilizer suppliers and producer associations, or 
financial institutions such as Rural Credit Union and Postal Savings Bank of China. They can 
also help to promote the weather index crop insurance product to their customers. 
2) The sales representatives in each village, and any intermediaries or financial institutions, have a 
responsibility to hand out promotional material and explain the application forms to interested 
households.  This promotional activity can be conducted by whole villages, among small groups, 
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Figure 8-4 Operational framework for weather index crop insurance at County level 
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even by house-to-house calling. They should elaborate on the specific insurance policy that sets 
out the premiums, insured amount, risk coverage, and claims procedures.   
3) The village representative will also need to collect the insurance premiums and householder’s 
information (including personal information, the farmland area and crops planted for each 
participating household).   Normally the farmland area for each household can be obtained from 
the village committee, and it will not change within a 10-year or longer period. Thus the 
representative can verify the information that the households report with the information from 
the village committee. Divergences can then be discussed between the representative and 
householders as the precise area and location of wheat planted needs to be written in the 
insurance policy, so the households can be paid out according to the policy. If necessary, the 
representative can go to the field to measure the actual mu to avoid disputes in claims procedure. 
After verification, the representative can establish a file for his village, which can also be used 
in the following years. As part of collecting the insurance premiums, the representative 
completes the application form and stamps it.  
4) After the premium and policyholders’ information is collected, the sales representative hand the 
file to the insurance company that takes over the insurance obligation from the date of receiving 
the premium. 
5) Once the insurance company at county level receives the premiums and individual households’ 
information, they should verify the applications and have the right to refuse any false or high-
risk applications, approve legitimate applications and issue an official insurance policy for each 
household within a specified period, such as 7 days.  
6) The sales representative then distributes the official insurance policy to each household which 
farmers sign for, so they have formal evidence to receive compensation in the future. The 
insurance company should ensure that the policies reach each household. 
 
Government subsidised premiums 
After the paperwork underwriting the risk is completed, the remaining task for the local insurance 
company is to apply for the subsidies that each level of government committed to make (steps 7-9 
and shown by the arrow in Figure 8-4). 
7) Insurance company summarizes the county transactions information and reports to the 
municipal level of the insurance company which also needs to summarize and transfer the city’s 
overall transaction information and premiums to the provincial level of the company.   
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8) After receiving the transaction information and farmers’ premiums, the insurance company at 
province level applies for the premium subsidy from the provincial finance department (for 
example, 25% of the total crop insurance premiums if the same level of support as policy-
oriented agricultural insurance is made). Within a prescribed period, the provincial finance 
department should pay the correct proportion as a subsidy directly to the provincial insurance 
company.  
9) Next, according to the summarized provincial transaction information, the provincial insurance 
company can apply for the subsidy from central government (for example, 40% of the total crop 
insurance premium if the same support as policy-oriented agricultural insurance applies). The 
national finance department will verify and appropriate the subsidy funding within the 
prescribed period. 
 
Insurance company payment of claims 
Compared with policy-oriented agricultural insurance whose operational processes are attached as 
Appendix 5, the claim settlement process for weather index crop insurance is much simpler, as steps 
10-12 and the arrow in Figure 8-4 indicates.  
10) The particular local meteorological office collects the specified weather data, processes and 
delivers it to insurance company at county level. It should also be available to insured 
households. Farmers do not need to complete any application to claim compensation, and 
insurance company does not need to do the on-farm assessment to verify the damage or the 
claim request of farmers.  
11) With the real-time weather measured at the meteorology station, once it meets the pre-specified 
index threshold, the insurance company will compute the payouts, and deliver them 
automatically to the sales representative in each village.  
12) To complete the process, the sales representative hands out the payments according to the 
signed insurance policies, and the villagers with an insurance policy will receive their 
corresponding compensation from the sales representative. To make these transactions more 
efficient, the premiums and any payouts can be made via the householders’ bank accounts. The 
fieldwork confirmed that each household has a special bank account to receive the annual grain 
subsidies from central government, so steps 11 and 12 can be omitted. 
Weather index crop insurance could simplify the transaction procedures compared to current policy-
oriented agricultural insurance as the insurance company does not need to arrange on-farm damage 
assessment and farmers do not need to make the claim application. The insurance company can 
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determine any payout based on the pre-specified conditions of the contract and the weather index 
information from local weather station. Thus, operating costs are reduced, and farmers have no 
ability or incentive to influence the claim.  Compensation is based on independent confirmation of 
the area of their crop and exogenous weather information. It is independent of farmers’ behaviour 
and thereby reduces the possibility of moral hazard and adverse selection. In addition, the whole 
process, as far as possible, is independent of the administrative powers of local government, which 
would help to ensure the dominant role of the insurance company in any weather index crop 
insurance project. 
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9 Concluding remarks  
Four key areas of reflection from the analysis of weather index crop insurance in Henan Province of 
China are canvassed in this chapter. These include reflections on: (1) the viability of weather index 
insurance in China; (2) differences between the theory and practice of weather index crop insurance; 
(3) the methods used to investigate weather index crop insurance; and (4) the scope of the study. 
9.1 Viability of weather index crop insurance in China 
Compared with existing crop insurance in China, weather index crop insurance exhibits some 
distinct theoretical advantages, namely: simplified procedures; reduced transaction costs; avoidance 
of some problems associated with asymmetric and imperfect information; and fairness and equity.  
Based on the discussion in Chapter 8, weather index crop insurance does appear to be a potentially 
viable option for winter wheat growers in Huojia County of Henan province: technical relationships 
between winter wheat yields and weather indicators are apparent; households exhibit a moderate but 
potentially increasing demand; insurance companies, as the supplier of the insurance, are optimistic 
about the prospects of weather index crop insurance and that the challenges can ultimately be 
overcome; while government, as the “broker”, have also indicated their conditional support. 
However, the generally positive perceptions about the viability of weather index crop insurance 
identified in this study may not necessarily be universal because:  a) not all weather events that 
cause significant crop losses, such as hail, can be indexed; b) not all regions may exhibit the 
relatively uniform weather patterns across the county that Huojia county does making it hard to 
come up with an accurate index; c) areas at high risk of adverse weather events may be unsuited to 
weather index crop insurance because of the high premiums needed to make the insurance scheme 
viable,  while insurance may not be necessary in areas where there is minimal weather risk. In these 
more extreme cases, other approaches such as a disaster relief approach may be more effective; d) 
weather index crop insurance may only be relevant where crop yields are strongly related to 
weather rather than other factors such as soil nutrition and crop varieties; and e) purely commercial 
insurance may not be viable or able to cope with the small scale and scattered location of farmers in 
China due to systemic risk and cost issues, with private insurance markets with government support 
being the likely feasible model. Thus, weather index crop insurance will be more applicable to areas 
with medium weather risks, relatively uniform farming systems, and more importantly, where crop 
yields are strongly correlated to a weather index but where the specified weather index does not 
have strong spatial characteristics.  
Therefore, the scale-up of weather index crop insurance in China will face many challenges because 
of the complicated weather and biophysical environment in crop-growing regions in China. The 
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design phase of the scheme for particular localities, farming systems and agro-ecological and agro-
climatic conditions will be crucial. Failure to attend to details in this design phase may lead to 
various problems both in the short-term, regarding suitability of the instrument, and in the longer 
term, because of distrust of insurance companies and sub-optimal risk management strategies.  
9.2 Reflections on theory versus practice 
The use of financial tools to insure farmers against weather related risk has been a prominent and 
topical issue in China because of the threat to farmers’ incomes and national food security imposed 
by the frequent occurrence of extreme weather events. A comprehensive study of weather index 
crop insurance provides important insights in the investigation of a new wave of agricultural 
insurance instruments in China. Theoretically, weather index crop insurance may provide an 
effective risk management aid for farmers, a safer and less expensive business for insurers, and a 
suitable alternative or complement to existing government-oriented crop insurance programs.  
Weather index crop insurance relies on recorded weather data that is generally available and reliable 
while there is no need to track yields, crop, or financial losses. This overcomes a series of 
difficulties faced in the development of existing agricultural insurance such as moral hazard and 
adverse selection, technical issues in post-disaster inspections, loss assessments and claims 
processing, high transaction costs and associated problems with fraud and corruption. The study 
sought to assess these theoretically potential gains in the case of weather index crop insurance in 
Henan.  
While, in principle, weather index insurance offers a range of theoretical advantages over other 
forms of agricultural insurance, in practice, various details need to be considered and challenges to 
overcome if the advantages are to be realised. Weather index crop insurance is a complex line of 
business that requires technical expertise and good coordination, both in the development and 
operational phases. Thus apart from investigating the theoretical issues underpinning weather index 
crop insurance instrument, this thesis has also focussed on issues surrounding practical 
implementation.  
Despite a rigorous statistical analysis of the crop yield—weather relationship, the study was unable 
to come up with a simple metric or index that could be employed in a workable weather index crop 
insurance scheme. Furthermore this study is a one-off investigation whereas in a working weather 
index crop insurance scheme, the relationship would need to be updated on an ongoing basis as 
information accumulates. Thus insurance companies without agronomic, economic, and actuarial 
skills, or technology and external resources to help model or ascertain these weather-yield 
correlations, might need to engage external agents to assist with the technical design of weather 
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index crop insurance instruments. They also need to improve the technical capability of staff within 
the insurance companies to appropriately interpret this information.  
The survey of households revealed that the majority of farmers lack awareness and understanding of 
weather index insurance but, at the same time, most are not satisfied with the current insurance 
product and so have expectations about the development of a new product. To engage farmers, the 
weather index crop insurance product will need to cover the weather risks of most concern to them 
at an affordable and acceptable price as well as to receive appropriate and attractive compensation 
once the pre-specified weather conditions occur.  
Interviews with the local insurance companies revealed that insurers are currently finding it difficult 
to cope with the existing policy-oriented agricultural insurance. To be a driving force in weather 
index crop insurance, insurance companies must first build the trust of potential policyholder by 
settling claims quickly and identifying partner organizations that farmers already trust. In addition, 
insurance companies need to devote more attention to client education and sales training, especially 
when they are relying on sales representative to promote their weather index crop insurance product. 
However, all these preparatory works incur their own costs and weighing the relative costs and 
benefits will be crucial. Smaller and more recent insurance companies are likely to seek help from 
local government, while the larger, comprehensive, and more established insurance companies 
would use their existing sales channels already established for other products, because the added 
costs can be shared among the different products.    
In theory weather index crop insurance might be a good way to meet government objectives to 
assist farmers cope with weather conditions and events, but in practice governments will always 
react to weather events/disasters and their reactive policies and measures may run counter to what is 
intended with the weather index crop insurance product. Nevertheless, this study provides valuable 
information if the government is thinking about modifying or extending the current crop insurance 
instruments or disaster relief measures. 
9.3 Reflection on methods and methodology  
Both quantitative and qualitative methods were employed in the study. Qualitative analysis was 
helpful in framing the study and providing context for the quantitative analysis, while the 
quantitative analysis provided some empirical rigour. Both are closely connected and 
complementary. 
The main elements of the quantitative analysis concern the relevance of weather changes to crop 
yield as well as the importance of other factors that affect farmers’ willingness-to-pay for particular 
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insurance instruments.  Mathematical and statistical techniques were used to discern the empirical 
relationships between recorded weather data and crop yields. While much of the crop yield and 
weather data are available through various sources, there are still many challenges in the analysis of 
this aggregate time series data. Aggregate data, such as mean crop yields from the whole village and 
a weather index that was the mean of several months’ rainfall, revealed yield trends from village to 
village across years and weather variations from month to month across years. This research 
avoided some of the aggregation issues associated with using township/county/city level crop yield 
data and aggregated yearly weather data that can distort the apparent relationship between crop 
yields and weather determined by regression analysis.  Perhaps better results could be obtained with 
less aggregated data, by using individual household farm level data and daily weather to establish 
the relationship.  
The qualitative information primarily came from surveys and interviews with householders, village 
leaders, insurance company and local government officials. The household surveys used a 
standardized questionnaire with fixed coded responses, although there was provision as well for 
open-ended responses to be coded later. The surveys and interviews were conducted for different 
purposes, but they provided insights into the trade-offs between large-scale surveys and limited but 
in-depth interviews and case studies. Large-scale surveys aim to ensure that data will be more 
representative of the population in an area. It is useful when looking for explanations, the nature of 
which can be relatively well specified in advance. Conversely, detailed personal interviews are best 
for exploring how both the problem and possible solutions are constructed and enables the research 
to be driven more by the nature of the data.  This is important in the Chinese context as many 
Chinese scholars often employ the technique of sending out surveys to a large number of people but 
without a lot of thought given to the questions being asked or how the information should be 
interpreted. 
Quantitative analysis can identify the nature and strength of relationships and quantify the degree of 
variation, correlation and impact which are important in establishing the empirics of particular 
measures or instruments and move beyond a conceptual discussion of them. However, quantitative 
analysis can be mechanical, and the empirical results often need to be interpreted in the context of 
qualitative studies. The qualitative dimension revealed insights into the subjective perceptions and 
attitudes associated explicitly or implicitly with weather index crop insurance and the factors that 
impact on its implementation. It involved building tangible views of the practitioners’ perceptions 
and enables the researcher to observe face-to-face interactions. The process seeks to elicit the full 
scope of attitudes and perceptions, thereby grounding the research in the contextual environment 
and enabling a verification of impressions, understanding, and interpretations. The author’s 
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experience was one of discovery, contemplation, and an endless process of iterative reflection in 
assessing the case for public-private partnerships in the development of weather index crop 
insurance within a particular geographic, social, and economic context.  
9.4 Reflections on scope and limitation of study  
The study design facilitated an in-depth investigation of weather index crop insurance. Huojia 
County has relatively uniform topography and farming systems dominated by winter wheat. 
Seasonal and year-to-year variations in weather conditions, even with irrigation, do impact on 
wheat yields. Village level crop production and yields for all villages in Huojia County, along with 
weather information from the local meteorological station, were available to explore the 
relationship between weather indicators and wheat yields. However, several limitations became 
apparent in the course of the study. In particular, the statistical analysis indicated that village 
specific factors (such as leadership and management skills) appeared to be influencing the yields 
across the villages. Identifying the specific nature of these factors and their impact on the weather-
yield relationship is not straightforward and essentially beyond the scope of this study. However on 
the basis that accurate weather-yield relationship are essential for effective weather index insurance 
and its parameters (premiums, triggers, payouts), a closer examination of village specific influences 
other than weather would appear warranted in any future study and before implementation of such 
instruments. 
The holistic nature of the analysis required information to be gathered from a wide range of 
stakeholders in order to understand the key challenges—institutional, financial, technical and 
operational—confronting weather index crop insurance markets. Particular emphasis was placed on 
in-depth interviews with selected stakeholders to understand the nuances of the issues surrounding 
weather index crop insurance. However, the inevitable constraints to a PhD study of time and cost, 
distance, and accessibility to government officials and insurance company managers, and the 
requirement to have local government staff guide the investigation, limited the number of in-depth 
interviews that could be included in the study. In addition, and for similar reasons, the study 
focussed on winter wheat only and overlooked other crops such as corn and rice. Furthermore, 
farmers are beginning to produce more high-value crops, including vegetables, oilseed crops and 
fruits. These “new” commodities have the potential to produce lucrative revenues, but they are also 
more susceptible to the negative impact of adverse weather conditions. However their yields are 
influenced in different ways by weather events compared to wheat, and similar investigations to this 
study would need to be carried out for those crops if weather index insurance were to be introduced 
for them.  
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Furthermore, the surveyed households do not represent all farmers in Huojia County, Huojia 
County does not represent all counties in Henan province, and Henan province does not represent 
the whole country. The village leaders interviewed in the study were selected according to the 
distance of their village from the weather station, and were neither the richest nor poorest villages.  
In addition, according to the county’s economic and social development evaluation system, Huojia 
County ranked 64th in 108 counties of Henan province in 2010. Thus Huojia County can be 
considered as representative of others in Henan and the central plains of China. In addition, there 
are also some limitations in the questionnaire design worth to be highlighted, such as inquiring the 
land quality and crop yield in question 10 and 25 of household survey because one family always 
has several blocks of land include good land and bad land in a village, and farmers usually did not 
know the average yield in the county, thus it is difficult for farmers to answer this kind of questions. 
There are several related areas of research that were beyond the immediate scope of this study but 
may be worthwhile fields of research endeavour building on the research in this study. They include 
research on how access to insurance affects input usage, crop selection and other agricultural 
investment choices with the potential to contribute important insights in technology adoption, risk 
management, and broader development issues. Another key, and so far underexplored, area of 
research on weather index crop insurance is how crop insurance, through lowering income 
variability and smoothing consumption, affects decisions made in relation to education, health, and 
other important aspects of household well-being. Additional research could also examine specific 
aspects of product design and how they impact on uptake. Other evaluations could consider 
different versions of the insurance product and different trigger levels, periods of coverage, 
proximity to weather stations, and coverage for different types of weather events to facilitate 
comparative analysis of important product design features.  
9.5 Concluding remarks 
Small-scale farmers in rural China still experience relatively low incomes. Weather index insurance 
cannot resolve the problems of low incomes within the sector and the Chinese government is 
targeting other measures to address the income problem. Instead, weather index crop insurance may 
assist these farmers to manage the risks associated with their crop production. It is these risks that 
make the livelihoods of these farmers most vulnerable. Furthermore the risks have increased as 
farming systems have intensified, become more specialised in efforts to improve incomes, and as 
farmers have become more engaged in the cash economy. Although this study has highlighted the 
many challenges faced in implementing weather index insurance in China, it may play an important 
role in the future in assisting rural households manage their risks as the farming systems continue to 
change. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Survey of Villager leader to Assess Insurance Demand 
 
Note to Respondents: 
First of all I really appreciate you sharing the time to talk with us, which would take approximately 
1-1.5 hours. The survey I am conducting is part of fieldwork for my PhD study being conducted 
under the supervision of The University of Queensland in Australia. I am interested in collecting 
information about the risks you face in farming, how you cope with these risks, and your 
perceptions on some types of insurance. Your participation will be most helpful to the research that 
I hope can improve assessment and understanding of the risk management options and strategies 
available to farmers in the region. The information you provide will remain anonymous and your 
privacy protected at all stages of the study. In addition I understand that you may not have all of the 
precise information available, and ask only that you provide your best estimates or best judgments.  
Date of Interview:                                                              Location: 
Household Type: Purely/Non-/Semi-Agricultural        Zone Type: Plain/Hilly or Mountainous 
A.  Demographic Characteristics 
1. Gender of Respondent:       A. Male       B. Female  
2. Age of Respondent:            Age of household leader: 
3. How many people in your family? 
Farm labour:        migrant workers:        children:         aged people:      
4. What’s your highest education level? 
A. never went to school                    B. elementary school     
C. high school                                   D. university or college 
5. How about your children’s’ education? 
A. how many are in kindergarten 
B. how many are in primary school 
C. how many are in secondary school 
D. how many are in high school 
E. how many are in college 
F. how many are in university 
6. How long have you engaged in farming? 
A. more than 20 years   B. 10-20 years    C. 5-10 years    D. less than 5 years 
7. Do you have non-agricultural skill? 
A. Yes, I have             B. No, I haven’t     
8. Is the agriculture your main income source? 
A. Yes                          B. No 
9. What is your main source of income? 
A. Growing grain                                                                 B. Sideline production     
C. Non-agricultural (migrant workers or self-employed)    D. Others 
10. What is the size of your household farming land exclude rented land? 
Occupied area of major crops:       Plots number:       Land quality: (good/general/bad) 
11. How many additional lands do you rent for agricultural production? 
12. If you rent land, how much do you pay per mu per year on average (if payment is in-kind please 
provide the cash value)? 
13. How many types of your major crops? What are they (food crops /cash crops/other)? 
If they are food crops, the main food crops are:  
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A. Wheat    B. Corn    C. Rice   D. Cotton   E. Other 
14. For your major crops, what is their sales revenue from high to low in the past five years? 
Order Crop variety Total sales revenue 
Wheat   
Corn   
…   
 
15. For your major crops, what is the max and min output in the past five years? In which year? 
What caused the min output?  
Crop variety Max output per mu Min output per mu Average yield per mu 
Wheat    
Corn    
…    
 
16. What is the main purpose of your planting?  
A. Meet household consumption B. Makes revenue though market C. Both 
17. How much is the proportion of production for sale accounted for the total yields? 
A. <10% B. 10%-30% C. 30%-50% D. 50%-70% E. 70%-90% F. >90% 
18. What do you think about the farming income? 
A. Losing money   B. No profitable    C. Earn a little money   D. Very profitable 
19. What do you think about the price changes of major crops in the past 5 years? 
A. Continually decline   B. Basically stable    C.  Slowly raise    D. Significantly raise 
20. What was the total income in the past 12 months from all sources including part time labour? 
_______ Farming income: ______ Non-farming income:   _____                                      
21. Family’s main expenses: 
A. Basic living expenses_____        B. Children’s education fee_____  
C. Medical expenses_____              D. Household furniture & appliances____    
E. Fees for seeds, fertilizer, pesticides, etc._____ small agricultural machine_________ 
F. Transportation and communication fees____    G. Fees for irrigation__________    
H. Other (for example social expenses, _____yuan) 
22. What is your attitude towards the irrigation condition here? What extent irrigation offsets any 
weather risk? 
A. Very dissatisfied      B. Dissatisfied         C. General      D. Satisfied     E. Very satisfied 
23. Do you have savings?  A. Yes     B. No        C. In debt 
B.  Risk Sources and Risk Perceptions 
24. Can you give a rough output and price of your major crops from 2006-2011? 
 Output Price 
2007   
2008   
2009   
2010   
2011   
 
25. What is your perception of the average yield? And why? 
A. Higher than county average        B. Lower than county average 
C. About the same as county average 
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26. What is your perception of yield riskiness? And why? 
A. Fewer variables than county average        B. More variable than county average 
C. Same variability as county 
27. How about the combined level and variability? 
A. Higher/same yield and less/same variability 
B. Lower yield, more variable 
C. Other combinations 
28. What do you think the major risks you encountered in farming?  
A. Natural disaster     B. Price fluctuation      C. Policy change     D. Labour risk    
E. Technical risk      F. Financial risk          G. Other 
29. In your minds, which kind of risk happened recently that influenced your farming? 
A. Natural disaster     B. Price fluctuation      C. Policy change     D. Labour risk    
E. Technical risk      F. Financial risk          G. Other 
30. What extent of impact was caused by the events described above on your production and 
livelihoods? 
A. Long term effects   B.  Short term affects    C. Temporarily affected 
31. How did you react to these risks?  
A. Saving money regularly    B. Buying crop insurance   C. Let it be 
32. Whether will local government or village committee provide some warning or protective 
measures? 
A. Yes, Provide _________        B. No                C. Have no idea  
33. If necessary, where do you borrow the money after the shock?  
A. Relatives/friends                    B. Moneylender/banks/    
C. Government/donor                D. No sources to borrow 
34. Please indicate how important you believe each item to be in terms of risk management in your 
farm. 0=do not use; 1=not important; 2=less important; 3=neutral; 4=important; 5=very 
important. 
Risk management options Important extent 
Crop diversification 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Geographic diversification 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Diversified marketing 
Selling each over a period time rather than all at once or over 
different market (like futures and options) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
Contract produce 
(Using contract to market your crop in advance at a fixed price) 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Join government support programs 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Maintaining financial reserves 
(Having cash and readily convertible assets, machineries, 
livestock) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
Investing off-farm for other sources of income 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Agricultural insurance  0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
C. Understanding and perception of insurance 
35. Do you have insurance (more generally) before (commercial or government subsidized 
insurance)?  
A. Yes, I have bought_______________                     B. No, never bought 
36. Who sold the insurance to you? 
A. Own initiative                                      B. Contacted by insurance company or agents 
C. Recommended by relatives or friends   D. Forced by government 
37. Do you think it is worth?         A. Yes     B. No 
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38. Have you ever claimed for this insurance? 
A. Yes, I have                               B. No, I have not 
39. Do you satisfy with their insurance-related services? 
A. Satisfied         B. General        C. Dissatisfied 
40. Have you used agricultural insurance products before? 
A. Yes, I have used before (choose from the options)  
a. wheat insurance b. rice insurance   c. corn insurance   d. cotton insurance   e. soybean 
insurance   f. pigs insurance g. cows insurance            h. other 
B. No, I have not used before 
41. How much do you know about agricultural insurance? 
A. Know it very well      B. Know some about it     C. Do not know about it 
42. How much do you know about the policy-oriented agricultural insurance? 
A. Know it very well      B. Know some about it     C. Do not know about it 
43. How did you get the information about policy-oriented agricultural insurance? 
A. Government propaganda                B. Insurance company promotion  
C. Multi-media (TV, broadcast, newspaper, etc.)   D. Internet      E. Other 
44. Are you participating policy-oriented agricultural insurance now? 
A. Yes _______________     B. No 
45. If you join,  
(1) Do you satisfy with the policy-oriented agricultural insurance? 
A. Satisfied                 B. General                C. Dissatisfied 
(2) How much do you pay for this insurance product each year? ________ 
(3) What do you think on the premium you paid? A. It is reasonable. B. It is not reasonable, then 
what is the reasonable price do you think? _______  
(4) After the risk event happen, can the insurance company staff reach the farm in time?  
A. Very timely          B. Timely          C. General     D. Not timely    E. Very slowly 
(5) After the risk event happen, is the on-farm loss assessment reasonable? 
A. Reasonable            B. Unreasonable, deliberately suppressed compensation  
(6) What is your attitude to buy the policy-oriented agricultural insurance? 
A. Feeling I am right, it is very useful for me        B. Feeling regrets, never buy again 
C. Feeling it is not essential, buying depends on the situation 
46. If you did not join, (1) what is your reason for uninsured?  
A. Do not know this business              B. Without this business in your area    
C. Do not trust insurance company      D. Do not have urgent needs for the product   
E. Cannot afford the premiums             F. Other 
(2) Do you think you need policy-oriented agricultural insurance? 
A.  Great need      B. May need    C. Not necessary     D. Do not need 
47. Do you think the crop insurance policy has been implemented or is able to implement 
effectively in your area? 
A. Fully implemented                  B. Partly implemented    
C. Less implemented                   D. Nothing implemented  
E. Have no idea 
D. Weather index agricultural insurance 
48. In the past 5 years, have you ever suffered from weather disasters? 
A. Yes, I have (they are____, the loss amount _______) 
a. drought  b. flood   c. pests and disease   d. heavy winds  e. hail and frost  f. fire  g. other  
B. No, I have not 
49. What is the main natural disaster do you think in the future? 
A. Droughts      B. Floods      C. Heavy winds       D. Pests       E. Diseases    
F. Hail               G. Frost         H. Fire                     I. Other 
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50. How about the happening likelihood of those risks above do you think?(frequency) 
A. Most likely B. More likely C. General D. Less likely   E. Almost impossible 
51. Once the even above happened, how much loss will be brought to your production?(severity) 
A. 0-20%     B. 20%-40%    C.40%-60%    D. 60%-80%        E.0-100% 
52. Once the even above happened, how much impact your family? 
A. Very serious      B. Serious   C. General    D. Little impact     E. No effect 
53. What is the effective measures do you think for preventing natural disasters in crop production? 
A. Crop insurance    B. Agriculture infrastructure   C. Villagers help each other    
D. Government-led preventive measures    E. Other 
54. Can you mark the severity that weather affect production in different periods? 
 Sowing season Growing season Harvest season 
No effect    
Neutral    
Very important effect    
55. Where do you get the weather information? 
A. Local weather station B. Newspaper C. Radio   D. TV   E. Internet   F. SMS   G. Other 
56. How much the frequency of your concerned about weather forecast? 
A. Never          B. Occasionally         C. Special times             D. Every day 
57. Is weather forecast from weather station coinciding with your observation? 
A. Inconsistent        B. Almost consistent       C. Consistent 
58. If an insurance policy needs to link to weather reports from your local station, do you trust the 
accuracy of the reported data? 
A. Yes, I do      B. Half-trust           C. No, I do not 
59. Please indicate your level of interest in a risk management tool for which would you pay a fair 
price and receive a payment under the following weather events. 
New types of insurance products based on excessive rainfall, deficit rainfall, excessive heat or cold 
weather are being evaluated for potential use in agriculture.  For example, if you buy deficit rainfall 
insurance, you will receive a payment if the number of millimetres of rain that fall in your farm 
during a month or a season is less than what you expected. The money you will get is based only on 
how much shortfall in rainfall you will experience. It is not based on how much yield shortfall you 
experience. Your insurance contract will be written based on the historical rainfall data at your local 
weather station. 
60. Recently, there is a new type of agricultural insurance has been piloted in Changfeng County, 
Anhui Province, for rice cultivation in drought conditions, the premium is 300 yuan/mu, the 
premium rate is 4%. And as we known, the general yield of rice is 750Kg/Mu; the price is about 
2 yuan/kg. In this case, if there is a similar insurance product for your major crops, are you 
willing to buy? _______ What is the maximum price you will pay?____________ 
61. A recent study of a drought area in China found that a typical severe summer drought with an 
occurrence of 1 in 10 years lasted approximately 55 days with cumulative rainfall less than 1 or 
Weather events No interest 
Slight 
interest 
Moderate 
interest 
High 
interest 
Very high 
interest 
Excessive rainfall at critical point 
in time      
Excessive heat at critical point in 
time      
Deficit in rainfall over a period of 
time      
Cold weather over a period of time      
Heavy winds       
Other      
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2.2 cm. As 2009 Henan meteorological data shown, the average rainfall during October 24, 
2008 to February 1, 2009 was reduced by 80% compared with the same period in the past years. 
The crops affected areas reached 45,190,000 mu. 
A. Have you ever experienced drought conditions similar to what is described above? 
      a. yes, I have     b. no, I have not 
B. If yes, can you recall the year it happened? 
C. It caused ___% of loss of your crop yield 
62. In this case, if there is an insurance product that, once the risk happens, you will get a certain 
compensation which is up to 1000 yuan/mu, how much are you willing to pay for this 
instrument?_____ 
A. Imagining the effects that a 55-day summer drought with less than 2.2 c, of rain would have 
on your farm would you be willing to pay 25 yuan/mu/year to protect yourself against this risk? 
a. Very likely    b. most likely   c. maybe         d. not very likely        e. not at all 
B. Imagining the effects that a 55-day summer drought would have on your farm with less than 
2.2cm of rain, would you be willing to pay 14 yuan/mu/year to protect yourself against this risk? 
a. Very likely    b. most likely   c. maybe    d. not very likely    e. not at all 
C. Imagining the effects that a 55-day summer drought would have on your farm with less than 
2.2cm of rain, would you be willing to pay 3 yuan/mu/year to protect yourself against this risk? 
a. Very likely    b. most likely   c. maybe    d. not very likely    e. not at all 
63. Please indicate your level of interest in a crop insurance product for which would you would 
pay a subsidized price equal to only 20% of the true cost of insurance (the proportion Which is 
same to the policy-oriented agricultural insurance) while receiving full payment under the 
following weather events. 
64. What is your expectation on your life after the purchasing of this weather index insurance 
product? 
A. Significantly worse than before   B.  Slight worse than before   C. Almost the same   
D. Slightly better than before            E. Significantly better than before 
65. Do you think weather index crop insurance is important to against the weather-related risk in 
crop production? 
A. Not important    B. Little important    C. Important    D. Very important 
66. If the weather index crop insurance is designed and sold by commercial insurance company 
itself, are you willing to buy? 
A. Yes, I am          B.  Maybe               C. No, I am not 
67. If the government join the scheme and provide subsidy for premium, are you willing to buy? 
A. Yes, I am           B.  Maybe             C. No, I am not 
68. If you are not willing to pay, what is the reason? (Multiple selection) 
A. Low probability of local natural disasters B. Risk can be resolved by other means 
C. Government will provide disaster relief    D. Loss doesn’t matter because cost is low 
E. Don’t know or know little about it             F. Don’t trust insurance company  
G. Other reason_______ 
Weather events No 
interest 
Slight 
interest 
Moderate 
interest 
High 
interest 
Very high 
interest 
Excessive rainfall at critical point 
in time 
     
Excessive heat at critical point in 
time 
     
Deficit in rainfall over a period of 
time 
     
Cold weather over a period of time      
Heavy winds      
Other      
265	  
	  
69. If you are willing to pay, which method do you prefer to pay for the premium? 
A. Farmers pay to insurance company upfront     B. Pay after the crop sale  
C. Unified turned over to the village committee   D. Bank deducting automatically                              
E. Other 
70. If you are willing to pay, what is the reason for “no real action”? 
A. Procedures and terms are too complicated         B. The claim is too difficult 
C. Do not trust insurance company                         D. Premiums is too high 
E. Family’s economic situation does not allow       F. Nobody buy it around me 
G. Has a bad impression from other’s experience   H. Other reason 
71. What do you consider much more when you make the decision on the willingness-to-pay? 
A. How much compensation can be obtained after the risk happens 
B. Whether the promise of insurance company is true 
C. The amount of the premium 
D. If there is suitable insurance product 
E. Whether the insurance can cover major natural risks 
F. Whether the insurance policy is easy to understand and practical 
G. Other ________________ 
 
To be answered by interviewer only: 
1. In your opinion the respondent was engaged in this survey and answered truthfully all 
questions? 
a. Strongly agree      b. moderately agree    c. agree     d. disagree    e. strongly disagree 
2. In your opinion the quality of answers provided in this survey is adequate to include in any 
written reports 
a. Strongly agree     b. moderately agree     c. agree     d. disagree    e. strongly disagree 
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Appendix 2: Survey of Villager leader to Assess Insurance Demand 
 
Note to Respondents: 
First of all I really appreciate you sharing the time to talk with me, which will take approximately 1-
2 hours.  The survey I am conducting is part of fieldwork for my PhD study being conducted under 
the supervision of The University of Queensland in Australia. I am interested in collecting 
information about the risks villager face in farming, how they cope with these risks, and your 
perceptions on some types of insurance. Your participation will be most helpful to the research 
which I hope can improve assessment and understanding of the risk management options and 
strategies available to farmers in the region. The information you provide will remain anonymous 
and your privacy protected at all stages of the study. In addition I understand that you may not have 
all of the precise information available, and ask only that you provide your best estimates or best 
judgments.  
Date of Interview:                                                              Location: 
Demographic Characteristics 
1. What is your role in the village? 
A. Village leader                                               B. Village deputy leader     
C. Village accountant                                        D. Other role 
2. How long have you been in this position? 
A. more than 10 years   B. 7-10 years    C. 3-7 years    D. less than 3 years 
3. What activities and responsibilities do you perform in your village role? 
a. Organisation of collective activities (which activities)? 
b. Information gathering and dissemination (which ones, particularly those related to crop 
yields, returns and weather information)? 
c. Agent for government or quasi-government services (e.g. agricultural policy insurance)      
Land area and use   
4. What is the average farm size in your village? What is the distribution of farm sizes? 
5. Is the farm land all of the same quality? If not, is the winter wheat grown on the better quality 
land and what proportion is this of the total land? 
6. Is the quality of land in your village similar to neighbouring villages? 
7. Are there any other differences between your village and neighbouring villages? 
8. Do all farmers have the same yield for their winter wheat? If not, what are the main reasons for 
the difference in yields? 
a. Different soil fertility 
b. Different management ability 
c. Different resources/inputs 
9. What % of farmland is usually planted to winter wheat? 
10. What are the other major crops and what proportion of the area sown? 
Crop activities, net returns and household incomes 
11. What are the typical cropping patterns or activities for winter wheat in your village? 
 Period (approx. date of phase beginning) Length of period 
Sowing   
Tillering   
267	  
	  
Jointing   
Boot   
Heading   
Ripening   
12. What types of inputs are you used for wheat planting? When are you applied during the season? 
What are the specific costs of these inputs per unit farming land? 
Items Type When to use Times & amount How much (value) 
Seeds     
Fertilizer N, P, S```    
Chemicals Pesticides, herbicide, etc    
Irrigation River, well, or other    
Machinery Cultivator, harvester, etc    
Other     
13. What is the average total cost of wheat production for per mu farming land in the village? 
_________yuan, specify if it includes labour costs______ and land rent cost______? 
14. Can you give a rough output and price of winter wheat from 2006-2011? 
 Output (kg/mu) Price (kg/yuan) 
2006   
2007   
2008   
2009   
2010   
 
15. What is the per capita farm income in the village? What proportion of the farm incomes is from 
crops? What proportion is from livestock? 
16. What is the per capita household income in the village? 
17. What are the main non-farm sources of income for households in the village? (Give type and 
amount and include transfer income) 
18. Is wheat produced for commercial purposes or for self-consumption or both? 
A. Commercial purposes    B. Self-consumption    C. Both 
19. How much wheat is stored/retained for own consumption? 
a. Equivalent of 1 year’s consumption 
b. Equivalent of 2 year’s consumption 
c. Other 
20. Are there any storage costs or losses? 
21. What are the main sales markets for wheat? 
A. Private trader     B. Government channel     C. Other________ 
22. Are there any tied arrangements with these sales channels? (E.g. provision of credit, provision 
of inputs such as fertiliser, provision of insurance?) 
Irrigation  
23. Is wheat production in this area rain fed or irrigated (if both, indicate proportion rain fed)? 
24. Who makes decisions on irrigation? Individual households or the village? Can villagers in your 
village access the irrigation water at any time they want? 
25. How many times are crops irrigated in an average season? In a wet season? In a dry season? 
26. Is there sufficient water available for all irrigation required in a dry season? In an average 
season? 
27. What costs are there for irrigation (yuan and labour) for the household and for the village? 
28. How do households/you judge when there is sufficient rain for winter wheat activities?  
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A. Estimate by experience                          B.  Learn/advice from other villagers  
C.  Learn/advice from extension officers   D. Other_______________ 
Risk and risk management 
29. What are the primary production risks? can you compare or rank them among the risks from 
least to most important 
Production risks Important extent 
Pests 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Diseases 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Weather 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Lack of access to inputs 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Fire 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Price 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Others 0 1 2 3 4 5 
30. Please indicate how important you believe each item to be in terms of risk management in your 
farm. 0=do not use; 1=not important; 2=less important; 3=neutral; 4=important; 5=very 
important. 
Risk management options Important extent 
Farm diversification (wheat variety, livestock, vegetable, etc.) 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Marketing channel 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Contract produce 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Government programs 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Maintaining financial reserves 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Investing off-farm for other sources of income 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Agricultural insurance  0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
31. In how many years out of 10 are winter wheat yields below average because of bad weather?   
32. What are the main reasons for the bad weather (specify whether event and frequency of 
occurrence in village)  
Weather event When happened Frequency of occurrence 
Too much rain   
Too small rain   
Too high temperature   
Too low temperature   
Too much sunshine   
Too few sunshine   
Too heavy wind   
Too small wind   
33. For the following weather events and stages of crop growth, indicate whether the weather event 
is likely to impact on crop growth and if so what the likely impact on winter wheat yields is 
likely to be (e.g. 25% more rain than average at ripening can reduce winter wheat yields by 
around 10%)?  
 Too 
much 
rain 
Too 
small 
rain 
Too high 
temperature 
Too low 
temperature 
Too 
much 
sunshine 
Too few 
sunshine 
Too 
heavy 
wind 
Too 
small 
wind 
Sowing         
Tillering         
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Jointing         
Boot         
Heading         
Ripening         
34. Which periods in the growing season are the most critical for a successful harvest to have 
rainfall, temperature, sunshine hours, and wind? 
 Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May Jun-Sep 
Rainfall          
Temperature          
Sunshine           
Wind          
Other          
OR if the respondent get used to provide information on the crop calendar 
 Before cropping Sowing Tillering Jointing Boot Heading Ripening 
Rainfall        
Temperature        
Sunshine hour        
Wind        
Other        
35. If you are exposed to weather risks, how frequently the following  coping strategies are you 
used in the past (for each strategy circle one answer) 
A. Use savings                                     frequently used; once used; not used; 
B. Borrow money                                frequently used; once used; not used; 
C. Sell livestock                                   frequently used; once used; not used; 
D. Family member get new job           frequently used; once used; not used; 
E. Work extra hours                            frequently used; once used; not used; 
F. Children quit school to work          frequently used; once used; not used 
G. Cut back on consumption               frequently used; once used; not used 
H. Agricultural insurance                    frequently used; once used; not used 
I. Store crops (draw down on stored grain)   frequently used; once used; not used 
J. Other (specify) 
36. Do you think these strategies and their relative use is likely to change in the future? 
37. Does the government provide subsidy for production loss in your village?  
A. No 
B. Yes-----How severe is the loss before the subsidy is provided?  
   -----What type of subsidy is provided (amount or grain or..?) 
   -----How many times has this subsidy been provided in the time you can remember? 
   -----Which level of government provides the subsidy (county, province or central)? 
 -----Has the village been responsible for any activities associated with the subsidies 
(determining affected households, facilitating payments?) 
Policy-oriented agricultural insurance 
38. Has policy-oriented agricultural insurance been available or used in the village?  
39. If no: 
a. Was it available to the village and if not, why not? 
b. Is it available in neighbouring villages? 
c. If it was available but was not taken up, why not? 
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i. Not relevant 
ii. Too expensive (what decrease in premium would be needed for it to be taken up; 
current premium and how much it would need to go down to) 
iii. Poor information 
iv. Don’t know of agricultural insurance business in this area 
v. The local insurance company didn’t set up this business 
vi. Don’t trust some particular insurance companies 
vii. Others_________________________ 
d. What problems would need to be overcome for it to be relevant or used by households 
and supported by the village? 
40. If yes: 
a. Since when 
b. Outline precise nature of insurance (obtain contract if available; otherwise details on 
criteria for payout; assessment of claims; level of payment, insurance premium etc.) 
c. Are there any government subsidies provided for the insurance? If so, what is the level 
of subsidy or proportion of insurance premium paid? 
d. Is it compulsory or voluntary and do all households in the village have the insurance? 
i. What number or proportions of households in the village have agricultural policy 
insurance? 
ii. Has the number of households taking out the insurance increased or decreased 
since it was introduced (numbers if possible) 
iii. If voluntary, what do you think are the main reasons why households have taken 
out the insurance? 
A. poor quality of land                    B. hard to get irrigation     
C. compulsory participation          D. see others bought 
E. afraid of serious damage           E. others 
e. How was the insurance implemented? 
i. Information, awareness, extension campaigns (by village, insurance companies 
or higher level government agencies) 
ii. Provided by whom (through which insurance company or government agency) 
iii. Role of village executive (agents for insurance; oversee claims or assessment; 
information provision; dispute resolution …). If they perform these roles, what 
resources do they use and what payments do they receive for these roles? 
f. Have any farmers in the village made a claim under the policy?  
i. If so, what was the outcome (successful claim? smooth process?)? 
ii. If not, why not? (Unsuccessful claim; criteria too strict; difficult in claim 
assessment or procedures) 
41. Do you think how the input cost changed after you paid for the policy-oriented wheat insurance? 
Or what do you think maybe change in using times or amount after paid for the insurance 
product? 
Items Type When to 
use 
Times & amount How much(value) 
Seeds     
Fertilizer N, P, S```    
Chemicals Pesticides, herbicide, etc.    
Irrigation River, well, or other    
Machinery Cultivator, harvester, etc.    
Other     
42. What are the main attitudes of purchasing the agricultural insurance product in the village? 
A. Very practical on stabilising incomes, will continue to take out insurance 
B. Feeling regret, never purchase again (explain why) 
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C. Undecided, may or may not take out in the future 
43. In your impression, are you satisfied with the claims working carried out by the insurance 
company? 
A. very satisfied     B more satisfied     C. generally    D. less satisfied      E. no satisfied 
44. What do you think is the most prominent problem in crop insurance business? And how to solve 
or improve this problem? 
A. untrue propaganda induce famers to pay   B. hard to get formal underwriting document  
C. follow-up services are not in place            D. loss estimation is inaccurate 
E. claims are not timely                                  F. other problem (please specify__________) 
45. Are there any other forms of crop insurance in the village? If so, provide details and compare 
with the agricultural policy insurance?  
46. What other forms of household insurance are in the village? Are the provided by the same or 
different companies? How do they compare with agricultural policy insurance in terms of the 
general type of contract, level of government support or subsidy, and acceptance or uptake by 
households? 
Weather index wheat insurance  
47. Does the village keep any weather records? 
48. If so what records are kept? Over what time periods? And where do the records come from? 
49. Are the records made publically available to all villagers? 
50. Do you think the weather records at the county meteorological station reflect weather in your 
village? Which records are the least accurate (rainfall, temperature, sunshine hours) and how 
much do they differ? 
51. What is your opinion on farmers’ ability to recount weather events and their awareness of the 
relationships between weather and crop yields? 
52. A new type of insurance product based on excessive rainfall, deficit rainfall, too hot or cold 
weather, excessive sunshine hour or cloudy weather, and too heavy wind or small wind are 
being evaluated for potential use in agriculture.  For example, if you buy deficit rainfall 
insurance, you will receive a payment according to the number of millimetres of rain at some 
critical stage of crop growth that is less than the average rainfall as recorded at the local weather 
station. (There are some important features to note about this type of insurance relative to 
agricultural policy insurance. First the insurance is based solely on the official weather data and 
not on your actual crop yields (thus you may still receive a payment even if your crop yields 
increase or vice versa depending on what happens to the weather indicator. Although broad 
relationships between crop yields and local weather data will have been used in designing the 
contract, the assessment of claims is based solely on the weather indicator not on the actual crop 
yields.) Second, because of this there is no need for an on-farm assessment of your claims – you 
will or will not be paid out according to the weather indicator. Third the payout you receive is 
based not on the deficit in rainfall on your farm but in the deficit in rainfall as recorded at the 
local weather station.)  
Please indicate your level of interest in a risk management tool for which would you pay a fair 
price and receive a payment under the following weather events. 
Weather events No interest 
Slight 
interest 
Moderate 
interest 
High 
interest 
Very high 
interest 
Excessive rainfall over a 
period of time      
Deficit in rainfall over a 
period of time      
High temperature over a 
period of time      
Low temperature over a      
272	  
	  
Explain your reasons for these responses 
• Do not trust correlation between weather in village and local weather station 
• Like the idea of no on-farm assessment of crop yields in claims 
• Other____________________________________ 
53. Imagine an insurance product that would pay you 1000 yuan/Mu if the accumulated rainfall 
over a specific period or the average temperature over a specific period is too high or too low. 
For example, the average precipitation in March during 1985-2010 is about 19 mm, if the 
precipitation in this month is less than 19 mm, you wheat yield would reduce 1.4kg/Mu for per 
millimetre precipitation less than 19. Assumed the wheat price is 2.2 yuan/kg, you will get a 
payment of 3 Yuan from insurance company for per mu farm land and per mm precipitation less 
than 19 mm. That is, if there is no rain in March, you will be given 57 yuan/mu to cover your 
possible loss in wheat production, and the maximum payment is 1000 yuan/mu.  
1) Under following situation, how much premium would you be willing to pay for such an 
insurance product?  
Period Situation 
MAXIMUM 
Would be 
willing to 
pay 
MINIMUM 
Would be 
willing to 
pay 
Rainfall in 
November 
If rainfall in this period is less than average 
level   
If rainfall in this period is less than 80% of 
average level    
If rainfall in this period is less than 60% of 
average level   
If rainfall in this period is less than 40% of 
average level   
If rainfall in this period is less than 20% of 
average level   
If there is no rainfall at all during this period   
You can give out a trigger you think is 
reasonable for wheat production   
Have no idea on the trigger, you trust the trigger 
set for this area by insurance company    
Rainfall in 
December 
If rainfall in this period is less than average 
level   
If rainfall in this period is less than 80% of 
average level   
If rainfall in this period is less than 60% of 
average level   
If rainfall in this period is less than 40% of 
average level   
If rainfall in this period is less than 20% of 
average level   
period of time 
Excessive sunshine over a 
period of time      
Deficit sunshine over a 
period of time      
Heavy winds      
Other      
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If there is no rainfall at all during this period   
You can give out a trigger you think is 
reasonable for wheat production   
Have no idea on the trigger, you trust the trigger 
set for this area by insurance company    
Rainfall in 
January 
If rainfall in this period is less than average 
level   
If rainfall in this period is less than 80% of 
average level   
If rainfall in this period is less than 60% of 
average level   
If rainfall in this period is less than 40% of 
average level   
If rainfall in this period is less than 20% of 
average level   
If there is no rainfall at all during this period   
You can give out a trigger you think is 
reasonable for wheat production   
Have no idea on the trigger, you trust the trigger 
set for this area by insurance company    
Rainfall in 
February 
If rainfall in this period is less than average 
level   
If rainfall in this period is less than 80% of 
average level   
If rainfall in this period is less than 60% of 
average level   
If rainfall in this period is less than 40% of 
average level   
If rainfall in this period is less than 20% of 
average level   
If there is no rainfall at all during this period   
You can give out a trigger you think is 
reasonable for wheat production   
Have no idea on the trigger, you trust the trigger 
set for this area by insurance company    
Rainfall in 
March 
If rainfall in this period is less than average 
level   
If rainfall in this period is less than 80% of 
average level   
If rainfall in this period is less than 60% of 
average level   
If rainfall in this period is less than 40% of 
average level   
If rainfall in this period is less than 20% of 
average level   
If there is no rainfall at all during this period   
You can give out a trigger you think is 
reasonable for wheat production   
Have no idea on the trigger, you trust the trigger 
set for this area by insurance company    
Rainfall in If rainfall in this period is less than average   
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April level 
If rainfall in this period is less than 80% of 
average level   
If rainfall in this period is less than 60% of 
average level   
If rainfall in this period is less than 40% of 
average level   
If rainfall in this period is less than 20% of 
average level   
If there is no rainfall at all during this period   
You can give out a trigger you think is 
reasonable for wheat production   
Have no idea on the trigger, you trust the trigger 
set for this area by insurance company    
Rainfall in 
May 
If rainfall in this period is less than average 
level   
If rainfall in this period is less than 80% of 
average level   
If rainfall in this period is less than 60% of 
average level   
If rainfall in this period is less than 40% of 
average level   
If rainfall in this period is less than 20% of 
average level   
If there is no rainfall at all during this period   
You can give out a trigger you think is 
reasonable for wheat production   
Have no idea on the trigger, you trust the trigger 
set for this area by insurance company    
Accumulated 
Rainfall 
from 
November to 
December 
If rainfall in this period is less than average 
level   
If rainfall in this period is less than 80% of 
average level   
If rainfall in this period is less than 60% of 
average level   
If rainfall in this period is less than 40% of 
average level   
If rainfall in this period is less than 20% of 
average level   
If there is no rainfall at all during this period   
You can give out a trigger you think is 
reasonable for wheat production   
Have no idea on the trigger, you trust the trigger 
set for this area by insurance company    
Accumulated 
Rainfall 
from January 
to March 
If rainfall in this period is less than average 
level   
If rainfall in this period is less than 80% of 
average level   
If rainfall in this period is less than 60% of 
average level   
If rainfall in this period is less than 40% of   
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average level 
If rainfall in this period is less than 20% of 
average level   
If there is no rainfall at all during this period   
You can give out a trigger you think is 
reasonable for wheat production   
Have no idea on the trigger, you trust the trigger 
set for this area by insurance company    
Accumulated 
Rainfall 
from 
February to 
May 
If rainfall in this period is less than average 
level   
If rainfall in this period is less than 80% of 
average level   
If rainfall in this period is less than 60% of 
average level   
If rainfall in this period is less than 40% of 
average level   
If rainfall in this period is less than 20% of 
average level   
If there is no rainfall at all during this period   
You can give out a trigger you think is 
reasonable for wheat production   
Have no idea on the trigger, you trust the trigger 
set for this area by insurance company    
2) If you took out the insurance but the weather indicator did not trigger a payout even 
though their crop yield went down, would they still take out the insurance in the 
following year?   
A. Yes, I will                       B. No, I won’t. 
3) If you chose to buy in particular years, can you tell me which years are you going to buy? 
And Why? _________________________________ 
                     A. according to own estimation       B. according to the weather forecast  
                     C. according to experts’ estimation D. according to your own economic situation 
54. Please indicate how important you believe each item to be when you make the decision of 
purchasing weather index wheat insurance in your village. 0=do not use; 1=not important; 
2=less important; 3=neutral; 4=important; 5=very important 
 Important extent 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
Whether the premium you can accept and afford to       
Whether you can get the pre-specified indemnity once the pre-
specified weather event happened 
      
Whether the insurance coverage is enough to cover most of weather 
risk in wheat production  
      
Whether the purchase and claim procedure is simply and timely       
Whether the insurance company is worthy to be trust       
Whether the insurance terms easy to understand       
Whether the government supervise or intervene this business       
Whether has appropriate legislation to protect the trade       
Other aspects___________________________________       
55. What reasons make you reject this weather index wheat insurance product?  
 Important extent 
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0 1 2 3 4 5 
Farmer manage risks in other ways        
Low yield variability on wheat production       
Agricultural income is not important for the households       
The government will cover severe crop losses       
Insurance is too complicated to understand and use       
The claim procedure is time and energy-consuming        
Unpleasant experience with insurance company in the past       
Can’t afford to the premium       
Nobody buy it around you or the village       
Lack of trust for the insurance company       
56. Who is the FIRST part of this business do you think is safe and reliable? 
A. Government       B. Insurance company        C. Villagers collectively participation 
57. What is the best approach to purchase weather index crop insurance products? (you can choose 
more than 1 choice, and give the order of choices) 
A. From insurance company 
B. Bundled with credit 
C. Bundled with seeds of wheat 
D. Bundled with fertilizer 
E. From village committee 
F. From agricultural cooperative 
58. Government subsidy and willingness-to-pay 
A. If it has government subsidy, I will pay 
B. Even if it has government subsidy, I still won’t pay 
C. If there is no government subsidy, I still want to pay 
D. If there is no government subsidy, I won’t pay 
59. Do you think the government should bear what percentage of premiums at least is reasonable? 
A. Below 30%             B. 30%-50%            C. 50-70%           D. Above 70% 
60. What do you think the role of village/village leaders in promoting or implementing or 
facilitating the weather index insurance and their perspectives on this? 
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Appendix 3: Survey of Insurance Staffs to Assess Program Feasibility 
 
Note to Respondents: 
First of all I really appreciate you sharing the time to talk with me, which would take approximately 
45-60 minutes. The survey I am conducting is part of fieldwork for my PhD study being conducted 
under the supervision of The University of Queensland in Australia. I am investigating the 
feasibility and relative merits of weather index insurance for the winter wheat production in our 
county. I am interested in collecting some information about your profession advice on designing 
the product, your perceptions on issues associate with its operation in rural areas, as well as your 
views on product prospects. The information you provide will remain anonymous and your privacy 
protected at all stages of the study.  
COMPANY:                         DEPARTMENT:                                SECTION:                                
1. What (if any) agricultural insurance instruments are currently offered by your company? 
1) What type(s) of insurance? What types of risks covered? To which kind of farmers? For 
which crops? In which areas? For how long?  
2) Can you provide a copy of contract terms or contract details for me? 
3) How loss determined and premium is assessed? 
4) How is product promoted among farmers? 
5) Do you have any joint products (e.g. insurance bundling with micro credit)? 
6) Is the product commercial in nature or is there some level of government subsidisation? 
7) What factors seem most likely to affect the commercial viability of the products? (For 
example, sufficient product demand, administrative and financial requirements, data 
availability, sufficient sector and geographical coverage) 
8) What are the problems experienced with current insurance arrangements? 
9) What improvements would you like to see? 
10) If you do not provide these products, what are the main reasons why you do not do so? 
Recently, new type of insurance product based on excessive rainfall, deficit rainfall, too hot or cold 
weather, excessive sunshine hour or cloudy weather, and too heavy wind or small wind are being 
evaluated for potential use in agriculture.  For example, if you sell deficit rainfall insurance, you 
will pay a payment if the number of millimetres of rain that falls at a specified location over a 
particular period is less than what is stated in the contract. The money you will pay is based only on 
the shortfall in rainfall and not on any shortfall in yield experienced by any individual farmer. Your 
insurance contract will be written based on the rainfall data at your local weather station. Compared 
with the traditional agricultural insurance products, weather index insurance does not require 
complex claims procedure by saving claims costs and speeding up the claims. At the same time, it 
also reduces insurance disputes by controlling moral hazard. 
 
2. What level of demand is there for potential insurance products to cover weather-related 
agricultural production losses in your area?  
1) Who is driving this demand and for which particular products?  
2) How do you identify the level of expected demand? (For example, surveys, informed 
persons)  
3) What specific risks do the products of interest to your company cover? (For example, 
drought, flood, disease, wind, etc.)   
4) If there is no demand why do you think this is so?  
 
3. When I design the possible contract, I used the monthly data of precipitation, temperature, and 
sunshine hours during the past 30 years from weather station and 30 years wheat yield data from 
statistics bureau in our county to regress the weather-yield relationship.  
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1) If weather index crop insurance scheme or pilot from your company, would you like to 
use the similar data/analysis or different data and analysis? (Monthly data or daily data, 
single weather index, or mixed weather indices?) That is, what reliability do they put on 
your analysis and is that sufficient for them to consider the product? 
2) If different,  
a. Why you prefer using different data/analysis?  
b. How do you intend to get the relevant historical agricultural data?  
c. How you plan to get the relevant historical and real-time weather data and 
infrastructure?  
4. Which kind of weather index is you interested? Single weather index or couples of indices 
mixed together? 
 Weather Index 
Your opinion on 
different index 
measurement 
Single weather 
index  
  
Aggregate index (like accumulated rainfall or average 
temperature during the whole wheat growing season)  
Phased index by each natural month  
Phase index by growing stages (such as sunshine is 
important for flowering, you can make the sunshine hours 
during flowering period as an index, etc.) 
 
Two or more 
weather indices  
During the whole crop growing season  
During specific stages  
 
5. Do you think such a weather-related contract would be possible feasible for an appropriate set 
of premiums and payouts?  
1) If you think it is not feasible, can you identify why?  
A. Do not trust the instrument? Cannot identify potential premiums or potential 
losses?  
B. Can you identify any challenges or constraints of this weather index crop 
insurance program and need to make any necessary adjustments from previous 
steps? 
2) And if so,  
A. What do you think of the premium in the possible contract (30 yuan/mu, including 
risk loading and administrative expenses, accounts 20% of pure premium 
respectively)?  
B. At what level are (or would be) premiums for existing or potential insurance 
products attractive to industry participants to manage weather-related production 
loss risk?  
C. What is the minimum premium you would need to offer the weather related product? 
How do you determine the minimum premium? Do you think it is acceptable for 
farmers? If not, do you think how much is likely to be accepted? 
D. Who do you think is the overall market potential for this product? 
E. Do they believe/have concerns about understanding of product or attractiveness of 
product or cost of product (start-up cost in research)? 
F. Do you prefer to operate this program by private business, or by a social mission, 
namely bilateral and multilateral win-win program? 
G. Which delivery channel do you prefer to?  
a. Sell it directly to farmers by company’s branches or agents 
b. Insurance policies retailed through an intermediary, such as banks, rural finance 
institutions, agricultural input providers or other organizations?   
H. How do you judge it’s a cost-efficient delivery channel for reaching poor farmers?  
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I. How do you transfer your business risk of weather index insurance? Does your 
insurance company access to reinsurance? Or do you have any idea on accessing to 
reinsurance? 
J. What do you think of government interest and commitment to supporting and 
partnering with initiatives in weather index crop insurance?  
a. Is there legal and regulatory framework for general agricultural insurance? Do 
you think it needs specific legal and regulation for weather index crop insurance?  
b. Do you think weather index crop insurance is easy to receive the approval from 
the regulatory authority responsible for the area? If not, how to modify the 
product to meet the regulator’s requirements? 
c. Do you think what is the generally premium proportion can be subsided by the 
governments (go through the levels)? 
K. Do you think what the insurance company can do on the implementation of this 
programme in following aspects?  If have difficulties, what kind of support do you 
need? Including capacity and technology gaps. 
a.   Train retailers 
b.   Educate farmers (explain the WII product to the client) 
c.   Contract design (technical support) 
d.   Contract monitoring and settlement processes (how to arrange weather data 
transmission with meteorology department) 
L. What do you see as the role for insurance company in assisting the development and 
success of such products? 
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Appendix 4: Survey of Government Officers to Assess Program Feasibility 
 
Note to Respondents: 
I appreciate you sharing the time to talk with me, which should take approximately 45-60 minutes. 
The survey I am conducting is part of fieldwork for my PhD study being conducted under the 
supervision of The University of Queensland in Australia. I am investigating the feasibility and 
design of weather index insurance for the winter wheat production in China. I am interested in 
collecting your thoughts about the relative merits and feasibility of such insurance instruments and 
their alignment with government objectives and policies regarding risk management for farmers. 
The information you provide will remain anonymous and your privacy will be protected at all 
stages of the study.  
GOVERNMENT:                   DEPARTMENT:                                SECTION: 
 
1. What agricultural risk management strategies or support does the government currently employ 
for protecting crop production or stabilising households’ incomes? 
1) Under what kind of situation, will the government provide disaster relief for crop 
production losses? 
A. How is a disaster defined? That is, would the support be provided in case of 
diminished production or only as genuine disaster relief?  
B. What subsidy has been given over the last 10 years?  
a. Specific programs and actual payments/support  
b. Which kind of farmers/individuals?  
c. Aggregate total of support? Average for per person or per unit? 
2) What other support agricultural production in this area? For example, price subsidies, tax 
reductions, provision of agricultural information service, construction of agricultural 
infrastructure, or provision of other insurance (policy insurance)?  
3) Except for the defined circumstances described above, in your experience, how do 
farmers deal with production losses? 
2. Do you think agricultural insurance is a necessary risk management strategy for farmers in your 
area? Please give reasons for your answer. 
   a. Very necessary    b. Necessary   c. Maybe    d. Not very necessary    e. Not at all 
1) Is any agricultural insurance carried out within the county? 
A. Is this commercial, government funded or quasi-commercial? 
B. Was it sold by voluntary or mandatory? 
C. When did the insurance commence and who initiated it? 
D. What level of government support is provided? 
2) If the insurance is government subsidised or quasi-commercial, what is the relationship 
between the government and the insurance company? 
A. In what form was the support/subsidies/re-insurance provided? 
B. How was the insurance company chosen to carry out this programme?  
C. How do you deal with the financial issue with the underwriting insurance company? 
3) Has the agricultural insurance program been reviewed? If so, what problems or 
improvements have been identified? 
4) What coordination of institution, organization is required with financial and other 
relevant departments to implement agricultural insurance? 
5) What things work well for agricultural insurance and what are the specific 
problems/challenges currently experienced? How is loss assessed and monitored? 
3. What (if any) strategies are currently being used to cover weather-related agricultural 
production losses in your area?  
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1) What is the level of use and awareness of these strategies?  
2) What are the challenges and benefits of these strategies?  
3) If none are available, why do you think these strategies are not available?  
4. The importance of household risk management and preparedness capabilities are becoming 
more important in changing climate.  
1) Do you think that agricultural insurance products assist farmers to become better risk 
managers and more prepared?  
2) If so, which products and how?  
3) If weather related form of insurance was provided, how would compare in size to these 
other forms of support? 
4) If no products currently available were suitable—what would you recommend? 
 
Recently, new types of insurance products that use weather indicators such as excessive rainfall, 
deficit rainfall, too hot or cold weather, excessive sunshine hour or cloudy weather, and too heavy 
wind or small wind are being evaluated for their potential use in agriculture.  For example, if the 
insurance company provides deficit rainfall insurance, farmers will receive a payment if the number 
of millimetres of rain that falls on the insured farm during a month or a season is less than what the 
contract specifies. The money the insurance company pays is based only on how much shortfall in 
rainfall, not on any actual yield shortfall experienced by the farmers. The insurance contract is 
designed based on the historical rainfall data at the local weather station 
 
5. What do you think of government interest and commitment to supporting and partnering with 
initiatives in weather index crop insurance? Or what do you see as the role for government in 
assisting the development and success of such products?  
6. Would the local government be willing to:  
1) Substitute the existing agricultural insurance program for weather index insurance  
2) Use weather index insurance as a complement to these programs  
3) Use the weather index insurance as the basis strategy for production risk management  
7. What resources or finances and policy support would the government be willing to provide for 
the implementation of weather index insurance? 
A. Provide a certain percentage of premiums as a subsidy, how about the general percentage? 
B. Provide fund for constructing and maintaining the agro-meteorology infrastructure and data 
system 
C. Undertake parts of research fees as start-up cost of this program 
D.  Develop enabling legal and regulatory environment for the implementation 
E. Educate farmers on role of insurance 
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Appendix 5: The Operation of Existing Policy-oriented Wheat Insurance 
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